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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis challenges the customary approach of studying the latent ethnic conflict 
in Latvia exclusively through the prism of post-Soviet studies, looking for the causes of 
societal disaccord in Latvia’s recent past as a Soviet Socialist Republic, when numerous 
traumas were induced on the eponymous nation, from the deportations of 1940 which 
robbed the nation of its intelligentsia, to Russification policies that threatened the very 
existence of the Latvian language and culture, and to mass labour immigration that 
radically changed the country’s demography and ethnic composition.  
 
While recognising that this approach has its own merits, this thesis focuses on 
another important factor contributing to the present ethnic discord, namely the historical 
development of the idea of the Latvian nation, especially vis-à-vis ethnic minorities, who 
have always been present in significant numbers on Latvian territory through the course of 
modern history. More often than not, the interwar period of Latvian independence and 
nation-building is discarded by political scientists as bearing purely symbolic meaning and 
having no real impact on the present. This thesis challenges this widespread assumption 
and argues that, on the contrary, both the genesis of the idea of the Latvian nation and its 
interwar experience of statehood are vital to understanding the present-day dynamics. 
 
 
My thesis encompasses the period of Latvian history from the mid-19th century, 
when Latvians’ national awakening began, to 1940, when the country lost its independence 
as a result of Soviet annexation. The aim of this thesis is three-fold: first, to challenge the 
widespread (and historically inaccurate) assumption prevalent in modern Latvia that the 
idea of the civic nation is something intrinsically alien and unsuitable, imposed on Latvia 
from above; secondly, to examine the long-forgotten original contributions made to the 
concept of civic nationalism, and to the whole universalist-particularist dilemma, by 
Latvian thinkers at the beginning of the 20th century, and to place them in the wider 
framework of European interwar history and nationalism studies; thirdly, to identify the 
key issues in majority-minority relations that contributed to the eventual deterioration of 
minority rights in Latvia prior to World War Two, and, to a certain extent, to the demise of 
parliamentarian democracy in 1934. These issues (divided into three principal clusters: 
citizenship, language, and education) are then compared to the remarkably similar 
challenges faced by Latvian society since 1991.  
 
 iii 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Abstract           ii 
List of Tables           iv               
List of Abbreviations                                                                                                                      v 
Notes                                                                                                                                                   vi 
Acknowledgements                                                                                                                         vii 
Author’s Declaration                                                                                                             viii 
                       
Introduction: Going Back to the Future      1 
 
Chapter 1: Theoretical Background: Liberalism, Democracy, and Nationalism 12 
1.1. The Civic vs. Ethnic Dichotomy and Its Contemporary Critics  13 
1.2. Non-territorial Cultural Autonomy      38 
1.3. Theories of Ethnic Bargaining      39 
1.4. Triadic Nexus, Quadratic Nexus, and the Fifth Element   40 
1.5. Communitarianism vs. Liberalism      43 
1.6. Beyond the Sovereign State      44 
 
Chapter 2: The Latvian Nation: Evolution of the Concept, 1850-1918  48 
2.1. The Idea of Latvian Autonomy and the National Question   54 
2.2. Three Latvian Nationalists       57 
2.2.1 M. Skujenieks, the Idealistic Nationalist    60 
2.2.2 M. Valters, the Practical Nationalist    75 
2.2.3 Skujenieks and Valters: Liberal vs. Communitarian Approaches 80  
2.2.4. E. Blanks, the Passionate Nationalist    82 
 2.3. P. Stu!ka and the National Question      86 
2.4. A Winning Concept? Conclusions      109 
 
Chapter 3: An Equal Among Nations, 1918-1934      112 
3.1.The National Council, 1918-1920      119 
3.2. The Constitutional Assembly, 1920-1922     130 
3.3. The Parliament, 1922-1934       149 
3.3.1. The First Saeima, 1922-1925     149 
3.3.2. The Second Saeima, 1925-1928     160 
3.3.3. The Third Saeima, 1928-1931     179 
3.3.4. The Fourth Saeima, 1931-1934     183 
              3.3.5. Atis "#ni$%, ‘The Minorities’ Oppressor’    196 
 
Chapter 4: The Citizenship Law of 1919 and Minority Bargaining    216 
 
Chapter 5: P. Schiemann, M. Laserson and Cultural Autonomy   272 
 5.1. Setting the Scene: Interwar Latvia according to Quadratic Nexus  274 
 5.2. The Fifth Element        279 
 
Chapter 6:  The ‘Latvian Latvia’, 1934-1940      308 
 
Chapter 7: A Nation Once Again        338 
  7.1. Citizenship        345 
  7.2. Cultural Autonomy       348 
  7.3. Language        352 
  7.4. Education        355 
  7.5. Social Integration       358 
 
Conclusions: A Virtue out of Necessity?       364 
Bibliography          369 
 iv 
List of Tables 
 
 
Table 1.  Changes in the percentage of citizens among ethnic groups in Latvia, 1920-1925.     263 
  
Table 2. Baltic German Representation in the interwar Latvian Saeima.          280 
Table 3. Jewish Representation in the interwar Latvian Saeima.           291 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
List of Abbreviations  
 
 
AFL-FFF/LNIM  All for Latvia – For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National 
Independence Movement  
 
BISS    Baltic Institute of Social Sciences 
 
EU   European Union 
 
FCNM   Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
 
FHRUL  For Human Rights in the United Latvia 
 
Interfront  The International Front of the Working People of Latvian Soviet Socialist 
Republic 
 
Iskolat  Ispolnitel’nii  komitet Soveta rabochih, soldatskih I bezzemel’nih 
deputatov Latvii;  the Executive Committee of Latvian Workers, Soldiers 
and Landless Peasants 
 
LNNK Latvijas Nacion!l!s Netkar"bas Kust"ba; Latvian National Independence 
Movement  
 
LNKBA Latvijas Nacion!lo Kult#ras Biedr"bu Asoci!cija; The Association of the 
National Cultural Societies of Latvia 
 
LSD   Latvian Social Democracy 
 
LSDSP  Latvijas Soci!demokr!tisk! Str!dnieku Partija; Latvian Social Democratic 
Workers’ Party  
 
LSSR   Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic 
 
LTF   Latvijas Tautas Fronte; The Popular Front of Latvia 
 
NCA      Non-territorial Cultural Autonomy 
 
NGO   Non-governmental Organisation 
 
NKVD Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennih Del; The People’s Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs 
 
OCMA   Office for Citizenship and Migration Affairs 
 
OSCE   Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
 
RSDRP Rossiiskaya Social-Demokraticheckaya Rabochaya Partiya; Russian 
Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party 
 
SIF    Social Integration Fund  
 
NEPC   Network of Education Policy Centres   
 
USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
 
 
 vi 
NOTES 
 
 
 
 
 
Names and Proper Names 
 
Due to the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the Baltic region, it proved very difficult to 
come up with a uniform transliteration of both personal and geographical names, and this 
inevitably led to some arbitrary decisions on my part. After careful consideration, I decided 
to use the original spelling of all personal names of ethnic Latvians; as for the ethnic 
minorities’ representatives, for those who were already known outside Latvia, I have used 
the most accepted spellings of their names (hence Laserson, Nurock, and Schiemann). I 
have taken the same approach with the names of political parties known outside Latvia 
(hence Agudat Israel and Zeire Zion). For the rest, I have followed the Latvian rendering 
of their names and surnames as per the Saeima’s records. Whenever multiple spellings of 
either personal or geographical names were present, I have done my best to indicate it 
either in brackets or footnotes.  
 
 
 
Translations 
 
All translations are by the author, unless indicated otherwise in the text.  
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Introduction: Back to the Future 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Progress in ideas, not in institutions. For the world gains by its failures. 
There is as much to learn from the experience of the nations that have 
failed, as from the discoveries of truth. 
         (Lord Acton) 
  
 
 
In 1940, the independent state of Latvia, along with its neighbours Estonia and 
Lithuania, disappeared from the map of Europe, having been annexed by the Soviet Union 
as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. It took Latvians fifty long years to resume their 
rightful place among other sovereign European nations. 
  
Since regaining national independence in 1991, Latvia has successfully recreated 
democratic state institutions, has effectively re-integrated into Western economic markets, 
and has largely curbed the widespread corruption of the early post-Soviet years. These 
achievements enabled Latvia’s accession first to NATO and then to the European Union in 
2004. The country’s poor performance during the economic downturn of 2008 has since 
been remedied by the austerity measures implemented relentlessly by the government, 
turning it into a benchmark case for other economically ailing European countries like 
Greece and Spain. But this overall success story has been marred by a persistent blemish of 
ethnic discord, in particular by the problem of Latvia’s non-citizens. 
  
The citizenship Law of 1994 granted automatic citizenship to the citizens of the 
interwar republic (1918-1940) and their descendants, thus creating over 700,000 non-
citizens – the majority of them non-ethnic Latvians (over sixty per cent of ethnic Russians 
failed to qualify for citizenship under the law). The Citizenship Law served two purposes: 
de jure, it signified the continuity of the Latvian interwar state; de facto, it separated those 
who had arrived in Latvia during the fifty years of Soviet rule (and whose loyalty towards 
an independent Latvian state was therefore questioned) from the body of citizens. These 
later arrivals were instead given the option of naturalising through history and language 
exams. Adding insult to injury, a complicated system of age-based quotas for 
naturalisation was introduced in order to control the number of applications, which was 
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initially predicted to be high. The quotas were lifted in 1998 after the actual demand for 
naturalisation turned out to be extremely low. 
  
Another justification usually given for the restrictive Citizenship Law is the 
‘endangered state of Latvianness’ – the proportion of ethnic Latvians fell from 75.5 per 
cent of the country’s population in 1935 to just 52 per cent in 1989, whereas the proportion 
of ethnic Russians tripled over the same period. Meanwhile, the Latvian language and 
culture were perceived to be under threat of extinction. 
  
The Citizenship law of 1994 is widely regarded as the primary source of ethnic 
tensions in post-Soviet Latvia (Smith et al. 1996; Lieven 1994; Pabriks and Purs 2002), 
and the ensuing naturalisation process has proved to be painfully slow. At the beginning of 
2012, the number of non-citizens still stood at 312,189, meaning that over fourteen per 
cent of the population were excluded from the country’s political life, unable to vote at 
either parliamentary or municipal elections.1 
  
The National Programme of Social Integration – commissioned by the government 
in 1998 in response to increasing international and domestic pressure, and officially 
adopted in 2000 – was eventually recognised as outdated and in need of revision: by 2006, 
it had become clear that no real progress was being made in uniting the ethnically divided 
society around common political values, prompting well-founded worries that a ‘two-
community state’ was emerging instead. The draft Guidelines for Social Integration 2008-
18, developed by the Secretariat of the Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration 
(which fell victim to the austerity programme mentioned earlier) in 2008, was widely 
criticised as ‘too multicultural’ and was ultimately discarded. Then a new National Identity 
and Social Integration Programme started being developed by the Ministry of Culture, 
which succeeded a string of other governmental institutions in the hosting of social 
integration matters. In March 2011, the ministry published a draft preamble to the future 
Programme, outlining its main goals and introducing new definitions – most importantly 
the definition of the ‘state nation’ (used by the authors to denominate the core ethnie), 
which, together with ethnic minorities, forms the ‘Latvian nation’ on the basis of a 
common ‘Latvian identity’ (i.e. Latvian language, Latvian culture and social memory). The 
preamble drew numerous criticisms from independent experts for being constructed upon 
outdated theoretical premises, and for placing ethno-cultural values above civic ones. After 
                                                
1 Data of the Office for Citizenship and Migration Affairs, http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/statistika/ (accessed 4th 
September 2012) 
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several months of controversy in Latvian printed and electronic media2, and consultations 
with experts and minority representatives, on 20th October 2011 the Cabinet of Ministers 
adopted the final version of the document as the Guidelines for National Identity, Civil 
Society and Integration Policy.3 Overall, and especially in comparison with the original 
Social Integration Programme, which posited that ‘the goal of integration is to form a 
democratic, consolidated civil society, founded on shared basic values’ and named an 
‘independent and democratic Latvian state’ as one of these fundamental values, the 
Guidelines may be interpreted as a swing towards ethnoculturalism and away from the 
earlier declared civic principles.4 
 
These recent discussions on the nature of nation and national identity notably 
brought the ethnic vs. civic theoretical division back into Latvian public discourse. The 
history of the concept of civic nation in post-independence Latvia is not an easy one. In the 
mid-90s, a group of social and political scientists attempted to initiate a public discussion 
on the future of the Latvian civic nation, but, according to the Latvian sociologist E. 
V!bers (2006:94), ‘The Latvian public was not ready for this idea, and perceived it with 
such negativity, with such intense inadequacy, that in order not to harm the naturalisation 
process, we stopped addressing this topic in the Latvian-language publications addressed 
to non-specialists.’5 The idea of the civic nation has not faded away completely, but it has 
since been removed to the margins of Latvian political thought. It would not be an 
exaggeration to say that the general public still perceives the idea of a civic, political 
nation as alien, foreign to Latvia; something which is being imposed from above, like 
numerous European Union directives which allegedly do not always take into account 
Latvia’s unique historical past and the unusual ethnic composition of its population. 
 
However, the ethnic vs. civic dilemma is by no means new to historical nationalist 
discourse in Latvia, where, as a result of a long history of foreign conquests and 
dominations, several ethnic groups have been living side by side for centuries, despite 
contemporary Latvian politicians making frequent claims to the contrary. If, during the 
                                                
2 See, for example, "jabs, I. 2011. ‘Neirotisk# integr#cija’ at http://politika.lv/article/neirotiska-integracija , 
and M$rniece, I. 2011. ‘P#r#k daudz latviskuma! Vai b$s pie%emami krieviem?’, Latvijas Av!ze, 13th May.   
3 ‘Nacion#l#s identit#tes, pilsonisk#s sabiedr&bas un integr#cijas politikas pamatnost#dnes (2012– 2018)’, 
http://www.km.gov.lv/lv/nozares_info/integracija.html  (accessed 06.09.2012). 
4 ‘National Programme The Integration of Society in Latvia’, 2001. R&ga: Naturalisation Board of the 
Republic of Latvia, pp. 7-8. 
5 V!bers, '. Sabiedr&bas integr#cijas procesa anal&ze un v!rt!jums, in: Apine, I. (ed.) (2006), Pretest!ba 
sabiedr!bas integr"cijai: c#lo$i un p"rvar#%anas iesp#jas (ethnicit"tes, valsts un pilsonisk"s sabiedr!bas 
mjiedarb!bas anal!ze. Riga:  Latvijas Universit#tes Filozofijas un sociolo(ijas instit$ts, LU a(ent$ra. 
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first five decades of its existence, the Latvian nationalist movement centred around the 
preservation of Latvian ethno-cultural heritage, the Russian Revolution of 1905 
transformed it into a state-oriented, independence-seeking movement. And although, until 
the February Revolution of 1917, a majority of Latvian nationalists would have been 
content with the goal of Latvia becoming a fully autonomous unit within a new democratic 
Russia, they nevertheless had to address the issue of the multiethnic nature of the Baltic 
territories as soon as their movement expanded beyond purely cultural demands.6 Hence at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, two competing concepts of the Latvian nation came 
into being simultaneously: a civic nation, which foresaw the equal democratic participation 
of all ethnic groups residing in Latvia, and an ethnic one, which put minorities at the 
margins of the new state. These two conflicting concepts influenced state legislation, 
permeated Latvian interwar politics, inspired parliamentary debates, and were widely 
reflected in the press right up to 1940, when the nation-building process was interrupted by 
the Soviet annexation. When Latvia regained independence in 1991, the civic vs. ethnic 
dilemma promptly resurfaced, remaining a highly contested topic to this day. 
 
There were two major ideological influences on the creation of a sovereign Latvian 
state in 1918. One was the famous ‘Fourteen Points’ speech by President Woodrow 
Wilson, with its proclaimed ‘mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial 
integrity to great and small nations alike’. The other was the theory of non-territorial 
cultural autonomy (NCA) developed by Austrian Marxists at the turn of the century, and 
which was embraced by Latvian Social Democrats, a main driving force behind the 
national revival, at a time when the peak of Latvian national aspirations was an 
autonomous Latvia within a democratic Russian state. When the kaleidoscopic changes in 
the international situation at the end of World War One granted Latvians an opportunity of 
becoming a sovereign nation instead of an autonomous republic, it seemed logical to 
extend the same principles which Latvians had deemed appropriate for themselves in the 
past towards their newly created national minorities.  
 
The newly created Latvian Republic was therefore a democratic state which 
guaranteed cultural rights to the ethnic minorities living on its territory; from the very start 
the founders of the state assured the minorities of their intention to build a united civic 
Latvian nation, where people of all ethnic backgrounds were welcome. This somewhat 
                                                
6 According to the census of 1897, Latvians comprised 68.2 per cent of the populations, Russians 12.2 per 
cent, Germans 7.1 per cent, Jews 6.2 per cent, Poles 3.3 per cent, Lithuanians 1.3 per cent and Estonians 0.9 
per cent (Skujenieeks 1913). 
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idealistic, ‘multicultural’ vision of the new statehood, however, was soon tested by various 
practical challenges. Some of these challenges were specific to the particular Latvian 
situation, while the others arose due to changes on the international scene. A cynical view 
would be that the more secure Latvians felt as a sovereign nation (after, for example, the 
recognition of the state de jure in 1921, and membership of the League of Nations 
achieved during the same year), the less need they felt to court their minorities. And 
although these considerations, without any doubt, contributed to the change in attitude on 
the part of certain Latvian politicians, to ignore other contributing factors, such as the lack 
of pre-existing state institutions and any experience of practical implementation of 
participatory democracy, as well as the absence of democratic traditions, and the overall 
dire economic conditions, would be an enormous oversimplification of the matter. Specific 
reasons notwithstanding, the ‘honeymoon’ between the Latvian majority and its ethnic 
minorities (the three biggest being the Russians, the Jews and the Baltic Germans) lasted 
for months rather than for years. After that, disagreements slowly started to pile up.  
 
Minority activism in interwar Latvia revolved around two axes, namely the 
citizenship question and the issue of cultural autonomy. The Citizenship Law of 1919, 
which excluded part of Latvian residents, mainly of Jewish ethnicity, from entitlement to 
Latvian citizenship, became the most debated issue of Latvian interwar politics and served 
as a litmus test for governments and individual politicians. Cultural autonomy for ethnic 
minorities was never legally and formally institutionalised in Latvia, unlike in 
neighbouring Estonia and Lithuania, although the Education laws of 1919 together ensured 
minorities’ control over their own educational and cultural matters in practice. Minorities’ 
later attempts at passing proper cultural autonomy laws, however, were unsuccessful. The 
citizenship issue and cultural autonomy belonged to two different spheres of interest – 
whereas the former belonged to the area of equal rights among all residents, the latter was 
concerned with the recognition of the right to cultural particularity specific to each ethnic 
minority. As we shall see, Latvian minorities chose the citizenship issue as the prime 
object of their aspirations and political struggle. 
 
The aim of this thesis is three-fold: first, to challenge the widespread (and 
historically inaccurate) assumption prevalent in modern Latvia that the idea of the civic 
nation is something intrinsically alien and unsuitable, imposed on Latvia from above. In 
order to do this, I have undertaken a very detailed ‘forensic’ examination of the available 
historical sources (primary and secondary) pertaining to the interwar republic. My second 
aim has been to examine the long-forgotten original contributions made to the concept of 
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civic nationalism, and to the whole universalist-particularist dilemma, by Latvian thinkers 
at the beginning of the 20th century, and to place them in the wider framework of European 
interwar history and nationalism studies. Nowadays, Latvia is largely viewed as a case 
study for political theorists rather than as an active contributor to the debates. The highly 
original contributions made to international political theory by Schiemann and Laserson 
demonstrate that this was not always the case. Thirdly, I aim to identify the key issues in 
majority-minority relations that contributed to the eventual deterioration of minority rights 
in Latvia prior to WW2, and, to a certain extent, to the demise of parliamentarian 
democracy in 1934. These issues (divided into three principal clusters: citizenship, 
language, and education) are then compared to the remarkably similar challenges faced by 
Latvian society since 1991.  
 
In brief, the main goal of my thesis, quoting Lord Acton (1988: 643), is ‘to exhibit 
the course of ideas and the course of events in their parallel progress and their action on 
each other’ in order to contribute to a better understanding of the nation-building in Latvia 
in the past and at present. 
 
My main hypothesis was that, historically, the multiethnic nature of the population 
of the Latvian territories had a crucial impact on the formation of Latvian nationalism; in 
its own turn, the advent of nationalism profoundly changed interethnic relations in Latvia. I 
believe that these changes took place long before Latvia’s annexation by the Soviet Union 
in 1940. However, I do not advocate the ‘ice box’ theory, i.e. that old ethnic hatreds were 
‘frozen’ during Soviet totalitarian rule only to spring back to life after that rule ended. It 
seems to me beyond any doubt that Soviet rule aggravated some pre-existing ethnic 
tensions as well as bringing along new ones. Nevertheless, Soviet ethnic policies in Latvia 
are the subject of a separate enquiry, and it would be way too ambitious to try to extend 
this thesis to cover this period of Latvian history (besides, Soviet ‘ethnic engineering’ 
policies have been already repeatedly addressed by other authors (Karklins, 1994; Lieven, 
1994; Plakans, 1995; Smith, G., 1996; Pabriks and Purs, 2002; Eglitis, 2002)).  
 
In short, my thesis is based upon the firm belief that in order to assess the 
challenges in the area of minority-majority relations presently faced by Latvia, one must 
enquire further back in history, with the aim of examining early developments in the 
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relationship between the emerging Latvian nationalism and Latvian ethnic minorities – an 
aspect which has been previously addressed by scholars only in passing.7 
 
In Latvia, the current widespread opinion – a maxim, even – is that residents of the 
interwar republic and their descendants are by default ardent supporters of the Latvian 
national idea and state independence, in contrast to Soviet-time settlers who, allegedly, 
cannot even start to comprehend its advantages. Not only is this an oversimplification of 
the whole concept of loyalty to one’s country, this argument is also used for classifying 
ethnic minorities as ‘good’, ‘traditional’ minorities (like Jews and Poles) and ‘alien’, ‘non-
traditional’ minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars). I will argue that such a divisive 
policy towards different ethnic minorities does not really have a basis in Latvian history 
(the Russian community, for example, has also been present in Latvia for centuries, 
although just as in the case with the Jewish community, its composition changed during the 
Soviet occupation), and that it fosters ethnic discord instead of societal integration. I 
believe that by examining, in detail, the genesis of the Latvian national idea on the one 
hand, and the history of ethnic politics in Latvia on the other, my thesis – challenging a 
number of existing stereotypes and faulty historical perceptions in the process – helps to 
fill in an existing gap in Latvian history.  
 
 Chapter One sets the main theoretical framework of the study, i.e., the ethnic vs. 
civic dichotomy of nationalism, examines its origins, summarises current debates on the 
applicability of the dichotomy as an analytical tool, provides a response to common 
criticisms of the dichotomy, and explains why the dichotomy was chosen as the main 
analytical framework for this study. The chapter also outlines four additional theoretical 
approaches, which are closely related to the civic-ethnic distinction, namely the theory of 
minority bargaining, the quadratic nexus theory (which I extend to include a fifth – original 
– dimension), the liberal vs. communitarian distinction, and post-sovereign theory – and 
justifies their respective application in Latvia’s case. 
 
Chapter Two traces the early development of the concept of the Latvian nation 
from the mid-19th century to 1918, and describes the historical background and 
preconditions for the emergence of Latvian nationalism. The four sub-chapters examine 
the theoretical legacy to the national question of four Latvian thinkers, namely M. 
Skujenieks, M. Valters, E. Blanks, and P. Stu!ka. The concluding part of the chapter 
                                                
7 Two notable exceptions to this rule are Nacion!lais jaut!jums Latvijj! 1850-1940 by L. Dribins (1997), and 
From Nationalism to Ethnic Policy: the Latvian Nation in the Present and the Past by A. Pabriks (1999). 
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makes a comparison between the contributions made by these four thinkers representing 
different sides of the political spectrum, to the national idea in general, and to the concept 
of a civic nation in particular; there is also an assessment of the impact of their theoretical 
legacy in present-day Latvia. 
  
Chapter Three, which is organised chronologically, describes the nation-building 
process and the changes in the relationship between the Latvian majority and ethnic 
minorities during the democratic Latvian Republic (1918-1934) through a detailed 
examination of legislative documents, parliamentary debates, newspapers, archive 
materials, and personal memoirs. The chapter also contains a small case study about A. 
!"ni#$ (who, as a former education minister, became known in Latvian historiography as 
the ‘minorities’ oppressor’), which challenges some of the prevailing assumptions about 
his attempted reforms by revealing other factors at work.  
 
Chapter Four, after providing the necessary historical and legal background in the 
introductory part, closely follows the political debates surrounding ‘the chronic issue of 
Latvian interwar politics’, the Citizenship Law of 1919. The citizenship issue is crucial to 
understanding the dynamics of majority-minority relations in the interwar years; what 
makes it even more important is the fact that, since 1991, citizenship has yet again become 
the most divisive issue in Latvian politics. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to a 
scrupulous analysis of the citizenship issue in interwar Latvia within the theoretical 
framework of the theory of minority bargaining. 
  
Chapter Five follows the fate of minorities’ cultural autonomy in interwar Latvia 
and stakes a theoretical claim by adding an additional, ‘fifth element’, to the existing 
theory of the ‘quadratic nexus’. This so-called fifth element, the complicated interplay 
between different national minorities sharing the same homeland along with the core 
nation, is explored through a case study dedicated to the unlikely alliance formed by the 
Baltic German and Jewish communities, represented by P. Schiemann and M. Laserson 
respectively, in interwar Latvia. The disagreements between these two minority activists 
on both theoretical and practical issues not only shed an interesting light on the dynamics 
of intergroup minority relations in interwar Latvia, but also have deep resonance with the 
modern debates on minority rights. In addition, Chapter Five examines their original 
theoretical contribution to the theory of minority rights, cultural autonomy, and to what 
nowadays is defined as post-sovereign, or postnationalist, studies.  
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The introduction to Chapter Six questions the highly ambiguous (despite the largely 
critical treatment that it has received at the hands of historians) public perception of K. 
Ulmanis and his dictatorial rule in present-day Latvia, and scrutinises the possible causes 
of this – until now – essentially ‘unanalysed nostalgia’. The rest of the chapter, organised 
chronologically, examines the six years of the authoritarian rule of K. Ulmanis, the 
changes it brought along in all main sectors of public life, and assesses the impact it left on 
the nation-building process and majority-minority relations in Latvia. 
 
Chapter Seven, after providing a brief description of the historical events that led to 
Latvia regaining its independence in 1991, examines the nation-building process over the 
past twenty years by dividing it into the clusters of citizenship, cultural autonomy, 
language policies, education, and social integration,  
 
The Conclusions summarise the findings of the previous chapters, draw some 
parallels between the two periods of Latvian independence, and suggest which lessons 
from the past may be applicable to today’s situation. 
 
In terms of methodology, my thesis belongs to the field of interdisciplinary studies, 
and is, above all, an amalgam of history and political theory. Although I have ultimately 
kept the original title of the thesis, ‘The history of the Idea of Latvians as a Civic Nation’, 
during the process of my research I came to realise that the resulting product does not 
exactly fall under the remit of intellectual history (in all its existing definitions, from 
Lovejoy to Skinner and his critics). Therefore, by combining traditional historical 
investigation of primary and secondary sources with the application of political theory 
concepts (which includes both the use of historically dated concepts in their respective 
historical setting, and, in some cases, the placing of these supposedly dated concepts 
within a framework of modern political theory), I have rather aimed at creating a kind of 
‘structural history’, described by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1992: 91) as 
history that ‘finds in each successive state of the structure under examination both the 
product of previous struggles to maintain or to transform this structure and the principle – 
via the contradictions, the tensions and the relations of force which constitute it – of 
subsequent transformation.’   
 
For the purpose of my research, I have used a variety of primary and secondary 
sources available in the Latvian, Russian, English, and German languages. The primary 
sources used included: transcripts of the sessions of the National Council, the 
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Constitutional Assembly, and all four of the Latvian interwar parliaments; as well as 
governmental documents, speeches, party programmes and legal acts; a variety of 
newspapers and other periodicals; and, finally, collections of personal documents and 
NKVD files from the Latvian State Archive and the Latvian State Historical Archives and 
a number of personal interviews. 
 
I have extensively drawn on secondary sources in Latvian history available in the 
Latvian language (some – also in Russian). These include, but are not limited to, the 
memoirs published by members of the Latvian émigré community, such as M.Valters 
(1969), F. Ciel!ns (1961, 1963,1964) V. Bastj"nis (1964, 1966, 1970), and others; works 
on the history of Latvia by the émigré Latvian historians #. $ilde (1964, 1976, 1982, 1985, 
1988), E. Dunsdorfs (1975, 1978, 1982), U. %!rmanis (1968, 1992, 1993), A. $v"be (1948, 
1962), A. Spekke (1951, 1965, 1995, 2003), and E. Andersons (1982, 1984). I am heavily 
indebted to contemporary Latvian historians, such as L. Dribins (1997, 2000, 2002, 2005, 
2008, 2009), A. Stranga (1998, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008|), I. Ronis (1978, 1994), I. 
Apine (1974, 1992, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008), I. Butulis (2005), I. Feldmanis (1993, 
20000), R. Cer&zis (2004), J. Goldmanis (1994, 2005), U. Kr!sli'( (2005), V. Volkovs 
(1996, 1998, 2005, 2007), T. Feigmane (2000, 2002), ). J!kabsons (2006), V. $*erbinskis 
(2006), and others. 
 
As for secondary sources in Latvian history and politics available in the English 
language, I am heavily indebted to the Latvian-American historians A. Plakans (1966, 
1974, 1995, 2007, 2011) and A. Ezergailis (1974, 1983, 1999). The book The Jews in 
Latvia, under the editorship of M. Bobe, which was published in Tel Aviv in 1971 by the 
Association of Latvian and Estonian Jews in Israel, was an irreplaceable source of 
information on the interwar Jewish community. The work of the British historian John 
Hiden (1987, 1992, 1994, 2004, 2012) on Latvia’s interwar history, and the history of its 
Baltic German community was indispensable for my thesis. David J. Smith’s (2002-I, 
2002-II, 2005, 2012) work in both Baltic history and in political theory was both a source 
of inspiration, and a frame of reference. My analysis of the ideological trends within the 
Latvian Marxist movement and my subchapter on the leader of the Latvian Bolsheviks, P. 
Stu*ka, was largely inspired by G. Swain (1999, 2010). The early writings of the Latvian 
political scientist A. Pabriks (1994, 1997, 1999) on Latvian nationalism, minority rights 
and the impact of communitarian and liberal values on the nation-building process were 
instrumental in determining directions for my own research; I have also borrowed from his 
later work (Pabriks 2001-I, 2001-II, 2003).  
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I also owe a huge intellectual debt to many contemporary historians and political 
scientists, Latvian and not, such as G. Smith (1996), A. Lieven (1994), I. Za!e (2005, 
2008), I. "jabs (2008, 2009), I. Silova (2001, 2002), N. Mui#nieks (1993), A. Purs (2002), 
R. Taagepera (1973), V. Pettai (2007), M. Jubulis (2001, 2008), and many others. 
 
To place interwar Latvia within a wider European context, I have drawn on the 
works of E.H. Carr (1962), C.A. Macartney (1929, 1934, 1972), A. Cobban (1945, 1969), 
A. Sturmthal (1944), O.I. Janowsky (1945), I. Kosinski (1970, 1974), D.H. Aldcroft 
(2006), G. Alderman (1993), M. Kitchen (1998), M. Mazower (1998), R.J. Overy (2007), 
E. Mendelsohn (1983), and others.  
 
In order to place different strains of Latvian political thought in a wider ideological 
context, I have extensively consulted the works of K. Renner (2005) and O. Bauer (2000), 
H. Krabbe (1922), R. Luxemburg (2012), L. Kolakowski (2005), A. Przeworski and J. 
Sprague (1986), and others. 
 
In the political theory part of my thesis, I have used a great variety of sources that 
are described, in detail, in Chapter One. I have also referred to my sources throughout the 
chapters, where appropriate, and in all quoted matter. The rest of the thesis contains my 
original work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                  Chapter 1: Theoretical Background. Liberalism, Democracy, and Nationalism 
 12 
 
Chapter One: Theoretical Background. Liberalism, Democracy, and 
Nationalism 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Liberal democracy and nationalism are the two major forces that have shaped the 
Western world for the past three centuries. The relationship between these two forces, 
however, is often strained and conflicted. If nationalist and nationalising movements at 
their early stages are often seen as liberal and liberating, then upon achieving their ultimate 
goal, a sovereign nation-state, they promptly come into contradiction with the ideals of 
liberalism, democracy and the principles of equality and justice associated with it.  
 
The sovereign nation-state derives its legitimacy from the national community 
whose interests it represents; in return, the nation-state assures that the interests and 
welfare of the nation supersede all other interests and claims. By doing so, the state already 
comes into contradiction with the ideal of individual liberty that is central to the doctrine of 
liberalism. The second major tension, created by the convergence of the terms ‘nation’ and 
‘state’, lies in the fact that the nation-state can only be considered truly legitimate if it 
represents the interests and the will of its entire population, thus presupposing a uniformity 
of interests and will that can only possibly exist within an ethnically, culturally and 
religiously homogeneous population. Such uniformity of interests and opinions is by itself 
not compatible with the liberal principles of individualism and autonomy. Moreover, in a 
world where the majority of nation-states are, to varying degrees, ethnically, culturally and 
religiously diverse, the application of the nation-state model as a homogeneous national 
community that is the sole bearer of sovereignty within a designated territory has resulted 
in what remains the biggest problem facing the nation-state – the problem of national 
minorities. Minorities, as political outsiders, ‘challenge the prevailing principle of 
legitimacy’ (Jackson Preece 2005: vii), and threaten uniformity by their refusal to comply. 
The so-called ‘minority question’ represents the greatest obstacle in the way of reconciling 
the nation-state with the values of liberal democracy. As such, it has occupied the minds of 
political scientists, philosophers and historians for a long time. 
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1.1. The Civic vs. Ethnic Dichotomy and Its Contemporary Critics 
 
The earliest response to the inherent contradiction between nationalism and liberal 
democratic ideals came in the form of the civic vs. ethnic (also known as the Western vs. 
Eastern, political vs. cultural, liberal vs. organic, territory-based vs. descent-based, 
voluntarist vs. particularist) dichotomy of nationalism. This analytical distinction, which 
reaches far back into the history of political thought – perhaps as far as nationalism itself –
remains one of the most contested subjects in the field of contemporary nationalism 
studies.  
 
 Although there is no general agreement on the exact date of birth of nationalism, it 
is safe to say that the majority of scholars date it back to the age of Romanticism. Among 
the Romanticists, Rousseau is traditionally recognised as the father of political nationalism, 
and Herder – of the cultural variety. Although both thinkers put a special emphasis on the 
historical past of the people, Rousseau was more interested in its influence upon future 
political transformations, whereas Herder was more preoccupied with the cultural 
implications of the past. Rousseau, in Considerations on Representative Government, 
envisions a national state (as opposed to a monarchical state) which is bound together by a 
common will and dedication to common political ideas, and which bestows equal rights 
and obligations upon its citizens. Herder, on the other hand, attaches little, if any, 
importance to political ideas or to the will of the general public, concentrating on the 
concept of Volk, comparing it to a nuclear family, and regarding the national state as a 
natural product of growth.1 
   
Later liberal thinkers of the 19th century, starting to suspect an inherent 
contradiction between nationalism and liberal theory, made the first attempts at reconciling 
the two by juxtaposing the old and the new, the retrograde and the progressive strains of 
nationalism. Lord Acton in Nationality distinguishes between the nations of the ancient 
world, ‘the progeny of a common ancestor’, ‘a result of merely physical and material 
                                                
1 F.M. Barnard in ‘Herder on Nationality, Humanity, and History’ (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003) 
casts a shadow of doubt over the appropriateness of the distinction between the political nationalism of 
Rousseau and the cultural nationalism of Herder, on the premise that detailed analysis of their writings 
renders more similarities in their views than first meets the eye. Be that as it may, one cannot avoid the fact 
that this traditional, if faulty, perception has greatly influenced most of the subsequent interpretations of the 
works of the two philosophers.  
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causes’ and the new conception of nationality under Christianity, ‘a moral and political 
being’ (Acton 1985: 426-427). To Acton, a passionate Liberal and an advocate of 
diversity, modern nationality is derived from the state, not vice versa, which would be 
‘contrary to the nature of modern civilisation’, as ‘our connection with the race is merely 
natural or physical, whilst our duties to the political nation are ethical’ (Acton 1985: 427).  
 
Mill, in Considerations on Representative Government, posits that although the 
feeling of nationality is generated by different causes, such as race, descent, language and 
religion, ‘the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents’, such as national history 
and common recollections (Mill 1958: 229). Like Acton, Mill believed that ethnic and 
cultural diversity resulting in ‘nationalities admixture’ was of great benefit to humanity. He 
was of the firm opinion that to make a distinction between what is due to a fellow 
countryman, as opposed to what is due to a fellow human being, is more worthy of savages 
than of a civilised society. Mill was, however, concerned about the possible diversity of 
interests becoming a hindrance to the functioning of a representative government. Having 
famously declared that ‘free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of 
different nationalities’ (Mill 1958: 230), and that for those institutions to prosper, the 
boundaries of governments should largely correspond to those of nationalities, he 
nevertheless concludes that due to ‘geographical hindrances’ many nations in Europe have 
no other course left open to them but ‘to make virtue out of necessity and reconcile 
themselves to living together under equal rights and laws’ (Mill 1958: 233). 
 
Meinecke draws a distinction between the two types of modern nation: the cultural 
one (Kulturnation), and the state, political nation (Staatsnation). He identifies the Swiss as 
a genuine political nation and the German nation as a cultural one. He also points out that 
the two ‘can shade into each other in historical reality’: a cultural nation can be also a 
political nation (France and England), members of different cultural nations can comprise a 
single political nation (Switzerland), and several political nations can grow out of a 
cultural nation (Germany). Meinecke observes that it is difficult to distinguish between 
cultural and political nations in practice, as it is often not possible to determine which ties 
– political, religious, or cultural – are more important in bonding a nation together. He also 
provides a definition of the political nation: ‘a population with a lively feeling of political 
community’ (Meinecke 1970: 11-18). 
 
But it was not until the second half of the 20th century and the aftermath of World 
War Two, which demonstrated the horrifying extremes of unbridled nationalism, that the 
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cultural-political nationalism dichotomy started to be applied as a symbolic divider 
between the West and the East. Whereas Acton, Mill and Meinecke spoke about cultural 
and political varieties of European nationalism either as of evolutionary phases or as of 
ideal types, Hans Kohn in his seminal work The Idea of Nationalism, first published in 
1944, drew an imaginary vertical line through the map of the world. According to Kohn, 
the two main varieties of nationalism, Western and Eastern, or ‘old’ and ‘new’, developed 
differently in the course of history and are based upon different ideological premises. 
While Western nationalism (that of Western Europe, the United States, and the British 
dominions) was based on political reality, was closely linked with the 18th century’s ideas 
of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism, and was more concerned about ‘the 
struggles of the present without too much sentimental regard for the past’, Eastern 
nationalism (including Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Asia), on the contrary, was 
rooted in the past, detached from the present political reality and arose out of an inferiority 
complex, out of protest against, and in conflict with the existing state. Kohn explains these 
two separate developments by the difference in the impact of the political ideas of the 
Renaissance and the Reformation: in the West, where they put down deep roots; in 
Germany, where they had only a limited influence; and further East, including Russia, 
where, according to Kohn, these ideas did not reach at all. Therefore, because of 
underdeveloped political and social structures, nationalism in the East was destined to 
express itself primarily in cultural terms, thus further deepening the long-existing cleavage 
between the West and the East. The differences between the cultural and political varieties 
of nationalism, in Kohn’s interpretation, become a dichotomy proper: what one possesses, 
the other one lacks:  
 
These two concepts of nationalism are the poles around which the new age with its 
innumerable shadings and transitions will revolve: from them it draws the pathos and the promises 
which move the hearts of men and masses as did in preceding ages the expectations of heavenly 
bliss and of redemption.  
(Kohn 2005: 574) 
 
Kohn also attaches strong normative tags to Western and Eastern nationalisms, 
continuously characterising the former as progressive and liberal, and the latter as 
backward and oppressive.  
 
The Western-Eastern dichotomy was further explored by John Plamenatz in his 
Two Types of Nationalism (1976). His interpretation of the differences between the 
                                                                                  Chapter 1: Theoretical Background. Liberalism, Democracy, and Nationalism 
 16 
Western and Eastern types of nationalism runs along similar lines to Kohn’s: whereas the 
former is the nationalism of peoples ‘culturally equipped’ for modern challenges, the latter 
is ‘the nationalism of peoples recently drawn into civilisation hitherto alien to them’, of 
people ‘who come to be called ‘backward’’, and whose nationalism is both competitive 
and imitative. But if for Kohn, Western nationalism simply equals political (liberal) 
nationalism and Eastern equals the cultural (illiberal) one, Plamenatz, who largely 
subscribes to the Western/liberal and Eastern/illiberal division, views cultural and political 
varieties of nationalism as developmental stages rather than as a fixed typology. To 
Plamenatz, nationalism is primarily a cultural phenomenon that can also often take 
political forms. As he sees it, France and England represented examples of cultural 
nationalism transformed into the political variety when they were, or at least seemed to be, 
‘the pre-eminently progressive people’; thus their nationalism became liberal. The cultural 
nationalism of Italy and Germany in the 19th century turned into the illiberal political 
nationalism of the 20th century, but this happened largely because they were ‘defeated in 
war’ or ‘disappointed in victory’. As for Eastern nationalism, which he defines as ‘not 
invariably but often’ illiberal, and which for Plamenatz encompasses the Slavic peoples of 
Eastern Europe, as well as the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the main accent 
is placed on their unpreparedness for the great ideas of modernity and on the authoritarian 
nature of this kind of nationalism. It is unclear from the Plamenatz’s account, though, how 
cultural and political elements co-exist in Eastern nationalism, and overall this part of his 
account is not as thorough as the one on Western nationalism. Plamenatz’s typology was 
critically reviewed by Gellner (1983), who raised many valid points, one of them being 
Plamenatz’s somewhat blurred account of how benign Western nationalism turned into its 
‘most un-benign’ form in the 20th century. He also stated that  ‘there can be no doubt but 
that he [Plamenatz] saw Western nationalism as relatively benign and nice, and the Eastern 
kind as nasty, and doomed to nastiness by the conditions which gave rise to it’ (Gellner 
1983: 99). It seems to me that in this particular instance ‘The Sad Montenigrin from 
Oxford’ is not guilty as charged. On the contrary, despite his obvious personal distaste for 
Eastern nationalism, Plamenatz ends his essay with an admirable (sixteen years prior to the 
fall of the Berlin Wall) foresight that although illiberal, this kind of nationalism has a 
liberating streak, and that it is ‘a part of social, intellectual and moral revolution of which 
the aspirations to democracy and personal freedom are also products’ (Plamenatz 1976: 
35-36). Another interesting and rather unexpected point made by Plamenatz, and 
somewhat overlooked by Gellner, is his claim that there is no ‘logical repugnance between 
nationalism and liberalism’ (Plamenatz 1976: 27). Further on, he posits that there is 
nothing illiberal about cultural nationalism as such because ‘diversity is desirable as much 
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within the nation as between nations if the life of the individual is to be enriched’ 
(Plamenatz 1976: 28). This seems to be a rather radical point of departure from the 
traditional interpretation of the tendency of political nationalism to be ‘liberal’ and of that 
of cultural nationalism to be ‘illiberal’. Later on, similar arguments will be employed by 
the adherents of the concept of liberal nationalism.  
 
Ernest Gellner (1998), for whom nationalism was primarily a political principle, 
constructed his own typology of nationalism, introducing four ‘time zones’ stretching from 
the European Atlantic coast to the East, and basing it upon differences ‘in terms of 
marriage between state and culture’. Zone 1 includes societies spread along the Atlantic 
coast, which had both culture and state present long before the arrival of the Age of 
Nationalism, and which were therefore ready for the peaceful transformation to benign 
liberal nationalism. Zone 2 encompasses the territory of the former Roman Empire, where 
culture was present for a long time, but there was no state in place. According to Gellner, 
two outcomes are possible under these circumstances – benign and liberal nationalism, or 
nationalism going ‘nasty’. Eastern Europe is divided into Zones 3 and 4; the latter includes 
countries that were under Communist rule for decades. Eastern Europe, where neither 
national culture nor national state were available at the dawn of the nationalism era is, 
according to Gellner, predestined for horror. Eastern European peoples do not really have a 
choice: either they abandon the nationalist project, or ethnic cleansing will be unleashed. I 
do not see any substantial difference between Gellner’s typology and the Western/Eastern 
dichotomy elaborated by Plamenatz, apart from Gellner’s more detailed account of the 
development of Eastern European nationalism. Certainly, Gellner also introduces Zone 2 as 
a subdivision of Western nationalism – but so, to perhaps a less detailed extent, does 
Plamenatz when distinguishing between the nationalisms of France and England and those 
of Germany and Italy. Both Plamenatz and Gellner identify the prevalence of the cultural 
over the political component in this area of the West, and stress the deficiencies in both 
cultural and political structures in the East.  
 
Eric Hobsbawm in Nations and Nationalism since 1870 (1990) speaks of the 
‘developed’ world of the 19th century and the ‘dependent’ world of the first half of the 
twentieth century, where the transition to the national state was ‘plainly a central fact of 
historical transformation’ in the case of the former, and a product of the movement for 
national liberation and independence as a part of overall political emancipation in the case 
of the latter (which also had a largely imitative character). This division by and large 
corresponds to the Western/Eastern dichotomies developed by Kohn and Plamenatz. 
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Liah Greenfeld identifies two branches of nationalism in her seminal Nationalism. 
Five Roads to Modernity (1992), namely individualistic-libertarian and collectivistic-
authoritarian. The difference between them depends on the interpretation of the concept of 
popular sovereignty, which Greenfeld characterises as a ‘relationship between nationalism 
and democracy’. In addition, she distinguishes two types of nationalism according to the 
criteria of ‘membership in a national collectivity’, which may be ‘civic’, (identical to 
citizenship, open, voluntaristic and can be acquired); or ‘ethnic’, where it ‘has nothing to 
do with an individual will, but constitutes a genetic characteristic’ (Greenfeld 1992: 11). 
Greenfeld observes that individualistic nationalism cannot be ethnic, but civic nationalism 
can be collectivistic. She also draws attention to the fact that these categories should only 
be used for describing certain characteristic tendencies within specific nationalisms, and 
treated as models, as they can never be fully realised. ‘In reality, obviously’ -- writes 
Greenfeld – ‘the most common type is a mixed one’. (Greenfeld 1992: 11-12) 
 
Anthony Smith (1993) largely supports Kohn’s original dichotomy and bases his 
own, more detailed, typology upon it. He contends that Kohn’s dichotomy remains ‘valid 
and useful’, but stresses the necessity of applying ‘geopolitical labels’ with caution, as both 
varieties of nationalism can be encountered both in the West and in the East, as well as 
within the separate national movements. Further on, Smith argues that although this 
traditional division captures the ‘basic logic of many nationalisms’, it overlooks a number 
of sub-varieties of nationalism; he proposes his own typology based upon the distinction 
between ethnic and territorial (Smith prefers the latter term to ‘political nationalism’) 
nationalisms. This typology divides territorial nationalisms into pre-independence, or anti-
colonial, and post-independence, or integration, nationalisms; whereas ethnic nationalisms 
are divided into pre-independence (secession and diaspora) nationalisms and post-
independence (irredentist and ‘pan’) nationalisms. According to Smith, this typology, 
without being exhaustive, allows us ‘to compare nationalisms within each category, and to 
place nationalisms in broad comparable contexts, while allowing the possibility of more 
general explanations’ (Smith 1993: 83). In Nationalism and Modernism (1998), Smith 
elaborates further on the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms, and introduces 
a third type, the ‘plural’ nationalism of immigrant societies like Australia and Canada. 
Describing the modern debates about the civic vs. ethnic character of nationalism, Smith 
emphasises that although few modern states possess just one kind of nationalism, ‘we can 
usefully distinguish between ‘ethnic’, ‘civic’ and ‘plural’ types of nations and 
nationalism’, and that these analytical distinctions can be successfully applied in practice, 
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helping to explain, for example, differences in the immigration policies of different states. 
On the other hand, Smith recognises that the two types often overlap, and that the 
combination of the two may be changing over time. As a warning against assigning 
normative connotations, Smith stresses that all three types have ‘peculiar problems’, i.e. 
ethnic-genealogical nationalism may be exclusive; civic-territorial nationalism is often 
‘impatient’ of ethnic differences; ‘plural’ nationalisms with an emphasis on diversity can 
contribute to the loss of national cohesion and instability, etc. Smith also reflects upon the 
pariah status of ethnic nationalism (which remains the most popular and widely-adopted 
version of nationalism in real life) among philosophers and political scientists, leaving this 
‘most vexed and explosive’ part of the subject unanalysed and unaddressed.  
 
In ‘The Ethnic Origins of Nations’ (1988), Smith introduces a ‘state-to-nation’ and 
‘nation-to-state’ distinction, describing the different paths that nations in the West and the 
East respectively took in their development due to varying political, economic and cultural 
conditions. This distinction largely overlaps with the Western/Eastern dichotomy. 
However, for Smith ethnic and territorial are not fixed categories, since nations, according 
to him, constantly re-negotiate their bases in response to changing historical circumstances. 
Smith posits that it is inevitable for a modern nation to incorporate ‘ethnic and territorial 
components in varying proportions at particular moments of their history’ (Smith 1988: 
149). 
 
Ethnic nationalism may have become a pariah among intellectuals, as observed by 
Smith, but such is not the fate of cultural nationalism.2 Hutchinson (1994) identifies two 
different types of nationalism, cultural and political, which ‘must not be conflated, for they 
articulate different, even competing notions of the nation, form their own distinctive 
organizations, and have sharply diverging political strategies’ (Hutchinson 1994: 122). 
Political nationalists, inspired by Enlightenment ideals, value reason above all and seek to 
secure a modern representative state, whilst for cultural nationalists nations are organic 
beings rather than political entities. It is important to note, though, that for Hutchinson the 
two nationalisms are like two sides of the same coin, as they ‘emerged side by side’ and 
are often combined, supporting each other:  
 
                                                
2 It is extremely difficult to avoid a confusion of terms here, because in nationalism studies ‘ethnic’ and ‘cultural’ are sometimes used as 
synonyms, and sometimes as two separate terms. Without getting into a terminological dispute, suffice to say that whenever one looks 
more closely at a national culture, including those of ‘civic’, ‘political’ nations, certain ethnic elements can always be discovered, and it 
is more often than not a culture of a particular ethnic group, usually a dominant one, or which used to be dominant, which has propelled 
itself to a more ‘universal’ level. In other words, ‘ethnic’ and ‘cultural’ are essentially synonyms when attached to ‘nationalism’, the 
main difference between them being that the term ‘cultural’, unlike ‘ethnic’, has no stigma attached to it.      
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Political nationalists asserted a cultural distinctiveness to mobilise their constituencies and 
justify their claims to political independence, and cultural nationalists, to defend the national ethos 
and institutions, required the support of a state. 
         (Hutchinson 2005: 46)  
 
Moreover, cultural nationalists provide an ‘essential moral basis for the projects of 
political nationalists’ (Hutchinson 2005: 46). Both Smith and Hutchinson, who address 
nationalism from an ethno-symbolist perspective, see political and cultural (territorial and 
ethnic for Smith, respectively) nationalisms not as radically different stages of historical 
transformation but rather as two different strains of nationalist thought or varieties of 
nationalist politics, which are often present, in proportions that vary over time, within the 
same society. 
 
One of the latest adherents of Kohn’s dichotomy, Michael Ignatieff, gives a rather 
straightforward account of the dual nature of nationalist movements in the introduction to 
his Blood and Belonging (1994). For Ignatieff, there are just two types of nationalism, 
civic and ethnic. The former ‘maintains that the nation should be composed of all those – 
regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity – who subscribe to the 
nation’s political creed’ (Ignatieff 1994: 3). The latter ‘claims, by contrast, that an 
individual’s deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen’ (Ignatieff 1994: 4-5). 
Moreover, for Ignatieff civic nationalism is necessarily democratic, and ethnic nationalism 
often produces authoritarian regimes. Ignatieff speaks of civic and ethnic nationalisms not 
as if of ideal types or analytical categories, but as of currently-existing varieties of 
nationalism: whereas Great Britain is portrayed as the apotheosis of civic belonging, 
‘ethnic nationalism is flourishing in Eastern Europe’. Ignatieff, a self-proclaimed 
cosmopolitan, attempts to reconcile cosmopolitanism with its antithesis, nationalism – he 
recognises that cosmopolitanism ‘will always depend, in the end, on the capacity of nation-
states to provide security and civility for their citizens’ and therefore believes in the 
necessity of nations (Ignatieff 1994:9). That is, in the necessity of civic nations. 
 
The civic-ethnic dichotomy, which had been previously extensively used for 
analysis of the nationalism phenomenon, was most rigorously challenged by Rogers 
Brubaker, who found it both analytically and normatively problematic. In his 1996 
precursory article (later partially incorporated into the collection of essays Nationalism 
Reframed (1996)), he draws attention to what he calls ‘the dual neglect of ethnicity’ in the 
existing literature on nationalist politics – ethnicity not generally being recognised as a 
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major impediment to the nation-building process, and at the same time not being seen as a 
major component of this process (Brubaker 1996: 413).  According to Brubaker (1996: 
413), this neglect can be explained by the fact that the existing ‘strong normative 
preference for civic over ethnic identities’ and the ‘robust empirical confidence in the 
development of civic identities and state-wide, state-oriented loyalties’, are rooted in the 
early 1960s, when there was strong confidence in the superiority and desirability of the 
Western model, as well as in the viability of its universal application. Brubaker (1996: 
414) recalls how the ‘more ethno-cultural models of nationalisation’ prevalent after the 
disintegration of the three great empires during the interwar period came to be regarded as 
marginal and irrelevant to modern development. However, posits Brubaker, the interwar 
nation-state experience cannot be viewed as marginal any more – on the contrary, for the 
analysis of the new, post-socialist nation-states it is much more relevant than the 
application of post-colonial theory or comparisons with the old state-nations of Western 
Europe.  
 
Brubaker introduces the concept of ‘the nationalising state’, which he applies to 
both the ‘old new’ Europe, and the ‘new’:  
 
A nationalising state, I have suggested, is one understood to be the state of and for a 
particular ethnocultural ‘core nation’ whose language, culture, demographic position, economic 
welfare and political hegemony must be protected and promoted by the state, the key elements here 
are (1) the sense of ‘ownership’ of the state by a particular ethnocultural nation that is conceived as 
distinct from citizenry or permanent resident population as a whole, and (2) the ‘remedial’ or 
‘compensatory’ project of using state power to promote the core nation’s specific (and therefore 
inadequately served) interests.  
       (Brubaker 1996: 431) 
 
After identifying the new, post-1991 European states as nationalising, Brubaker 
considers the alternative state models available, the three principal ones being (1) the 
‘civic’ state (‘state of and for and of all’ its citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity); (2) the 
binational or multinational state comprised of two or more ethnocultural core nations; (3) 
‘the hybrid model of minority rights: the state is understood as a national, but not as a 
nationalising state’. (Brubaker 1996: 432) He posits that the much lauded civic model does 
not stand much chance in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (despite some civic 
principles being incorporated into constitutions and frequently invoked in public) precisely 
because of ‘the pervasively institutionalised understanding of nationality as fundamentally 
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ethnocultural rather than political’ (Brubaker 1996: 432). The same goes for the binational 
and multinational models. Brubaker considers the ‘minority rights model’ to have better 
prospects provided that the ‘internationally-sponsored minority rights regimes will be more 
successful today’ than in interwar Europe. (Brubaker 1996: 433) 
  
Although already drawing attention to the normative bias of the civic-ethnic 
distinction, in 1996 Brubaker still applied both ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ labels extensively in his 
own theorising on nationalising states. Later on, however, he attempted to fully discredit 
the dichotomy. In ‘Ethnicity Without Groups’ (2004), Brubaker claims that the civic-ethnic 
distinction does not address the empirical characteristics of nationalist movements and 
serves more ‘political’ rather than ‘analytical’ purposes regardless of whether it is applied 
by politicians in order to legitimise or discredit a certain nationalist project, or by scholars 
seeking to categorise ‘different modes of self-understanding’ (Brubaker 2004: 135).  To 
support his claim, Brubaker submits the ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ categories to a scrupulous 
examination, uncovering multiple analytical and normative ambiguities, such as the 
ambivalent nature of the ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ terms themselves, an equivocal relationship 
between both civic and ethnic categories and culture, a continuous overlapping of the two 
categories and a strong normative meaning attached. These undeniable weaknesses of the 
dichotomy are, however, hardly a novelty, as they have been previously observed and to a 
varying extent addressed by some of its adherents, notably by Smith (1998, 1993) and 
Hutchinson (1995), and to a lesser extent by Plamenatz (1976). A cardinal point made by 
Brubaker, and later extrapolated on by the proponents of liberal nationalism, is that the 
common interpretation of civic nationalism as ‘inclusive’ and thus liberal, voluntarist and 
universalist, and of ethnic nationalism as ‘exclusive’ and thus illiberal, ascriptive and 
particularist, is actually a fallacy. In fact, argues Brubaker, all forms of nationalisms are 
both inclusive and exclusive, ‘what varies is not the fact or even the degree of 
inclusiveness or exclusiveness, but the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion’ 
(Brubaker 2004: 141). Brubaker reasons that the civic understanding of nationalism is 
rooted in the idea of citizenship granted regardless of particularist traits, but that the 
modern institution of citizenship itself is by its very nature exclusive as well as inclusive. 
Considering that access to citizenship is always limited by various factors, he continues, 
‘on a global scale, it is probably far more important, in shaping life chances and sustaining 
massive and morally arbitrary inequalities, than is any kind of exclusion based on putative 
ethnicity’ (Brubaker 2004: 141). Brubaker then puts forward his own ‘modest alternative’ 
to the civic-ethnic dichotomy: a distinction between the state-framed and counter-state 
forms of nationalism.  His proposed classification has given birth to a whole new body of 
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nationalism studies, but was extensively criticised by Kuzio (2001) who, ironically, found 
it more ‘confusing’ than the traditional civic-ethnic dichotomy (see further down).  
 
Will Kymlicka (1999), the most famous proponent of multiculturalism and the 
liberal theory of minority rights, believes that although Ignatieff is right to distinguish 
between civic and ethnic nationalisms, he overlooks the presence of the cultural 
component in civic nationalism (and this failure to recognise the connection between the 
state and culture, according to Kymlicka, accounts for liberals’ failure to understand 
nationalism), and that his claims on the impact of this distinction on democracy are often 
‘overstated’. Kymlicka provides examples of native-born Americans, ‘whose citizenship 
has nothing to do with their political beliefs’ (Kymlicka 1999: 133) and of Latin American 
countries, as a proof that civic nations are perfectly capable of producing military 
dictatorships. For Kymlicka himself, ‘what distinguishes ‘civic’ nations from ‘ethnic’ 
nations is not the absence of any cultural component to national identity, but rather the fact 
that anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of race or colour’ (Kymlicka 
1995: 24-25). Moreover, ‘the idea of a purely non-cultural definition of civic nationalism is 
implausible, and often leads to self-contradiction’ (Kymlicka 1995: 200). Kymlicka 
maintains that participation in a national culture, contrary to what liberals claim, does not 
inhibit individual choice, but rather ‘makes individual freedom meaningful’ (Kymlicka 
2001: 209). Kymlicka casts aside the possibility of a symbiosis between cosmopolitan 
beliefs and nationalists feelings, as for him cosmopolitans are those who ‘regret the 
privileges of national identities in political life, and who reject the principle that political 
arrangements should be ordered in such a way as to reflect and protect national identities’ 
(Kymlicka 2001: 204). ‘Liberals today no longer are confident that history is on the side of 
cosmopolitanism’, claims Kymlicka (1999: 36), and puts forward the idea of liberal 
nationalism as an alternative attempt at reconciliation between nationalism and ideas of 
liberal democracy. He defines liberal nationalism by a set of constraints it puts on 
traditional nationalist principles: despite bearing a ‘particular national character’ in terms 
of state language, national symbols and institutions, it ‘does not attempt to coercively 
impose a national identity on those who do not share it’3; ‘allows political activities aimed 
at giving public space a different national character’; does not restrict membership of the 
national group to a particular race, ethnicity, or religion; displays ‘relatively thin’ criteria 
of admission, like a state language exam and a long-term commitment to the nation’s well-
                                                
3 This seems to me to be a slight contradiction in terms – can anything really be ‘imposed’ without 
‘coercion’? 
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being. Finally, being unaggressive, liberal nationalism is ‘willing to accord public 
recognition to, and share public space with, those national minorities within a state which 
consistently and democratically insist upon their national distinctiveness’. (Kumlicka 
2001: 39-41) The politics of liberal nationalism, therefore, are consistent with the liberal 
principles of individual freedom and social justice, although Kymlicka does make the 
caveat that they will not resolve all existing tensions between national and ethnic groups. 
More importantly, he acknowledges that liberal nationalism, in order to operate, depends 
on ‘some level of goodwill’ (Kymlicka 1996: 193). This latter statement sounds a bit 
optimistic – abandoning wishful thinking, one has to recognise that such peaceful 
coexistence would require a tremendous amount of goodwill, not just ‘some’, on both 
sides, and at the same time. Such unanimity of will and intent on behalf of the parties 
pursuing rather different agendas is not outright impossible, but is seldom observable in 
real life, and is as such not particularly to be depended on. Kymlicka is also being 
somewhat evasive as to how exactly this idyll can be brought about. 
 
David Miller, one of the most prominent advocates of liberal nationalism, observes 
that although the Western/Eastern dichotomy has been applied in an invariably different 
manner by Kohn, Plamenatz, Gellner and Smith, the overarching conclusion is that 
‘“Western” nationalism is at least compatible with a liberal state if not positively 
conducive to such a state, whereas “Eastern” nationalism leads more or less inevitably to 
authoritarianism and cultural repression’ (Miller 1995: 9). This claim that the idea of 
nationality encourages political authoritarianism is, according to Miller, one of the two 
serious challenges this idea faces (the first one, of a philosophical kind, accuses the idea of 
being ‘rationally indefensible’). On the other hand, the ‘Western’ civic conception of 
nationhood which discards shared history and common culture in favour of the purely 
political bases of association is squarely rejected by Miller. In ‘Citizenship and National 
Identity’ (2000), Miller sets out to explore and defend the idea of nationality on the 
premise that nationality is ‘a primary source of identity for citizens in contemporary 
democratic states’ (Miller 2000: 6). In yet another attempt to bring together ideas of 
nationality and liberal democracy which are usually seen as clearly antagonistic, he 
develops a ‘left-communitarian’ model of republican citizenship, which he defines as the 
active involvement of all citizens in the shaping of the future of the political community, as 
opposed to liberal or libertarian individualistic conceptions of citizenship (which are less 
demanding of participation in the case of the former, or impose literally no obligations on 
individuals in the case of the latter). The left-communitarian model constructed by Miller 
evidently aims to appease both liberals and adherents of the strong civic society: the 
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national community is being strengthened by individuals who made a (unanimous) free 
conscious choice to actively contribute and participate.  Such a model, according to Miller, 
is better equipped than any other to accommodate cultural diversity ‘by virtue of its ability 
to draw groups who initially have very different priorities into public debate, and to find 
compromise solutions to political issues that members of each group can accept’ (Miller 
2000: 3). It may seem that the model proposed by Miller is a version of civic nationalism, 
but although from the very start he takes care to distance himself from the purely ethnic 
conception of the nation, he at the same time recognises the significant role ethnicity as a 
group identity plays in nationalist politics, and tries to solve the problem by claiming, 
somewhat unconvincingly, that ethnic identity is increasingly becoming a matter of choice.  
 
In any case, Miller’s model is a theoretical construct, which he hypothetically 
applies to real life situations, trying to predict possible (but ultimately invariably positive) 
outcomes. Whereas Yael Tamir, another apologist for liberal nationalism, has an altogether 
different point of departure: an Israeli philosopher, she strives to reconcile Zionist 
nationalist politics with liberal democratic ideas. She is, overall, less optimistic than Miller 
about the buoyancy of such symbiosis – it speaks for itself that one of the chapters in her 
book Liberal Nationalism (1993) carries Mill’s phrase ‘Making a virtue out of necessity’ 
as its title. Tamir (1993: 35) recognises that liberal nationalism, which ‘attempts to capture 
what is essential to both schools of thought, drawing from liberalism a commitment to 
personal autonomy and individual rights, and from nationalism an appreciation of the 
importance of membership in human communities in general, and in national communities 
in particular’ poses no problem only in ethnically homogenous nation-states, whereas in 
multinational states the demand on one national culture reflected by the state brings with it 
harsh implications for minority groups, which will always be at a disadvantage, one way or 
another. This conflict, according to Tamir, is endogenous and cannot be resolved – 
minorities’ grievances can be alleviated by the open political process and cultural rights 
guaranteed by liberal nationalist policies, but these grievances will not disappear. But 
liberal nationalism is, nevertheless, the best available option, posits Tamir and proves her 
case by critically examining and discarding alternatives. For instance, she brings out an 
intrinsic contradiction of the ‘political nation’ using an example of political dissent in a 
society based upon commitment to common political values – it follows logically that 
someone who is a citizen by birthright but does not share these values or even actively 
opposes them should be stripped of citizenship, which is against everything that liberals 
hold dear. She also draws attention to the fact that a political nation model presupposes 
active political participation and the involvement of each and every citizen, whereas in real 
                                                                                  Chapter 1: Theoretical Background. Liberalism, Democracy, and Nationalism 
 26 
life large segments of the population abstain even from such minimal political action as 
voting in elections, inevitably casting ‘doubts on the view of the state as a voluntary 
association whose authority is grounded on consent’ (Tamir 1993: 131). Tamir also rejects 
the notion of a nationally and culturally neutral state on the grounds that cultural 
differences are part of the political reality, not of the private domain, ‘as those who create 
the political system, legislate its laws, occupy key political positions and run the state 
bureaucracy have a culture that they cannot avoid bringing into the political domain, the 
separation between state and culture is revealed as an impossible endeavour’ (Tamir 1993: 
149). Tamir predicts that ‘the illusion that liberal and national ideas could be fully 
accommodated within one political framework’ will fade away, but that the liberal national 
entity which endorses liberal principles of distribution inwards and outwards, and whose 
political system reflects a particular national culture, while leaving its citizens free to 
practice different cultures – is here to stay. Tamir’s definition of liberal nationalism is 
almost identical to Kymlicka’s, and, like him, she believes that the most distinctive feature 
of this model, in comparison to the other liberal conceptions of society, is the introduction 
of culture as a political dimension.  
 
Stefan Auer in Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe (2004) promotes the cause 
of liberal ‘cultural’ nationalism being conducive to democratic transition in the post-
communist countries. Heavily borrowing from Miller, Kymlicka and Tamir, Auer claims 
that ‘in order to make liberal values relevant to a particular political community, they have 
to be articulated within the specific cultural context of that community’ (Auer 2004: 9), 
and this is where liberal nationalism, ‘which seeks to reconcile the universal demands of 
liberalism with particularist attachments to a national culture’ comes in handy. According 
to Auer, ‘even ethnic nationalism, if culturally based, can be liberal.’ (Auer 2004: 26) Auer 
rejects the ‘old’ civic and ethnic classification of nationalism on the grounds that post-
communist studies cannot be advanced by this simplistic dualism, which distorts our 
perception of political developments, and suggests abandoning it in favour of ‘cautious and 
detailed analysis of nationalistic discourses within each nation’, which in his opinion, 
would make it possible to highlight similarities across the countries without neglecting 
peculiarities (Auer 2004: 28). He does not elaborate on how exactly this detailed analysis 
of various nationalistic discourses would manage to highlight similarities without a 
theoretical framework in place. 
 
Bernard Yack (1999) shrewdly observes that ‘distinguishing civic from ethnic 
understandings of nationhood is part of a larger effort by contemporary liberals to channel 
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national sentiments in a direction – civic nationalism – that seems consistent with the 
commitments to individual rights and diversity that they associate with a decent political 
order’ (Yack 1999: 104). Yack is sceptical about the civic-ethnic distinction not only 
because of the normative implications, but also because the image of a civic nation as a 
community built on commitment to certain political ideas seems untenable to him as ‘a 
mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinking’. Yack argues that the so-called civic 
nations, as the French, Canadian and American nations are usually perceived to be, are not 
built solely upon the commitment to a set of political principles – no matter how much one 
sympathises with the political principles of another nation, one would not consider 
changing one’s national allegiance, because of a deeper emotional attachment which has 
little to do with rational choice.  Therefore, the much-praised civic nation is an illusion and 
a political myth, a norm that is not rooted in our historical experience. As for the 
proponents of the idea of the civic nation, 
 
...The norms that they come up with tend to say much more about the way in which we 
should order lives within given national communities than about why the boundaries of these 
communities should take one shape rather than the other. 
         (Yack 1999: 111) 
 
For Yack, too, the cultural and the political are too closely intertwined in modern 
society to attempt a separation. He argues that liberal principles, after all, developed and 
flourished within the network of national communities. Yack employs the argument that 
national membership based upon political assent may turn out to be even more illiberal that 
that based upon descent; birthright-based citizenship, according to Yack, promotes 
toleration ‘precisely by removing the question of communal membership from the realm of 
choice’ (Yack 1999: 116). 
 
Nationalisms per se are not always intolerant or exclusionist, says Kai Nielsen 
(1999), another supporter of liberal nationalism. For Nielsen, too, a national identity based 
solely upon political principles is ‘too thin’ and lacks the necessary cultural component. 
Therefore, discarding civic nationalism, but unwilling to endorse the ethnic one, he comes 
up with a third variety – cultural nationalism (the latter two not to be confused). According 
to Nielsen, all nationalisms are cultural, but not all cultural nationalisms are ethnic, as long 
as the culture supported by the state is a liberal-democratic culture (in Nielsen’s 
interpretation, one that protects minority rights). On this condition, concludes Nielsen, 
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‘nationalism and liberalism can, and do, go comfortably hand in hand’ (Nielsen 1999: 
128). Nielsen is very categorical in his rejection of the civic/ethnic dichotomy:  
 
Talk of civic nationalism had better be dropped from our political vocabulary (including 
the vocabulary of political theory), if we wish to be clear and coherent in our analyses in the real 
world. We should see that all nationalism is cultural nationalism. 
(Nielsen 1999: 127) 
 
Umut Özkirimli in Contemporary Debates on Nationalism (2005) summarises 
arguments against the civic/ethnic dichotomy, i.e. normative implications, analytical 
deficiencies, etc. and concludes that it can be dismissed as ‘bogus’. Instead, he suggests 
that nationalism can be analysed as a form of discourse, because ‘...nationalism is a 
particular way of seeing and interpreting the world, a frame of reference that helps us to 
make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds us’ (Özkirimli 2005: 30).  
 
In order to forestall criticisms of the proposed definition being too general or too 
vague, Özkirimli comes up with four specific ways in which the nationalist discourse 
operates, namely: 1) ‘the discourse of nationalism divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’; 
2) ‘the discourse of nationalism hegemonises’; 3) ‘the discourse of nationalism naturalizes 
itself’; 4) ‘the discourse of nationalism operates through institutions’. I am not at all 
convinced, though, that these four statements make Özkirimli’s case for the originality of 
the nationalist discourse any stronger – for example, all four statements remain true if you 
substitute ‘discourse of nationalism’ for ‘discourse of religion’, or for ‘discourse of racial 
supremacy’, or for ‘discourse of imperialism’. Moreover, the validity of the first three 
statements, which can be theoretically attributed to any kind of mass ideology, largely 
depends upon the fourth, namely the support of public institutions, being available. 
Therefore, as useful as an analysis of any public discourse is for our understanding of the 
reality that surrounds us and the on-going social and political processes, contemplation of 
nationalist discourse does not, in my opinion, invalidate, exclude or replace the civic/ethnic 
dichotomy as an analytical tool. The two are complementary, not antagonistic.  
 
The civic/ethnic dichotomy received a somewhat kinder treatment, albeit not an 
uncritical one, at the hands of Aviel Roshwald (2006). When characterising civic and 
ethnic nationalisms, Roshwald draws attention to their voluntary and ascriptive aspects 
respectively: 
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…civic nationalism is commonly associated with liberal, tolerant, inclusive values, because its 
criteria for membership can theoretically be met by any resident of a nation-state territory; it’s 
simply a matter of individually choosing to subscribe to a common set of principles. Civic 
nationalism does not in theory impose any requirements for cultural homogeneity beyond the 
circumscribed realm of a shared political culture. Ethnic nationalism is considered intolerant of 
both individual right and cultural diversity because of its preoccupation with ascriptive qualities 
that can neither be freely acquired nor voluntarily relinquished, its conception of the nation as an 
organically cohesive collective entity, and its understanding of national-cultural identity as an 
integrated package in which there can be no distinction between a public, political-legal arena and 
a private or associational, cultural-communal sphere.  
 
(Roshwald 2006: 256) 
 
 
Roshwald is fully aware of the normative and analytical ambiguities of the 
dichotomy – for example, he observes that ‘even at the theoretical level, a purely ethnic or 
purely civic nationalism is a contradiction in terms’ (Roshwald 2006: 256) and that ‘a 
purely civic nationalism would, arguably, not be an example of nationalism at all’ 
(Roshwald 2006: 257). He does believe, however, that ethnic and civic typologies remain 
powerful instruments of analysis, but cautions against simplistic usage, speaking of civic- 
or ethnic- leaning nations instead. Roshwald, similar to Tamir, observes that ‘every polity 
necessarily embodies some element of cultural particularism’ and that every liberal-
democratic state ‘faces a contradiction between its role as embodiment of particular culture 
and its espousal of equal rights for all’ (Roshwald 2006: 281). 
 
Taras Kuzio (2001) recognises the legitimacy of using civic and ethnic typologies 
of nationalism as ideal types for analytical purposes, but believes that the recent 
developments in post-communist Europe are not taken into account by this traditional 
division, thus leading to a terminological confusion. According to Kuzio, in order to ‘come 
to grips’ with all the recent changes, two steps are necessary: first, to recognise that many 
of the present nation-building policies employed in the East are similar to those employed 
in the West during earlier periods of history. Second, to accept that all so-called civic 
states, regardless of their geographical location, include ethno-cultural elements. Kuzio 
posits that the balance between the civic and ethnic elements depends solely upon the 
progress of democratisation and the development of civil society. He is also critical of 
Brubaker’s distinction between civic, nationalising and bi-ethnic states, on the grounds that 
he applies the newly coined term ‘nationalising states’ exclusively to Eastern Europe, but 
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not to the West, effectively substituting one normative term for another. Furthermore, 
according to Kuzio, Brubaker’s framework cannot be applied successfully to all twenty-
seven post-communist states as it does not distinguish between those nationalising states 
that adopted civic nation-building policies, and those who resorted to authoritarian 
measures. Notably, Kuzio calls Brubaker’s framework ‘confusing’ and observes that ‘a 
less confusing division of European states would be according to whether they are civic or 
ethnic’ (Kuzio 2001: 144) (back to square one?). Kuzio’s own alternative theoretical 
framework divides the post-communist states into two large categories, ‘civic’ and 
‘nationalising ethnic’, with the former being subdivided into mono-ethnic, plural-liberal, 
plural non-liberal, and ethnic democracies. 
 
Out of all the post-communist states, he places only Belarus and Yugoslavia in the 
‘nationalising ethnic’ category. In the end, though, Kuzio does not radically break with the 
traditional civic/ethnic typology, but rather extrapolates it further, building on Brubaker’s 
notions of civic and nationalising states. This more detailed classification allows him 
greater flexibility and permits the placement of the twenty-five post-communist states in 
the ‘civic’ category, thus finally erasing the hypothetical divide between the East and the 
West. Unfortunately, Kuzio does not elaborate on how his proposed classification would 
work when applied to states outside the post-communist bloc. 
 
Mark Jubulis (2008) maintains that the distinction between civic and ethnic nations 
is ‘exaggerated’, largely because scholars tend to underestimate role of culture in civic 
nations and to insufficiently distinguish it from ethnicity in ethnic nations. He is critical of 
Kohn’s distinction between civic and ethnic nations exactly because it is a dichotomy, i.e. 
a strict division not allowing for any ‘grey areas’, which allegedly leads to consequent 
over-simplification of nationalism typologies. Jubulis, however, does not precipitately 
discard it altogether, insisting that it ‘can retain its usefulness as long as we are clear about 
ideal types and as long as we are more sensitive to the role of culture, as supportive of 
civic identity and as distinct from ethnicity’ (Jubulis 2008: 6). Furthermore, in order to add 
a third, cultural dimension to the traditional division, he proposes changing perspective 
from the vertical civic/ethnic dichotomy to a linear spectrum ‘on which nations are 
positioned based on their openness to new members’, with the ‘civic ideal’ at one end, 
‘ethnic’ at the other, and ‘cultural/linguistic’ in the middle. The potential shortcoming of 
such a spectrum, according to Jubulis, is the difficulty of determining the exact placement 
of a nation with a relative balance of all three components. He also makes the caveat that 
nations can move along the spectrum in the course of history.  
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The placement of culture as a third separate criterion in the middle of the spectrum 
seems problematic to me. After all, as Jubulis’s argument goes, both civic and ethnic 
nationalism models are infused by culture. However, if a hypothetical nation is placed in 
the middle of the spectrum, it would imply a strong cultural component, but if it is shifted 
to the left (civic) or to the right (ethnic), it would allegedly start losing it, which is self-
contradictory.  
 
The latest (at the time of writing of this thesis) alternative dual dichotomy, which 
bears, in my opinion, a close resemblance to the original civic-ethnic one, was introduced 
by Stepan, Linz, and Yadav in Crafting State-Nations. India and Other Multinational 
Democracies (2011). The authors juxtapose state-nations and nation-states, aiming at 
establishing ‘a normative standard to which multinational democracies can aspire and to 
introduce a set of observable empirical socio-political realities that a polity, if it is a state-
nation, will manifest’ (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011: 4). It is this focus on the practical 
implementation of the state-nation ideal, with the unreserved recognition of the 
‘normative’ element in it that distinguishes Crafting State Nations from the other works in 
the field. 
   
State-nations are defined as multicultural (sometimes with significant multinational 
components) states, which ‘nonetheless still manage to engender strong identification and 
loyalty from their citizens, an identification and loyalty that proponents of homogeneous 
nation states perceive that only nation states can engender’ (Linz and Stepan 1996 as 
quoted in: Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2011: 4). Nation-states, by contrast, ‘stand for a 
political-institutional approach that attempts to match political boundaries of the state with 
the presumed cultural boundaries of the nation, or vice versa.’ (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 
2011: 4) The authors add a caveat that both are ideal-type distinctions and that the ‘state-
nation is not a matter of recognising a pre-existing reality.’ (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2011: 
8) 
 
In order to become a state-nation, a diverse polity is expected to follow four 
‘empirically verifiable patterns’: (1) a high degree of positive identification with the state; 
(2) multiple but complementary political identities and loyalties among its citizens; (3) ‘a 
high degree of institutional trust in the most important constitutional, legal, and 
administrative components of the state’; (4) ‘a comparatively high degree of positive 
support for democracy’ among the citizens. (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2011:7-8) But the 
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most important component (which in my opinion also happens to be the weakest link when 
one considers practical implications) is the intrinsic sense of belonging to the polity (which 
the authors choose to call the ‘we-feeling’). It is the ‘we-feeling’ that marks the difference 
between the state-nation and the simply multinational state, which always remains at risk 
of separatist trends. 
 
The ‘we-feeling’ is in its substance not dissimilar from Meinecke’s ‘lively feeling 
of political community’ described earlier. However, Meinecke is being descriptive rather 
than prescriptive in his usage of the term, stipulating that the exact origins of nation-
bonding ties are very hard to determine. Stepan, Linz and Yadav, while making the ‘we-
feeling’ a crucial element of the state-nation existence, do not exactly ponder on how this 
feeling will come about. Their description of the ‘we-feeling’ – it ‘may take the form of 
defining a tradition, history, a shared culture in an inclusive manner, with attachment to 
common symbols of the state, or of inculcating some form of ‘constitutional patriotism’’ 
(Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2011: 5) resonates very well with the much-discussed and highly 
desirable attributes of the civic nation. In practice, however, this ideal finds it very hard to 
compete against readily available and easily accessible ethnocultural bonds. The authors 
do not elaborate on how, and why, civic ties will become preferable to ethnic ones. 
Ironically, while Stepan, Linz and Yadav set out to deliver the latest practical solution to 
state-nation building, their project is undermined by the same old theoretical division 
between civic and ethnic, or rather by the seeming impossibility of achieving a right mix of 
the two. 
 
Overall, the existing critique of the civic/ethnic dichotomy can be summarised as 
follows: it is normatively laden, analytically problematic due to the ambiguity of terms, 
simplistically dual as it allows for no ‘grey areas’, does not sufficiently account for the role 
of culture in national communities, is too narrow to account for recent developments in the 
post-communist bloc, and does not offer much in terms of practical implementation. I will 
attempt to address each of these arguments in turn.  
Normative tags 
 
It cannot be denied that the terms ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ have acquired strong 
normative meanings in relation to nationalism over time, with ‘civic’ readily implying 
‘liberal’ and ‘inclusive’, and ‘ethnic’ usually associated with ‘illiberal’ and ‘exclusive’. 
The main argument against these normative tags is that they are potentially misleading, 
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because a civic nation is not necessarily liberal and democratic (here Brazil under the 
military government of 1964-1985 serves as a perfect example), and besides, both civic 
and ethnic nations may be exclusive, albeit on different grounds. Therefore, it is not 
entirely clear why exclusion on the basis of ethnicity and descent is normatively more 
problematic than, for example, exclusion on the basis of political affiliation.  
 
I believe that the main reason that most liberals feel more uncomfortable with 
exclusion on an ethnic basis lies in the fact that ethnicity, like race, and unlike political 
affiliation, is an inborn trait, often marked by certain obvious physical characteristics, 
leaving little free choice for the individual in terms of membership of a specific ethnic 
community. This is not the case with other types of affiliation, such as political or 
religious. For example, although one can be born and remain Conservative through one’s 
life, if one decides to switch to Labour instead, it is an incomparably easier task than for an 
ethnic Indian to become ethnically English (not just in his or her own description, but also 
in the perception of others). Religions welcome converts and new recruits (although some, 
like Judaism, do it with more reservations). And although there is a certain truth to Miller’s 
(2000) claim that ethnicity may also be a matter of choice, ethnicity, just like race, largely 
remains an ascriptive, and not a self-descriptive characteristic. And it is this ascriptive 
aspect limiting the free choice of the individual that makes liberally minded people wary of 
ethnic nationalism. I would like to stress ‘liberally minded’, because strictly speaking, 
‘ethnic nationalism’ has negative connotations only in their perception; people of different 
political convictions do not necessarily perceive ‘ethnic nationalism’ as a pejorative term. 
Besides, the word ‘nationalism’ itself has acquired persistent negative connotations outside 
of nationalist rhetoric (or the field of nationalism studies), but nobody is seriously 
considering replacing it with something impartial and politically correct, like, for example, 
‘people’s quest for self-determination’.    
 
Ambiguity of terms 
As for the alleged ambiguity of the terms ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’, this brings to mind 
what Isaiah Berlin (2005: 168) once famously said about the concept of freedom: ‘Like 
happiness and goodness, like nature and reality, it is a term whose meaning is so porous 
that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist’; he went on to claim that ‘this 
protean word’, freedom, has about two hundred different meanings recorded. Two hundred 
meanings may be exceptional, but most of the terms employed by social scientists in their 
                                                                                  Chapter 1: Theoretical Background. Liberalism, Democracy, and Nationalism 
 34 
studies are contentious and highly resistant to strict definitions. For that matter, a concise 
and unambiguous definition of nationalism is still waiting to be developed. ‘Liberal’ can 
also have a variety of meanings, depending on geographical location and historical context. 
Under scrupulous analysis, the widely used term ‘liberal democracy’ becomes a 
contradiction in terms. And if terms were to be discarded on the charge that they are 
ambiguous, political science would come to a standstill. But, ‘to neglect the field of 
political thought, because its unstable subject-matter, with its blurred edges, is not to be 
caught by the fixed concept, abstract models and fine instruments suitable to logic or to 
linguistic analysis... is merely to allow oneself to remain at the mercy of primitive and 
uncriticised political beliefs’ (Berlin 2005: 167). 
 
Simplistic dualism 
Although Kohn’s original division between the types of nationalism is dualistic, 
none of the well-known subsequent interpretations of his dichotomy (with the possible 
exception of Ignatieff’s (1993)) exclude the so-called ‘grey areas’ between civic and ethnic 
nationalisms; on the contrary, ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ are persistently used strictly as ideal 
types. Even Kohn’s predecessor, Meinecke, observes that it is difficult to distinguish 
between cultural and political nations in practice. Plamenatz (1976) speaks of two types of 
nationalism, but stresses that the nationalisms of different peoples do not clearly fall into 
just one of them. Greenfeld (1992) insists that the two types of nationalism, individualistic-
libertarian and collectivistic-authoritarian, should be only used as models, and that in 
reality the most common is the mixed type. Anthony Smith (1993) claims that both 
varieties of nationalism can be encountered in the West as well as in the East, and also 
within specific national movements. For Hutchinson (1994), cultural and political 
nationalisms represent two sides of the same coin and are often combined. Any dichotomy 
is dual by nature – that is its main characteristic, but it is the analysis it is used for, and the 
method of its application, which should be held responsible for occasional excessive 
dualism or exaggerated simplicity. 
 
Undermining the role of culture 
 
There is a persistent opinion that the civic-ethnic dichotomy insufficiently 
addresses the role of national culture in the construction of national identity, and aims to 
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replace it with a ‘mythical civic culture’ (Tamir 1993; Kymlicka 1995, 2001; Nielsen 
1999; Yack 1999; Jubulis 2008). This claim is usually made either by the proponents of 
liberal nationalism, or by those who argue for the existence of ‘cultural nationalism’ as a 
category in its own right (in the words of Kai Nielsen, ‘cultural nationalism, neither civic 
nor ethnic’).  
 
As a rule, this argument is more contextualised than based in broader political 
theory (Quebec for Kymlicka and Nielsen, Israel for Tamir, and Latvia for Jubulis). As 
Yael Tamir (1999) reflected herself, one’s theoretical approach is often influenced by 
personal reasons. It is also notable that this line of reasoning has been adopted by different 
scholars not so much in response to the civic-ethnic dichotomy as such, but to its 
sometimes-casual application to real-life cases (of which Michael Ignatieff’s ‘Blood and 
Belonging’ is perhaps the most prominent example).  
 
I would like to argue that the notions civic and ethnic, applied as ideal types, and 
not as crude templates, do not in the least diminish the role of culture in the construction of 
national identity. On the contrary, proponents of the dichotomy view culture as a very 
potent ingredient of national politics. But just as advocates of cultural nationalism believe 
– rightly – that it is very difficult to separate politics and culture, adherents of civic 
nationalism are convinced that it is even more difficult, if not altogether impossible, to 
separate culture and ethnicity. Rather, as Beiner (1999: 14) observes, ‘what animates the 
‘civic’ conception is the vision of a shared citizenship and civic identity that would be in 
principle capable of transcending these cultural preoccupations, however legitimate they 
may be, in a political community where linguistic and cultural identities are in a potential 
conflict’.  
 
Overall, it is obvious that the role of culture and that of ethnicity and religion as its 
integral components are, and are likely to remain, extremely important within any national 
community, civic- or ethnic-leaning alike. The only difference, according to the 
dichotomy, is that while recognising the potency of culture, the former would strive to 
separate it from the state while the latter would be reluctant to do so.  
 
 
 
                                                                                  Chapter 1: Theoretical Background. Liberalism, Democracy, and Nationalism 
 36 
Unsuitability for post-communist studies 
The collapse of the Communist bloc in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
emergence of the new national states introduced a whole new dimension into nationalist 
politics, leading to claims that existing theoretical frameworks were not suitable for the 
analysis of the new developments (Auer 2004; Kuzio 2001, Jubulis 2008). For example, 
Auer writes that although liberal nationalism has recently gained new credibility in the 
West, ‘no significant attempt has been made to show its relevance to the experience of the 
post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, while ‘old classifications of 
nationalism (civic and ethnic, equated with Western and Eastern) distort the perception of 
recent political developments in the region’ (Auer 2004: 28). Jubulis posits that ‘we need 
to appreciate that nations in the West have an ethnic or cultural element and nations in the 
East can have a civic dimension’ (Jubulis 2008: 6). Kuzio argues mainly against 
Brubaker’s classification of civic and ‘nationalising’ states on the grounds that it is ‘far too 
broad when applied to twenty-seven post-communist countries’ (Kuzio 2001: 137); the 
main fault he finds with Brubaker’s typology is that it is ‘placed within the context of the 
traditional literature on nationalism, which divides Europe into a ‘civic West’ and an 
‘ethnic East’’ (Kuzio 2001: 135).  
 
It seems that the main concern here is not so much about the analytical deficiency 
of the civic-ethnic divide as about the allegedly biased way it is being applied to the post-
communist states. Apparently, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the ‘civic’ notion 
per se when it is applied to the Eastern European countries, or with the term 
‘ethnocultural’ when applied to the West. I think there is a certain danger in censoring 
analytical terms and bringing political correctness into nationalism studies, especially if 
one subscribes to Kuzio’s own view that the balance between ethnic and civic elements is 
dependent upon the general level of democratisation and advances in civil society’s 
development. Here one needs to bear in mind that most post-communist studies up until 
now have confirmed that despite the overall continuous progress in achieving these two 
objectives among the Eastern European nations, the process is not quite complete as yet. 
     
*** 
 
Overall, it may be said that the civic-ethnic dichotomy appeared in response to the 
need to address an inherent contradiction between nationalism and liberal democratic 
ideals, as an attempt to reconcile a collectivist ideology that strives at particularism with an 
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ideology that promotes individual liberty and equal rights for all. And although out of the 
two, liberalism arguably goes much further back in history than nationalism, from the 19th 
century onwards the two ideologies largely developed in parallel, and together came to 
dominate the world – after all, we live in a world of national states, the majority of which 
are also (or at least claim to be) liberal democracies. This does not mean, however, that the 
necessary checks and balances are all in place – there have been many moments in history 
when an escalation of virulent nationalism led to the demise of a liberal democracy 
altogether, and the relationship between the two remains problematic even at the best of 
times. In my opinion, the civic-ethnic dichotomy was brought to life as an earnest attempt 
at reconciliation of the two. As time went by, and ethnic nationalism showed little sign of 
waning (on the contrary, the collapse of the Communist bloc and increasing world 
migration gave it a boost), it was perhaps inevitable that an attempt to make a ‘virtue out of 
necessity’ in the case of ethnic nationalism, too, would be made, either by casting doubt on 
the credibility of the civic version, or by re-evaluating the role of ethnicity in the process of 
nation-building. In any case, these ‘revisionist’ efforts have significantly widened our 
understanding of nationalism, introducing wholly new dimensions of the interplay between 
politics, civil society, ethnicity, culture and religion. What they, in my understanding, have 
failed to do is to convincingly discredit or, more importantly, to successfully replace the 
civic-ethnic dichotomy, which remains a perfectly valid analytical tool. But, once again, 
this only holds true on the condition that ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ are used as ideal types in the 
Weberian sense, and not as labels for existing national movements.  
 
Another strong argument in favour of the suitability of the ethnic vs. civic 
distinction for the analysis of the evolution of the concept of the Latvian nation during the 
first half of the 20th century is the fact that both the Latvian nationalist thinkers and their 
minority counterparts were well familiar with the dichotomy. In a sharp contrast to the 
modern-day situation in Latvia, where the concept of the civic nation is dismissed outright 
as unsuitable (see Chapter Seven), the ethnic vs. civic debates permeated Latvian public 
space during the interwar years, being discussed in the Saeima, argued about at the 
sessions of the Riga Council, and polemicised in the press, as described in Chapters Two 
and Three. It seemed only appropriate to place those historical debates within the original 
theoretical framework. 
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1.2. Non-territorial Cultural Autonomy 
 
Another theoretical framework indispensable for my analysis of minority politics in 
interwar Latvia is the idea of non-territorial cultural autonomy (NCA). This was first 
introduced by the Austrian Social Democrat Karl Renner in his programmatic article Staat 
und Nation (1899) and was then further developed by his colleague Otto Bauer in the 
monumental Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (1906). It seemed that the 
NCA model elaborated by the Austrian Marxists had something to offer to everybody – it 
rendered the Marxists with an attractive option of reconciling socialist leanings with 
national pride, and provided the bourgeois national ideologues with some sort of 
vindication that truth was on their side all along. The theory itself rested upon the three 
fundamental premises; a sharp distinction between the nation and the state, the ‘personality 
principle’ freeing a national group from any territorial attachment, and the principle of 
pluralistic sovereignty allowing national communities to take certain functions over from 
the state. Both Renner and Bauer repeatedly compared national associations with religious 
confessions, claiming that both are best separated from the state.  
 
Although the NCA model was largely abandoned by its authors after 1918, when 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire (which the model was intended to salvage in the first place) 
fell apart, it had a very strong impact on the political and philosophical thinking of the 
time, inspiring authors far away from its native Austria. Admittedly, its influence was 
greatest among Social Democrats in Central and Eastern Europe – not least because the 
Austro-Marxists were the first to break with the orthodox Marxist tradition that recognised 
no national sentiment, offering an attractive alternative for those who were sympathetic to 
the plight of the working class but were nevertheless not ready to throw national 
aspirations away. Many Latvian Social Democrats, like Skujenieks and Valters, were taken 
with the NCA idea and built their own theoretical work on its premises, albeit very 
selectively – Skujenieks (1913), for example, although extremely supportive of cultural 
autonomy in general, did not accept the non-territorial principle, while Valters (1914) 
evaluated the advantages of cultural autonomy almost exclusively from the vantage point 
of ethnic Latvians, who were themselves an ethnic minority within the Russian Empire at 
the time.  
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However, the impact of the NCA concept was not limited to Social Democratic 
circles only – before being ultimately ‘buried by Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky’, it inspired a 
number of short-lived experiments during the last days of the Russian Empire (see 
Bowring 2005), and had a pronounced impact on the Zionist movement in Europe. After 
the collapse of the Russian Empire, two newly created Baltic countries came closest to the 
practical implementation of the model – in 1919, the Latvian National Council passed two 
laws – a Law on Latvian Educational Institutions and a Law on Minority Schools in Latvia 
– which, although not granting explicit cultural autonomy to national minorities, together 
secured minorities’ practical control over their own education and cultural matters. This 
was an important achievement, secondary only to the Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy 
of 1925, which granted non-territorial cultural autonomy to Estonia’s largest minorities (a 
lesser known cultural autonomy for Jews was established in Lithuania in 1920; it did not, 
however, follow the personality principle). In both Estonia and Latvia, the implementation 
of cultural autonomy (full in the case of the former, and partial in the case of the latter) 
would not have been possible without the indefatigable efforts of its main advocates, the 
liberally inclined members of the Baltic German community.  
 
After World War Two, the NCA remained forgotten for decades, until it was 
revived in the early 1990s, largely by the efforts of its foremost contemporary advocate E. 
Nimni, who initiated and moderated modern debates on the NCA, as well as writing 
countless commentaries and introductions to the theory (Nimni 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005). 
The ranks of supporters of the NCA model have been growing steadily since, as the ideas 
of Renner and Bauer have proved to resonate deeply with modern debates on 
multiculturalism and minority rights. 
 
1.3. Theories of Ethnic Bargaining  
Despite the overall complexity of Latvian political life during the interwar period, 
with its kaleidoscopic changes of government and the proliferation of political parties, 
further complicated by the lack of transparency and by personal struggles for influence, 
three closely-interrelated major developments can be clearly traced: the continuous 
deterioration of majority-minority relations, the radicalisation of both the left and the right 
wings of the political spectrum; and, ultimately, the abandonment of liberal democratic 
values and parliamentary rule in favour of unbridled ethnic nationalism.  
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There is a vast body of dedicated work which links democratic politics and ethnic 
mobilisation together (Dahl 1971; Rabushka and Shepsle 2008; Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 
1977, 2008). Chandra (2001: 338-339) provided an excellent summary of the ‘five 
principal propositions’ affecting the bargaining process between majority and minority 
groups that emerge from this area of study:  
 
1) Demands made by ethnic groups are indivisible;  
2) Demands made by ethnic groups are zero-sum;  
3) Demands made by ethnic groups are motivated by a desire for relative rather 
than absolute gains;  
4) Demands made by ethnic groups are about high stakes because they concern 
resources that affect future bargaining power; and  
5) Demands made by ethnic groups are inseparable from a larger conception of 
selfhood and therefore cannot be treated as discrete issues.  
 
In Chapter Four, I apply these propositions, as well as one of the latest concepts in 
the theory of ethnic bargaining, the integrationist versus the segregationist dichotomy 
introduced by Jenne (2007), to the case of the Citizenship Law of 1919. Having been 
described by contemporaries as ‘a chronic issue of Latvian politics’ and ‘the most 
controversial issue in Latvian parliamentary life’, the Citizenship Law of 1919 as a case 
study reveals many important undercurrents in Latvian ethnic politics of the interwar era.  
 
1.4.  Triadic Nexus, Quadratic Nexus, and the Fifth Element. 
 
Another analytical approach that I based my investigation upon was developed by 
Rogers Brubaker (1995, 1996). His theoretical framework of the ‘triadic nexus’ linking 
nationalising state, national minorities and their ‘external national homelands’ successfully 
challenged the prevailing, until then, dyadic approach to the study of national conflict, 
which had traditionally juxtaposed a majority state-possessing nation and an ethnic 
minority. The triadic model, besides introducing minority kin-states (which Brubaker 
designates as ‘external national homelands’) as a significant contributing factor in 
nationalist politics, also offered a new, ‘relational’ approach to the study of ethnic conflict, 
as all three sides of the nexus are defined not as static actors or as ‘fixed entities’, but as 
dynamic relational fields within which perceptions, representations, interpretations, and, 
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subsequently, claims, continuously shift and are closely intertwined, as well as being 
frequently contested by the actors involved.4  
 
The triadic nexus model proved to be particularly popular in the study of ethnic 
relations in Central and Eastern Europe, and indeed came to dominate the field, allowing 
Pettai (2006: 125) to call it ‘almost a cliché’. David Smith (2002) was the first, to the best 
of my knowledge, to expand the model by adding a fourth dimension to the nexus, namely 
international organisations such as the European Union, the European Council, the OSCE, 
and NATO – an avenue later explored by many other commentators (see Tesser 2003, 
Kemp 2006, Galbreath 2005). This fourth dimension has also attracted criticisms – for 
example, Kemp (2006), after successfully exploring what he terms a  ‘fourth variable’ (i.e. 
the international community and its role in domestic politics), as well as appending another 
important contributing factor, international law, and providing many other valuable 
insights, somewhat unexpectedly concludes that ‘the international community is not a 
player, so one should not amend Brubaker’s theory to speak of a quadratic nexus’. Rather, 
posits Kemp (2006: 123), the international community ‘provides a framework, standards 
and potential mediation in cases when the actors have exhausted domestic and bilateral 
means of resolving their differences’. Perhaps, one should read this interpretation of the 
supposedly ‘hands-off’ role of international organisations as if it were a category of 
analysis rather than a category of practice, or, in other words, as a normative description of 
the niche the international organisations ultimately aspire to fill in an ideal world rather 
than a reflection upon existing reality. Another argument in defence of the fourth 
dimension of the nexus is that the original triadic model does not conceive the elements of 
the nexus as ‘actors’ (although there are ‘actors’ in each given field), but rather as 
interconnected ‘relational fields’. Furthermore, Brubaker, in fact, distinguishes between 
‘internal’ and external relational fields and posits that the central aspect of the nexus is 
reciprocal interfield monitoring, where ‘actors in each field closely and continuously 
monitor relations and actions in each of the other two fields’, and where the representation 
of other fields is often contested and becomes the object of ‘representational struggle’ 
(Brubaker 1995: 118). Therefore, even if one accepts Kemp’s normative definition of 
international organisations as ‘non-actors’, there is little doubt that the ‘fourth dimension’ 
                                                
4 Brubaker’s concept of the ‘relational field’ is based on the notion of field developed by the sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu (see, for example, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Bourdieu envisioned the field as ‘a space 
within which an effect of field is exercised, so that what happens to any object that traverses this space 
cannot be explained solely by the intrinsic properties of the object in question’, and posited that ‘to think in 
terms of field is to think relationally’ (1992: 100, 96). Notably, Bourdieu’s framework for analysis in terms 
of field is also triadic (see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 104-105). 
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does constitute a relational field according to Brubaker’s theory (and the original theory of 
fields by Bourdieu, for that matter). Consequently, I beg to differ with Kemp on the subject 
of amending Brubaker’s framework, and vote firmly for the ‘quadratic nexus’.  
 
The ‘Fifth Element’ 
 
In fact, I would like to suggest that there is yet another side to the national question, 
another ‘relational field’ in the nexus: the complicated interplay between different national 
minorities sharing the same homeland along with the core nation. I will argue that this 
‘fifth element’ is vital for the comprehensive analysis of interethnic relations in the cases 
where more than one sizeable ethnic minority is present in the same state (or indeed was 
present in the past – I will elaborate on this point in the concluding part of Chapter Five) as 
it has a direct impact on minorities’ relations with the eponymous nation, with their 
respective kin-states, and on the overall state of majority-minority relations in a given 
country. 
 
This fifth dimension of ethnic relations has been conspicuously overlooked by 
nationalism studies.5 Brubaker (1996: 60) himself, for example, speaks of variance within 
a national minority, which he views not simply as a group, but rather as a ‘dynamic 
political stance’, or even a ‘family of related but mutually competing stances’, and of the 
variation of cultural and political demands which different national minorities can make of 
their respective states, but he never speaks about the variance among national minorities 
within the same state.  
 
Despite claiming that the triadic relation is ‘a relation between relational fields; 
and relations between the three fields are closely intertwined with relations internal to, and 
constitutive of, the fields’ (Brubaker 1996: 67), Brubaker, when applying the framework to 
the case of interwar Poland and meticulously analysing relations between the Polish 
nationalising state, its four biggest ethnic minorities  (i.e. the Germans, the Jews, the 
Ukrainians, and the Belarussians), and their external homelands (Germany, the Belarussian 
and Ukrainian Socialist Republics, and, for the Jews, ‘a homeland distant not only in space 
but also…in time’, Palestine), stops short of examining this other dimension. He 
scrupulously accounts for the cultural, economic and political differences in the position of 
                                                
5 A notable exception is Mendelsohn’s ‘The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars’ (1983), 
which accounts not just for the relations of the Jews with the eponymous nations, but also – more often than 
not, with an effect detrimental to the Jewish situation - with other ethnic minorities within the same state. 
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each minority, and for the divergent ways in which they were perceived by the majority 
nation, as well as for the variations in the claims they in return made on that majority 
nation, delivering, as promised, a ‘relational and interactive perspective’. But what is 
conspicuously missing from this account, is the relational interplay among these four 
minority groups, which, although largely living in segregation, did, in fact, interact in the 
sphere of politics, and especially in the sphere of minority politics.  
 
The same element is also noticeably missing from subsequent studies of ethnic 
conflict based upon Brubaker’s triadic model, or the enhanced ‘quadratic nexus’. Although 
many authors pay attention to the variances within a specific ethnic minority, or the 
variations among different minorities (especially those studies that have a historical 
component), no attempt has yet been made, as far as I am able to tell, to look into relations 
between different minorities and to link these to the other parts of the nexus, either triadic 
or quadratic. 
 
The ‘relational, dynamic, interactive approach to the nationalist conflict’, 
advocated by Brubaker (1996: 75), which was greatly enhanced by the addition of a fourth 
dimension of international organisations, would further benefit – in my opinion - from 
adding this ‘fifth element’ of the interplay between several national minorities, as I will 
demonstrate in Chapter Five of this thesis with the example of Baltic German and Jewish 
(and, to some extent, also Russian and Polish) communities in interwar Latvia. 
 
1.5.  Communitarianism vs. Liberalism 
 
Another theoretical framework instrumental for understanding the dynamics of 
nation-building and majority-minority relations in interwar Latvia is the distinction 
between a liberal (focus on the individual) and a communitarian (focus on the community) 
approach, as elaborated by Rawls (1971, 1993), Taylor (1989) and Walzer (1990). The 
liberal-communitarian debate is closely related to the previously discussed civic-ethnic 
distinction and the post-sovereignty theory in a sense that it also addresses the tensions 
created by the uneasy symbiosis of liberalism, the nation, and the state. 
 
This distinction was extended by Miller, in order to avoid simplistic duality, who 
divided communitarianism into three sub-categories: 1) communitarianism of the left, or 
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egalitarian; 2) communitarianism of the right, or authoritarian; and 3) communitarianism 
of the centre, or liberal. (Miller 2000: 97-107) 
   
All three types of communitarianism described by Miller featured prominently in 
the political discourse of the interwar republic.  Perhaps not surprisingly, as forging a new 
national state requires great social mobilisation and unity – in fact, it is ‘the communitarian 
understanding of life that lies at the basis of formation of a state’ (Pabriks 1997: 45). After 
the Latvian state was formed, the notions of the ‘nation’ and of the ‘state community’ were 
promptly elevated to a sacramental level in the political and public discourse, where they 
become untouchable for either questioning or criticism. Not just the national membership, 
but also the substrate membership in minority communities was defined strictly on 
collective terms. As a result, using Sandel’s (1992) descriptions, ‘the communitarian 
politics of the common good’ started to trump ‘the liberal politics of rights’.  
 
The detrimental effects of this erosion of liberal values on Latvian interwar politics, 
and on the post-1991 nation-building process have been previously observed by Pabriks 
(1997). I agree with Pabriks’s assessment that the unequivocal domination of 
communitarian values contributed to the collapse of Latvian democracy in 1934, and 
impedes the formation of a civic nation at present. I will further explore the balance 
between communitarian and liberal values in Latvian politics in the remaining chapters of 
this thesis.  
 
1.6. Beyond the Sovereign State  
 
The previous part of this chapter described how for many years, political theorists 
and historians have been studying the nation-state, trying to locate the source of the 
problem within the nation itself, out of a belief that if a democratic, liberal, and just version 
of nationalism could be achieved, then the problem of minorities would be successfully 
resolved. The civic concept of nationalism, liberal nationalism, and multiculturalism have 
all appeared as attempts to remedy the nation, but have paid little attention to the other side 
of the equation, the state, whose legally defined inalienable sovereignty has seemed to be 
fixed in stone. 
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The European Union brought with it changes to the established legal and political 
order, member states having voluntarily transferred some of their powers to the 
overarching EU institutions.  These new developments, coupled with the concerns about 
the effects of globalisation, increasing migration and ethnic diversity of the population, and 
the plight of stateless nations, stimulated a radically new contemporary way of thinking 
about the relationship between the state and the nation, which, in McCormick’s (1996: 
553) words, allowed to  ‘bracket off the nation for a moment, and reflect on the state’.  
 
Gottlieb (1993: 24) claims that ‘the fact that scores of nations are struggling for 
self-determination calls for fresh thinking about the relationship between states and 
nations’. According to Gottlieb, this relationship, which has been ‘sadly neglected’ since 
the treaty of Versailles, acquired new salience since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
The main question posited by Gottlieb is whether the existing system of states can be 
supplemented with – but not replaced by – ‘a new system of nations, with legal regimes 
capable of responding to the claims of the hundreds of peoples that still aspire to 
independence’ (Gottlieb 1993: 24). The international legal community, asserts Gottlieb, 
can be expanded beyond states and international organisations to the stateless peoples 
endowed with international legal status. (Gottlieb 1993: 39) 
 
MacCormick (1996: 554) posits that ‘the attempt to match up nations with states, 
and then to accord sovereignty to each state may be the true source of the evils we 
perceive’, and suggests that the ‘sovereign state as the essential model for legal security 
and political order’ may be up for revision (1996: 555). Speculating about the outcome of 
the revision of the old conceptions of state sovereignty and the absolutist nation-state, he 
claims that it does not necessarily mean the abolition of the nation, the state, and 
nationalism itself, but possibly a creation of ‘space for a new nationalism, an acceptable 
and even perhaps mandatory nationalism that it is intrinsically liberal in character’ 
(MacCormick 1996: 562).  
 
Habermas (1996: 128) identifies two sets of problems that the sovereign nation-
state has to confront today, namely the differentiation of civil society, and the existing 
trends towards globalisation; both, he claims, throw light on its historical limitations. 
Habermas (1996: 137) concludes that ‘in view of both the growing pluralism inside the 
national societies and global problems national governments face on the outside, the nation 
state can no longer provide the appropriate frame for the maintenance of democratic 
citizenship in the foreseeable future’. 
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Appadurai (1996), reflecting on the impact of increasing globalisation, and the 
‘deterritorialisation’ that accompanies it, on the modern world, declared that the nation is 
in crisis, and that ‘we need to think ourselves beyond the nation’ (1996: 158). According to 
Appadurai, ‘the nationalist genie’ has escaped ‘the bottle of the territorial state’, which 
could never perfectly contain it anyway, and, being carried by the increasingly mobile 
population, is not restrained by ‘ideas of spatial boundary and territorial sovereignty’, and 
is being replaced by ‘transnations’ and ‘transnationalism’.  
 
Keating (2001) advocates a what he calls plurinational state integrated in 
supranational and international systems, and believes that nationality claims can be 
reconciled through shared and divided sovereignty, where one’s status is negotiated within 
the constitutional order of the state. 
 
However, these ground-breaking reappraisals of the link between the state and the 
nation are not as novel as they may appear at a first glance. The idea of non-territorial 
cultural autonomy (NCA) developed by the Austrian Social Democrats at the turn of the 
19th and 20th centuries and described earlier in this chapter, already contained seeds of 
dissent from the veneration of the state, which would germinate in the works of their most 
devoted followers. Another popular idea at the time was the juridical concept of plural 
sovereignty elaborated by such thinkers as the French jurist L. Duguit, the Dutch legal 
philosopher H. Krabbe and the British political theorist H. J. Laski. Both of these concepts 
seriously challenged the territorially based sovereign nation-state.  
 
The theory of the a-national state developed by the Baltic German minority leader 
P. Schiemann, which was for the first time articulated from the podium of the second 
Nationalities Congress in 1926, linked the two theories described above, and effectively 
called for the separation of all ethnically cultural affairs from the political state unit.  M. 
Laserson, the Latvian Jewish minority leader, challenged the traditional model of 
relationship between minorities and the state in his book Staat, Souveränität und Minorität 
(1927). These minority thinkers from Latvia were not alone in their scepticism about the 
ability of the sovereign nation-state to treat all its residents equally. C. Macartney, who 
was recognised by the Royal Institute of International Affairs as the leading authority on 
the relationship between national states and national minorities, came to the conclusion 
that national states and national minorities were incompatible (Macartney 1934). A. 
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Cobban (1945) maintained that the culturally united nation-state as the sole basis of 
legitimate political organisation is untenable both in practice and in theory. 
 
In Chapter Five, I will examine, in brief, the original contribution made by Latvian 
minority thinkers, well ahead of their own times, to what nowadays is defined as ‘post-
sovereign’, or ‘postnational’ studies. 
 !
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Chapter Two: The Latvian Nation – Evolution of the Concept. 
1850-1918 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
By the end of the 18th century, after a succession of rule by foreign powers, all 
territories inhabited by Latvians, namely Vidzeme (Livland), Kurzeme (Courland), and 
Latgale (Lettgallia), had become part of the Russian Empire. The land-owning Baltic 
German nobility, however, after swearing allegiance to the new sovereign, largely kept 
control of local administration; the ethnically Latvian population remained in serfdom. 
After serfdom was gradually abolished by 1819, a new class of landless peasants emerged 
in the territories. In the 1860s, those peasants started migrating into the cities, where the 
newly developing industrial enterprises were hungry for labour.  In record time, the capital 
city of Riga was transformed from a sleepy provincial town into one of the biggest 
industrial centre of the Russian Empire, and its second-largest commercial port. In 1852, 
there were 65,413 people living in Riga; in 1914 – 520,000. In 1851, Riga counted 63 
factories; by 1910 that number increased to 324 (Skujeneeks 1922: 95). The gradual 
improvement of economic conditions stimulated cultural development; a rapidly widening 
network of elementary schools in the countryside, and of the higher education 
establishments in the cities, ensured the highest literacy level of the population of the 
Baltic provinces among the peoples of the Russian Empire. From the Latvian peasantry, 
and its newly formed working class, a national intelligentsia started to emerge. 
 
In the second half of the 19th century, the Latvian territories, much like the rest of 
Europe, were subjected to two social major forces: the emancipation of the bourgeoisie, 
and the rising labour movement. These two often-conflicting impetuses shaped the Latvian 
nation, and contributed to the diversity of its ideological base. According to Plakans 
(1995:92), it is misleading to speak of a specific programme or a coherent movement when 
describing the early stages of Latvian nationalist movement; besides known clusters of 
like-minded individuals in such centres as Dorpat, St Petersburg, Moscow and Riga, there 
were many people who ‘had come to their new beliefs on their own’. The same is true 
about the later stages of the nationalist movement – it borrowed many popular doctrines of 
the time; Latvian nationalism was exposed to various ideological influences, from German 
Romanticism to Kantian Idealism, from Russian ‘legal Marxism’ to German Orthodox 
Marxism (as well as, for some, Bolshevism), and, significantly, the Austro-Marxist ideas 
of non-territorial cultural autonomy.  
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The Latvian nationalist movement, also known in Latvia as the National 
Awakening, is traditionally divided into three periods: the First National Awakening dating 
from the 1850s to the 1880s, the Second National Awakening beginning around 1905 and 
leading to the proclamation of national independence in 1918; and the Third Awakening, 
starting in the late 1980s and resulting in the restoration of the Latvian Republic in 1991. 
 
The First National Awakening originated at the University of Dorpat (now Tartu, 
Estonia) where a group of young Latvian intellectuals got together to study Latvian 
folklore, Latvian history and to discuss the future of Latvian culture and language. This 
early national movement, which united students, essayists, scientists and poets, later 
became known as the Young Latvians, and quickly spread to other expatriate Latvian 
communities, in St Petersburg and Moscow, and to Riga itself. The most prominent Young 
Latvians were Kri!j"nis Valdem"rs, an essayist and economist; Kri!j"nis Barons, the 
founding father of Latvian folk studies; the poet and essayist Juris Alun"ns and Atis 
Kronvalds, a teacher and linguist. The Young Latvians focused primarily on the 
preservation and development of Latvian culture, language in particular; as well as on 
economic growth and the creation of Latvian financial capital. Although they did not have 
a particular political agenda, this did not prevent Baltic Germans from seeing them as a 
threat to the existing order of things. The publication of the newspaper P!terburgas Av"zes, 
edited by Barons, Alun"ns and Valdem"rs, which became a platform for discussion 
amongst nationalistically minded Latvians, was constantly hindered by the Baltic 
Germans’ complaints to the Russian Ministry of Interior demanding stronger censorship; 
the Young Latvians themselves and their cultural aspirations were constantly ridiculed in 
the German press.  
 
It may be said that this deepening confrontation with the Baltic Germans, which 
exacerbated the existing centuries-long grievances of ethnic Latvians, somewhat clouded 
the Young Latvians’ judgement and thus predetermined the future course of Latvian 
history. Scholars largely agree that at that particular moment, the movement could either 
have followed a course of slow democratisation and liberalisation of the existing 
administrative order, or, as actually happened, taken a radical pro-Russian stance in hope 
of a faster progress (Skujenieks 1913; Valters 1914; Plakans 1995; Butulis 2005). In 
Plakans’s (1995:100) words, ‘the Latvian nationalists’ flirtation with the Slavophile 
movement in Moscow and Saint Petersburg bore unexpected fruit’: Russian Senator 
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Manasein’s famous investigation, so actively supported by thousands of Latvian petitions, 
resulted not in the liberalisation of the existing order as widely hoped, but in subsequent 
decades of ruthless Russification, which was just as detrimental to Latvian national 
aspirations as it was to the Baltic Germans’ formerly privileged position. In a way, 
Latvians finally achieved the desired political equality with the Germans – both were now 
at the mercy of Russian bureaucrats who took over regional administration, educational 
establishments, courts and public institutions. Plakans (1995: 101) observes that ‘in this 
political game, the Latvians had been naïve’. Skujenieks (1913: 238), eighty-two years 
earlier, expressed a similar sentiment with a popular saying: ‘Where two are brawling, the 
third is laughing’. 
 
The Young Latvians awakened nationalistic sentiments in Latvians, but they did 
not come up with any kind of programme for the nationalist movement. Neither did they 
address pressing social issues such as the deepening economic inequality and class 
segregation within Latvian society; as a result, their influence upon the wider masses 
started to fade. By the 1880s, the movement had largely outlived its usefulness (Butulis 
2005).  
 
Its ideological successor, the New Current movement, which dates from the mid-
1880s, put social inequality and the lack of democratic governance at the centre of its 
agenda. But as the members of the New Current, led by J!nis Pliek"ans (Rainis) and 
P#teris Stu$ka, at the time largely subscribed to orthodox Marxist ideology, they rejected 
the cultural nationalism of the Young Latvians as irrelevant to the plight of the 
proletarians; neither were they interested in political autonomy. Indeed, Latvian essayist 
Ernest Blanks (1927) lamented that had the New Current followed the developments in 
European national and political thought, they would have discovered in the early nineties 
new ideas ‘much more appropriate for our situation’ – Springer’s [Renner’s] and Bauer’s 
works on the national question in multinational regions.1 But while the New Current did 
not pay much attention to the national question, they, through the newspaper Dienas Lapa, 
edited by Rainis and Stu$ka in turn, and through their numerous cells established in all 
major Latvian cities, tirelessly called for labour strikes and protest actions. By starting a 
                                                
1 Contrary to Blanks’s assumptions, P. Stu$ka was familiar with the works of Renner and Bauer; he has 
positively evaluated the latter’s contribution as ‘the first substantial work on the national question from a 
Marxist point of view’ (Stu$ka 1972: 88). However, Stu$ka ultimately rejected the Austro-Marxist vision as 
nationalism under a socialist label.  
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tradition of political activism, they, albeit inadvertently, made an important contribution to 
the future of the nationalist movement. 
 
From the New Current’s Marxist cells sprang the Social Democratic movement, 
which remained one of the principal forces shaping Latvian political life prior to World 
War Two. As elsewhere in Europe, the Social Democratic movement in Latvia was not 
homogeneous but united a whole spectrum of political opinions, from the orthodox 
Marxism of German and Russian Social Democrats preached by Bolsheviks, to the 
Austrian Marxism of Bauer and Renner advocated by Mensheviks, and socialism 
represented by the Bund. None of the above, however, remained indifferent to the national 
question. As these ideological differences are vital to understanding the nature of Latvian 
nationalism, the turbulent history of Latvian Social Democracy deserves a closer 
examination. 
 
The Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (LSDSP in its Latvian 
abbreviation), the first organised Latvian party ever, was founded in Riga in 1904 by J!nis 
Ozols, J!nis Jansons-Brauns and P"teris Stu#ka. The LSDSP initially united only 2,500 
Social Democrats of Latvian ethnic origin, whereas Social Democrats of Russian and 
Jewish ethnicity were members of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party and the 
Bund respectively – both of these organisations had local chapters in Riga. Therefore, the 
LSDSP was formed on a national basis (Apine 1974; Kalni$% 1956). In 1906, the LSDSP 
merged with the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDRP in its Russian 
abbreviation), becoming its territorial chapter under a new name – the Latvian Social 
Democracy. Importantly, in 1906, the party also absorbed about 500 Social Democrats of 
Russian ethnicity, and 80 of German ethnicity, therefore becoming multi-ethnic (Apine 
2005).  
 
The original 1904 programme of the LSDSP put forward four demands: national 
self-determination, autonomy for the provinces, equality for all nations, and free use of 
their mother tongues. It is worth noting that when it joined the RSDRP in 1906, the LSD 
added the caveat that it did not have to follow the RSDRP’s programme on the agrarian 
question. Butulis (2005) observes that it was a paradox of a kind that a party programme 
which ‘dogmatically followed’ the German Social-Democratic model abstained from 
agrarian demands.  
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Echoing disputes between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks of its Russian 
counterpart, the Latvian Social Democracy also witnessed constant rifts between the two 
ideologies, with the Bolsheviks, notably P!teris Stu"ka, repeatedly criticising the 
Mensheviks for putting the national question ahead of the social in their aspirations for 
Latvian national autonomy. Mensheviks, such as Mar#ers Skujenieks and Fricis Menders, 
reneged on Marxist dogma, adopting the views of Renner and Bauer on the national 
question, whereas the Bolsheviks P. Stu"ka, Fr. Rozi$%, J. Dani%evskis stuck to the 
orthodox Marxism of Engels and Kautsky. Bolsheviks largely dominated the LSD up to 
1917, while Mensheviks, despite their ideological differences, refrained from organising a 
separate faction (according to Ezergailis (1974: 26), Latvians did not officially split into 
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks because of their ‘fetish of unity’ and a lack of theoretical 
precision). There was yet another uniting factor for Latvian Marxists: as observed by 
&!rmanis (1968: 50), ‘…Latvian internationalists were by no means indifferent to the vital 
interests of their own nation, and in practice they were often more nationalistic than could 
be inferred from their dogmatic phraseology and from the attacks upon ‘the nationalistic 
bourgeoisie’ found in the Bolshevik press’.  
 
Although in 1914, the Bolsheviks had gained control of the party, in 1917 
Bolsheviks and Mensheviks together passed a resolution demanding Latvia’s right to self-
determination as an indivisible state made up of Vidzeme, Kurzeme and Latgale; overall, 
they cooperated on the question of autonomy (&!rmanis 1968). By 1918, the LSD had, 
however, finally split, with the Mensheviks re-establishing the LSDSP, and the Bolshevik 
faction of the LSD, led by P!teris Stu"ka, later founding the Latvian Communist Party. 
 
Another important Social Democratic organisation was the Social Democratic 
Union founded by Mi'elis Valters and Ernest Rolavs in Switzerland in 1903, although it 
always remained small in numbers. The Union, which was greatly influenced by the works 
of Austro-Marxists, took a somewhat more radical stance than the LSDSP on a number of 
issues, notably on agrarian reform – it demanded immediate re-distribution of the land. The 
unionists believed the LSDSP to be an unnecessary competitor which was destroying the 
unity of the socialist movement in Latvia by introducing ideas of Russian socialist 
revolutionaries - deemed inappropriate for Latvian circumstances by the unionists (Kalni$% 
1956). Nevertheless, the LSDSP enjoyed much wider popular support than the Union.  
 
Chapter 2: The Latvian Nation – Evolution of the Concept. 1850-1918 
 
 53 
Significantly, even before 1905, the Social Democratic Union had put forward the 
idea of decentralising and remodelling Russia as a federation. M. Valters, who was the 
editor of the newspaper Proletarietis at the time, voiced the idea of Russia’s 
‘decentralisation-disintegration’ as the only alternative to the existing order, in an article 
published in 1903 (Apine 1974:190). In 1905, in an article published in the newspaper 
Revolucion!ra Baltija, Valters came up with an even more radical solution – to create ‘as 
many states as there are nations in present-day Russia’. He did not, however, repeat this 
demand in his later works, as observed by Apine (2005:33). Dribins (1997:63) writes that 
Valters ‘was the first to lift the flag of national independence’. Ernests Blanks believes that 
the Social Democratic Union continued the National Awakening tradition and developed 
its ideology further, despite maintaining firm socialist positions. He calls them ‘national 
socialists’ (Blanks 1927:280). 
 
Despite the numerous ideological disagreements within the Latvian Social 
Democratic movement, it successfully merged the ideas of its predecessors, such as the 
cultural nationalism of the Young Latvians and the political activism of the New Current, 
with a strong focus on social issues. !"rmanis (1968) posits that Latvian political 
nationalism, which ‘burst out with great fervour in 1917’, was born within the Social 
Democratic movement. 
 
Apart from the Social Democracy, other nationalist-oriented Latvian parties sprang 
to life. The Latvian Democratic Party, whose programme demanded a democratic order in 
Russia and regional autonomy for Latvia, local autonomy in education matters, as well as 
universal suffrage, was founded in Riga in 1905. Its supporters came from the urban petite 
bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. Among its prominent members were A. Bergs, the editor of 
the newspaper Baltijas V"stnesis, and the philosopher P. Zal#te, who was also the author of 
one of the first detailed proposals for Latvian autonomy. Importantly, the Latvian 
Democratic Party was calling for full equality of rights for Latvian Jews (Dribins 2002: 
48). The right wing was represented by the People’s Party founded by F. Veinbergs, which 
took an openly anti-Semitic stance, and by the New Nationalists under the leadership of A. 
Niedra, who undertook to modernise the Young Latvians in a non-socialist direction, 
through the development of agriculture, industry, and Latvian culture.    
 
The revolution of 1905 arguably was not led by any particular political force in 
Latvia, but assumed a rather spontaneous character (the Social Democrats attempted to 
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assume leadership, but they proved not to be ready organisationally to exercise control at 
all times). According to Spekke (1948), after the revolution was brutally suppressed by the 
Russians, Latvia, despite heavy losses, emerged with a new self-confidence and a feeling 
of strength. The idea of Latvian autonomy, and possibly independence, seemed to linger in 
the air.  
 
2.1. The National Question and the Idea of Latvian Autonomy    
             
Although it would be the Social Democrats who brought together the national 
sentiment and the idea of Latvia as an autonomous unit, the early works on both the 
national question and on political autonomy were produced by authors with no partisan 
affiliation. The first known publication on the Latvian national question was Political 
Thoughts from Latvia (Politiskas domas iz Latvijas) by Fr!drihs Veinbergs, first published 
in Leipzig in 1885. Although it understandably contained no reference to Latvia’s 
autonomy, it attempted to link, albeit somewhat awkwardly, the previously separated 
issues of class segregation, economic inequality, national consciousness and foreign 
cultural domination in Latvia. In this sense, Veinbergs’s opus can be seen as a precursor of 
the later works on the national question by Latvian Social Democrats. 
 
An apologist for the upper classes as a necessary condition of social progress, 
Veinbergs devotes the larger part of his pamphlet to a historical overview of the English 
and French class systems, highlighting the calamities which befall the aristocracy when it 
starts to abuse its privileged position. As for Latvia, Veinbergs posits that with the 
worldwide spread of social democracy, the only two reasons it has not yet taken root in the 
Latvian soil are: 1) the lingering hope for long-awaited social reforms in the Baltic 
provinces of the Russian Empire; 2) the fact that socially and educationally advanced 
Latvians have not been alienated from the lower classes as yet, national interests holding 
them together. According to Veinbergs, the lower classes live in hope that as a result of 
social reforms the indigenous upper classes will have a bigger say in state administration 
and will thus be able to protect the Latvian lower classes from ‘excessive oppression’. The 
newly emerging Latvian upper classes, representing the majority of the population, should 
replace the German upper classes as local administrators. Such a change, argues 
Veinbergs, would meet no resistance on the part of the Russian government, as the peace 
and order which this changeover would ensure in the Baltic provinces are in their best 
interests. Furthermore, writes Veinbergs (1924: 81), the well-being of the Russian 
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language would also benefit from the new circumstances as ‘there is no doubt that 
Latvians, who share ethnic and linguistic roots with Russians [sic!], would be much more 
sympathetic towards the expansion of the Russian language than Germans’. 
 
Veinbergs’s conservative version of Latvian nationalism based upon the premise of 
the rule of Latvian upper classes had been ridiculed by his democratically-inclined 
contemporaries, like J. !akste and M. Valters, but, importantly, it stimulated further 
debates on the future of the Latvian nation, and even more importantly, of its necessarily 
democratic character. According to one of the members of the student corporation 
Austrums, J. !akste, a law student at the time, gave a highly critical paper on Political 
Thoughts from Latvia at a regular meeting of Austrums in Moscow. !akste countered 
Veinbergs’s thesis on the leading role of Latvian upper classes with the quote by Kr. 
Valdem"rs that ‘Latvian nation can only be democratic’, and was unanimously supported 
by his audience. (Kurmis 1973: 40) 
 
It still remains undetermined who exactly, how and when, first voiced the idea of 
Latvian autonomy, although many claims have been made to this effect. Quite possibly, 
the earliest mention of autonomy was made by Professor P#teris Z"l$te, a Latvian 
philosopher, editor, one of the founders of the Latvian State University, and a passionate 
adherent of Kantian philosophy. Z"l$te’s project for Latvian autonomy was first published 
in 1905, but according to the author, it was conceived and written during his studies at the 
University of Jena in 1891-1893, where he studied Plato, John Locke and Kant. According 
to Z"l$te, it was particularly Kant’s ideas and views on peoples’ self-determination (above 
all, those expressed in Perpetual Peace) that served as his main source of inspiration. 
However, due to censorship constraints, he could only publish his proposal under the title 
The Ideal of the State [Valsts Ide!ls] in the newspaper M!jas Viesis in 1905.  
 
Z"l$te’s ideal of the state is embedded with liberal individualistic values. The ideal 
state, according to Z"l$te, ‘is not and cannot be detrimental to either individual or public 
life; on the contrary, it should enhance them’2. The state’s responsibility, in his view, is ‘to 
cultivate the welfare of all its peoples [visu tautu], and all separate individuals; to ensure 
that everybody can live their natural lives and develop their abilities. However, this should 
be done in such a manner that will guarantee the harmonious common existence of 
different individuals and peoples’. Anybody, posits Z"l$te, should be able to determine his 
                                                
2 This and all further quotes per Z"l$te, P. ‘Valsts ideals’, Mahjas Weesis, 1905, Nr. 46, 47, 49.  
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own fate, while being guided by the reciprocal principle ‘do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you’. The same moral, he argues, applies to social life; nations have similar 
rights to self-determination. 
 
Z!l"te’s project for Latvian autonomy within the Russian Empire, which he insisted 
would only strengthen ties between the two, was clearly based upon democratic, inclusive 
principles:   
• ‘Latvia’ is defined as Southern Vidzeme, all of Kurzeme, and Inflantija (Latgale), 
which are populated by Latvians.  
• It remains a part of Russia, with which it shares a ruler and a common Parliament, 
which legislates in the matters pertaining to the whole Russian state.  
• Latvia, in addition, has its own constitution, its own Saeima, and its own governor, 
who will defend Latvian interests within the Russian government. 
• The Latvian Saeima consists of the legislative body and the executive body, which 
he calls the Ministry. The Ministers and the Chief Minister are elected by the 
legislators. The Latvian Saeima’s competence encompasses all matters apart from 
those under the Russian parliament’s responsibility. 
• The Saeima is elected by a secret ballot through direct general elections. 
• Suffrage belongs to every ‘eligible (cilv!ka ties"bu nezaud!jis) Latvian resident of 
21 years and over, regardless of gender, ethnicity and religious creed’.  
• The Russian government is responsible for: the civil list; all foreign relations (in 
politics and trade); financial matters; army recruitment; customs, taxes and excise 
tax; as well as post, telegraph and railway communications. Administration of the 
above on Latvian territory is the responsibility of the Latvian autonomous 
government. 
• All matters not mentioned above fall under the jurisdiction of the Latvian Saeima. 
• Latvian autonomy extends to school and church matters, as well as to agrarian 
matters. 
• This autonomy should be based upon universal suffrage through direct secret 
ballot; habeas corpus; the right to association; as well as freedom of speech, of 
assembly, and of the press.  
• Religion is separated from the State. 
• All subjects at school are taught in children’s mother’s tongue. 
• Religious dogma at schools is to be replaced by ethics or religious studies. 
• Schools are to be free from partisan or religious influences. 
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!"rmanis (1992) also believes that Z#l$te’s The Ideal of the State can be considered 
the first project for Latvian autonomy, which did not receive popular support due to the 
simple fact that the author was not associated with or supported by any political party or 
group. It was also an important step in the development of national theory as it contained 
many ideas that were progressive for its time. Pried$te-Kleinhofa (2008:19) observes that 
Z#l$te was the first Latvian philosopher to be interested both in nationalist theory and in 
nationalist politics.   
 
The next eight years produced no significant work on the national question. Ernests 
Blanks, one of the leading Latvian nationalist ideologues and himself a proponent of ethnic 
nationalism, writes bitterly in 1927 that the era between the revolution of 1905 and the 
First World War was Latvian nationalism’s ‘degradation period’, when the ‘national 
psyche gradually atrophied, and Social Democratic cosmopolitan propaganda reached a 
new high’ (Blanks 1994: 291).   
 
Blanks considered the publication of two significant works on the national issue by 
M. Skujenieks and M. Valters on the eve of World War One to be the beginning of a new 
chapter in Latvian nationalist thought, and lauded the two writers accordingly. An active 
contributor to the national question himself, Blanks seemed to be unable to gauge just how 
far his own increasingly chauvinistic view were removed from the views of his paragons. 
 
2.2. Three Latvian Nationalists 
 
It was the idea of non-territorial cultural autonomy (NCA) first introduced by the 
Austrian Social Democrat Karl Renner in his programmatic article Staat und Nation (1899) 
and further developed by his colleague Otto Bauer in the monumental Die 
Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (1906) that gave a new impetus to the 
Latvian national idea. It seemed that the NCA model elaborated by the Austrian Marxists 
had something to offer to everybody – it rendered the Marxists with an attractive option of 
reconciling socialist leanings with national pride, and provided the bourgeois national 
ideologues with some sort of vindication that truth was on their side all along. The theory 
itself rested upon the three fundamental premises; a sharp distinction between the nation 
and the state, the ‘personality principle’ freeing a national group from any territorial 
attachment, and the principle of pluralistic sovereignty allowing national communities to 
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take certain functions over from the state. Both Renner and Bauer repeatedly compared 
national associations with religious confessions, claiming that both are best separated from 
the state. After the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which the model aimed to salvage, had 
collapsed in 1918, the NCA model was abandoned by its authors. Nevertheless, it had a 
very strong impact on the political and philosophical thinking of the time, especially 
among the Social Democrats in Central and Eastern Europe. Many Latvian Social 
Democrats, like Skujenieks and Valters, were taken with the NCA idea and built their own 
theoretical work on its premises, albeit very selectively – Skujenieks (1913), for example, 
although extremely supportive of cultural autonomy in general, did not accept the non-
territorial principle, while Valters (1914) evaluated the advantages of cultural autonomy 
almost exclusively from the vantage point of ethnic Latvians, who were themselves an 
ethnic minority within the Russian Empire at the time. Latvian Bolshevik leader P. Stu!ka 
(1907), although ultimately rejecting the NCA principle, recognised the importance of 
Bauer’s work on nationality issues, and doled out some carefully worded praise for 
Skujenieks’s work as well. Even E. Blanks quoted some of Springer’s (K. Renner’s pen 
name) and Bauer’s definitions on an ad hoc basis (and usually to his own ends) in his 
essays.  
 
The main significance of this new chapter in the history of Latvian nationalist 
thought, inspired by Austro-Marxism, lies in the fact that it compelled Latvian theorists to 
finally address an issue which had to be addressed sooner or later, namely the ethnic 
diversity of the population of Latvian territories, and the possible impact of this diversity 
on the nature of the Latvian nation. According to the census of 1897, the last census 
carried out in the Russian Empire, Latvians comprised just 68.2 per cent of the population 
of the 17 Latvian districts3, with Russians being the biggest ethnic minority – 12.2 per 
cent, followed by Germans – 7.1 per cent, Jews – 6.2 per cent, Poles – 3.3 per cent, 
Lithuanians – 1.3 per cent, and Estonians – 0.9 per cent (Skujeneeks 1913: 191). This 
ethnic composition, especially in the absence of compact territorial settlements (most 
ethnic minorities, apart from those Jews restricted by the Pale of Settlement, tended to 
settle in the cities), presented a serious challenge to the Latvian national project. In fact, it 
was facing a dilemma: is the new Latvian nation inclusive of all residents, or does it belong 
solely to ethnic Latvians? This became the one issue on which Latvian democratically 
inclined nationalist thinkers widely differed.  
                                                
3 These included C"sis, Tukums, Valmiera, Jaunjelgava, Bauska, Dobele, Aizpute, Ventspils, Valka, 
Kuld#ga, Talsi, R#ga, Grobi$a, Ludza, R"zekne, Dinaburg (now Daugavpils), and %lukste districts.  
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The following three sub-chapters will examine the works of M. Skujenieks, who at 
the time was in favour of a civic Latvian nation; of M. Valters, another proponent of 
political unity for all residents, although of a slightly different persuasion; and of E. 
Blanks, who represented the competing version of ethnic nationalism.  
 
Both M. Skujenieks and M. Valters started their political careers as Social 
Democrats; both went on to become prominent Latvian politicians and were among the 
founders of the Latvian state, having famously contributed to the main state documents; 
and both were dedicated democrats who had their reputations tarnished because of the 
support they lent (albeit to a different degree – whereas Skujenieks became a member of 
the authoritarian government, Valters merely published a convivial newspaper article) to 
the authoritarian coup d'état of 1934. Skujenieks was a member of all four Parliaments in 
interwar Latvia, and twice held the post of prime minister (notably, of a left-wing 
government in 1926-28, and of a right-wing one in 1931-33). Valters had been a Minister 
of Interior in the first government of the independent Latvia for less than a year, before in 
September 1919 he left active politics altogether and resigned himself to diplomacy. After 
Latvia had been annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, Skujenieks was deported to 
Moscow where in 1941 he was shot. Valters after 1940 lived and worked in exile, and died 
in Nice in 1964.  
 
Ernests Blanks studied history and philosophy in Moscow, and was one of the 
leaders of the Latvian National Democratic Party, the members of which U. !"rmanis 
(1968: 51) credits as the ‘most active and vociferous spokesmen’ for the widest possible 
autonomy for Latvia. Blanks himself is also credited for being the first to openly express 
the idea of Latvia as a sovereign state, in 1917; and for authoring the term ‘Atmoda’, 
Latvian for ‘awakening’, which came to symbolise national renaissance. Blanks was a 
member of the National Council, but his main passion was journalism – he published 
dozens of articles on the national question, mainly in the newspapers ‘Latvijas Sargs’ and 
‘Latvijas Vestnesis’. He is also well known for his detailed account of the history of the 
Latvian nationalist movement,  
 
Skujenieks, Valters, and Blanks have gone down in Latvian history as prominent 
nationalist ideologists and ardent Latvian patriots committed to the idea of Latvia as a 
sovereign state and dedicated to the nation-building process. At the time when their major 
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works were published, their only point of ideological divergence was the role of ethnic 
minorities in that process. Let us take a look at each of their suggested versions of the 
future Latvian nation in turn. 
 
2.2.1. Mar!ers  Skujenieks, the Idealistic Nationalist  
 
It was with the publication of The National Question in Latvia [Nacion!lais 
jaut!jums Latvij!] by Mar!ers Skujenieks in 1913 that Latvian nationalism gained its own 
theoretical and analytical base. Skujenieks, already a dedicated socialist prior to the 1905 
revolution, broke ideological ranks with the Latvian Bolsheviks and together with another 
prominent Social Democrat, Felikss Ciel"ns, formed an informal Menshevik faction. 
According to #ilde (1985), Skujenieks was not able to blindly accept the ‘socialist dogma’ 
in its entirety, especially not the part about the worker not having or needing a Fatherland. 
Instead, Skujenieks became increasingly drawn toward the ideas of Austro-Marxists, 
notably Bauer. #ilde (1985:231) quotes one of Skujenieks’s roommates during his student 
years in Moscow, who remembers that Skujenieks did not pay much attention to his studies 
at the university so taken was he by the National Question, spending his days at the 
Rumyancev library reading up the relevant literature and taking notes. B. Kalni$% 
(1956:90) writes that ‘Latvian Marxists, criticising M. Skujenieks, gave him the nickname 
“sheepish nationalist”, still hoping that he would return to Marxist views’. Skujenieks, 
however, persisted in his beliefs, and went on to publish The National Question in Latvia, 
which probably remains the widest account of nationalism written in the Latvian language 
up to the date. 
 
The National Question in Latvia owes a significant debt to Bauer’s theoretical work 
on the subject, especially to The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy (1907), 
and particularly in relation to disproving the alleged antagonism between class and 
national belonging. Skujenieks (1913: 137), too, sees no contradiction between class 
struggle and national aspirations, and claims that it was a mistake on the part of Latvian 
Marxists to fail to see that ‘there are many different kinds of nationalism in existence and 
that nationalism per se is not necessarily retrograde’.  
 
The main body of his book, however, is an ambitious take on the general theory of 
nationalism, which sets it apart from the writings of his contemporaries, certainly in Latvia 
and quite possibly also abroad. It is challenging to give a comprehensive review of his 
Chapter 2: The Latvian Nation – Evolution of the Concept. 1850-1918 
 
 61 
monumental work within the constraints of this thesis, but it is important to note that it is a 
generally accepted view among nationalism scholars that no attempts at the general 
academic study of nationalism had been made prior to the end of WWI, and that it was the 
early works of Hayes and Kohn which marked the first steps in the development of 
nationalism theory (Smith 1998: 10; Özkirimli 2000: 12-13). In this light, the work of the 
Latvian statistician (Skujenieks was the founder of the Latvian State Statistics Board) 
published in 1913 seems all the more remarkable.   
 
In his seminal work, Skujenieks gives an overview of the rise of nationalism 
worldwide, re-evaluates existing definitions, suggests his own typology of nationalism, 
analyses current trends and the latest developments both at home and abroad, and sketches 
his own vision of the future of Latvia as an administratively autonomous region of Russia. 
His work is not without fault – similar to Bauer (as critiqued by Nimni (1991: 143)), he 
attempts to address the national question from an ideological position different from that of 
orthodox Marxism while still using, largely uncritically, many of the classical Marxist 
analytical tools. This often affects his line of reasoning, at times making his argument 
unclear, or leading to contradictions; these theoretical ambiguities are most pronounced in 
Skujenieks’s treatment of the relationship between class and national identities, and of the 
role of different classes as agents of social change.  
 
In the introduction, Skujenieks outlines the genesis of nationalism, closely 
following the Marxist tradition (which was one of the major contributing factors to what is 
now known as the modernist theory of nationalism) - i.e. he links the emergence of 
nationalist sentiment with modern capitalist development, market expansion and improved 
communications. He observes the paradox between the growing need for a common 
language of communication (Skujenieks does not name Esperanto, but refers to the 
‘attempts to create such an international language of communication’), deterioration of 
particular national traits and the strive for international culture stimulated by recent 
economic developments on the one hand, and the worldwide process of national 
awakening during the last century, on the other. ‘Consolidation of small and dependent 
nations can be observed everywhere. Many nations [tautas], which seemed to be petrified, 
which did not show any signs of development, suddenly started to awaken from their 
centuries-long slumber.’ (Skujeneeks 1913: 6) Notably, Skujenieks does not confine his 
scope to Europe, which would be characteristic for writers at the time: besides Hungarians, 
Czechs, Finns and Irish, he mentions national awakening and ‘determination for national 
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and political independence’ in Turkey, Egypt, Persia, India, China, and Japan. Skujenieks 
posits that the aforementioned contradiction between globalisation and particularism 
dissolves when one has a closer look at its causes, which should be sought in economic 
development: ‘Close ties between different nations, which grew particularly strong with 
advent of the capitalist order, call for a commonly understood language. But capitalism’s 
development inside each respective country brings about nationalism for the peoples.’ 
(Skujeneeks 1913: 7) 
 
Nationalism does exist, asserts Skujenieks (1913: 7) and its potential great power is 
often abused: ‘No matter where we look, we encounter developments that are, justifiably 
and not, connected to the national question. The word ‘nationalism’ is assigned different 
meanings. All kinds of economic and political projects are being justified by defending 
national interests and nationalism.’ He notes the enormous impact that nationalism has on 
the international scene: ‘Relationships among the nations are also changing. Nations that 
have been recently oppressed themselves are now oppressing others, as, for example, 
Hungarians. New nations are entering the world political scene, and international relations 
are getting more complex.’ (Skujeneeks 1913: 7) Skujenieks summarises international 
developments afflicted by the rise of nationalism: the Balkan War, which liberated 
Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks from the Turkish dominance, annexation of Polish lands in 
the Eastern German provinces ‘under the pretext of German national interests’, and the 
ethnic conflict between German and Czech workers in Austria. He posits that in the name 
of Russian national interests, native language rights are being infringed upon in the Baltic 
provinces, while in the name of nationalism, Irish rights are being curbed and Boer lands 
are being conquered in Africa.  
 
Skujenieks (1913: 8) grasped the extreme complexity of nationalism, which he 
calls ‘one of the most complicated issues of today’, and its ever-changing nature and 
ability to adapt to particular circumstances: ‘…National aspirations and demands are not 
identical everywhere. They change depending on the time and the place. They do not 
contain universal norms applicable in every situation.’ He is not mistaken about 
nationalism’s destructive powers, either – he calls them ‘the dark additives’. But he insists 
that as the nation has become an important social phenomenon, it deserves the closest 
attention. The purpose of his book, he writes, is ‘to discuss national relations in Latvia and 
therefore, at least to some measure, to clarify the question of how the common life of 
people belonging to different ethnicities can be organised’. It is important, he claims 
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(Skujeneeks 1913: 10), ‘because the central question of the national problem is how to 
arrange the common life of different peoples within one state or region.’ This latter 
statement sets Skujenieks radically apart from his Latvian predecessors and 
contemporaries alike, who interpreted the national question exclusively from the 
perspectives of the cultural and economic emancipation of the ethnic Latvian nation, and 
of the goal of political autonomy or independence for this ethnic nation. Non-Latvian 
ethnic groups were either omitted from these designs, or mentioned exclusively in relation 
to minority rights provisions (with the exception of M. Valters, who considered association 
with other ethnic groups a precondition for political unity, but more on this later). Making 
the co-existence of different ethnic groups within one political unit central to the national 
project, Skujenieks laid a theoretical foundation for the Latvian civic nation. 
 
A social scientist by calling, Skujenieks starts his second chapter by stressing the 
necessity of working out a definition of the nation – no easy task given the ambiguity of 
the term. In this regard he quotes Kautsky: ‘The nation is the social relationship, which 
constantly develops and which assumes different content under different circumstances; 
the nation is like Proteus, and every time we try to seize it, it metamorphoses into 
something else or disappears entirely; nevertheless, it continuously exists and greatly 
influences us’ (Skujeneeks 1913: 10-11). Despite the anticipated difficulties in defining the 
nation, he continues, it is absolutely necessary because ‘if we accept a wrong definition, 
we from the very beginning lay a wrong foundation to our enquiry and cannot be sure 
about the validity of our conclusions’. (Skujeneeks 1913: 11) Besides, observes 
Skujenieks, there is already a plenitude of definitions in existence that do not satisfy the 
very basic theoretical requirements. 
 
Skujenieks (1913: 13-14) provides an extensive critique of the then-existing 
definitions of nation and nationalism. It is highly erroneous, he claims, to equate the terms 
nation and state. Skujenieks argues that states where a particular ethnic group is contained 
within the same political unit are in a minority in the world, and concludes that the borders 
of nation and state should not necessarily coincide.  
 
We can be certain that the nation is a community, he states. But it is not the only 
existing community as there are also state communities, class communities, professional 
communities, city communities, street communities, single house communities, etc. He 
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muses that the passengers of a certain ship also constitute a community of a kind. So how 
can the nation be theoretically separated from all these other communities uniting people?  
 
The most popular definition, continues Skujenieks, is that the nation is a language 
community. He argues that language is not the only characteristic of a nation, and besides, 
a common spoken language does not necessarily make people into a nation (here he 
borrows heavily from Chapter One of Bauer’s (1906) The Question of Nationalities and 
Social Democracy; all the examples Skujenieks uses to illustrate his point, come from 
Bauer’s book – English and Irish, Danes and Norwegians, Serbs and Croats; as well as 
Jews). Skujenieks stipulates further that although Jews are a nation [tauta], they have long 
lost their common language and adopted the languages of the countries they live in (with 
the exception of Russian Jews who, he says, speak Yiddish (but not the original Hebrew) 
among themselves). However, a Russian-speaking Jew, claims Skujenieks, is well aware of 
the fact that he belongs to the same community as a Latvian- or a German-speaking Jew.  
 
As for nation as a community united by blood ties, Skujenieks (1913: 14-15) 
concedes that the times when this statement rang true are long gone. Skujenieks is 
convinced that differences in ethnic provenance do not affect national unity; the blood 
relationship is overvalued. He notes ironically that although the noble Baltic German 
family of Lieven traces its descent line from the Livonian traitor Kaupo, nobody would 
seriously think of calling them Livs4. Besides, he observes, assimilated members of the 
nation are often the most dedicated ones (Skujeneeks 1913: 15). 
 
Those who claim that a nation is a community created by the sense of belonging 
shared by its members, continues Skujenieks (1913: 18), base their theory solely on 
psychology, and not on objective criteria. Many people, perhaps even a majority of them, 
are not even conscious of belonging to a particular nation (he provides an example of an 
average Latgalian, who, when asked about his nationality, would usually answer that he is 
a Catholic, an Old Believer, or a Russian Orthodox5). Nevertheless, he continues, nations 
do not cease to exist simply because their members are not actively aware of belonging to 
a nation. 
 
                                                
4 Livs, or Livonians – indigenous people of Livonia, or Livland (nowadays – north-western Latvia and south-
western Estonia). Kaupo, their leader, lived in the 13th century. 
5 Latgale – a south-eastern part of Latvia with a distinctive culture created through the strong influence of 
Roman Catholicism and Slavic cultures. 
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Common fate, asserts Skujenieks, is an important but not a decisive factor in the 
makeup of a nation. He supports his statement with the argument that although there is a 
lot of commonality in the historical fate of Latvians, Estonians and Finns, they have never 
merged into one nation. Often, the nation has been historically divided into several parts, 
whose historical experiences differ, but they stay one nation nevertheless. 
 
Religion, writes Skujenieks, should not been viewed as a factor contributing to a 
common nation. Latvians, for example, belong to four major confessions – Lutheran, 
Catholic, Russian Orthodox, and Baptist. He counters the wide spread assumption that the 
division between Baltic and Latgalian Latvians is based in their faith differences, arguing 
that the main reason for existing differences is the uneven economic development in the 
regions. 
 
Skujenieks then calls into question the territorial principle, according to which a 
nation is a community of people inhabiting the same territory. Again, he concedes that in 
the past there were certain large areas that were ethnically homogenous, and for some parts 
of the world, like Russia’s central regions, it may still be true. Overall, however, the 
capitalist development brought with it a huge admixture of people everywhere, especially 
in big industrial cities. At the same time, the multiethnic composition of the population of 
Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires is often defined not so much by economical, as by 
political considerations. Skujenieks observes that although Latvians are a majority in 
Latvia overall, there are cities in Latvia where they are a minority. National territory, as a 
territory that is mainly populated by members of a certain ethnic group, cannot be equated 
with a nation, he argues.  
 
The ‘most commonly used and abused definition’ is the one that characterises a 
nation as a community united by common interests, argues Skujenieks from a typical 
Marxist perspective. He asserts that the so-called ‘Latvian interests’ which are being 
constantly exploited by the Latvian press are in reality the interests of its bourgeoisie only, 
and that the class segregation in modern society is so advanced that there can be no 
commonality of interests among representatives of different classes apart from a handful of 
issues (which he will discuss at a later stage). 
 
The main deficiency of the existing definitions, concludes Skujenieks (1913: 19-
20), is the fact that they tend to treat the nation as a constant, as something fixed and 
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unchanging; whereas in reality a nation is a living organism, which constantly evolves and 
changes its characteristics in response to external conditions. Therefore it is totally 
erroneous to talk of national spirit as of something with which the nation has been 
inculcated since ancient times, which has been preserved since then, and which will always 
guide the nation towards its historical mission. National character is not at all unalterable 
and rigid, neither is it perpetual. This is not to undermine the importance of national 
character, he continues, as all the metamorphoses in the national history have been 
imprinted upon it, as if written in stone, and can be therefore called the ‘national history 
petrified’ – a paraphrase of Bauer’s ‘The inherited characteristics of a nation are nothing 
but the precipitate of it past, its solidified history [erstarrte Geschichte], so to speak.’ 
(Bauer 2000:32). 
 
The notion of variability of national character was borrowed by Skujenieks from 
Bauer; he makes a direct reference to Bauer’s statement that a study of the national 
question should begin with a conception of national character. He then closely follows 
Bauer’s argument on the relationship between the national and the class characters, and on 
their relative strength in forging community ties. One does not exclude the other, the 
difference between the two is the transitory nature of the class character – it is bound to 
disappear as soon as the class segregation is removed; the national character, however, will 
remain and flourish. 
 
Skujenieks posits that the national character and the national culture make a 
nation, the third component being a national language. His definition is in substance very 
close to Bauer’s (2000: 103-104) community of nature (hereditary features plus acquired 
traits from exposure to historical conditions passed from one generation to another) and 
community of culture, though the terms differ slightly. Skujenieks’s interpretation of 
national culture (1913: 25-29) is an amalgam of Marxism, cosmopolitanism and national 
romanticism. He defines it by refuting two hypothetical objections to the notion. First, that 
national culture does not exist, and that culture itself is by definition international. Second, 
that all members of the same nation do not share the same culture because of class 
differences, and it is therefore more legitimate to talk about a class, rather than a national, 
culture. In response to the first objection, he argues that prominent historical, philosophical 
and economical teachings and thinking do not belong to one nation only; they transcend 
national borders and are owned by every cultured person in the world. Therefore by 
content culture is international. But the nation’s cultural achievements can only gain 
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international outreach through the medium of language. Skujenieks argues that if Faustus 
had not been translated into other languages, it would remain merely a German cultural 
treasure, similar to the work of the Latvian poet Rainis, which belongs only to Latvians.  
Therefore, although culture is international in content, it is national in form.  
 
Slujenieks makes a reservation that this definition cannot be attributed in full 
measure to cultural achievements expressed through other means than spoken and written 
word, i.e. sculpture, paintings, music – these are accessible to any cultural nation’s 
members in their original form, and the national component is of lesser importance. For 
example, he notes, although music of Grieg, Sibelius and Kalni!" (Latvian composer 1879-
1951) is mainly inspired by Northern motives, it is not as if these composers cannot be 
comprehended by Southerners.  
 
As for the second objection, Skujenieks (1913: 29-31) separates two issues: the 
provenance of cultural products, and actual access to them. For him, class influence is most 
obvious in historical and economical works; but when it comes to natural sciences, it is 
absurd to talk about workers’ or bourgeois botany, astronomy, medicine, etc. A nation as a 
community owns the whole body of cultural works, which belongs to all its members 
without class distinctions. A different matter, however, is whether all members of the 
nation can enjoy access to it. Skujenieks asserts that although at the time of writing 
national culture belongs almost solely to the propertied classes, there is an unmistakable 
tendency towards its democratisation. Once again he shows his solidarity with Marxists by 
supporting Bauer’s view on the central role of the working class in this democratisation.   
 
Moving on to the next chapter, Skujenieks (1913: 39-40) introduces the dichotomy 
of nations with history and nations without history. Similarly to Bauer, he distances 
himself from the classical Marxist interpretation of this distinction, which in Nimni’s 
(1995: 66) words ‘had been a source of both embarrassment and amazement for a 
considerable number of commentators within the Marxist tradition’, and attempts to apply 
the dichotomy while omitting its deterministic component. Skujenieks emphasises that the 
distinction is strictly terminological, that in reality there is no such thing as a nation 
without traditions and history. Nations with history, he writes, are the ones that are 
politically independent class societies. Nations without history are those that at some point 
lost their independence and yielded real power to the ruling classes of other nations, 
turning themselves into an oppressed nation of peasants who are not constant actors in 
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either cultural or political life. Through the prism of this definition, Skujenieks reviews the 
Latvian history of German domination, the advent of capitalism and the birth of Latvian 
middle classes. He asserts that nations without history have a right to existence alongside 
the historical ones; argues that their culture, albeit much less developed in depth and scope, 
should not be perceived as inferior. Skujenieks also stresses importance of public 
education in the national language for the national development, and warns of the dangers 
of Russification. 
 
While passionately arguing against assimilation in any form, Germanisation or 
Russification alike, and insisting upon the utmost importance of the national language and 
public education in that language for the nation’s cultural development and for its very 
existence, Skujenieks demonstrates a clean break with the classical Marxist tradition, 
within which assimilation of small stateless nations into bigger ones is both inevitable and 
highly desirable. But while recognising the multiethnic and multicultural nature of Latvia 
and insisting on the importance of a common national language at the same time, 
Skujenieks does not address the inbuilt tension between the two; he merely predicts that 
that ‘a very complicated language issue lies ahead of us’ (1913: 163). But the language 
issue, a major stumbling block in the practical implementation of the theory of cultural 
autonomy, had not been sufficiently addressed by any of its famous proponents of the time, 
including K. Renner, O. Bauer, or Skujenieks’s fellow countryman P. Schiemann. 
 
From the theoretical part of his book, Skujenieks moves on to practical questions, 
first of all to the necessity of a long-awaited municipal reform in the Baltic provinces. 
Observing that in the absence of universal suffrage interethnic relations in Latvia have not 
come under particular strain, Skujenieks  imagines the ‘multicultural’ sessions of a 
democratically elected Landtag of the Livland province:  
 
... If every 10,000 residents delegated a representative to the Landtag on a proportional 
basis, there would be 56 Latvian deputies, 51 Estonian, 10 German, 7 Russian, and 4 deputies 
belonging to the other ethnic groups. …It is hard to imagine such a Landtag having boring 
sessions!’  
(Skujeneeks 1913: 161-162) 
 
Skujenieks provides a sketch of the ethnic diversity of the Latvian population and 
the problems it causes in everyday life:  
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Several peoples live side by side in our homeland. Not even side by side, but rather in a 
most colourful mixture. …. And instigation of national hatred is a common phenomenon. All the 
time we hear about the ‘German Cause’ and about national struggle against those belonging to 
other ethnic groups.   
(Skujeneeks 1913: 116)  
 
But how to change these conditions, asks Skujenieks? His answer is wide political 
and cultural autonomy through democratically elected local governments: ‘Such 
establishments will be able to secure and extend the language rights of different ethnic 
groups.’ But unlike his main sources of inspiration, Austro-Marxists, Skujenieks is not 
quite ready to give up the territoriality principle: ‘At the same time, the coverage of a 
municipal authority should comply with the given ethnic group’s settlement area’ (1913: 
285). 
 
Notably, Skujenieks (1913: 139) distinguishes between a Nationalstaat (France, 
England, and Scandinavian countries), in which ethnic and geographic borders coincide, 
and a Nationalitetenstaat [sic.] (Austrian, Russian and Ottoman Empires), where people 
belonging to different ethnic groups live side by side or in a colourful mixture within the 
same state, and stresses that they produce two different kinds of nationalism.  In an 
ethnically homogenous national state, he writes, where the words ‘people’ and ‘nation’ are 
interchangeable, and education in a native tongue is a given, ‘the national question has no 
place at all, and it does not permeate the minds of the working classes’. It is, claims 
Skujenieks, the aggressive nationalism of the bourgeoisie, indistinguishable from 
imperialism, militarism, and colonialism, which gave the very word ‘nationalism’ its 
current bad connotations (1913:140). But the nationalism of states composed of different 
nationalities, argues Skujenieks, is an entirely different matter. Oppressed nations fight for 
recognition of their own national rights, like the right to use their mother tongue in public 
communication and to get education in this tongue, not for domination over other peoples 
(1913:144). But despite insisting that the ‘aggressive nationalism of the bourgeoisie’, 
which is in its essence a struggle for power, and the ‘cultural nationalism of the working 
classes’, which is a struggle for basic rights, are two separate phenomena born of different 
circumstances, Skujenieks allows that they can also overlap and merge. Moreover, he 
posits that once the goal of ensuring basic linguistic and political rights is achieved, the 
cultural nationalism of the national proletariat could be hijacked by its power-hungry 
members in order to satisfy their own ambition of gaining advantage over other ethnic 
groups. Skujenieks (1913:143) warns that this alarming tendency can already be detected 
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within the Latvian national movement, referring to an article published on 25th January 
1911 by the liberal socialist newspaper Jaun! Dienas Lapa, which stated that if Baltic 
Germans did not yield to Latvian and Estonian demands for equal rights without a bitter 
struggle, ‘then it would be only natural that, after Latvians and Estonians win, which is 
largely a question of time, they would also treat local Germans not from a position of 
justice, but from a position of power.’6 
 
Skujenieks laments that the ‘national struggles among different peoples’ are being 
mentioned on a daily basis in the Baltic political press. Many social groups, he observes, 
claim that all their political actions are based solely upon national premises. The Riga city 
council elections of 1913 were presented in the Latvian press as a ‘historical fight among 
Latvians and Germans’, while a ‘united Latvian party’ promised to safeguard Latvian 
national interests. According to Skujenieks, the actual fight that took place was actually 
among the Latvian and German bourgeoisie, not among the ‘peoples’, and aptly reasons 
that in the situation where only one per cent of the population enjoys suffrage, it is 
unreasonable to talk about popular support. ‘…Also during election to the State Duma 
nationalistic chords had been pinched and patriotic songs had been sung. It was done by 
Russian nationalists, by German press, and by a bigger part of Latvian press.’ (Skujeneeks 
1913: 116-117) 
 
This national struggle, asserts Skujenieks putting on his Marxist hat again, is in 
reality a masked class struggle. To support his claim, he produces a rather unorthodox 
interpretation of the ‘traditional struggle against Germans’. Skujenieks is convinced, 
despite continuous (over fifty) years of attacks by the Latvian press on the privileges of 
Baltic Germans, that Germans in Latvia as an ethnic group do not enjoy privileges since 
decades ago. He argues that the Baltic Germans lost all their political privileges after the 
amendments to the Baltic Provinces’ Constitution in the 1880s and the start of 
Russification.  Baltic Germans had been replaced by Russians, claims Skujenieks: 
administration, courts, schools are now in hands of Russian bureaucrats. If Germans still 
play a big role in the Baltics, insists Skujenieks, it is because they represent an 
economically strong group in the region - Baltic industry, wholesale trade, and significant 
land ownership still belong largely to them. They do not, however, possess any advantages 
that would be stipulated by the law. For the sake of fairness, continues Skujenieks, not all 
Germans are big-shot capitalists; there is also a significant number of workers and 
                                                
6 ‘Latweeschi 1910. gad!’, Jaun! Deenas Lapa, 12.01.1911 
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tradesmen among them. So whatever advantages there have, they are, strictly speaking, 
ensured not by belonging to the German nation (tauta), but rather by a certain prosperity 
level. The Baltic Germans, claims Skujenieks, nowadays do not enjoy full political rights 
just as Latvians do not.  
 
Further on, Skujenieks critically evaluates the past of the Latvian nationalist 
movement. All leaders of the Latvian national movement without exception, claims 
Skujenieks, were ideologists of the petite bourgeoisie. The creation of the petite 
bourgeoisie, especially the class of small landowners, and its development and 
consolidation had been the main goals pursued by the nationalist leaders. Skujenieks 
believes that economy played central role in the early nationalist movement, and that 
economic emancipation was put ahead of nationalistic demands. He cites the absence of 
the real protest against Russification at the time as the evidence of just how little attention 
was paid to equal rights for all citizens and to the legal status of the Latvian language. The 
Germans’ position in the Baltic was very strong, he notes, and the citizens of the 
autonomous Baltic provinces (peasants excluded) to a very large extent defined their own 
destiny. The central government in the past had no habit of interfering in the Baltic internal 
affairs, and all important matters were dealt with by the Landtags and municipal 
governments. Skujenieks observes that the Baltic Satversme of the time contained many 
viable principles; however, it was a mixture of both progressive and retrograde norms, 
especially in relation to the existing class/guild system. He posits that the common opinion 
among Latvians, Estonians, and partly also among Germans, in the past was that the 
municipalities’ wide area of authority should be preserved by any means, but that the 
electorate should be extended – in other words, the initial goal of the nationalist movement 
was democratisation of the existing system.  
 
However, continues Skujenieks, Latvian nationalist leaders of the first generation 
did not find this path particularly promising, especially not within the nearest future, and 
therefore turned for help elsewhere (outside the Baltics). It had been ceremoniously 
announced that Latvians, in fact, are Slavs suffering under the German yoke, and that other 
Slavic peoples ought to reach out a helping hand. Skujenieks mentions that the newspaper 
‘Kronshtadskii Vestnik’ was the first to call Latvians Slavs in 1862; in 1865 K. Biezb!rdis, 
the first Latvian linguist, writes about Latvians as ‘die jüngeren Brüder der Slavischen 
Welt’ (Skujeneeks 1913:125) Now, observes Skujenieks, the view that Latvians are Slavs 
has been largely discarded, but at that time the all-Slavic theory was blossoming. The 
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Russian Slavophiles were a force to be reckoned with – they were somewhat feared by the 
government; and many Slavophiles themselves occupied high positions in the Russian 
government. With the support of the Slavophiles, the Latvian nationalist movement stood a 
very good chance of getting rid of the Baltic German domination, but Russification was the 
price to pay. According to Skujenieks, some of the farsighted nationalist leaders 
understood very well that it would be much more difficult to defend Latvian national 
identity from the Russification than from the Germanisation attempts. But the union with 
the Slavophiles held a promise of quick economic emancipation, which was the ultimate 
goal of the nationalists, and for the sake of it they were ready to sacrifice demands for 
schooling and public administration in the national language (Skujeneeks 1913:125).  
 
Nationalists achieved their goals – German domination had been uprooted, and 
Latvians were freed from the dictate of guilds, corporations and other exclusive in 
character German establishments. But in exchange for civic and economic rights, posits 
Skujenieks, Latvians traded in their own cultural development. According to Skujenieks, 
early nationalist leaders, such as Kr. Valdem!rs and Fr. Br"vzemnieks, endorsed 
Russification. 
   
At the next stage of the nationalist movement, while bourgeoisie continued its 
perpetual ‘struggle against Germans’, continues Skujenieks, the New Current leaders 
dedicated all their efforts to a fight against what they labelled ‘pseudo-nationalism’, 
ignoring the actual changes in interethnic relations in the Baltics, and crusading against 
any kind of nationalism, which they considered an outdated and condemnable 
phenomenon. Skujenieks deems it a crucial mistake made by the Latvian Marxists, which 
can be explained by the fact that Marxism came to Latvia through the works of German 
and Russian orthodox Marxists, who tirelessly condemned nationalism as reactionary. 
Therefore, also in Latvia for a time nationalism became a synonym of reaction.  
 
True to his professional calling, Skujenieks supplies an abundance of statistical 
data on Latvian territory and demography, and runs numeric comparisons between Latvian 
territories and other European countries. He observes that Latvia’s ethnic composition 
constantly changes, and comes up with his own classification of different population 
groups.  
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Latvians, according to Skujenieks, are the indigenous population of the territories. 
They were later joined by the non-Latvians, who can be divided into two large sub-groups: 
1) non-Latvians, who were born and raised in Latvia, whose ancestors had been living in 
Latvia for centuries, and 2) new settlers, who consider some other region outside Latvia to 
be their motherland, and who plan to reside in Latvia for a short period of time, as well as 
those who have recently arrived but plan to stay for a longer period of time.  If Latvians are 
the indigenous people, continues Skujenieks, then those non-Latvians belonging to the first 
group are the local residents, whereas those belonging to the second group are the new 
settlers. Baltic Germans had been living side by side with Latvians for centuries. Russian 
Old Believers had been living in Latvia for many generations too; same with the Jews, 
especially in the Kurzeme region. Therefore local residents are comprised of: 1) Latvians 
as indigenous people, 2) Germans, 3) Russian Old Believers, and 4) Jews.   
 
Skujenieks, however, is no slave to the rigid classification, especially if it impedes 
scientific accuracy. It goes without saying, he writes, that in reality, there are many new 
settlers among the members of the latter three groups. Likewise, there are many local 
residents among the Orthodox Russians, Lithuanians and Poles. But overall this 
classification is correct, says Skujenieks, and supports it with the following original 
evidence. According to him, in all European countries apart from Greece the absolute 
number of women will always be bigger than that of men.  As these are the men who 
traditionally get uprooted and start migrating in search of better-paid work, by comparing 
proportion of male and female residents across the different groups of population, it easy to 
distinguish between the permanent residents and the new settlers. For example, in 
Kurzeme (date of data collection unspecified) for each hundred of male residents, there 
were 111 Latvian females, 118 German, 108 Jewish, 17 Belarussian and 44 Russian 
Orthodox females. (Skujeneeks 1913: 208-210)  
 
Writing about Russification and the colonisation of the Baltic provinces by Russian 
peasants, Skujenieks does not let emotion to cloud his objectivity. Likening Russian 
settlers to the vandals destroying a superior economic culture, he supports his statement by 
describing different agrarian techniques brought along by the Russian settlers but 
unsuitable for the Latvian less fertile soil; he writes of the destruction of the superior 
agrarian methods that were already in place; about the settlers’ overall conservative and 
parochial ways, which prevented their accommodation or assimilation within the Latvian 
society. But he makes an immediate reservation that the settlers themselves are not to be 
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blamed, but rather those who had implemented those conscious colonisation policies. 
Despite acknowledging that Russification is detrimental for Latvian cultural development, 
Skujenieks remains optimistic about the future: ‘The numbers of Russian colonists in the 
Baltics will always remain smaller than local population. It had been repeatedly observed 
that settlers of a lower culture gradually try to merge with the culturally better developed 
environment and little by little change their identity.’ (Skujeneeks 1913: 219) 
 
Commenting on the present-day state of Latvian nationalism, Skujenieks remarks 
that some liberal conservatives are ready to infringe on the rights of other ethnic groups for 
the benefit of their own people. Such actions, claims Skujenieks, do not advance the 
national cause but rather complicate it unnecessarily. The more one ethnic group gains, the 
less is left for the others. These kinds of relations among ethnic groups are unnecessary, he 
insists, they are created by present conditions.  
 
But how to change the present situation, asks Skujenieks? His answer is the 
introduction of cultural autonomy; he insists that local governance is closely linked to the 
national question. According to Skujenieks (1913: 254), ‘overall, the national question 
cannot be separated from the issue of local governance in the provinces inhabited by 
different ethnic groups; the essence of the national problem is how to organise their 
common life in the best possible, practical manner’. However, presently the Landtags 
represent exclusively the interests of the landed nobility; besides, since the 1880s, with the 
advent of Russification, the Landtags’ authority was being consistently diminished. Under 
universal suffrage, the Landtags would represent interests of all ethnic and economic 
groups, and would be much more efficient: ‘Local governments which are responsible for 
all local aspects of life will be able to do so much more when they are elected 
democratically. Such establishments will be able to secure and extend language rights of 
different ethnic groups.’  
 
But despite his astute and perceptive understanding of both the liberating, and the 
destructive potential of nationalism, which he supports with abundant empirical data, 
Skujenieks seems to be unable to transcend his self-imposed, class-based dichotomy of 
benign proletarian nationalism, and the aggressive nationalism of the ruling classes. For 
him, proletarians can do no wrong, and the bourgeois nothing right (the fact that 
Skujenieks himself hailed from a wealthy family of intellectuals, could have contributed to 
his socialist zeal). This stubborn, uncritical clinging to a Marxist belief in the pivotal role 
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of the working class blinds him to the existing evidence, and ultimately undermines his 
theoretical framework. Another weakness in his analysis is the failure to address potential 
tensions between the cultural aspirations of different ethnic groups within a single political 
entity, and the complex relationship between culture and politics. For this perhaps he 
should not be judged too harshly, as even one hundred years later political scientists - 
especially proponents of liberal nationalism (Taylor 1992; Tamir 1993; Miller 1995) and 
multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1993, 1995) - still struggle to reconcile ethnic diversity and the 
principles of equality with the order of nation-states. Like many other liberal thinkers of 
his time, Skujenieks simply invested too much hope in democracy per se, obviously 
believing that once a just democratic order was established, all existing tensions would 
resolve themselves. Struggles among ethnic groups are unnecessary, he claims, they are 
created by the current conditions. He is idealistically committed to the principles of 
equality: ‘The more one ethnic group gains, the more others stand to lose.’(1913: 284)  In 
his later life, after entering active politics, Skujenieks would undergo many ideological 
transformations, and would leave the socialist camp altogether by becoming a leader of a 
centre-right party in 1928. He would also earn the mistrust of the Latvian ethnic minorities 
by his increasingly harsh stance on citizenship and immigration issues. 
 
At the time of its publication, The National Question in Latvia gained positive 
reviews, but attracted little general interest. M. Valters gave it his strong approval, while 
expressing reservations about the author’s alleged over-reliance on the Marxist dialectical 
method (Dribins: 1997).  The editor and publicist A. Plensners (1928: 198) wrote that 
Skujenieks’s book, ‘despite a pronounced foreign approach in his analysis’, was without 
doubt one of the most serious works of the day on the national question, but observed that 
it had hardly made any impact upon the society, possibly due to the fact that it was 
published on the eve of World War I. Dribins (1997: 86-87) posits that with the publication 
of The National Question in Latvia, ‘the national theme was transferred into the domain of 
scientific analysis.’  
 
2.2.2. Mi!elis Valters, the Practical Nationalist  
 
By 1914, when The Question of Our Nationality. Thoughts on the Latvian Present 
and Future [M!su taut"bas jaut#jums. Domas par Latvijas tagadni un nakotni] was 
published, Mi!elis Valters had already become hugely disappointed by orthodox Marxism, 
and the ideological rift between him and the mainstream Latvian Social Democracy was 
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rapidly widening. However, his book shows that he was not in a haste to abandon socialist 
views entirely. His sources of influence and inspiration are the same as Skujenieks’s – the 
works of Renner and Bauer. Yet, unlike Skujenieks, who is deeply interested in the general 
concept of the nation and in both its theoretical and practical implications worldwide, 
Valters primarily focuses on Latvia; he examines the history of the national movement, 
follows the evolution of Latvian nationalist thought, evaluates the current state of the 
Latvian press, and discusses the goals and benefits of municipal reform.  
 
In the opening chapter, Valters warns of recent ‘assimilationist’ tendencies among 
Latvians both at home and abroad, which often masquerade as ‘social and democratic 
ideas’ spread by Latvian Marxists (1914: 12). Observing that one of the Marxists’ main 
objections to the expansion of Latvian cultural societies in the diaspora is their alleged 
association on a purely ethnic basis, which Marxists consider to be undemocratic, Valters 
(1914: 15) argues that ‘…Latvians come together not because they belong to the same 
ethnic group, but mainly because it is the easiest way to satisfy their cultural needs’.  
Valters firmly believes that when the national idea merges with ‘overall development 
efforts’, together they start to attract all of the people’s progressive forces, whereas the 
‘dark elements’ are increasingly pushed away.  
 
The second chapter addresses the ostensible paradox between national and class 
struggles.  Valters repudiates the orthodox Marxist view that with the development of the 
Latvian working class, a process of assimilation and de-nationalisation will speed up. The 
working class is by nature anti-capitalistic, he concurs, but capitalism should not be 
equated with nationalism, although the former often uses the latter as an ideological and 
political instrument. Similarly to Skujenieks, Valters believes that there is a big difference 
between different kinds of nationalism, and that ‘capitalist market nationalism’ and the 
‘nationalism of small nations’ protection and cultural development’ belong in two separate 
categories. Similarly to Bauer, and also to Skujenieks, Valters views the ‘internationalism’ 
of the working class as a catalyst, not a threat, to the ‘cultural nationalism of small 
nations’. (Valters 1914: 26) 
 
Like Skujenieks, Valters defends Latvian culture as being in the first stages of 
development, and as such not competitive with big well-established cultures. For Valters, 
too, the biggest foe of Latvian national culture is Russification, which he claims often lurks 
behind the international and cosmopolitan ideas of the Latvian Marxists.  
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Chapter Three explores the causes of the present decline in national politics. 
Valters believes that Latvian intelligentsia in 1880s was not ready, theoretically and 
politically, to take the national idea to the next level, which he blames on Latvians’ 
isolation from the liberation movements of other nations. ‘If we were situated closer to 
Austria, we would perhaps be able to get inspiration from the national struggle in this land 
laden with national problems.’ (Valters 1914: 41) Valters is utterly dismissive of the New 
Current, claiming that it borrowed its world outlook from the brochures of German 
Marxists, stubbornly stuck to the ‘naïve cosmopolitism’ of Russian Marxists, and itself did 
not contribute anything valuable to the national idea; on the contrary, its contribution, 
according to Valters, was detrimental. He criticises the orthodox German Marxism for its 
incomprehension of the importance of the national question and the failure to develop a 
theoretical base for it. The biggest weakness of Russian Marxism, in Valters’s 
understanding, is the ‘lack of national principles’, or, in other words, ‘hate against 
nationalism of small nations’. (Valters 1914: 56) 
 
Valters posits that the new Latvian nationalism, which strives to achieve self-
determination for Latvian people, developed as an effort of Latvian Social Democracy. He 
writes that the New Current, which in the past opposed the political thinking of older 
generation, now stands in opposition to the new nationalist thought. 
 
The Old Current (Valters’s term for the Young Latvians) lacked a social platform; 
it gave birth to the idea of a Latvian nation, but it did not have a programme for further 
action. Political nationalism is the next stage of cultural nationalism’s development, claims 
Valters. The Old Current stimulated Latvians’ economical development and the growth of 
Latvian capital, but it lacked social thinking, and therefore failed to involve the wide 
masses.      
 
Addressing the question of regional administrative autonomy and the impending 
reform, Valters decisively refutes the well-worn argument of its opponents that such 
autonomy would endanger ethnic minorities. He subscribes to the Austro-Marxist theory of 
cultural autonomy, i.e. that it would allow ethnic minorities to keep up their traditional way 
of life without endangering the administration of regional autonomy. Ever practical, 
Valters (1914: 81) notes that such an arrangement would benefit not just the ethnic 
minorities living in Latvia, but also the Latvian diasporas elsewhere (which, at the time 
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when at least a hundred thousand ethnic Latvians were living abroad, was a vital 
consideration). 
 
Like Skujenieks, Valters recognises that the existing administrative system of 
Landtags has its positive features, and is organisationally superior to Russian zemstes  [a 
Latvian word for zemstvo, Russian territorially-administrative unit], but that it needs 
further democratisation: ‘from a wider point of view, we can tell the supporters of zemstes 
that we have nothing against the Landtags on condition that they get reformed in terms of 
rights.’ (Valters 1914: 114) 
 
Chapter Ten, with the telling title Latvians’ association with other ethnic groups, 
especially Germans, is dedicated to an evaluation of Latvians’ potential allies and foes: 
 
 Constant fighting against attempts to destroy our nation makes us consider not only how 
to reinforce our position through our own means, but also where to look for support among other 
forces nearby, who, in their own turn, are forced to draw closer to us for their own protection.  
       (Valters 1914: 120) 
 
Valters refers to the P!terburgas Av"zes publication of 1902, which raised the 
question of possible cooperation between Latvians and the other nations. The newspaper 
defended the view that Latvians should care more about their own unity and development 
rather than seek cooperation with other nations. But for Valters, the goal of unity can be 
achieved through solidarity with others rather than in isolation. He speaks both of ‘peoples 
with whom we live together’ and of ‘those who are our neighbours’ and argues that it 
would be a political mistake to deny any association outright:  
 
While deciding which peoples we should be cooperating with, we should try to look at our 
mutual relationships from a strictly political point of view, suppressing all emotions…We should, 
as much as possible, liberate our political life from past memories and recognise that in politics 
such memories often prevent us from considering the future path calmly.  
      (Valters 1914: 121) 
 
 
It is self-evident to Valters (1914: 121-122) that any alliance is only possible in the 
‘face of a sincere wish to cooperate, and where both parties have equal rights’. Valters 
believes that it is not the past that prevents Latvians from the cooperation with the Baltic 
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Germans, but rather their present attitude towards the Baltic nations. As soon as the Baltic 
Germans recognise Latvians as equals, he writes, there will be ‘no further impediments to 
political accord’ (Valters 1914: 122). Valters actually predicts, very accurately in 
retrospect, that the Baltic Germans will get eventually divided: ‘…One part of Germans 
will of course stick to their old politics, but along with the Latvians gaining more power, 
another part of Germans will join them. We will find a common language with these 
Germans. The question whether these Germans will decide to remain Germans or choose 
to assimilate with Latvians, is not of a big importance – this is, despite all the discussions it 
raised at a time in the Latvian press, truly is of very little practical significance.’ (Valters 
1914: 122) 
 
Re-affirming his choice of the Baltic Germans as the future allies of Latvians, 
Valters (1914: 123) asserts: ‘Latvians do not and never will have hateful feelings against 
cultural Germans in the Baltics. On the contrary, Latvians will respect them as 
representatives of the bigger German culture, and will support them, as their ethnic group’s 
decline would be a loss for cultural life in the Baltics.’  
 
Valters then evaluates the potential danger that the affiliation with a different ethnic 
group poses to Latvians, i.e. losing their own members to that group, and dismisses it as 
irrelevant to the modern developments in the Baltics. He recalls how just ten years before a 
question about ‘crossing over’ from one nation to another was viewed exclusively from a 
racial point of view; how the ‘possibility of Baltic nations joining together seemed 
unbelievable because nations were perceived as absolutely closed communities, and 
nobody gave a lot of thought to development of political parties in the Baltics, which, as 
history has proved, rearranges these closed communities…and opened their borders’.  
Valters predicts that when the Baltic German community gets divided into two, one of 
them will feel politically and socially closer to the progressive part of the Latvian nation. 
The same can be said about Russians, writes Valters. As for Latvians, they stand little to 
lose from such division, as the small conservative group which would in this case split 
away from Latvians, will be ‘a negligible cultural loss’…Valters concludes: ‘The 
differentiation process among Baltic nations can only be beneficial to us, as we will be 
able to evaluate political circumstances correctly and through this reshuffling will be able 
to attract the most free-minded elements of other nations.’ (Valters 1914: 133) 
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Overall, Valters does not hold such benevolent views on the Baltic Russians as he 
does on the Baltic Germans; he accuses Russians of chauvinism and indifference towards 
Latvian cultural events. Valters (1914: 143-144) concedes that understanding between 
Russians and Latvians would be possible only if the liberal part of Russians separated from 
the rest in order ‘to support Latvians in strong liberalism’.  
 
In conclusion, Valters stresses importance of the ‘social question’, and the 
imperative to find a balance between political, cultural and social in the quest for a Latvian 
nation.  
 
2.2.3. Skujenieks and Valters: Liberal vs. Communitarian Approaches 
 
 
Understandably, parallels and comparisons are often drawn between The National 
Question in Latvia by Skujenieks and The Question of Our Nationality by Valters. For 
example, !ilde (1985: 91) writes that the only difference between the two authors’ works is 
‘the fact that M. Valters completely repudiated any Marxist doctrine, whereas M. 
Skujenieks at that time still keeps in mind one or two socialist findings; although he is just 
as harsh towards the nation’s deniers as M. Valters.’ Apine (2008), observing that both 
works remained scientifically valuable throughout the 20th century, draws the conclusion 
that Valters represents political (in a sense of autonomy-oriented) nationalism, while 
Skujenieks is an adherent of cultural nationalism.  
 
As regards the distinction between cultural and political (autonomy-oriented) 
nationalism, neither Skujenieks nor Valters directly mentions the idea of Latvian national 
independence, which, arguably, was already ‘in the air’ at the time.7 Valters is certainly 
more outspoken than Skujenieks on the question of regional autonomy – he repeatedly uses 
expressions like ‘organised national communities’ and ‘political national unions’, which 
". !ilde (1985: 192) interprets as euphemisms for Latvian national independence, used for 
the benefit of Russian censors. Valters also frequently uses the term ‘political nationalism’ 
itself to denote autonomy-seeking nationalism. And in this sense, Apine’s aforementioned 
juxtaposition of cultural and political nationalisms seems justified. However, if Valters’s 
book had to be published abroad to avoid Russian censorship, would not Skujenieks, 
                                                
7 M. Valters himself is repeatedly credited with voicing the idea of Latvia’s political indpendence already in 
1903 (!ilde 1982: 45; Ciel#ns 1964: 13). 
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whose book was actually published in St Petersburg, have exercised even bigger caution 
towards the censors? Besides, Valters’s passionate book, although it includes historical 
overviews and theoretical parts, reads more like a political pamphlet, whereas Skujenieks’s 
methodical work belongs to the domain of social science.      
 
A more important distinction to make between the two theorists and their 
respective concepts of the Latvian national community may be the liberal stance of 
Skujenieks, and the communitarian approach of Valters. Skujenieks’s vision of the future 
Latvia at the time was built upon the unreserved recognition of the country’s multiethnic 
nature. In 1913 Skujenieks was, one may say, dedicated to ‘making a virtue out of 
necessity’.  Skujenieks would undergo many political transformations in his later life, and 
like many other political idealists before and after him, would ultimately betray the ideas 
of his youth; nevertheless, it seems significant that in his other book, which came out nine 
years later, he again wrote that: (1922: 227) 
 
Regardless of the big percentage of ethnic Latvians, Latvia is, however, a land where 
people of different ethnicities live next to each other; at the same time every ethnic group has its 
own goals and aspirations, and wants to live its own life. Latvia may be considered a multinational 
state, as opposed to a national state, inhabited by those belonging to just one ethnic group.8 
 
By comparison, Valters, despite demonstrating an outright willingness to grant 
equal rights to minorities, as well as to ensure their democratic participation in the life of 
the new state (without which he believed political unity was impossible), at times reveals a 
clear ethnocentric tendency. For Valters, the primary concern is, unreservedly, the ethnic 
Latvian nation.  In his vision of the future Latvia, ethnic Latvians are the core, possibly 
joined, and perhaps at a later stage, by the ‘more progressive parts’ of the other ethnic 
groups. Symptomatically, he tends to evaluate this possible affiliation exclusively through 
the prism of its potential benefits for the national endeavour of the Latvian people, without 
quite admitting that ethnic minorities can contribute anything of intrinsic value to the new 
Latvian state. Valters believes that the modest assistance to the Latvian cause that he 
allocates to the minorities would aid their own political emancipation, as they would 
follow Latvians in their ‘strong liberalism’. In Valters’s model, the national self-
determination of ethnic Latvians is both the first and the final cause, to which the 
multiethnic nature of the population is only a possible contributing factor; and the future 
                                                
8 Notably, in the updated edition of the monograph of 1937 this passage is conspicuously absent.  
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accord between the core nation and the minorities is largely dependent on how useful and 
accommodating those minorities will become in advancing the Latvian enterprise. It was 
this communitarian model that was adopted by the majority of Latvian democrats during 
the interwar period, and that still dominates the nation-building discourse of Latvian 
politicians today.9 
 
2.2.4. Ernests Blanks, the Passionate Nationalist 
 
During the very first years of national independence, Blanks, although sceptical 
about minorities’ loyalty towards the Latvian state, grudgingly allowed overall for the 
formation of a political nation. For example, when responding, in 1919, to the debates over 
the Citizenship Law in the Saeima and to subsequent publications in the Russian-language 
newspaper Segodnya accusing the titular nation of chauvinism, he wrote (referring to the 
precariousness of Latvia’s situation while it was still at war with Russia, and not safe from 
Germany either) that ‘what is being defined as chauvinism is the state’s willingness to sift 
out those Russian and Jewish elements who came to Latvia by chance during the war 
years, and who have not made any sacrifices in the fight against Bolsheviks’. At this point 
in time, Blanks obviously still believed, which is not the case with his later writings, that 
unity between Latvians and minorities could have been achieved after a successful 
‘sifting’: ‘…we however hope that after several conspiracy plans have fallen through, those 
who wish us ill will abandon their attempts to sell Latvian freedom. When this happens, 
the wall that exists between the Latvian people and the minorities will fall down. In all 
aspects, the collapse of this wall is totally dependent upon their attitude towards Latvian 
sovereignty.’10 
 
But less than a year later, Blanks already demonstrates a less tolerant attitude. In 
June 1920, A. Fr!denbergs, a liberally-minded National Democrat and newly elected 
Mayor of Riga, took a brave political stand against radical nationalist publications that 
were opposing what they saw as overly liberal provisions for ethnic minorities. In his 
article ‘The civic nation and nationalists’, he claimed that: ‘Cultural autonomy in the case 
of minority schools, the permitted use of the German and Russian languages in state and 
communal institutions, and so on attest to the fact that the shadows of the past do not 
                                                
9 For a succinct analysis of the historical interrelationship between individual and communitarian values in 
independent Latvia, see Pabriks (1997). 
10 Blanks, E.  ‘Chauvinisms’. Jaun!k!s Zi"as,  30.08.1919.  
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conceal the rising Latvian sun. We seriously want to build Latvia together with citizen-
non-Latvians who honestly want to merge with us in a single civic nation.’11  
 
Fr!denbergs’s idea of the Latvian civic nation had been relentlessly criticised in the 
Latvian nationalist press, above all by Blanks, for being based upon an ‘an unreal illusion 
of collaboration’. From then on Blanks became Fr!denbergs’s personal nemesis, criticising, 
in the pages of the newspaper Latvian Sargs, every move the City Council made in 
conjunction with the minorities’ faction.  
 
Blanks’s monograph Nation and State, published in 1926, reveals him as an 
accomplished apologist for ethnic nationalism: ‘Just one glance at the Latvian state’s 
geographical position, and at its big neighbours Russia and Germany, makes it abundantly 
clear that Latvia will never survive as a mixture of three or four ethnic groups (Latvians, 
Germans, Russians, and Jews); it will exist only as a Latvian national state or it will not 
exist at all’. (Blanks 1926: 18) 
 
Unlike Skujenieks, Blanks (1926: 5) does not believe that it is possible to define the 
concept of ‘nation’; for him a nation is ‘a subjective notion, a trait of a certain 
consciousness’. He also posits that a nation is characterised by solidarity, and that the 
nation’s members are united by ‘invisible spiritual bonds’ which guarantee consensus. But 
despite being committed to a somewhat exultant, romanticist version of nationalism, 
Blanks has no taste for the idea of a strong leader. During the parliamentary crisis, he 
defends the Latvian Constitution, claiming that it is the current political leadership, and a 
society indifferent toward politics that should be blamed for the present state of affairs, not 
the fundamental principles of the republic. Blanks is unequivocally critical of Mussolini, 
and of authoritarian regimes in general. According to Blanks (1926: 35), ‘amending the 
weak sides of democracy with a dictatorship is like treating an illness with death.’  
 
Blanks (1926:22) argues passionately against all foreign influences upon national 
culture; he is critical of both German and Russian influences, but it is obvious that he 
considers the latter especially detrimental to the Latvian national character: ‘Latvian youth 
must understand that to speak German in our country is impolite, and that to speak Russian 
or to mix Russian words with Latvian is uncultured.’ He also warns his readers about 
possible dangers of Jewish economic and political domination.  
                                                
11 Fr!denbergs, A. ‘Politisk" n"cija un nacion"listi’. Jaun!k!s Zi"as,  05.06.1920. 
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Independence has been won, ascertains Blanks, and now it is time for the second 
phase, which he calls a phase of ‘internal reinforcement and consolidation’. 
Reinforcement, for Blanks, is not just the development of the national economy and of 
further democratisation, both of which he considered vital for the Latvian Republic, but 
also the strengthening of the ‘Latvian element’ against any foreign influences. He 
repeatedly opposes Russian (Blanks had a particular dislike for ‘Russian culture’, always 
putting it in parentheses), or any other ‘Orientalist’ tendencies, which he considers 
backward, and warns against cosmopolitanism, as well as against the possible dangers of 
Jewish economic and political domination.  Blanks takes on a role of a national safeguard 
against any foreign ‘decadence’, often pushing it to the point of ridiculous. For example, 
he bemoans the dictate of the Anglo-American (‘Jimmy’) fashion in clothes and shoes as 
‘all this nonsense that comes from abroad’; according to Blanks, ‘truly cultured nations 
would never stoop down to such foolery’. Blanks, somewhat touchingly, appeals to 
women’s organisations to take the matter into their own hands, and with the help of some 
homemade sewing to put an end to this ‘foreign intervention’. (Blanks 1926) 
 
In Blanks’s view, minorities are enjoying disproportionate rights and privileges as 
Latvian citizens. For example, he complains that ‘judging from our ‘international’ 
education policies, one may think that Latvia is a typical national conglomerate state. 
Thankfully, it is not true’ (Blanks 1926: 121).  
 
Blanks (1926: 122) examines the historical contribution made by Latvian 
minorities. He accepts that Germans in Latvia have ‘centuries-long historical roots’ and 
that over this time ‘they have acclimatised and acquired citizenship rights naturally’. Yet, 
claims Blanks, the same cannot be said of the local Russians. All Russians apart from Old 
Believers in Latgale, are ‘recent settlers and immigrants’, he writes, who have ‘no 
accomplishments in Latvian history’ (Blanks 1926: 122). Blanks is convinced that ‘as 
Russians here have neither property nor cultural traditions, unlike Germans, they should 
not be included among ethnic minorities’ (Blanks 1926: 122). Acknowledging that 
economically Jews as an ethnic group have made real progress since Latvian 
independence, Blanks (1926: 123) expresses concern that ‘Jewish influence in our trade 
and overall economic life has reached such a level that it is starting to threaten Latvian 
businessmen’. But what is really unacceptable to Blanks is the fact that Jews are also 
actively popularising Russian culture in Latvia by taking an active part in Russian-
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language newspaper publishing and Russian theatre productions, as well as by sending 
their children to Russian schools. This is a recurrent theme in Blanks’s writings (in one of 
his newspaper articles he once wrote that ‘Jews are unacceptable to us in the first place as 
Russian Jews’12), which became central to his nationalist views and politics. Whereas 
founders of the Latvian state in their ‘unexamined liberalism’, to use Walzer’s term (1995: 
145), strove to guarantee equality for minority cultures through the legislation, the 
practical implication of this cultural pluralism was that the Latvian culture and language, 
which the national state was supposed to nurture and protect, were constantly challenged 
(in Blanks’s view – infringed upon) by the two big competing cultures, Russian and 
German. For Blanks, the fact that Jews, who he claimed were free to exercise their own 
cultural rights, or to assimilate into the Latvian culture, opted for the Russian or German 
cultures instead, signified the ultimate betrayal.  
 
It is noteworthy that Blanks refers to Theodore Roosevelt, the 26th President of the 
USA, for ideological support. For example, countering the then current idea that Latvia 
should adopt the American ‘melting pot’ concept, Blanks argues that a new notion of 
‘Americanism’ has taken a strong hold over the last few years. Most likely, he is referring 
to the speech True Americanism (1894) in which Roosevelt denounces ‘hyphenated 
Americans’ and double allegiances. Roosevelt’s views on citizenship and nation-building 
are known to be ambiguous, and often contradictory; Blanks seems to embrace his 
campaign against hyphenated citizens, which escalated during WWI, while totally 
discarding another important part of Roosevelt’s (1913: 164) legacy: ‘Probably the best 
test of true love of liberty in any country is the way in which minorities are treated in that 
country.’ 
 
Like Roosevelt, Blanks was concerned about possible double allegiances. Unlike 
Roosevelt, he was unable to appreciate the positive contribution of ethnic minorities, or to 
offer a way for them to integrate. Especially when it comes to the Latvian Russians, Blanks 
does not set requirements for assimilation, but rather speaks of a hypothetical exodus: 
‘Taking into consideration their negative role in the history of our cultural and political 
life, and their zero role in our economic life, Latvia will not suffer anything in the event of 
their departure’. (Blanks 1926:123) 
 
                                                
12 Blanks, E. ‘Muhsu nazional! politika un minoritates’, Latwijas Wehstnesis, 21.10.1922. 
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It is perhaps not surprising, given his overall xenophobic tendencies, that in the 
early twenties Blanks became associated with a proto-fascist organisation, The Latvian 
National Club (LNK); Blanks’s writings contributed significantly to the ideological 
foundations of the movement (Kr!sli"#: 2005; Za$e: 2008). However, according to Dribins 
(1997), by the mid-twenties Blanks had broken all connections with the LNK and other 
national extremist organisations. Dribins also asserts that Blanks cannot be perceived as a 
classic anti-Semite, as he never attacked Jews as an ethnic or a religious group. Moreover, 
in 1933 he published a brochure, Hitler, Jews and Latvia, condemning Nazi policies 
towards the Jewish population, and warning pro-Nazi oriented Latvian extremists that the 
Latvian people could also fall prey to aggressive German expansionism.  
 
In the early 30s, Blanks grew increasingly bitter about the Latvian political scene, 
accusing politicians of corruption, demagoguery and betrayal of national ideals. This 
increasing disappointment in the Latvian Parliament conditioned him towards acceptance 
and support, albeit somewhat reluctant, of the authoritarian coup d'état instigated by the 
Prime Minister K. Ulmanis (who advertised a new, improved Constitution as one of the 
goals of his regime – a promise which was never fulfilled) in May 1934. The few – rather 
spiritless - publications he authored after the coup praised the role of the People’s Leader 
in strengthening national culture. Blanks’s career as a publicist was essentially over – soon 
he became an anonymous propaganda labourer in the authoritarian Ministry of Public 
Relations. 
 
2.3. P!teris Stu"ka, the National Question and the Question of Latvia’s 
Autonomy 
  
As seen from the earlier part of this chapter, the national question started to 
dominate political discussions in Latvia after 1905; it occupied the minds of Latvian Social 
Democrats-Mensheviks and bourgeoisie alike. The Latvian Bolsheviks, despite the 
programmatic denial of the importance of nationality, did not remain immune to the 
national question either. Surprisingly, it manifested itself most strongly in the writings of 
the main Latvian theoretic of Marxism, the hardened Bolshevik P!teris Stu%ka. When it 
came to his native Latvia, Stu%ka was not so quick to subscribe to Leninist internationalism 
in practice, as he was in theory, often demonstrating conflicting views and attitudes, and at 
times behaving in a manner that would have made any Latvian nationalist proud.  
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P!teris Stu"ka remains an enigmatic character in Latvian history, as he lived many 
lives. A prosperous lawyer and a prominent Social Democrat, a former editor of the Social 
Democratic newspaper Dienas Lapa and Rainis’s brother-in-law, Chairman of the Latvian 
Socialist Soviet Republic and an instigator of mass terror, the first Chairman of the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and a declared ‘enemy of the people’ during 
Stalin’s purges in the 1930s (luckily for Stu"ka – posthumously), a lauded Latvian 
communist hero whose name the Latvian University bore from 1958 to 1990, and a 
persona non grata in the Latvian nationalist pantheon.… In Russia he is probably best 
remembered as one of the founders of Soviet jurisprudence, but his main legacy in his 
native Latvia is the short-lived (on most of Latvia’s territory - from December 1918 to 
May 1919) Latvian Socialist Soviet Republic.13  
 
A son of a well-to-do farmer from the Vidzeme region, Stu"ka showed early 
academic potential, which enabled him to enrol in a prestigious German classical high 
school in Riga at the age of fourteen. It was there that Stu"ka met the future poet J#$is 
Pliek%ans (Rainis), who would become a close friend, and whose younger sister Dora he 
would later marry.14 Upon graduating from school, both friends continued their studies at 
the Law faculty of St. Petersburg University, where they also became attracted to social 
democratic ideas. Both would take turns serving as editors of Dienas Lapa, the liberal 
socialist newspaper of the New Current movement published in Riga. Little is known of 
Stu"ka’s other socialist activities in the late 1890s, until his arrest (along with other New 
Current members) and deportation to the Vyatka region of Russia in 1897. But the fact that 
Stu"ka was among the very few people in the Bolshevik Party whose party membership 
was back-dated to as early as 1895 speaks for itself (Dz!rve 1957: 28).  
 
While in exile in Russia, Stu"ka, among other things, dabbled in statistics – he 
contributed to several publications of the Vyatka region statistical department (Dz!rve 
1957). He continued with his social democratic activities, too; during the first Congress of 
the Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party (LSDSP in its Latvian abbreviation) that 
took place illegally in Riga in 1904, Stu"ka (back in Latvia) represented the Riga 
organization and was elected as one of the Congress’s chairmen. Although the LSDSP was 
                                                
13 For an English translation of Stu"ka’s legal writings, see Shalet, R., Maggs, P.B. and Beirne, P. (1988) P. 
I. Stu!ka. Selected Writings on Soviet Law and Marxism. Armouk, New York; London, England: M.E. 
Sharpe, Inc. 
14 The early friendship between Rainis and Stu"ka subsequently developed into a very uneasy relationship. It 
is described in detail in the fictionalized biography of the Latvian national poet, ‘Rainis and His Brothers’ by 
R. Dobrovenskis (2000), where Stu"ka is portrayed as one of the ‘brothers’ alongside J. Jansons (Brauns), P. 
Dauge, M. Valters, and others. 
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aspiring to become a member of the all-Russian Social Democratic Workers Party 
(RSDRP in its Russian abbreviation), a prolonged dispute about the basis of such 
membership ensued between the Latvian Social Democrats and their Russian counterparts. 
Whereas the LSDSP Congress unanimously voted for joining the RSDRP on a federative 
basis, the Russian Bolsheviks, especially V.I. Lenin, insisted on the centralised 
organisation of the united party. Although Stu!ka would eventually change his mind and 
recognise his ‘past mistakes’, he was initially a strong supporter of the federation principle:  
‘…if we could assume that all members of the organisation are ideal people without any 
human weaknesses, then, understandably, there would not be much to say against such an 
order [i.e. a centralised party structure]. But, unfortunately, what we see in real life is that 
revolutionaries also have weaknesses’.15 The majority of the Latvian Social Democrats, 
Stu!ka included, remained firm on the federalist principle due to several considerations, 
such as their willingness to keep a good relationship with the Bund (which was adamant on 
federation), and their determination to avoid splintering the Latvian party, and last but not 
least, the fear that if the LSDSP joined on a centralised basis, all its future activities and 
propaganda among the workers would be conducted in the Russian language (Kalni"# 
1972; Dz$rve 1957). ‘As long as there are a million Latvians who do not speak other 
languages apart from the Latvian language, it is our responsibility to provide access to 
Social Democratic theory for them in that language, and to fight for their right to speak, 
and to conduct business with the state and municipal institutions in that language,’- wrote 
Stu!ka.16 
 
In 1907 Stu!ka, fearing another arrest, left Latvia first for Finland, and then for St. 
Petersburg (the order for his arrest and deportation did actually arrive a few days after his 
departure). In Finland, he for the first time personally met Vladimir Lenin, the man who 
would become his role model for years to come. Perhaps it was that meeting, and the 
ensuing friendship, that completed Stu!ka’s ideological transformation and his final 
departure from the Menshevik-sympathising ranks of the Latvian Social Democrats – in 
1907 he became the leader of the Latvian Bolsheviks (Kalni"# 1972); however, %ilde 
(1982) concedes that Stu!ka did not play a major role in the Russian Bolshevik party until 
1917.  
 
                                                
15 As quoted in Dz$rve (1957), p.51. 
16 Stu!ka, P. (1906) ‘Vienot& partija vai partiju apvienojums’, C!"a, Nr. 29, 25 March, as quoted in Dz$rve 
(1957, p. 75). 
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Stu!ka’s political metamorphosis was in startling contrast to that of his 
contemporaries M. Valters and M. Skujenieks, whose ideological evolution took them 
from the Social Democratic left to the centre-right of bourgeois parties: Stu!ka started out 
as a ‘moderate Social Democrat’ (as described by B. Kalni"# in 1906 (Kalni"# 1983: 23)), 
and eventually became a fervent Bolshevik. What exactly led to Stu!ka’s radicalization, 
while many of his peers, including his closest friend Rainis, became Social Democrats in a 
present-day sense is unclear. Was it because Stu!ka, while studying at St. Petersburg, and 
later during his exile years in Russia, fell under the spell of the Russian Marxist tradition, 
while other Latvian Social Democrats, according to Kalni"# (1983; 1972) had been more 
exposed to the more moderate teachings of German Social Democrats?  
 
The ideological genesis of Latvian social democracy is a contentious issue. 
Kalni"#, for example, insists that Latvian social democracy developed in the ‘Western 
Socialist spirit’, and drew its inspiration from the works of Bebel, Kautsky, and Lafargue, 
and not from Plekhanov, Akselrod, Martov, and Lenin. He writes that the movement was 
started by graduates of German high schools who continued their education at Dorpat 
University, while reading socialist books from the German bookstores in Baltic cities 
(Kalni"# 1956: 94; 1972: 134-135). Likewise, F. Ciel$ns (1961: 244) also writes that 
Latvian Social Democrats were not familiar with the works of Russian Marxists until 1906. 
Without doubt, German socialist publications after 1890, when the German Reichstag did 
not renew the Anti-Socialist Laws, were more abundant than Russian Marxist literature 
still published illegally; they still needed to be smuggled into Latvia though, hence the 
famous suitcase filled with socialist literature brought by Rainis from his trip to 
Switzerland in 1893. But Rainis himself, along with Stu!ka, M. Skujenieks, F. Ciel$ns, V. 
Bastj%nis, A, Petr$vics, A. Bu#evics and many other prominent Latvian socialists spent 
their university years in St. Petersburg and Moscow, during the times when universities 
were in the vanguard of new ideas and political change, and hardly in isolation from the 
Russian Marxists, whose ideological differences with their German counterparts, until the 
rise of Leninism, were relatively minor. Indeed, J. Ozols (1906: 30), describing the first 
steps of the Latvian Social Democratic movement, explicitly mentions that the Latvian 
intelligentsia was exposed to ‘German and Russian socialist literature’ in Dorpat and ‘other 
Russian universities’. J. Jansons (Brauns), one of the most prominent Latvian Social 
Democrats of the early period, recollects that the first Latvian Marxists, being cordoned off 
in ‘our idle provincial corner’, had at first been isolated from the Russian Marxists and 
Russian émigré political currents (like G. Plekhanov’s group Liberation of Labour, based 
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in Geneva). However, Jansons attests  that although the New Current members gained their 
initial introduction to Marxism from the works of Marx, Engels and Kautsky, as early as 
1895 they also became familiar with the ‘Critical Remarks on the Subject of Russia’s 
Economic Development’ by P. Struve, and ‘The development of the Monist View of 
History’ by the ‘father of Russian Marxism’ Plekhanov (the latter work, according to 
Jansons, had a particularly profound inpact on Latvian Social Democrats) . ‘I want to stress 
that our Marxism has not appeared thanks to one or other particular person; neither has it 
been borrowed from abroad as a ready-made ideological mould. No, it was a process of 
collective thought, to which our democratically inclined young people, following different 
paths, contributed together.’ (Jansons 1913: 83)  
 
Overall, it seems to be an oversimplification to deny any Russian influence on the 
socialist movement in Latvia, characterising it as a Western-type moderate movement – 
not least because of the revolution of 1905 in Latvia, and the role of the Social Democrats 
in it, which belies its supposedly moderate character. Rather, as another prominent Latvian 
socialist, J. Aug!kalns-Aberbergs (1929: 17) describes it, Latvian Social Democrats chose 
their own path, leaning towards German Social Democrats ideologically, but following 
their Russian counterparts when it came to revolutionary tactics. Until the final split in 
1918, Latvian Bolshevism and Latvian Menshevism (a division that mirrored the one in the 
RSDRP) represented two sides of the same coin. As Ezergailis (1983: 23) puts it, ‘the 
differences that existed between the Latvian Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was much more a 
matter of personalities than it was of programs’.  
 
Strictly speaking, Latvian Marxism, while widely recognised as exceptional in 
tactics, never had its own theoretical base. Ezergailis (1974: 24) names Stu"ka as one 
exception to the ‘dearth of theoreticians’ in Latvia (coincidentally, the short life-span of 
the Latvian Soviet shows that Stu"ka was not so good at tactics). But in terms of his 
overall grasp of Marxist ideology, familiarity with its various strains, and of the sheer 
scope of issues covered in his own writings, Stu"ka was infinitely superior to his 
contemporaries, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike, who in their theoretical work usually 
concentrated just on one particular aspect of socialism (as with culture for Rainis, and the 
national question for Skujenieks). Ezergailis (1974: 88) correctly observes that Stu"ka 
‘was not forced to join the Bolsheviks’, and that prior to the revolution of 1917 he did not 
necessarily perceive Lenin as his intellectual superior. Rather, Stu"ka stood for his own 
brand of Marxism, his own system of beliefs, which eventually led him to converge with 
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the Russian Bolsheviks. Swain (2010: 1999) observes that Stu!ka represented ‘Latvia’s 
own Marxist tradition’ – a tradition that he also defines as Latvian ‘Luxemburgism’.17  
 
Rosa Luxemburg, a German Marxist of Polish-Jewish extraction, who represented 
the left wing of German social democracy (together with K. Liebknecht, she founded the 
German Communist Party in 1918), was famously in simultaneous opposition to the 
revisionists, to the Marxist orthodox centre, and to the Bolsheviks. A revolutionary Marxist 
herself, she relentlessly criticised E. Bernstein for his opportunistic departure from the 
Marxist concept of history; ardently disagreed with K. Kautsky on the question of mass 
strike and the spontaneity of the revolutionary movement; and vehemently opposed the 
Bolsheviks on the issues of democracy (of which, it needs to be said, Luxemburg had her 
own interpretation), nationality and self-determination (this list of Luxemburg’s 
ideological grievances against her fellow Marxists is not exhaustive). 
 
It is a well-known fact that Marxist theory, Austro-Marxism notwithstanding, has 
precious little to say on nationality in general. Set against this background, Nimni (1991: 
50) calls Luxemburg ‘probably the most uncompromising Marxist commentator on the 
national question’. He explains Luxemburg’s ‘inability to conceptualize the national 
phenomenon’ by her adherence to the ‘logic of epiphenominalism’, or, in other words, her 
stubborn refusal to examine national communities in an analytical framework different 
from the Marxist theory of the universal development of the forces of production. (Nimni 
1991: 56)  
 
Swain (1999: 668) posits that Latvian social democracy in general was 
‘Luxemburgist through and through’, and that it was ‘closer to the ideas of Rosa 
Luxemburg than Vladimir Lenin, while Stu!ka in particular was ‘dogmatically 
Luxemburgist when it came to the question of nationality’. In support of the first part of his 
statement, Swain refers to the aforementioned claim made by B. Kalni"# that Latvian 
social democracy had closer links with German than with Russian Marxists. This, in 
Swain’s interpretation, ensured that the Latvian party ‘kept a certain distance from Lenin 
and his fractional disputes’ until the outbreak of World War One, pursuing its own policy 
of ‘worker Menshevism’ and insisting on operating within a federal structure. But the 
                                                
17 Kolakowski (2005: 403) refers to ‘Luxemburgism’ as ‘a particular variant of Marxism which, though not 
possessing an articulate philosophical basis, occupies a place of its own in the history of the socialist 
doctrine’. 
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Latvian Social Democrats’ aloofness, stresses Swain, should not be confused with 
moderation, especially in their position on the agrarian question. Indeed, while Lenin 
repeatedly revised his position on agrarian reform prior to 1917, Latvian Bolsheviks, 
especially Stu!ka, who was considered an authority on the matter among them, stubbornly 
stuck to immediate nationalisation of the land and the means of agricultural productions, 
and collectivisation – a policy which proved to be disastrous and which ultimately led to 
the Bolsheviks’ demise in Latvia. Stu!ka’s position on the agrarian question is, in fact, 
very close to that of Luxemburg, who fiercely criticised ‘Lenin and his friends’ for the 
‘sudden, chaotic conversion of large landownership into peasant landownership’, which in 
Luxemburg’s opinion piled up ‘insurmountable obstacles to the socialist transformation of 
agrarian relations.’ (Luxemburg 2012: 43- 44) 
 
What were the other similarities in the ideological outlooks of the German 
revolutionary Marxist and the leader of the Latvian Bolsheviks? Stu!ka admittedly shared 
Luxemburg’s uncompromisingly negative stance on the right of nationalities (especially 
small ones) to self-determination – which she famously called ‘an idle petty bourgeois 
phrase and humbug’ (Luxemburg 2012: 49) – as ‘the greatest danger for international 
socialism’ (Luxemburg 2012: 55). She considered the recognition of the right of 
nationalities to self-determination, which former Russian provinces, including the Baltics, 
opportunistically used for achieving state independence, as the Bolsheviks’ greatest 
mistake (Kolakowski 2005: 428). Stu!ka wrote in 1919:  
 
Neither the Latvian Social Democratic Party, nor its successor the Latvian Social 
Democracy, has ever used a slogan of ‘independent’, ‘sovereign’ Latvia. On the contrary, we 
always ridiculed this slogan as absurd, as during the era of imperialism the independence of tiny 
states is nothing other than diplomatic deception, and during the era of socialism it is simply 
unnecessary. 
      (Stu!ka 1919: 6) 
 
Stu!ka, like Luxemburg, uncompromisingly clung to the classical Marxist principle 
expressed by Engels as a ‘universal revolution on a universal terrain’: 
 
Only the proletarian revolution can freely and without a hidden agenda proclaim the real 
self-determination of the peoples. But this does not mean that it will create a fragmented world of 
small separate national units; the proletarian revolution is by its nature a true carrier of true 
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internationalism and it recognizes that communism should result in an all-world union of 
communist autarchy.  
        
(Stu!ka 1920?: 223) 
 
For Luxemburg, who never changed her views on the matter, this obstinacy cost 
her her proper place in the Communist pantheon – in the 1930s her position was linked by 
Stalin to the theory of permanent revolution formulated by Trotsky, whom Stalin claimed 
she had inspired; ‘in consequence, all that was distinctive in Rosa Luxemburg’s political 
and theoretical views became a dead letter’. (Kolakowski 2005: 431-432) 
 
Stu!ka’s views on the subject of universal revolution proved to be more flexible. 
After allowing himself to be coaxed by Lenin and Stalin into accepting the post of the 
Head of the Latvian Soviet government, and perhaps in exchange for Lenin’s forgiveness 
for the disastrous results of this government’s rule, he compromised and acknowledged 
that: 
 
To protect itself from imperialistic accusations, the Soviet state must recognise the 
bourgeois or democratic self-determination of nations, leaving it to each nation to live out this 
illusion internally, and should simply liberate them [nations] from external imperialistic influences 
and conduct broad propaganda for proletarian, or Soviet self-determination supported by the 
working people.   
 
(Stu!ka 1920?: 223)18 
 
 
But here, I think, the similarity between Luxemburg’s and Stu!ka’s views ends. For 
example, while Luxemburg was in strong opposition to the proletarian dictatorship 
implemented by the Bolsheviks as a reign of terror (Luxemburg herself interpreted the 
proletarian dictatorship as a ‘manner of applying democracy’, not its elimination), Stu!ka 
had no qualms about unleashing terror and silencing his opponents during his short rule in 
Latvia. I also beg to differ with the second part of Swain’s statement that Stu!ka was 
‘dogmatically Luxemburgist’ on the question of nationality. Luxemburg was unwavering 
in her opposition to the very idea of nation; she was not prepared to make any sentimental 
                                                
18 Quoted as per Stu!ka, P. ‘Nacion"lisms un tautu pa#noteik#an"s’, first published in 1972 in: Stu!ka, P. 
(1972) Nacion!lais jaut!jums un latvie"u proletai!ts. Darbu izlase. 1906-1930. R$ga: Liesma; with a 
footnote that the article was written not earlier than in the end of 1920.  
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concessions to her native Poland, whose long-sought independence she fiercely opposed 
(she often put the words ‘The Poles’ in inverted commas in her writing); nor did she show 
any compassion towards the Polish Jews during the pogroms of 1903-1906, sternly 
advising them not to expect recognition of their cultural rights under capitalism. This 
unwavering position on national matters cannot be compared to Stu!ka’s, who, when it 
came to all matters Latvian, demonstrated surprising ambiguity, as I will show later in this 
chapter. 
 
Stu!ka’s stance on the national question was perhaps the most important point of 
his ideological divergence with his Social Democratic peers in Latvia. The works of K. 
Renner, and especially of O. Bauer, on the national question and non-territorial cultural 
autonomy had a profound impact on the Latvian Social Democrats, inspiring Skujenieks’s 
book The National Question in Latvia (1913) and Valters’s The Question of Our 
Nationality (1914), and ultimately transforming the Latvian social democracy into an 
independence-seeking movement. It needs to be said that although Stu!ka ultimately 
rejected the Austro-Marxist vision as nationalism under a socialist label’, he did not, at the 
time, eschew Austro-Marxism as categorically as the Bolsheviks’ main theorist on the 
national question, J. Stalin, who viciously criticised Renner and Bauer’s theory of 
nationalism labelling it ‘weak‘, ‘idealistic’ and ‘self-refuting’ in his essay Marxism and the 
National Question published in 1913. Stu!ka, in fact, considered Bauer’s book Question of 
Nationalities and Social Democracy (1907) to be ‘the first substantial work on the national 
question from a Marxist point of view”, and praised Bauer’s explorations of nations’ pasts 
(Stu!ka 1972: 88). Stu!ka (1972: 93) also gave a generally positive evaluation of 
Skujenieks’s The National Question in Latvia, which owed a significant intellectual debt to 
Bauer, but in conclusion he wrote: ‘People and nations are important facts that cannot be 
simply discarded…here I agree with M. Skujenieks; however, we must not make a leap to 
nationalism from here. I hope that the author will not follow this path, either.’ Ezergailis 
(1974: 115) juxtaposes Skujenieks’s ‘autonomous federalism’ with the ‘democratic 
centralism’ of Stu!ka, asserting that Skujenieks’s thesis was based on a ‘belief in the 
uniqueness of Latvia and her higher economic and cultural level’. Paradoxically, Stu!ka 
was also convinced of Latvia’s superiority over Russia – but that only led him to believe 
that the socialist revolution stood a better chance in Latvia than in Russia, and he remained 
adamant to the end that the interests of the proletariat could not be reconciled with those of 
the national bourgeoisie.  
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Stu!ka’s growing dedication to class struggle and the world revolution, which 
seemed to intensify rapidly from 1907 onward, deepened the rift between him and the 
Latvian Mensheviks, the question of Latvia’s independence from Russia becoming the 
decisive point. Arguably, until the February Revolution of 1917, and immediately 
afterwards, all Latvian Social Democrats advocated some kind of cultural autonomy for 
Latvia in a free democratic Russia. As observed by "#rmanis (1968: 41), ‘the difference in 
the various drafts and declarations of autonomy which appeared after the Revolution was 
in the question of relations with Russia’. In the course of just a few months, though, all 
Latvian political parties, apart from the Bolsheviks, abandoned the earlier autonomy 
projects and started pursuing full independence.19 Stu!ka became the main advocate for the 
preservation of the union with Russia, which was reflected in the numerous articles he 
published in the Social Democratic press at the time. 
 
Stu!ka obviously believed, like the leader of the Russian Bolsheviks V. Lenin, that 
in the absence of any coercion the Latvian working class would make the right choice: 
 
Right now is the time to finally decide what we want when we say ‘Latvia and Russia’. 
The self-determination rights of the Latvian people do not depend on bureaucrats or generals any 
more, but only on the people themselves. Therefore we should openly say what our thoughts are on 
this question.20  
 
Stu!ka does not see the union with Russia as the only possible choice; he has 
obviously contemplated other options, while still considering the final proletarian victory 
in the class struggle an ultimate goal: 
 
Let us admit that we were never frightened (and could not have been frightened) by the 
danger of separation from the autocratic – at that time – Russia. Whatever you say about the 
                                                
19 It seems impossible to determine who was the first to voice the idea of Latvian independence, as there are 
many contenders. M. Valters was repeatedly credited as the author of the idea of Latvian independence. For 
example, Apine (1974, p. 190 and 2005, p. 33) mentions that Valters promoted the idea of Russia’s 
‘decentralisation-disintegration’ as the only alternative to the existing order in an article published in 1903, 
and came up with an even more radical solution – to create ‘as many states as there nations in present-day 
Russia’ in an article published in 1905. Dribins (1997, p. 163) contends that Valters ‘was the first to raise the 
flag of national independence’. $ilde (1985, p. 192) interprets the expressions ‘organised national 
communities’ and ‘political national unions’, which Valters repeatedly used in his book ‘The Question of 
Our Nationality’ (1914), as euphemism for Latvian national independence. Ciel#ns (1961, p. 505) believes 
that L. Laic#ns (who at the time was still a National Democrat) was the first to put forward the demand for 
Latvian sovereignty in the newspaper Dzimtenes Atbalss during the summer of 1917. E. Blanks, one of the 
leaders of the National Democratic Party, whose members "#rmanis (1968, p. 51) calls the ‘most active and 
vociferous spokesmen’ for the widest possible autonomy for Latvia, is yet another possible contender. 
20 Stu!ka, P. (under the pseudonym §) (1917) ‘Latwija un Kreewija’, Zih!a, 10 (24) March. 
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German regime, there were, and there still are, certain political freedoms there. The economic 
development there is so advanced, that when any serious Social Democrat imagines the 
possibilities of the final fight there, his heart skips a beat (and there is no doubt that some of our big 
patriots, at the bottom of their hearts, think the same). A German eagle, or a Russian sceptre - for 
the [Latvian] proletariat it makes no difference; what is important is to be close to our own class 
comrades, either in Germany or in Russia, as the final fight for socialism is still ahead of us.21 
 
But no matter how dedicated he is to the idea of the world revolution, Stu!ka is not 
prepared to sacrifice the unity of the Latvian people – here he seems to be in full 
agreement with the nationalists:  
 
The natural desire that the Latvian people do not get split up between the two masters [i.e. 
Russia and Germany] is quite understandable. It is understandable even to those who are in no way 
nationalists, simply because in this case their cultural force would also be split up, and this would 
lead to endless chauvinism. …Everybody is concerned that this separation should not happen, 
albeit for different reasons; at the very least, this concern can be expressed with an old saying: ‘In 
heaven or in hell, but all together!’22 
 
 
However, Stu!ka believes that with the recent democratic changes in Russia, and 
with the common goals shared by the Latvian and Russian proletariat, there can be no 
hidden dangers if Latvia decides to stay with Russia: 
  
But the Latvian proletariat does not have the slightest reason to long for separation, not 
beforehand, and not now when it has been shedding blood together with its Russian comrades for 
the final victory. We wholeheartedly believe that our democratic freedoms, also in terms of our 
language specifically, are not threatened by Russian democracy.23 
 
 The ambiguity of Stu!ka’s views on Latvian independence is clearly demonstrated 
in his article published in May 1917. On the one hand, Stu!ka persists in his 
‘Luxemburgist’ position on the undesirability of the independence of small states:  
 
We say that comrade Lenin goes too far to the national side when he insists on the 
unlimited rights of every nation to secession, and we say that it is generally childish to talk about 
the independence of small states during the imperialistic era. Comrade Lenin, as a member of a big 
                                                
21 Stu!ka, P. (under the pseudonym §) (1917) ‘Latwija un Kreewija’, Zih!a, 10 (24) March. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. 
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nation, offers us more rights then we really want; and we say that it is the union of the big states 
that is really in the proletariat’s best interests…24  
 
On the other hand, Stu!ka yet again asserts that a divided Latvia is not the price he 
is prepared to pay: ‘But we, Latvian Social Democrats, also allow the possibility that if in a 
complicated international situation, Kurzeme was forced to become independent, or to 
become a free port territory, then we would also obviously vote for the rest of Latvia 
joining the independent Kurzeme’.25 Altogether, it seems that Stu!ka may have considered 
Latvia being a part of Russia a short-term tactical solution before the universal socialist 
revolution came to pass: he claims that the Latvian Bolsheviks are, above all, ‘for a 
broadly democratic, self-governing, undivided Latvia within a democratic Russia, if not 
within a wider all-European or all-world democratic republic’; and that ‘only then it will 
be in Kurzeme’s interests to be annexed by Russia when it is an equal part of Russia or of 
an even wider democracy.’26 
 
"#rmanis (1968: 72) also observes that the attitude of the Latvian Bolsheviks to the 
national question was ‘particularly significant’, as although ‘they parroted the principle of 
‘democratic centralism’ and advocated a class struggle’, they cooperated with other 
Latvian political parties and organizations on the question of autonomy on several 
occasions in 1917, and in ‘certain hypothetical international situations’ promised to 
support the separation of Latvia from Russia. 
  
As a well-established lawyer, in his earlier years Stu!ka managed to combine his 
Social Democratic activities, mainly in the theoretical field, with a comfortable bourgeois 
existence (see Valters 1969, Kalni$% 1983, Lorencs 2005). Both Valters and Kalni$% 
mention Stu!ka’s large, handsomely appointed apartment and the generous hospitality that 
he extended to his fellow (and less comfortably situated) Social Democrats. Valters (1969: 
198) claims, however, that ‘the hardness of a Communist chieftain was present in his soul 
already in the 90s; behind all this bourgeois façade there was something else… some 
concept of justice which did not want to take into account the laws of life and its 
                                                
24 Stu!ka, P. (under the pseudonym §) (1917) ‘Kurzemes aneksijas jautajum&’, Zih!a, 07 (20) May. This 
statement by Stu!ka is, in my opinion, in clear contradiction with the assertion made by Ezergailis (1974, p. 
86) that ‘Stu!ka did not differ from Lenin to any significant degree on the matter of tactical use of the 
nationality question’. I would like to argue that there was less difference in Stu!ka’s and Lenin’s views on 
nationality in general, than on the ‘tactical use’ of it. It was precisely Lenin’s flexibility on the national 
question for the sake of strategy that both Luxemburg and, albeit not quite as vehemently, Stu!ka were so 
opposed to. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid. 
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unavoidable deficiencies’. Valters repeatedly juxtaposes the personalities of Stu!ka and 
Rainis (whom Valters worshipped); he speaks of Stu!ka’s ‘autocratic leftism’, his 
consistency, his opposition to the national idea, and his intolerance. For Stu!ka, with his 
‘lawyer’s psychology’, writes Valters, it is the idea that rules absolutely - and it should be 
meticulously implemented. Valters remarks caustically that Stu!ka’s pen name Paragrafs 
(Paragraph) was indeed very fitting (1969: 198). Lorencs’s (2005: 100) descriptions of 
Stu!ka are unequivocally negative: he speaks of Stu!ka’s ‘cowardly caution’, his 
aloofness, his lack of ‘comradely warmth’, and his haughtiness. ‘The morality of an 
underground movement, its special comradeship, closeness and altruistic selflessness were 
completely alien to Stu!ka,’ – claims Lorencs (2005: 100). It is impossible to determine 
just how much these personal recollections of Stu!ka, written at a much later date, were 
informed by subsequent developments in Stu!ka’s political career – consciously or not, the 
benefits of hindsight may be hard to resist.  
 
In any case, the apparent clash between Stu!ka’s benign ‘bourgeois’ appearance 
and his dogmatic ideological fanaticism puzzled even casual observers. George Popoff, 
who left a detailed account of life in Riga under the Bolshevik government, although 
repeatedly calling Stu!ka ‘the Latvian Lenin’, nevertheless insists that ‘he was no savage 
terrorist or bloodthirsty tyrant, but rather a quiet thinker and deliberate theorist, a sort of 
Red professor. Moreover, in private life he was a pleasant and good-natured old fellow, by 
no means inaccessible to argument.’ (Popoff 1932: 57). Describing the public address that 
Stu!ka delivered in response to the rumours circulating about the impending massacres of 
the German and Jewish population - a speech which Popoff witnessed - he writes:   
 
I must confess that he won all our hearts immediately – indeed, he made an exceedingly 
agreeable impression. What a charming old fellow he seemed as he stood there on the platform, 
and how quiet, highly moral and ‘unrevolutionary’ was all that he said! An extreme socialist, of 
course; but not a trace of the savage tyrant, the rabid Bolshevik! He was more like a comfortable, 
good-natured shopkeeper, a professor or a clergyman. 
       (Popoff 1932: 69-70) 
 
Referring to Stu!ka’s low-hanging moustache, Popoff calls him ‘an amiable 
walrus’. (Popoff 1932: 70). However, just a few months later, recounting the increasing 
panic among the Bolsheviks after the fall of Mitau when they were bracing themselves for 
the defence of Riga, Popoff changes his tune:  
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…Even President Stutchka, who till now had always been considerably more moderate 
than such rabid extremists as Simon Berg, Endrup, Danishevsky27, the President of the 
Revolutionary Tribunal and most of the other Bolshevist leaders, and had acted to some degree as a 
brake on their frantic zeal, now changed his tone – doubtless from fear that he would lose his 
popularity and that the control of the movement would slip out of his hands. He became less and 
less of the good-natured and friendly theorist and professor we had formerly known; he displayed a 
new roughness and irritability; and indulged more and more frequently in demagogic utterances, 
from which he had hitherto completely abstained.  
(Popoff 1932, p. 205) 
 
By the time Popoff describes in his memoir, Stu!ka had not just become a hardcore 
Marxist – in many of his views he was more radical than his role model V. Lenin (who 
reportedly had to intervene upon receiving complaints about Stu!ka’s ‘excesses’ during his 
reign over the Latvian population). Stranga (2007: 104) writes that Stu!ka’s communism, 
the ‘perfect Latvian communism’, was implemented with the aim of showing Russians 
how to build a real, ‘pure’ communism different from their own – and that meant endless 
terror.28  
 
The Latvian Socialist Soviet Republic was proclaimed on December 17, 1918. 
Shortly afterwards, Stu!ka arrived in Latvia from St. Petersburg. It was, strictly speaking, 
already a second attempt at establishing socialism in Latvia – the first being the Iskolat 
Republic (Iskolat – a Russian abbreviation of the Executive Committee of Latvian 
Workers, Soldiers and Landless Peasants) whose brief existence encompasses the period 
from July 1917 until February 1918 (with the advance of the German troops, Iskolat 
retreated to Moscow where it was later disbanded). Iskolat proclaimed itself the highest 
organ of power in Latvia and issued a decree on nationalisation of all agricultural land and 
natural resources, and on the formation of the Red Guard. "#rmanis (1968: 63) observes 
that ‘a part of Iskolat’s decrees had a pronounced national inclination: all business in 
government institutions were to be transacted in the Latvian language, programmes of 
instruction in schools were altered in order to emphasise the teaching of Latvian language 
and Latvian history’. On Latvia’s position vis-à-vis Russia, Iskolat declared that it 
                                                
 
27 Simon Berg - the head of the Riga Soviet; R$dolfs Endrups – Commissar for Finance in Stu!ka’s 
government; J$lijs Dani%evskis – Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and for a while also Commissar for Social 
Welfare (&ilde 1976: 292).  
28 The precise number of the victims of Stu!ka’s regime remains unknown. &ilde repeatedly mentions (1976, 
p. 295; 1982, p. 195) 3632 people shot (1549 in Riga, and 2083 in the countryside), but Stranga (2007) 
observes that these numbers are not supported by documental evidence.  
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‘recognises the autonomy of a united Latvia (Kurzeme, Vidzeme and Latgale) which is 
based on democratic centralism, i.e. a system which does not exceed the framework of the 
decreed principles of the Russian dictatorship of the proletariat and at the same time 
ensures the broadest self-determination of the Latvian labour democracy’.29 The Latvian 
Socialist Soviet republic was the Iskolat’s successor in more ways than one – the Iskolat’s 
former Chairman Fr. Rozi!" (#zis) was, alongside Stu$ka, one of the two possible 
candidates for the head of the new Latvian Soviet government. Dribins (2011: 51) 
describes how after the vote among the Latvian Bolsheviks in Moscow - where on 4th 
December 1918 the decision was to take place - turned out to be equally divided between 
the two candidates, Stu$ka and Rozi!" reportedly tossed a coin that flipped in Stu$ka’s 
favour. Rozi!", unperturbed, acquiesced to becoming the Commissar for Agriculture in 
Stu$ka’s government. 
 
After announcing the dawn of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and adopting a 
new Constitution (which closely followed the constitution of the Russian federation of 
1918, which Stu$ka had helped to develop), Stu$ka formed a central government, and a 
number of Soviets responsible for the main spheres of life in Soviet Latvia, i.e. economy, 
finance, welfare, education, etc. Initially welcomed by the general population, Stu$ka’s 
government quickly lost its popularity because of the nationalisation of the land, and the 
collectivization of the means of production - ideas intrinsically foreign to the Latvian 
farmer of the time; because of the famine which followed collectivisation, and of the 
repression, such as executions dispensed by military tribunals, torture and property 
confiscations, which the regime employed to stifle discontent.  
 
The Latvian Soviet received uneven treatment at the hands of historians. If Soviet 
historiography endlessly glorified its short existence as a heroic attempt stifled by the 
imperialist forces, Latvian historians tend to emphasize the active role of Bolshevik Russia 
in installing Stu$ka’s government, and the overall chaos of war in the Latvian lands in 
1918 (%ilde 1976, Bleiere et al. 2005). The same goes for anecdotal evidence. For 
example, Kroders (1968) attributes the Bolsheviks’ popularity in Kurzeme to the general 
confusion in the occupied territories in 1919, when the residents of the devastated land 
were past caring about ideological agendas: ‘Whoever comes – Bolsheviks or Mensheviks, 
                                                
29 Br!vais Str"lnieks, 22.12.1917, quoted per: &'rmanis, U. (1968) ‘The Idea of Independent Latvia and its 
Development in 1917’, in: Sprudz, A. and Rusis, A. (eds.) Res Baltica. A Collection of Essays in Honour of 
the Memory of Dr. Alfred Bilmanis. Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, p. 64. 
 
Chapter 2: The Latvian Nation – Evolution of the Concept. 1850-1918 
 
 101 
it will be a relief from the German occupation’s inhumanity and destruction’ (1968: 299). 
He also mentions mistrust on the part of the local population towards the ‘totally non-
Latvian surnames in our government – Ulmanis, Meierovics, Valters, Goldmanis, 
Hermanovskis, and Blumbergs’, which he claims helped swing popular support in the 
Bolsheviks’ favour (1968: 300).  Centuries-long distrust towards the Germans, public 
speculation about the uneasy cooperation between Ulmanis and Van der Goltz in general, 
and popular dismay at the promise of Latvian citizenship Prime Minister Ulmanis had had 
to give to those German soldiers who agreed to fight for Latvian independence, must have 
made the soil ripe for those seeds of suspicion. It should be added, that, ironically, the 
Bolsheviks did indeed have a much more Latvian-sounding team: Rozi!", P#tersons, 
K$rkli!"...  
 
At the same time, historians agree that the electoral records of the municipal 
elections of 1917, and the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly of the same 
year unequivocally indicate that the Bolsheviks enjoyed the support of the majority of the 
Latvian population at the time. For example, in Riga the Latvian Social Democracy (which 
was by then controlled by the Bolsheviks, who led all the election lists) obtained 41%, 
while all the other parties together gained 59%; in Valka, the Bolsheviks gained 61% of 
the votes, in C#sis – 64%, and in Valmiera – 75%. In the elections to the All-Russia 
Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviks gained 72% of all votes in Vidzeme (by 
comparison, the Agrarian Union gained 23%, and the Mensheviks – 5%; whereas Stu%ka 
received 97,781 votes, the Agrarian Union candidate J. Goldmanis got only 31,253 (Z&le 
and Ziemelis 1979: 20; 'ilde 1976: 172)). Stu%ka’s government did not enjoy popular 
support for very long, but such support was beyond any doubt enormous to start with: ‘In 
1917 the Latvian Social Democracy was under Bolshevik leadership and in a position to 
exult loyalty not only from the party membership but also from thousands of other 
Latvians’ (Ezergailis 1983: 69). Page (1948: 28) also attests that ‘when the Red Army 
drove into Latvia in December of 1918, there were numerous indications that it was 
operating on friendly territory’.  
 
The overwhelming popular support further convinced Stu%ka that Latvia was ripe 
for a socialist transformation. But the form of this transformation, i.e. Latvia’s becoming 
an independent Soviet state, caused a disagreement between Stu%ka and Lenin - as a true 
dogmatic thinker, Stu%ka persisted in his beliefs, and refused to consider tactical 
considerations. Stu%ka had never supported the idea of Latvia’s independence, firmly 
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believing that the independence of small countries under imperialism was nothing but a 
‘diplomatic deception’, and under socialism was simply unnecessary (Stu!ka 1919: 6). 
Stu!ka was reportedly ‘horrified’ at the decision taken by Lenin and the Central 
Committee to form a provisional revolutionary government in Latvia (White 1994; Swain 
1999), and only reluctantly agreed to accept the post of head of government of the 
independent Soviet Latvia in 1919 under considerable pressure from Lenin himself. 
Nevertheless, upon receiving orders to create a Latvian Republic, ‘he endeavoured to do it 
with a certain perfectionism, being convinced that his own ‘power construction’ was 
superior to that of the Russians’ ("ilde 1976: 290).  
 
Stu!ka’s revolutionary zeal in expropriating land and property and in dealing out 
harsh punishments to the ‘enemies of the people’, however, was not matched by a similar 
fervour in matters national or ethnic, despite his repeated assertions of being against all 
nationalisms, even when under a socialist label.30 When it came to his native Latvia, 
Stu!ka was not so quick to subscribe to Leninist internationalism in practice as he was in 
theory, often demonstrating conflicting views and attitudes, and at times behaving in a 
manner that would have made any Latvian nationalist proud. It is a famous fact that 
Stu!ka’s ‘revolutionary’ government did not include a single non-ethnic Latvian. Stranga 
(1998, p. 26) observes that Stu!ka’s government, which started its activities with an 
unmistakably characteristic terror, was ‘the most Latvian of all governments in the Latvia 
of 1919 – in terms of its ethnic composition, and in terms of the initial support of the 
residents’. When it came to geographical borders, Stu!ka acted like a nationalist – his 
position on Latgale being an integral part of Latvia remained unshakeable ("ilde 1976: 
295); he vehemently defended Valka as a Latvian city in the territorial dispute with 
Estonia, and insisted that Palanga, claimed by Lithuanians, ‘is a part of Kurland separating 
us from Prussia, and is necessary for revolutionary purposes’ (Stu!ka 1919: 26). In the 
Latvian Soviet, Latvian was declared the official language of communication, and all 
decrees were issued, and public announcements made, in Latvian only. Stu!ka justified 
choosing Latvian as the only language of communication by claiming that ‘Latvia is a land 
inhabited largely by Latvians’, and, incredibly, that ‘the majority of Latvians do not know 
any other language’. Dribins mentions that reacting to criticisms from Moscow, the 
Latvian Soviet government issued a decree on March 8, 1919 that allowed the usage of 
                                                
30 Stu!ka was closely familiar with the works of Austro-Marxists; he disagreed with O. Bauer on the future of 
the national question, but acknowledged his ‘diligent work in researching the past’ and praised Bauer’s ‘new 
ideas’ (see Stu!ka 1907: 38-39). 
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Russian and Latgalian along with Latvian, and adds: ‘This enabled the majority of 
Latgale’s Jews to read the communists’ orders and circulars, as they did not speak Latvian 
at the time’. (2005: 9) 
 
Stu!ka was also strongly opposed to the idea of a centralised Russian government, 
insisting on conditions of true autonomy in all fields apart from the military: ‘We are 
putting forward an unconditional demand for local, i.e. Soviet regional government, and 
local Soviet control.’ He continues that ‘within those limits which are necessary in order to 
account for the specific Latvian conditions, we will be autonomists despite any reproaches 
or accusations of being too independent’ (Stu!ka 1919: 61). 
 
These ‘specific Latvian conditions’, in Stu!ka’s own interpretation, deserve a 
closer look. In striking similarity to his Latvian nationalist counterparts, Stu!ka appears 
convinced of Latvia’s superiority to Russia, both economic and cultural. He posits that 
Latvia, ‘despite the devastation of the war, still represents an area economically radically 
different from the rest of Russia, as its capitalist relations are more developed’ (1919: 59). 
(This latter circumstance had led Stu!ka to believe mistakenly that Latvia would be able to 
take a short cut to socialism). Having otherwise copied all the management structures and 
symbols of Soviet Russia, Stu!ka nonetheless did not find it possible to use the famous 
hammer and sickle emblem: citing the necessity of ‘stressing the higher level of economic 
development of the region’, he proposes to replace the sickle, ‘long forgotten in our land’, 
with a scythe (1919: 16).  
 
He also recalls how ‘once upon a time, our Russian comrades made fun of the 
‘bourgeois appearance’ of most Latvian workers, of their habit of dressing nicely, living in 
a nice flat or room, etc.’ (Stu!ka 1919: 58). In an article published in 1914, Stu!ka (1972: 
86) casually observes that ‘...Latvian emigrants, who came to live in an environment with a 
lower degree of development, even in exile managed to assimilate part of the local 
indigenous population, but being stuck at this stage without further evolution, within one 
generation slid below the level of local residents’ – he is obviously referring to the 
Latvians exiled from Latvia to Russia.  
 
Stu!ka’s animosity towards the Baltic Germans rivals that of his nationalist 
counterparts; he is preoccupied with the past German domination of Latvia, and its 
influence upon Latvian social and cultural life, observing bitterly: ‘In 1897, the German 
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influence in Latvia was strong enough to motivate a significant part of Latvians to start 
calling themselves Germans.’ (1919: 28). Moreover, using his earlier acquired skills and 
putting himself on a par with the latter-day Skujenieks in statistical manipulation, Stu!ka 
sets out to prove that the overall presence of Germans in Latvia has been exaggerated: 
 
In 1897, out of 282,230 inhabitants of Riga there were 127,046 Latvians and 67,286 
Germans, or 24 %. In reality, this number is much lower, because one needs to subtract 3,964 Jews 
(by faith) who declared themselves Germans, and 7,489 peasants with the ‘German native tongue’ 
(there are no such peasants in the Baltics; they are just Latvian peasants who declared themselves 
Germans), and as a result the percentage of Germans in Riga in 1897 will not exceed 20 %…The 
census of 1913 in Riga provided a totally different picture: out of 517,582 inhabitants there were 
already 191,956 Latvians, and only 61, 923 Germans, or only 12 %! And thus the number of 
Germans in Latvia does not validate all the talk of the German character of Latvia!31 
       
(Stu!ka 1919: 29) 
 
But simply disproving German numerical domination is not sufficient for Stu!ka, 
and he launches an attack on German culture: ‘German craftsmen in the countryside are 
less cultured in comparison with Latvian peasants, and the percentage of illiterate people 
among the Germans is much higher’ (1919, p. 31). From the countryside he moves to the 
urban scene, where, according to Stu!ka, Baltic Germans fare even worse:  
 
Also in the cities all these artisans and petite bourgeoisie of German provenance are no 
more cultured than Latvians. On the contrary, if one subtracts the so called literati, or intelligentsia, 
where Riga’s Germans account for 16%, and Latvians only for 1.5 %, then literacy among the 
remaining Latvian population is 77%, and among the remaining German population – only 67%! 
       
(Stu!ka 1919: 31) 
 
Finally, he makes a rather surprising - for a Marxist – statement, which can be 
interpreted as recognition of the existing upward class mobility in Latvian society: ‘The 
                                                
31 Stu!ka obviously chooses to ignore the fact that although numerically ethnic Latvians grew from 1897 to 
1913, their percentage of the whole population of Riga over the same period fell from 45 to 42. It is unclear 
how he came up with the number of 191,956 Latvians in Riga in 1913 (Stu!ka does not identify his sources) 
– other sources indicate that the number of Latvians in Riga in 1913 was around 217,000, or 42 % of the 
whole population of the city (see, for example, Skujenieks 1938, p. 12). Stu!ka’s observation of the inflated 
number of Germans is supported by Skujenieks (Skujeneeks 1913, footnote * on p. 188), who also writes: 
‘Russian statistics define ethnicity by native tongue. Many Jews have declared Russian and German as their 
native tongues. Therefore the numbers of Germans and Russians are inflated on account of Jews.’ 
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nobility once upon a time represented a closed society. But that was once upon a time! 
This difference is disappearing with each passing day.’ (1919: 31)  
 
There is no unanimous opinion on Stu!ka’s attitude towards the Jews. Stranga 
(2007), for example, believes that Stu!ka was not an anti-Semite, and supports his position 
with the argument that the Bund was able to continue its activities in the Soviet Latvian 
Republic, and that there were no impediments to education in Yiddish. According to 
Stranga, the persecution of the Bundists that followed later (all Zionist organizations were 
banned in the summer of 1919) did not have an anti-Semitic character either. He does, 
however, mention that Stu!ka’s national communism created two-fold problems for 
Russian-speaking Jews: firstly, the communist regime consistently implemented the 
Latvian language as the official language of communication; secondly, Stu!ka was a 
consistent defender of a ‘united and indivisible Latvia’ that included Latgale, causing 
dissatisfaction among those Latgalian Jews more oriented towards the Vitebsk province of 
Russia – dissatisfaction that Stu!ka chose to ignore (this, according to Stranga  (2007: 
105), can hardly be held against Stu!ka).  
 
Bobe (1971) posits that Stu!ka’s government discriminated against Jews, and 
therefore can be counted as anti-Semitic. V. Ziv, in an article published on 22nd May 1924, 
on the 5th anniversary of the liberation of Riga, paints the Stu!ka government as extremely 
hostile towards the Jews: ‘The minority question arose for the first time in Latvia on 2nd 
January 1919, when the ‘victorious’ army led by Stu!ka occupied Riga. From this day 
onwards, and until the Bolsheviks’ retreat, Latvia became an epicentre of the persecution 
of minorities.’32 
 
According to Ziv, a ‘nationalist war’ was waged under the slogan of social equality, 
when Jewish, German and Russian shopkeepers and landlords were singled out for 
lootings, confiscations and persecutions. Ziv describes, as ‘characteristic of the regime’, 
that those minority representatives who were able to speak Latvian enjoyed certain 
privileges. He draws attention to the fact that there was not a single German or Jew among 
the commissars. Ziv mentions a rather curious fact about the procurement of printing paper 
– according to him, the Bolshevik newspaper C!"a was published on paper of the highest 
quality, whereas newspapers in minority languages could only get hold of small quantities 
                                                
 
32 Dr. V.Ziv (1924), ‘Stuchka I menshinstva’, Segodnya, 22 May. 
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of wrapping paper to print on. Ziv goes as far as positing that ‘the advent of the communist 
government opened the history of anti-Semitism in Latvia – until then, Latvians and Jews 
were good neighbours. There was no old reckoning between them, and there could not 
have been, as both were equally oppressed in the past.’33  
 
Dribins (2009) asserts that the majority of Latvian Jews, despite being the poorest 
part of the population, did not support the Soviet government in 1919, and that 
approximately one thousand Latvian Jews were fighting in the Latvian national army 
against the Latvian Bolsheviks and the Red Army. ‘In any case, after the Soviets were 
driven out of Latvia, Stu!ka was forced to change his attitude – or, to be more precise, his 
political tactic – towards the ethnic minorities’ – Dribins (2009: 9) mentions Stu!ka’s later 
publications in which he attempted to ‘defend’ Latvian Jews against the alleged anti-
Semitism of the leader of the Latvian Social Democrat-Mensheviks, M. Skujenieks.  
 
Stu!ka himself categorically denied all the accusations of anti-Semitism against his 
government, but, notably, not the existence of anti-Jewish sentiment among Latvians in 
general – which he tries to attribute to the Latvian propertied classes exclusively, but then, 
carried away by his own rhetoric, repeatedly shoots himself in the foot. For example, he 
starts with a typical socialist-internationalist argument about class struggle: ‘The Latvian 
bourgeoisie, and its petite bourgeoisie are anti-Semites with a long history. Jews in Latvia 
are largely merchants and factory owners, and they were competing against the rising 
Latvian bourgeoisie’. But then, a few sentences later, the overall tone of proletarian 
compassion changes to ill-disguised contempt: ‘Besides, there are those Moskovskye 
suburbs in Riga, where the impoverished Jewish population is living side by side with true 
Russian darkness’. (Stu!ka 1919: 55). Yet the ensuing passage evokes writings on the 
same topic by the ardent nationalist Ernests Blanks:  
 
It should be added that another feature of Latvian Jewry, especially of that in Riga and 
Kurland, is their ‘German orientation’…As a consequence, the nationalistic hatred of the Latvian 
bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie towards the Germans has been extrapolated to Jews. And the joy 
with which this part of the Jews welcomed the German occupation both in 1917 and in 1919 also 
served this cause.  
 
(Stu!ka 1919: 55) 
                                                
33 Ibid. 
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After the Soviet government was ousted by the Latvian national army, Stu!ka 
retreated to Moscow, where he dedicated his efforts to the drawing up of the Soviet civil 
code. He passed away in 1932, and his ashes were interred in the Kremlin Wall behind the 
Mausoleum of his role model Lenin. During the Great Purge, Stu!ka’s legal theory was 
declared a ‘harmful ideology’, and Stu!ka himself – an ‘enemy of the people’. He was 
rehabilitated after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, and made an exemplary 
communist hero in Latvia – both the Latvian University (which was established by 
Stu!ka’s government in 1919), and the small town of Aizkraukle were named after him.  
 
As much as the memory of Stu!ka and his Latvian Soviet was hated in interwar 
Latvia, subsequent historical events put it in a somewhat different perspective. For 
example, "ilde (1982: 195), comparing the Latvia of 1919 to that of the Stalin era, points 
out several advantages of Stu!ka’s regime, namely: 1) only Latvians, and not Russians, 
were in the government and among the party leaders; 2) Stu!ka, overall, did not strive to 
bring any Russians to Latvia; 3) there were no overarching, all-republican ministries; 
everything was concentrated in Latvians’ own hands instead 4) the Latgalian dialect was 
allowed, and on the whole Latgale was joined to Latvia. 
  
 Similarly, Dribins (2005: 135) observes: ‘He will never be forgiven for the ‘red 
terror’ horrors of 1919, for ignoring the wishes of Latvian landless peasants, and for his 
negative stance on the demands for national independence. But the Latvian people also 
remember how Stu!ka opposed Latvia’s Russification, sometimes harshly arguing with the 
big comrades from Moscow. It distinguishes him positively from the later communists, 
especially when compared with A. Pel#e, A. Voss, and other spineless toadies’. 
  
 Interestingly, Dribins (1997, pp. 86-87) himself names M. Skujenieks as the 
founder of the movement within Latvian nationalism that would later become known as 
‘national communism’ – an ill-fated attempt by a group of Latvian communist leaders, 
such as E. Berklavs, V. Kr$mi%# and P. Dz&rve, to expand the Latvian Republic’s 
autonomy and to eliminate the Russifying aspects of the Soviet regime during the 
Khruschev Thaw (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983). It seems, however, that a much closer 
comparison can be drawn between Stu!ka and the national communists, especially 
between him and Pauls Dz&rve. Prior to his demise during the purge of 1959, Dz&rve 
served as the Director of the Economy Institute of the Latvian Academy of Sciences. In 
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1957, Dz!rve published a newspaper article and a book about Stu"ka, which – rather 
meekly, truth be told – attempted to interpret Stu"ka’s widely acknowledged ‘mistakes’ in 
agrarian policy and in the overall management of the first Latvian Soviet as creative 
attempts to protect his native country, with its unique history and nature, from certain 
aspects of Bolshevization.34  
  
 It is hard to gauge what was deemed as a worse transgression by the Communist 
party: Dz!rve’s own program of unorthodox economic measures aimed at protecting 
Latvian industry and agriculture, or his alleged tarnishing of the image of ‘this noted 
Soviet Latvian figure’, ‘the communist internationalist and the fighter for friendship 
between nations’, Comrade Stu"ka. Apparently, Comrade Dz!rve ‘exhibited serious 
political mistakes’ and ‘revealed his own inability to correctly understand the nature of P. 
Stu"ka’s mistakes and their importance’ by using them ‘as a positive example of 
independent and creative attempts to answer questions about Socialist construction, of 
taking revolutionary initiative, by taking into consideration Latvia’s uniqueness’.35 
 
 The Latvian national communists will be fondly remembered for their failed 
attempts to resist Russification in Latvia long after their demise in 1959. In the late 1980s, 
the elderly E. Berklavs would become one of the most prominent leaders of the 
independence movement and the founder of the Latvian National Independence Movement 
(LNNK in its Latvian abbreviation), which would transform into an important political 
party in the newly independent Latvia.36 As for comrade Stu"ka, who was a source of 
inspiration for the national communists, he sank into oblivion – as soon as Latvia re-gained 
independence, both the University of Latvia, and the town of Aizkraukle were relieved of 
his name, as a part of the overall purge of the Communist past.  
  
                                                
34 The boldest of Dz!rve’s statements goes as follows: ‘P!teris Stu"ka was fighting against the bureaucratic 
centralism which ignored local conditions and peculiarities, which was present in the work of the 
management of some of the organizations and enterprises which were under control of the Communist party 
of the Russian Federation.’(Dz!rve 1957: 131) 
35 Document No. 57, ‘Secret report by L. Lapina, Head of the Science, Schools and Culture Section of the 
Central Committee of the Latvian Communist party, and N. Muravjov, Deputy Leader, to the Bureau. 
December 15th, 1959’, in: Plakans, A. (2007), pp. 270-271.  
36 In 1997, LNNK merged with the For Fatherland and Freedom (TB in its Latvian abbreviation), forming a 
conservative right-wing alliance with a nationalist agenda. In 2010, LNNK/TB joined forces with the 
radically nationalist party All for Latvia.  
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 It is an irony of history that P!teris Stu"ka, a dogmatic Marxist and a Communist 
warrior, is ultimately best remembered in Latvia for an aberration in his professed creed, 
namely for the nationalist feelings which he himself took such great care to suppress.37  
 
2.4. A Winning Concept? Conclusions  
 
The works of Skujenieks, Valters, Blanks, and Stu"ka offer an important insight not 
just into the history of Latvian nationalist thought, but also into the general complex 
relationship between nationalism, ethnicity and democracy at the beginning of the 20th 
century, which still resonates with modern debates on multiculturalism and minority rights.   
 
Blanks’s vision of an ethnic Latvian nation was most fully implemented during the 
authoritarian regime of K. Ulmanis, when the economic, political and cultural interests of 
the core ethnic group were put ahead of the welfare of all state citizens as a whole. This, 
however, was achieved at the cost of parliamentary democracy and civic freedoms – a 
price Blanks himself was ultimately not prepared to pay. Whether this turn of events made 
him reconsider his views, we will never know for sure – but perhaps the fact that a prolific 
writer like Blanks completely disappeared from the public scene after the coup is an 
answer in itself. And perhaps his fate can serve as a warning to those who think that an 
ethnic democracy is a viable option. Because although this way of thinking remains 
confined to the far-right end of the nationalist spectrum in today’s Latvia, it has not 
disappeared from the political scene entirely, regularly resurfacing in the Saeima debates 
and in the mass media. 
 
Valters’s concept of the Latvian nation, which attempted to reconcile Latvian 
ethnic pre-eminence with democratic fairness, was unquestionably favoured by the 
majority of Latvian democrats during the interwar republic, and it continues to be popular 
at present. His vision of Latvia’s future has fully materialised - Latvia has taken its rightful 
place among other sovereign democratic nations, and the continuity of the Latvian 
language and culture is protected by law. However, this model of majority-minority 
relations, with its emphasis on communitarian values, proved to be problematic for 
successful nation-building during the interwar period, and is even more problematic in 
post-1991 Latvia – this will be discussed later in this thesis.  
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The Latvian civic nation envisioned by Skujenieks in 1913, just as during the First 
Republic, remains conspicuously out of reach. Although Skujenieks’s own ideological 
transformations later in life do not lend additional credibility to his theory, one must 
separate the man and his work, and they should be judged separately. Whatever 
Skujenieks’s personal failings, his ‘National Question in Latvia’ remains a remarkable 
example of Latvia’s own political thought, which not only demonstrates affinity with the 
latest European theory of the time, but also contains many original ideas and is full of 
intellectual courage, allowing it to transcend narrow parochial borders. I believe that if 
resurrected from the past, Skujenieks’s theoretical legacy would introduce an entirely new 
dimension into Latvian modern political thinking.   
 
!. "ilde (1982:70) observes that at the beginning of the 20th century both 
Skujenieks and Valters failed, as national ideologists, to capture the imagination of a wider 
audience. He attributes this to the fact that they appealed only to fellow intellectuals, and 
were unable to rally the masses. In this respect, Blanks perhaps gained a wider popular 
support base in interwar Latvia, his ideas being reproduced and recycled by the LNK and 
other extremist organisations, and the seeds of his xenophobic teachings falling into soil 
made more fertile by the worldwide Depression. But it is important to remember that it 
was the civic nation model advocated by Skujenieks and Valters that was officially 
adopted by the Latvian state at the time independence was attained. All available historical 
evidence suggests that in 1918 the founders of the Latvian state perceived national unity 
and ethnic harmony to be integral parts of the future political system, and were firmly 
committed to the principles of equality and inclusiveness. This willingness to include all 
ethnic groups living in Latvia in the process of building the new state was manifested both 
in the first legislative acts and in politicians’ speeches, and was widely echoed by the 
Latvian press, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.  
 
Stu#ka’s legacy is not a straightforward question. The Latvian Soviet, with its 
socialist internationalist ideology, was a short-lived political enterprise, which quickly lost 
its initial appeal to the Latvian population. However, just twenty-one year later, in 1940, 
the dictatorship of the proletariat would loom over Latvia again. That second socialist 
experiment, which lasted until 1991, would erase the independent state of Latvia from the 
map of Europe, would send hundreds of thousands of Latvians into exile, and would 
impose Russification with a vengeance.  
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Whether Stu!ka would have felt any remorse if he had still been alive then, we can 
only speculate. But it seems that he had done his penance – after 1919 and until his death 
in 1932, he lived and worked in Russia, without returning to Latvia once. As "#rmanis 
(1973: 155) poignantly observes, out of the three contending government heads of 1919, 
Niedra, Ulmanis, and Stu!ka, only Niedra was lucky to be buried in Latvian soil. Stu!ka, 
just like Ulmanis, died in exile – is there a worse fate for a nationalist? 
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Chapter Three: An Equal Among Nations, 1918-1934 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The February revolution of 1917 gave a new impetus to Latvian political life. 
Paraphrasing Ezergailis (1917: 1), the word ‘Latvia’, which was already in common 
currency, suddenly assumed not just cultural, but also political connotations.  A number of 
new political parties sprang to life in 1917. The National Democratic Party, which was the 
first to demand state independence for Latvia through its newspaper Dzimtenes Atbalss, 
was formed in Moscow in March by the Latvian émigré intelligentsia. Ernests Blanks, 
J!nis Akuraters, Atis "#ni$%, K!rlis Skalbe, and Andrejs Fr&denbergs were all members of 
this party, and they would all make significant contributions, albeit often on different sides 
of the barricades, to the national question in independent Latvia. Another prominent party 
that would play a decisive role in Latvian interwar politics, the Agrarian Union, was 
founded in Valka in May 1917. Among its members were the future Latvian statesmen 
K!rlis Ulmanis, Zigfr&ds Meierovics, J!nis Goldmanis, and former Social Democrat 
Mi'elis Valters. 
Two overarching organisations that would play a crucial role in achieving 
independence were also formed in 1917. The Democratic Bloc, also known as the ‘Bloc of 
the seventeen men’ (this should not be taken literally, as the actual numbers were higher) 
was founded upon the initiative of the Social Democrat P. Kalni$% and writer A. Deglavs 
in September in Riga, which was then under the German occupation; M. Valters, M. 
Skujenieks, and Fr. Menders were among its members. The Latvian Provisional National 
Council was established in November 1917 in Valka, founded by most of the Latvian 
political parties and organisations, with the notable exception of the Social Democrats. J. 
Goldmanis, J. (akste, Fr. Trasuns, Z. Meierovics, and )dolfs Kl&ve were all active in the 
Council. (*ilde 1982) The two organisations complemented each other in terms of 
membership – the centre-right leanings of the National Council were balanced out by the 
leftist Democratic Bloc; in conjunction, they were a perfect representation of the Latvian 
people. Ethnic minorities, however, were represented in neither of them.  
By 1918, Latvia had been ravaged by World War One, its industry ruined, 
population dispersed, and territory partitioned. Kurzeme was occupied by the Germans, 
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which prompted a massive exodus of the rural population – about 570,000 people fled 
eastwards to Vidzeme, Latgale, and Russia in 1915 alone; over the next two years the 
number of refugees from the Latvian provinces reached 760,000 (Plakans 1995: 114-115). 
Riga was taken by German forces in September 1917, from where they started to spread 
northwards to Vidzeme. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed in March 1918, legalised the 
partition of the Latvian territories – Germany kept control of Kurzeme and Riga, the fate of 
Vidzeme remained undecided, and Latgale was ceded to Bolshevik Russia (the latter fact 
was of little practical importance as the Bolsheviks had already declared the right to self-
determination for all peoples within their territories; besides, they were too busy fighting to 
protect the achievements of the October revolution at home). This new political order 
turned out to be short-lived – Germany’s defeat on the Western front prompted Kaiser 
Wilhelm, in September 1918 to recognise Vidzeme and Riga as free territories. This was 
done in order to maximise available military resources and in a vain attempt to appease the 
Baltic peoples so that they would remain voluntarily under German administration. As a 
result of this mind-boggling turn of events, in the autumn of 1918 no great power could 
legitimately claim the Latvian territories – all of a sudden, independence came within 
reach, and Latvian nationalists immediately seized the opportunity. On 18th November 
1918, the Latvian National Council, formed by the Provisional National Council and the 
Democratic Bloc the previous day, proclaimed Latvia an independent national state. The 
National Council also established a provisional Government led by the Agrarian Union 
representative K!rlis Ulmanis.  
It is noteworthy that "ilde (1982) attributes the formation of the National Council 
primarily to Ulmanis’s desire to include ethnic minorities in the state-building process, 
despite certain reservations towards the new state on the part of the Baltic Germans:  
Ulmanis’s strongest argument in favour of the National Council was the fact that the 
Provisional National Council represented only ethnic Latvians, but it was necessary to create a 
political body that would represent all of the country’s population. It was also necessary to involve 
ethnic minorities in state-building. The minorities comprised approximately one quarter of all 
Latvia’s residents. … If ethnic minorities were not invited to join from the start, it was only 
because of their scepticism – they did not comprehend the Latvian State idea; moreover, the Baltic 
Germans were openly against the formation of such a state.  
("ilde 1982: 163)  
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All available historical evidence suggests that in 1918 the founders of the Latvian 
state perceived national unity and ethnic harmony to be integral parts of the future political 
system, and were firmly committed to the principles of equality and inclusiveness. This 
willingness to include all ethnic groups living in Latvia in the process of building the new 
state was manifested both in the first legislative acts and in politicians’ speeches, and was 
widely echoed by the Latvian liberal press.  
 The document known as the National Council Platform defined Latvia as a united, 
sovereign and independent democratic republic. Delegates were to be sent to the National 
Council by: a) political parties; b) national minorities; c) those Latvian regions, i.e. 
Kurzeme and Latgale, where at the moment no political parties existed. Article 4, which 
was dedicated to minority rights, declared that national minorities could send their 
representatives to the Constitutional Assembly and to legislative bodies on a proportional 
representation basis; that minorities represented in the National Council could participate 
in the Provisional Government on a coalition basis; and that the national and cultural rights 
of national minorities were protected by constitutional law.  
The newly appointed Prime Minister K. Ulmanis emphasised in his speech that ‘All 
citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, are invited to help out [in building the new state], as 
the rights of all ethnic groups will be guaranteed by the Latvian state. It will be a state of 
democratic fairness, where there will be no place for oppression and injustice.’1 
The newspaper Jaun!k!s Zi"as enthusiastically greeted the newly born state in its 
editorial on 19th November 1918: 
The main manifestation of this state’s genius is national unity! With a wise and farsighted 
vision, different classes and circles represented in the National Council have united around 
common state tasks. Similarly, the whole Latvian nation without any exception, including our 
minority fellow-citizens, should with a common effort support the building of the new state and all 
its supreme power institutions!2 
Further on, the article explained the basic tenets of the National Council: 
                                                
1 Jaun!k!s Zi"as, Nr. 4, 19.11.1918. 
2 Ibid. 
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The Latvian National Council is founded upon the principle that it is a territorial state 
power; that it is not an exclusively Latvian, or exclusively German, power body, but that it 
represents all ethnic groups resident in Latvia. This is why it bears the name of the Latvian 
[Latvijas], and not ethnic Latvian [Latvie!u], National Council. Ethnic minorities are not 
represented in the National Council as yet. But it has been decided to allocate twenty per cent of 
the total number of deputies to be shared among Germans, Russians, Jews, Poles, Lithuanians, 
Estonians and other ethnic groups living in Latvia.3 
Max Laserson (1971: 95), a lawyer and a member of the National Council, and of 
the first three interwar parliaments representing the Jewish Socialist party Zeire Zion, 
recalls: ‘At its first meeting the National Council gave expression through the speeches of 
its members to its firm desire to bring minority groups into the structure of the new state. 
This desire found expression on the part of both right-wing and left-wing circles.’ He 
attests that ‘…the main groups of the Latvian people aspired from the earliest days of their 
independent State to recognise the cultural rights of the minority peoples, as well as their 
right to take an active part in the political life of the country.’ (Laserson 1971: 95)  
Historians also concur that ‘Latvian political figures believed strongly that a multi-
ethnic solution would offer the best, if not the only guarantee of their state’s future 
viability.’ (Hiden 2004: 42). Dribins (1998: 128) mentions that on the eve of 
independence, Mi!elis Valters addressed Baltic Germans in the article ‘Latvian State 
Nation’ (Lettlands Staatvolk) published by the liberal newspaper Baltische Zeitung, 
inviting them to evaluate the legitimacy of Latvian political aspirations and asking them 
not to hinder the creation of an independent Latvia. Valters stressed that the ethnic 
Latvians wanted to create a united state nation [valsts n"cija], which along with them 
would include all those who saw Latvia as their motherland. He asserted that the Baltic 
Germans could be a socially, politically and culturally important integral part of this 
nation; and that minorities’ representatives would take an active part in the legislation and 
administration of the national state. At the same time, Dribins draws attention to the 
somewhat limited character of this vision of Latvia’s political future, as the article clearly 
stressed that the ethnic Latvians would be a core nation that would always take the 
initiative.   
                                                
3 Jaun"k"s Zi#as, Nr. 4, 19.11.1918. 
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What were the minorities’ reactions to the founding of the new state? They ranged 
from a negative attitude on the part of conservative Baltic Germans to a sceptical one on 
the part of the Jews, and an indifferent one on the part of Latvian Russians.  
Jaun!k!s Zi"as reviewed, on a daily basis, the articles in other Latvian newspapers 
following the announcement of independence. On 20th November 1918, it quotes 
extensively from the editorial ‘The Latvian National Council’ (der Lettische Volksrat) 
published by the Baltische Zeitung, which, by and large, calls on its readership to support 
the formation of an independent Latvian state:  
It seems to us that there can be no doubt that in the immediate interests of our Motherland, 
the fact that such a large number of Latvian political groupings has united in their common will to 
build a new state can only be welcomed. It would not be right, against the spirit of the century and 
in disregard of the seriousness of the situation, for national minorities …to take a negative stance 
towards this turn of events. …We do need a state, as German military power will be able to 
maintain the social order only for a limited time; this state of order is temporary. We need a state so 
that internal forces can be created for the protection of our internal culture. We also need a state in 
order to forge, through a positive process, political forces that will prevent the devastation that like 
a political epidemic constantly threatens us from the East. 4 
The Baltische Zeitung cannot, however, resist the temptation to examine an 
alternative state order in which the Baltic Germans would assume a more prominent role: 
‘It would be in accordance with the German tradition and, undeniably, in everybody’s best 
interests, if Germans for their part came up with an initiative to bring all the Baltic lands 
together.’ 5 
The conclusion of the editorial, nevertheless, is that the Baltic Germans have no 
other option than to yield to the will of the majority: 
But neither the Estonian nor Latvian nations would agree to it. Estonians want their own 
state in the territory inhabited by Estonians, and Latvians want Latvia. As already said, an 
alternative path would be justifiable and possible, but it is clear by now that it is not an 
option…That second path is not to be followed. Therefore, we now have to support the 
construction of both the Estonian and the Latvian states.6 
                                                
4 Jaun!k!s Zi"as, Nr. 5, 20.11.1918. 
5 Jaun!k!s Zi"as, Nr. 5, 20.11.1918. 
6 Ibid.  
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Jaun!k!s Zi"as also complains that ‘in terms of reaction to the news of the 
formation of the Latvian state, the conservative Baltic German newspaper Rigasche 
Zeitung stands apart’ – it did not dedicate a special article to the event, as all other 
newspapers did, but just mentioned it in the ‘Local News’ column. Jaun!k!s Zi"as also 
finds the whole tone of the article and the choice of words inappropriate for the occasion: 
the Rigasche Zeitung complained that the adornments in the National Theatre, where the 
state proclamation took place, were not ready on time, causing a thirty-minute delay, and 
described the decorations as ‘pieces of red-and-white cloth, apparently the new republic’s 
flags’. Worst of all, continues Jaun!k!s Zi"as, the Rigasche Zeitung correspondent, 
describing the outfits worn by the public in attendance, had claimed that ‘some ladies were 
even in décolletage’.  ‘This is not true!’, indignantly protests  Jaun!k!s Zi"as, and 
concludes bitterly : ‘…obviously, this is how the Rigasche Zeitung is trying to find a 
common understanding between the Latvian majority and the national minorities…’. 
Cer!zis (2004: 68) writes that the local German press demonstrated a very cautious 
attitude in its published commentaries, stalling and waiting to see what kind of reaction 
would follow from Germany and the Entente states. Hiden (2004) observes that amidst 
ethnic Latvian declarations about their willingness to ensure minorities’ participation in the 
new republic, the German National Committee, uniting several political parties and 
organisations, used the moment to try to secure special treatment for the Baltic German 
population, demanding that their representation should reflect their economic and cultural 
significance rather than their numbers; these demands were not exactly popular with the 
Latvians. Hiden (2004: 43) writes that the National Committee’s ‘overall position on the 
Latvian state remained that of the reluctant suitor; it would not say yes and it would not say 
no’. Dribins (2002: 51) notes that the majority of Jews took a sceptical, wait-and-see 
attitude towards the independent Latvian republic. Apine (2007) observes that Latvian 
Russians were not convinced about the viability of the Latvian state; some of them still 
hoped for a democratic Russia, while others expected the Russian Empire to come back to 
life.  
Overall, this notable lack of enthusiasm on the part of the national minorities at the 
moment when the new state was born but its fate was still far from certain, bears witness to 
the fact that they did not share the national aspirations of the Latvians, but had assumed the 
passive role of onlookers. This wary cautiousness, however, has a number of plausible 
explanations. Conservative Germans were offended that their carefully nurtured idea of the 
Chapter 3: An Equal Among Nations, 1918-1934 
 
 118 
Latvian and Estonian territories united under Baltic German leadership had been cruelly 
snatched away; besides, considering the long history of animosity between them and the 
Latvians, they had suddenly been put in a precarious position. More liberally inclined 
Germans, the Jews and the Russians, although not opposed to the idea of an independent 
Latvian state, nevertheless felt threatened by the new order of things, despite Latvian 
assurances of protection of minority rights. Everybody was entering unchartered waters – 
especially taking into account the deep existing segregation among Latvian ethnic groups 
in all spheres of public life, and the inevitable resulting lack of communication. The 
Latvian national movement leading the path to independence had a strictly ethnic 
membership; minorities had not participated in the foundation of the new state, but were 
presented with the fact of its existence. Mutual trust could not arise out of nowhere; the 
promises of equality made by the Latvians were reassuring, but minorities questioned their 
underlying motives. 
The two main explanations for the Latvians’ willingness to include minorities in 
the construction of the new state that have been offered to date are 1) their concern about 
the image the new state would project internationally, and 2) their need for minorities’ 
support in the precarious political and economical situation. Bobe (1971: 52) writes that 
the state of Latvia came about during a period of ‘general recognition of the principle of 
self-determination for small nationalities’; therefore it was only logical that the Latvians 
chose to follow this principle. Laserson (1971: 96) draws attention to the fact that the 
Latvians had been an oppressed minority themselves, and their own political past within 
the Tsarist Empire would not permit them ‘to proceed immediately to an extreme 
chauvinism’; besides, Latvians wanted to demonstrate good will to the Allies. Recalling 
the economic devastation in Latvia in 1918, Laserson (1971: 97) also mentions that the 
‘minorities included a considerable number of industrialists and business men [sic.] with 
foreign ties, and persons who still retained part of their property and money. They included 
a large number of members of the liberal professions who were also a very useful group in 
the emergency conditions.’ He claims that appeasing the national minorities was necessary 
‘to help to prevent hesitant groups among the Germans of Latvia from joining the 
reactionary activities of the Landeswehr and Von der Goltz, and would also prevent 
hesitant Russians from joining the counterrevolutionary forces of Bermondt-Avalov and 
Yudenitch’. (Laserson 1971: 97) Importantly, Laserson, after having carefully examined 
all possible considerations behind the liberal minority policies introduced by the Latvians, 
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does not subscribe to the view that these were the results of international pressure. 
Moreover, he draws a sharp distinction between the minority treaties signed by Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and others in 1919-20s, and the declarations that were signed 
by Latvia immediately after its establishment in 1918. He remains convinced that ‘the main 
groups of the Latvian people aspired from the earliest days of their independent State to 
recognise the cultural rights of the minority peoples, as well as their right to take an active 
part in the political life of the country.’ (Laserson 1971: 95). I tend to agree with Laserson, 
rather than with Bobe, that such an early, unprompted recognition of minority rights by 
Latvian state founders was of an exceptional character. 
Similarly, Hiden (2004: 42) writes that ‘aspirations to build a Latvia for the 
Latvians were certainly held in check by anxieties over the external world, but other 
Latvian political figures believed strongly that a multi-ethnic solution would offer the best, 
if not the only guarantee of their state’s future viability.’  
 
3.1. The National Council 1918-1920 
The newborn state found itself in an extremely fragile situation while different 
forces fought over its territories. Kurzeme and part of Vidzeme were still under German 
control. In December 1918, the part of Vidzeme unoccupied by the Germans and the whole 
of Latgale were taken over by the Latvian Bolsheviks led by P. Stu!ka. The Provisional 
Government fled to Liepaja in Kurzeme, seeking refuge from the Bolsheviks in the 
German-occupied territory. April 1919 witnessed the creation of the parallel pro-German 
government of A. Niedra supported by the Iron Guard military forces under von der 
Goltz’s command. From the north, Latvia was threatened by Bermondt-Avalov, a self-
proclaimed Russian count, who rallied the remaining divisions of the Baltic White Russian 
Army, formerly under the command of Prince Anatol Lieven. Von der Goltz and 
Bermondt-Avalov joined forces against the Latvian national army raised by the Provisional 
Government, and were finally defeated by them in December 1919. The Bolsheviks were 
driven out of Latgale at the beginning of 1920. Latvia signed a peace treaty with Russia in 
August 1920; at the same time Russia officially recognised the Latvian State. The 
Independence Wars were over, the provisional government returned to Riga, and on 1st 
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May 1920 the Constitutional Assembly was elected with the purpose of drafting the 
Latvian Constitution.  
The provisional government faced the daunting task of reviving the national 
economy and introducing order into the chaos left behind by World War One and the 
subsequent Independence Wars with their kaleidoscopic changes of occupying forces. The 
Latvian territories had been devastated, and their population was scarce – if in 1914 the 
population of the Latvian territories stood at 2,552,000, in 1920 it was only 1,596,131. 
Two of the Latvian regions suffered the most – the Riga region lost 65 per cent of its 
population, and Zemgale lost 42 per cent. It was estimated that appx. 750,000 people had 
left Latvia during the war – as E. Blanks put it, ‘with all their cattle’ [‘ar visiem lopiem’] 
(Blanks 1928: 9). These alarming demographic changes were compounded by changes in 
the structure of the population – the numbers of males and of young children decreased in 
favour of females and elderly people, and the birth rate remained negative until 1921 
(Skujeneeks 1927; Plakans 1995).  
The undernourished population of the recently liberated territories was ravaged by 
an epidemic of typhus, and by widely spread venereal diseases, the two eternal travelling 
companions of war. Latgale was worst affected – 528 incidents of typhus were registered 
there at the peak of the epidemic, in March 1920. (Plensners 1928)   
The country’s industry was ruined – at the start of the war, the main Latvian 
industrial enterprises had been evacuated to Russia. Bridges had been destroyed by the 
Russians during their retreat in 1916; in the cities, there were no street lights at night. 
There was no money in the Central Bank (there was no Central Bank yet either), and as 
one witness recollects, the country’s first budget was carried around by the finance 
minister in his wallet. But the newly independent Latvians were ready to do their best for 
the homeland. 
A British timber merchant who travelled to Latvia on business in 1920, marvels at 
Latvians’ orderliness and tidiness:  
Yet though the whole country was ragged, with its twisted shell-torn trees, its broken 
fences and boarded paneless windows, its shabby clothes and empty shops, it was clean. Some say 
the Dutch are the cleanest people, others the Finns, but I give the prize to the Letts. To be clean 
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where everything is neat and tidy may be force of habit. But to be clean and clean up when what 
remains is broken, ragged and dilapidated shows an inborn sense of the love of cleanliness.  
(Anderson 1942: 39) 
Despite the surrounding mayhem, Latvian legislators were busily drafting the legal 
basis of the new state. During the 59 sessions of the National Council, from 18th November 
1918 until 18th March 1920, 83 laws were passed (183 draft laws were submitted). Among 
the members of the National Council, which had 183 seats altogether, there were 19 Baltic 
Germans, 15 Jewish delegates, 7 Russians, 2 Lithuanians, and one Pole. Minorities were 
also represented in the government – in the first provisional government (19.11.1918 – 
13.07.1919), the post of State Controller was held by the German representative Eduards 
Rozenbergs (Eduard Rosenberg); while in the second provisional government (14.07.1919 
– 08.12.1919) there were three minorities’ representatives: the Finance Minister – Roberts 
Erhards (Robert Erhardt), the Justice Minister – Edvins Magnuss  (Edwin Magnus), both 
Baltic Germans; and the Jewish Pauls Mincs (Paul Minz) as State Controller.7 Erhards and 
Mincs would also retain their positions in the third provisional government (09.12.1919 – 
11.06.1920). 
As early as December 1918, Jaun!k!s Zi"as published an editorial ‘The need to 
consolidate our political parties’ in response to the growing political fragmentation that 
would become a source of malaise in Latvian democracy for years to come. The article 
drew attention to the fact that the abundance of parties could not be explained by the 
diversity of political views, as many newly created parties had very similar programmes, 
and it concluded that fragmentation was not only against the public interest, but also 
against the parties’ own financial interests, as merging with other similar parties would 
allow them to enjoy economies of scale.8 
Aside from party fragmentation, another ailment of Latvian political life manifested 
itself very early – despite an initially declared mutual determination ‘to build Latvia 
together’, political, ideological, and cultural disagreements between the Latvian majority 
and the ethnic minorities quickly started to accumulate. Grand declarations collided with 
complex realities. Over the next few years, both phenomena would grow in strength, 
                                                
7 Latvijas Tautas padomes stenogramu satura r!d#t!js. 1925.  Latvijas Republikas Saeimas izdevums. 
8 ‘M!su politisko partiju apvieno"anas vaj#dz$ba’, Jaun#k#s Zi%as, No.16, 04.12.1918.  
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dividing opinions and loyalties, inspiring vicious campaigns on the opposing sides in the 
press, and often bringing the Parliament’s work to a halt. Both political fragmentation, and 
the constant in-fighting between the majority and the minorities, significantly contributed 
to the eventual demise of Latvian democracy.  
But when on 8th December 1919 the National Council passed two laws – a Law on 
Latvian Educational Institutions and a Law on Minority Schools in Latvia – there was 
nothing to indicate these future disagreements. Taken together, the two laws secured 
minorities’ control over their own education and cultural affairs.  
Article 1 of The Law on Latvian Educational Institutions specified that all Latvia’s 
educational and pedagogical institutions and affairs were to be under the authority of the 
Ministry of Education, with the exception of those schools that were founded in 
accordance with a separate law. Article 2 stipulated that schools and pedagogical 
institutions were to be founded and maintained by state and municipal institutions, as well 
as – with the permission of the Ministry of Education – by juridical and physical persons. 
Article 8 declared the Latvian language, Latvian history and Latvia’s geography to be 
compulsory subjects in all schools. In those schools where the language of instruction was 
other than the state language, the latter was to be introduced from the second year of 
primary school. Article 39 stipulated that all compulsory school studies (from the age of 
six until the age of sixteen) were to be conducted in the pupil’s ‘family language’ [!imenes 
valod"]. Article 40 defined the family language as the language declared by the pupil’s 
parents when enrolling the pupil in the school, and in which the pupil could express his or 
her thoughts freely. Article 41 declared that state and municipal institutions were to 
maintain as many schools for each ethnic group as were necessary for their children’s 
compulsory education, in accordance with the provision of this Law. The footnote to 
Article 41 stipulated that Latvian citizens belonging to an ethnic minority had a right to 
require the opening of a special class if there were not fewer than thirty pupils studying 
under the supervision of the same teacher. Those children who because of their insufficient 
numbers could not attend either a class or a school in their family language, could either 
study privately, or, on an exceptional basis, attend schools with a different language of 
instruction.9  
                                                
9 ‘1919. g. 8. Decembra sehd! peenemtais Likums par Latwijas izglihtibas eestahdem’, Waldibas Wehstnesis, 
Nr. 88, 17.12.1919. 
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The Law on Minority Schools in Latvia determined set boundaries for the 
autonomy of minority schools. It established Minority Departments within the Ministry of 
Education whose heads, although reporting to the Minister, were to be appointed by the 
respective minority’s faction in the Parliament. These departments had a free hand in 
choosing the language of instruction, and in administering their allocated portion of the 
state school budget. Moreover, Article 7 of the Law stipulated that the heads of the 
minority education departments ‘represented their respective ethnic group in all cultural 
affairs, with the right to liaise with all departments of the Ministry of Education, as well as 
to participate, in an advisory capacity, in the sessions of the Cabinet of Ministers related to 
any aspects of the cultural life of their respective ethnic group.’10 This remarkable piece of 
legislation, which was the most liberal law on minority education in Europe at the time 
(the even more advanced Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy would not be passed until 
1925), did not give rise to any substantial objections from among the delegates, and was 
passed unanimously, with only 18 abstaining votes.  
However, just eight months later, another minority-related piece of legislation 
provoked heated debates. In August 1919, the National Council reviewed, in two readings, 
the draft Law on Language Rights, prepared by the Commission on National Affairs 
headed by the Baltic German Paul Schiemann. It is worth examining the debates in detail, 
as not only were they one of the very first manifestations of the underlying tensions 
between the majority and minority representatives, but language rights as such would 
eventually become of the most contentious issues in Latvian politics right up until today. 
The draft submitted to the Council stipulated: 
Article 1. Any Latvian citizen is to have the right to use his native language in private and 
public life. 
Article 2. Those belonging to an ethnic community, who comprise more than 20 per cent 
(but not fewer than 1,000 people) of a city or a district’s population, are to have the right 
to communicate in their native language, both orally and in writing, with the local 
administration and courts, as well as to receive responses from them in the same language. 
                                                
10 ‘1919.g. 8. Decembra sehd! peenemtais Likums par mazakuma tautibu skolu eekahrtu Latwij"’, Waldibas 
Wehstnesis, Nr. 89, 18.12.1919. 
Chapter 3: An Equal Among Nations, 1918-1934 
 
 124 
Article 3. Independent of the conditions stipulated in Article 2, the use of the German and 
Russian languages is to be guaranteed: 
a) For the German language – in all state and municipal offices, cities and bathing 
places across all of Latvia except in Latgale. 
b) For the Russian language – in all Latvian dwellings with at least 15,000 residents; 
and in all state, municipal and public offices in Latgale. 
Article 4. Free language usage is to be allowed in all Latvian districts where non-Latvians 
comprise more than 50 per cent of the population.  
Article 5. All post and telegraph offices are to allow the use of the German and Russian 
languages alongside the Latvian language. 
Article 6. State and municipal notices are to be published in languages which, in 
accordance with the stipulations of this Law, enjoy full rights in a given place; all public 
announcements are to be published in one of each ethnic minority’s newspapers.  
The rapporteur M. Skujenieks (LSDSP), presenting the draft to the Council, states 
that there are no objections to this ‘basic request to ensure the use of each minority 
language’.11 However, the ensuing discussion of the draft causes controversy among the 
delegates.  
K. Pau!uks (Latvian Agrarian Union), supported by E. Blanks (Democratic Union) 
criticises the draft for being based upon the wrong principle of dividing the country’s 
administration into separate units, and for the almost complete absence of references to the 
Latvian language, which he interprets as an insufficiently respectful attitude towards the 
State language on the part of minorities. Pau!uks suggests rejecting the draft on the first 
reading and leaving the final solution of the language question to the future Constitutional 
Assembly.  
M. Skujenieks counters that K. Pau!uks and E. Blanks’s judgement is clouded by 
prejudices, and that they ‘see ghosts where there are none’. He insists that although it is 
                                                
11 Obviously, at this time the views of Skujenieks as a practicing politician did not yet differ from the liberal 
views expressed in his 1913 book. However, a tension between the two would start manifest itself very soon. 
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possible that the draft needs an amendment introducing a definition of the State language, 
its main points are correct. [The German part of the audience applauds]. 
P. Schiemann (German Democrats) passionately defends the draft, and adds that if 
changes are necessary, it should be forwarded to a different committee, because the 
Minorities committee is not willing to change a word. 
A. Kl!ve (Latvian Agrarian Union) observes that with this draft law, the minorities 
are trying to impose on the majority’s rights and notes that K. Skalbe, the committee’s 
secretary, who has signed the draft, should as a Social Democrat have been more 
protective of the national cause. J. Gri"ans (Latgalian faction) announces that such a raw 
draft, which is full of misunderstandings, is unacceptable. E. Rosenbergs (German 
Progressive Party) stresses that the law would help to attract those elements of the 
minorities who are still hesitant in their political orientation. Pau#uks explains that he is not 
against minority rights per se, but wants minorities to stay within boundaries set by the 
state. According to the draft law, says Pau#uks, it would be necessary to grant equal rights 
to eight different languages, and state officials would also have to speak the Jewish and 
Gypsy languages. However, he has nothing against handing the draft over to a different 
committee for elaboration. J. C$lits (Radical Democrats) suggests removing the draft law 
from the agenda, and handing it over to some other committee at one of the future 
sessions.12 
The session was concluded. The draft Law never re-surfaced again – presumably, it 
was lost while being transferred for review from one committee to another.  
Another early point of collision between Latvian and minority deputies was the 
first draft of the Citizenship Law, also reviewed by the National Council in August 1918. 
The Citizenship Law, which would become the most troubled piece of Latvian legislation 
of the interwar period (it would be returned to the lawmakers on numerous occasions, 
would be amended several times, and would become a trump card frequently played by 
both the majority and the minorities in their political game) and the debates surrounding it 
are reviewed in detail in Chapter Four. 
                                                
12 Jaun!k!s Zi"as, Nr 79, 28.08.1919 ‘Tautas Padomes s%de 27.08.1919’. 
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September 1919 witnessed some heated sessions at Riga City Council, proving 
once more that promising to respect all ethnic groups’ cultural peculiarities in theory is one 
matter, and trying to implement those multicultural principles in real life is another. The 
test for the Council’s cultural tolerance came by way of the decree on the official weekly 
holiday for retailers. When Sunday was suggested as a day off for shopkeepers, the Jewish 
faction argued that as Jewish-owned shops, due to religious considerations, also had to 
close down on Saturdays, they would be forced to take two days off instead of one, which 
would make them uncompetitive with Christian-owned shops. Therefore they suggested 
that Jewish-owned shops should be allowed to be closed on Saturdays, but to remain open 
on Sundays. Importantly, this was a rare occasion when both left- and right- wing Jewish 
deputies found a common position – the compromise between them was reached by 
agreeing that the Sabbath is not a religious, but a cultural tradition. The Social Democrats’ 
initial position on the matter was that social principles came above everything else, and 
therefore any day could be designated as a holiday, as long as it was just one day for 
everyone. Eventually, though, they sided with the rest of the Latvians and voted for 
Sunday as the official day off – this prompted the Bundists to leave the Social Democratic 
faction, accusing their former partners of ‘not protecting Jewish cultural interests’. The 
German faction joined with the Jews in the name of tolerance, while the Russians took a 
neutral stance, and did not participate in the debates, or the voting.   
Jaun!k!s Zi"as, analysing the ‘shopkeeping debates’ at the City Council, earnestly 
tries to take into account all vested interests. It claims that the Jewish position is 
understandable, and toys with the idea of designating any other day of the week, say 
Thursday, as a holiday for all – but it would only be viable, continues Jaun!k!s Zi"as, if 
‘we had no religious or cultural traditions of our own’. Moreover, ‘we have grown up with 
the idea of Sunday’. And although in principle the Jewish plight is worth supporting, the 
City Council, writes Jaun!k!s Zi"as, obviously has national and state interests at heart – 
after all, Riga, as a city with a Latvian Christian majority, deserves to have its Sunday. As 
for the Jewish shops being allowed to open on Sunday, speculates the newspaper, again, at 
first glance there can be no objections, but a closer look allows us to see that with a big 
number of Jewish shops located in Riga it would absolutely disrupt the ‘Sunday peace’. As 
a result of these multicultural polemics, where cultural, economic, and party interests 
became closely intertwined, reports Jaun!k!s Zi"as, the City Council has finally 
announced Sunday as the official day off. In conclusion, Jaun!k!s Zi"as mentions that the 
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National Council member and editor of the newspaper Rigasche Rundschau, Paul 
Schiemann, has published an open letter addressed to the Social Democratic faction calling 
the adopted regulation ‘a Pyrrhic victory’ and claiming that such a decision by the City 
Council ‘signifies a concession to the anti-Semitic inclinations of the masses’.13 
In September 1919, M. Valters resigned from the post of Interior Minister within 
the Provisional government after repeated clashes with the Social Democrats, notably with 
Fr. Menders. Jaun!kas Zi"as writes on this occasion: ‘Minister Valters’s continued 
presence in the government threatened to cause a sharp conflict with the Social Democrats 
and partly also with the centrist Social Democratic Union.’14 There was no love lost 
between the ‘renegade’ Valters and his former party colleagues, but they were not 
Valters’s only enemies; for example, the Baltic Germans still regarded him as an 
unpredictable leftist. Valters’s resignation was enshrouded by rumours; one of the most 
persistent was his alleged close connections with Germany.  A. Kl!ve, a prominent member 
of the Agrarian Union and the leader of its faction in the Saeima, as well as Valters’s long-
time contender for the affections of K. Ulmanis, dedicates a disproportionate part of his 
memoir ‘unmasking’ the ‘Germanophil’ Valters; according to Kl!ve, Latvia’s British and 
American allies urged Ulmanis to dismiss M. Valters from his post in the government 
(Kl!ve 1969). "ilde (1985: 202) cites evidence that the main reason behind his resignation 
was not so much Valters’s devotion to the protection of minority rights, as his continual 
disagreements with the Social Democrats, and Prime Minister Ulmanis’s willingness to 
sacrifice Valters for the sake of government stability. Bastj#nis (1966: 97) also posits that 
Ulmanis himself, ‘out of a feeling of uncontrolled envy towards a talented colleague, 
pushed him off the political stage’. Whatever the real reason for Valters’s demise, the 
ethnic minorities lost a reliable supporter within the government at the time.  
It is noteworthy that the minorities’ factions were initially in opposition to the 
armistice treaty with Bolshevik Russia, which Latvia eventually signed on 11th August 
1920. During the heated debates at the National Council in October 1919, V. Pres$akovs, 
speaking on behalf of the Russian National Society, and P. Schiemann, speaking on behalf 
of the Democratic Bloc, criticised the idea of signing an armistice with a non-democratic 
government of Russia. (Laserson 1971). J. Akuraters immediately interpreted their position 
as a demonstration of disloyalty towards the Latvian state: ‘This armistice is desired by all 
                                                
13 ‘Swehtdeenas meers’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, No. 88, 08.09.1919. 
14 ‘No kabineta ir izstumts Valters’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, No. 82, 01.09.1919.  
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Latvian political factions in the National Council. Only the minorities, the Germans and 
the Russians, do not want it. And the reasons behind this are very clear: both Dr 
Schiemann and Pres!akovs had difficulties in concealing these reasons during their 
speeches. They only want peace with a ‘democratic Russia’, because their democratic 
Russia is hiding under the masks of Kolchak and Denikin.’15  In other words, Akuraters 
was accusing the Baltic German Schiemann and the Russian Pres!akovs of monarchical 
sympathies, building this assumption on the fact that both these minorities were in a 
privileged position under the Russian Empire. This Jesuitical casuistry would become a 
favourite weapon used by ethnic nationalist against the minorities during the interwar 
period – whatever position minorities took on Soviet Russia, they were promptly accused 
of either being Bolshevists, or monarchists. For example, the openly anti-Bolshevik 
editorial team of the newspaper Segodnya was often portrayed by its Latvian counterparts 
as a clique of monarchists. 
The election of Andrejs Fr"denbergs, a liberally-minded National Democrat and a 
passionate believer in the viability of the Latvian civic nation, as Mayor of Riga in 
February 1920 revived the discussions on civic and ethnic nationalism. In June 1920, with 
the article ‘The civic nation and nationalists’, he took a brave political stand against radical 
nationalists and their latest publications. Referring to some recent publications in the press 
by authors whom Fr"denbergs designated as ‘irresponsible elements’, he claimed that ‘they 
use our sacred national slogans for their own ends’ and ‘hardly comprehend the 
responsibility that would befall them if their declared ideas got implemented in practice’.16 
Recalling recent times when Latvians had suffered injustice at the hands of Tsarist 
bureaucrats, he posited that ‘when the Russian giant fell apart, the misfortune of the 
Russian people did not elicit any compassion in our hearts: with satisfaction we watched as 
the state which could not come up to modern standards passed away’. However, continued 
Fr"denbergs, the Latvian people, who, thanks to the will of fate, had become the ruling 
people in the state, must not follow the mistaken paths of the old Russia - the very first task 
at hand was to create conditions for securing Latvia’s own citizens’ freedom and rights, 
and ‘the protection of citizens’ national individuality against excesses and against the 
majority belongs among these rights’. 
                                                
15 ‘Par Tautas Padomes s#di’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, No. 114 08.10.1919. 
16 Most likely, Fr"denbergs is referring to the article ‘Latvian Latvia’ by  Ivande Kaija published in Latvijas 
Sargs on 28.04.1920. 
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Addressing the Latvian Russian and Baltic German minorities, Fr!denbergs 
asserted: ‘This is our and your common land, which we will defend from any attacks from 
Russia, as well as from big Germany. When this understanding is shared by Latvians, 
Germans, Jews and others who live in our land, then the Latvian civic nation will be born’. 
He noted that despite the fact that there was ‘plenty of fuel for hate amongst different 
peoples’, the establishment of cultural autonomy in minority schools and the admittance of 
the German and Russian languages to state and communal institutions bore witness to the 
fact that ‘the shadows of the past do not conceal the rising Latvian sun’. Fr!denbergs 
concluded: ‘We seriously want to build Latvia together with citizen non-Latvians who 
honestly want to merge with us in a single civic nation’.17 
Fr!denbergs’s idea of the Latvian civic nation was mercilessly criticised in the 
Latvian nationalist press, especially by E. Blanks, for being based upon an ‘illusion of 
unreal collaboration’. Blanks became Fr!denbergs’s personal nemesis, criticising every 
move the City Council made in conjunction with the minorities’ faction, in the pages of the 
newspaper Latvian Sargs; there was even a court case filed by Fr!denbergs against Blanks 
on the grounds of assault on personal dignity. 
In May 1920, the City Council formed a special commission on minorities’ social 
care, which was to administer the budget allocated by the city to minorities, including 
donations by minority businessmen. Blanks commented on this fact in two articles, with 
the telling titles ’The guardian of national interests’ and ‘The City Head has lost his head’, 
protesting against Fr!denbergs’s ‘pro-German policies’ and against what he saw as the 
beginning of a transformation of the national state into a ‘Latvian vs. minorities’ two-
community state.  
It is difficult to say whether Fr!denbergs eventually grew tired of being a permanent 
target of Blanks’s personalised attacks, or whether his interest in minorities-related matters 
simply waned, but in the second half of the 1920s he withdrew from active political life, 
finding a different outlet for his inexhaustible energy and publishing articles dedicated to 
studies of Esperanto (he was one of the founders of the Latvian Esperanto society), and the 
fight against alcoholism. Needless to say, these other undertakings did not cause as much 
controversy in the wider society as his lonely crusade for the Latvian civic nation. 
                                                
17 Fr!denbergs, A. ‘Politisk" n"cija un nacion"listi’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, Nr. 126, 05.06.1920.  
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On 18th May 1920, debates arose at the City Council about the presence of 
minorities’ representatives in the social care department. Deputy !trausmanis, a 
representative of the Agrarian Union, objected to forming a special commission of 
minority representatives, calling it ‘a republic within a republic’. P. Schiemann, supported 
by the Social Democrats and the Mayor A. Fr"denbergs, insisted that such a commission 
was a necessity. The decision on forming the commission was passed by 35 votes to 25.18 
Blanks responded to the decision on the pages of the newspaper Latvijas Sargs with 
an indignant article entitled ‘On Guard for Nationalism’. The Russian newspaper Segodnya 
retaliated with an article ‘On Guard for Chauvinism’, musing that Blanks, who had 
compared the minorities’ section within the city council to an ‘autonomous railcar’, was 
being nostalgic for the times when Jews were thrown out of the railcars. 19 
  Following on from this continuous exchange of ‘pleasantries’ between the two 
newspapers, E. Bramanov (Brams) writes in Segodnya:   
 
For Latvijas Sargs, all Germans are barons; all Russians keep portraits of Tsar Nikolai and 
Bermondt close to their hearts; and all Jews are speculators...It is difficult to argue against Latvijas 
Sargs – how can you possibly prove to its essayists, who distance themselves from Niedra and 
Stuchka, that Russians also have a right to their own Bermondts and Lenins, and Jews – to their 
own Trotsky.... 
We are not going to apologise for all the crimes alleged by Latvijas Sargs. Our position 
….is so clear, that it does not need a loyalty certificate from a newspaper.20 
 
3.2. The Constitutional Assembly 1920-1922 
The elections to the Constitutional Assembly in April 1920, and the lively polemics 
they inspired in the press clearly demonstrated that the Latvian public’s appetite for 
representative democracy was growing; and that minorities were already starting to take a 
more pro-active role in the political life of the new state. The Russian newspaper Segodnya 
called on its readership: 
 
                                                
18 ‘V gorodskoi dume’, Segodnya, No. 110, 19.05.1920.  
19 ‘Na strazhe shovinizma’, Segodnya, No. 113, 22.05.1920.  
20 Bramanov, E. ‘Zhupeli’, Segodnya, 29.05.1920. 
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Citizens, remember that your own happiness, and that of your close ones, is in your own 
hands. Forget your trivial everyday interests, and go to the polling stations! 
Citizens belonging to ethnic minorities, for you it is especially important that not a single 
vote is lost. Your rights, your language, your school, your faith can be duly and permanently 
protected only by your own representatives!21 
The turnout at the elections was exceptionally high – more than 700,000 residents, 
or almost 85 per cent of the voting population. (!ilde 1976: 344)  Sixteen parties and 
political organisations made it to the Constitutional Assembly. The most popular was the 
Latvian Social Democratic Socialist Party, which got almost 40 per cent of all votes, and, 
as a result, a total of 57 mandates. The next in popularity, the Agrarian Union, got 
significantly less – 18 per cent of all votes, and 26 mandates. The Latgalian Agrarian 
Party, in third place, received 17 mandates. No other party among the sixteen gained more 
than 6 mandates. By comparison, the minority parties together shared 17 mandates.22 As a 
result, in the Constitutional Assembly where nobody had a majority, the minorities became 
a force to be reckoned with – their votes could tilt the balance either left, or centre-right; 
this situation would continue for years to come. Minorities would use this acquired power 
for their own ends, often providing support for other parties in return for a promise to put 
their weight behind minority-related legislation. Even before the Constitutional Assembly 
started its work, Latvian bourgeois nationalist circles were already expressing indignation 
about this future forced cooperation with the ‘reactionary’ minorities, voiced yet again by 
E. Blanks: ‘The existing antagonism between Latvian democracy and minorities absolutely 
excludes the possibility of any bargains with them. The main social question in Latvia, the 
agrarian question, sets these two poles even further apart’.23 
Nevertheless, loathsome as it was to the Latvian parties that the minority bloc had 
become indispensable to them, they would groan about it, but in the absence of other 
choices, would often negotiate with the minorities behind the scenes.  
                         *** 
                                                
21 Denj viborov v Uchreditelynoye Sobraniye’, Segodnya, 17.04.1920. 
22 Out of 150 members of the Constitutional Assembly, 17 represented ethnic minorities (6 Jewish deputies, 6 
Germans, 4 Russians, and one Polish delegate). It was characteristic of the relative political passivity of the 
minorities that while they comprised 25 per cent of the population, they only managed to get 12 per cent of 
the votes in the first truly democratic elections in Latvia. The Baltic Germans continued to be the best 
organised minority group throughout the independence years, while the Jews were politically active but very 
fragmented, and the Russians remained the most passive.  
23 Blanks, E. ‘Satversmes Sapulze’. Latvijas Kareivis, 1920, Nr. 52, 22.04. 
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The Latvian Constitutional Assembly had two main official tasks: to work out the 
new country’s Constitution, and to provide the legal basis for the much-needed agrarian 
reform. Its third, unofficial task was to find a modus operandi where all different 
represented groups could be united around the common tasks of state legislation.  
Challenging as the first two tasks were, they were successfully accomplished in a relatively 
short period of time (the first part of the Law on Agrarian Reform was passed on 16th 
September 1920, and the Latvian Constitution was adopted on 15th February 1922). The 
third task turned out to be a tougher nut to crack. !ilde (1982) describes this challenge to 
the Latvian legislative body as follows:  
Speaking of the nation of 1920 that gathered at the Constitutional Assembly, it was far 
from homogeneous, and did not grow organically to form one united community of citizens. Out of 
every four citizens of the Latvian Republic, only three were ethnic Latvians; others were ethnic 
minorities, who willingly or unwillingly had to get used to recognising themselves as Latvian 
citizens. It was not possible to accomplish this in one fell swoop.  
(!ilde 1982: 229) 
The tensions between the ethnic Latvian and minorities’ representatives, which had 
manifested themselves on several occasions during the National Council sessions, were not 
about to abate during the Constitutional Assembly, as there was a significant overlap in the 
membership of the two; many delegates got re-elected. M. Skujenieks (1928: 62) finds it 
worth mentioning that ‘that the elections [for the Constitutional Assembly] did not bring 
any proportional changes among the representation of the political parties, preserving those 
political relationships that were established during the National Council’. Those already 
established ‘political relationships’ obviously entailed certain hostility between the 
majority and minority deputies. This hostile attitude emerges in F. Ciel"ns’s otherwise 
joyful recollection of the first celebratory session of the Assembly: ‘It was a warm sunny 
day when, on 1st May 1920, the members of the Constitutional Assembly gathered for its 
first session. It seemed that nature itself was smiling on this extraordinary event in the 
history of the Latvian people’ (Ciel"ns 1963: 118). He describes how the deputies, putting 
the recent pre-election fights behind them, shook each other’s hands, willingly 
demonstrating their joyful mood on such a big historic day. ‘Elated national self-assurance, 
even pride was visible on the deputies’ faces’ (Ciel"ns 1963: 118). However, it seems from 
Ciel"ns’s account that this celebratory occasion was not for everybody: 
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The minority representatives felt pushed back on the day of the Constitutional Assembly’s 
convention. After all, the democratic Latvian state had been won by Latvians’ own hard sacrifices, 
and that called for respect. They [minority representatives] tried to stay in the background. Only 
two deputies did not stay in the shadows, but boldly, even obtrusively mingled with the Latvian 
deputies. One of them was the German pastor Keller, the other Jewish deputy Dubins, who at the 
National Council still spoke Russian to Latvians, but now, with a loyal smile, addressed everybody 
in Latvian.’  
(Ciel!ns 1963: 125) 
 It was not just minority members of the Constitutional Assembly that ‘felt pushed 
back’ and ‘stayed in the shadows’. In fact, divisions among the Latvian legislators closely 
reflected those experienced by the wider society, where different ethnic groups continued 
to live in their accustomed isolation from each other. This pronounced segregation was 
often observed by foreign visitors; one of them writes poignantly: 
In Estonia there were Estonians, in Lithuania there were Lithuanians but in Latvia there 
were not Latvians. There were Letts, Baltic Germans, Jews and Russians. And each of these four 
was a distinct and isolated group with only superficial contact with the others. Ignorance of this 
social and political structure on the part of a foreigner ruined a few well meant [sic.] uplifting 
dinners given by British or American newcomers…It was incredible that a small town like Riga 
with about three hundred thousand inhabitants could contain so many exclusive circles…  
       (Anderson 1942: 42) 
Latvians, Germans, Russians and Jews largely socialised only with the members of 
their own ethnic group; they read newspapers in their own language, and attended their 
own theatres. Anybody who has read memoirs of Latvian interwar society written by 
members of different ethnic groups, knows this eerie feeling – but for the occasional 
mentioning of familiar places, it is hard to believe that all the athors are describing life in 
the same country and at the same moment in history; it is rather as if they all exist in 
parallel universes. Business and trade negotiations aside, municipalities and the 
Constitutional Assembly were the only places where representatives of different ethnic 
groups engaged in discussions; perhaps it is little wonder that these discussions often got 
polarised.  
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During its first session, the Constitutional Assembly elected its Chairman, whose 
functions were essentially those of a state president. The Agrarian Union’s candidate J!nis 
"akste won with 83 votes, while only 48 votes were given to his rival, national poet J!nis 
Rainis (Pliek#!ns) representing the Social Democrats. Rainis, who had become a symbol of 
Latvian independence for generations of Latvians, and his wife Aspazija (Elza Pliek#!ne) 
had received a royal welcome from the Latvian people just two years before, upon their 
return from their fifteen-year-long exile in Switzerland. Ciel$ns (1963) gives two 
explanations for the outcome of the vote – first, "akste had already proved himself an 
excellent chairman during the National Council, whereas Rainis’s qualities as a chairman 
were unknown (for this reason, not even all Social Democrats voted for him); secondly, 
Rainis, with his well-known socialist credentials and sympathetic views on minorities 
issues, was snubbed as an LSDSP candidate by all bourgeois parties. J. K!rkli%# (1990) 
describes Rainis as being at odds with both the Social Democrats and the bourgeois 
parties: while the former wanted his undivided allegiance both as a politician and a writer 
(for example, the Social Democratic party forbade its members to write for the bourgeois 
press), the latter viewed the poet with suspicion because of his ideological beliefs, and 
because his enormous popularity among the masses lent additional credibility to their 
political competitors. Rainis, who was convinced that he would win, suffered a terrible 
blow to his self-esteem and took it very badly – immediately after the results of the vote 
were announced, he rose up and went home, where he stayed for a month under the pretext 
of illness (Ciel$ns 1963: 127). J. "akste would become the first president of Latvia in 
1922. The bitterly disappointed Rainis would eventually move to the margins of political 
life, further weakening the base of support for the minorities’ movement among ethnically 
Latvian politicians.    
    *** 
Apart from the drawing-up of the Latvian Constitution, the Assembly faced another 
daunting task – Latvia was in desperate need of agrarian reform. Plakans (1995) estimates 
that in 1920, some 40-50 per cent of the Latvian rural population was landless. In addition, 
the large and middle-sized land plots were concentrated in the hands of non-Latvian 
owners, mainly Baltic Germans, but in Latgale also Poles. Von Rauch (1995: 87) identifies 
three main factors behind the drive for reform in Latvia: 1) socio-economic, i.e. the desire 
to redistribute the land on a more equal basis; 2) political, as the re-distribution of small 
land-holdings to the peasants supposedly made them immune to Bolshevik propaganda, 
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which at the time was still a real threat; and 3) political-nationalist, which aimed at 
undermining the economic and thus political influence of the foreign upper class. This last 
consideration was aggravated by the centuries-long domination of the Germans as Latvia’s 
ruling elite – Latvians felt that Germans should be stripped of all remaining privileges as 
soon as possible. Aizsilnieks (1968: 234) also mentions historical justice as one of the 
motives behind the reform. Plakans (1995: 124) observes that for the Assembly ‘to allow 
these relatively wealthy non-Latvians to continue to own or control some half of all 
agricultural properties would have been to commit political suicide.’ 
The first and the fourth parts of the Law were passed in September 1920, the 
second part in December of the same year, and the third part in May 1922 (Aizsilnieks 
1968). The Law nationalised all rural properties exceeding 110 hectares in size, which 
were transferred to the specially created State Land Fund for further distribution among the 
landless peasants. The actual implementation of the Law took 17 years. Historians agree 
that the reform of 1920 solved the landlessness question, but at the same time turned 
Latvia into a typical country of smallholders, which had both political and economic 
downsides (Plakans 1995; von Rauch 1995). Aizsilnieks (1968: 236) astutely observes that 
the results would have been be different if the goal of the reform, from the very beginning 
had been formulated not so as ‘to restore the agriculture destroyed by the war’, but rather 
so as ‘to create rational agriculture in Latvia’. 
Predictably, the elaboration of the Law sparked heated debates between the 
Latvians and the Baltic Germans. Although everybody understood that redistribution of the 
land in one form or another was inevitable, the scope of nationalisation and especially the 
question of compensation to landowners remained highly contested. The Baltic Germans 
came up with a proposal envisaging that landowners would voluntarily release parts of 
their estates against suitable compensation on an ad hoc basis, but this would not stand 
with the Latvians. The Social Democrats took the most radical stance on the reform, while 
the Agrarian Union and the right-wing parties were inclined to satisfy, at least partially, the 
Germans’ request for compensation. In the end, compensation to the landowners was voted 
down by only three votes. In 1925, the Baltic Germans together with some Russian and 
Polish members of the Parliament complained about the Agrarian Reform to the League of 
Nations. Although their appeal was rejected as unfounded, it caused outrage in the Latvian 
press, and overall did not improve already tainted relations between Latvians and Baltic 
Germans. 
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Both the Russian and the Jewish parliamentarians had initially abstained from 
participation in the debates on the Agrarian Reform, but then, in a surprising turn of 
events, appended their signatures to a petition to the Agrarian Commission of the 
Assembly, which was rejected as ‘reactionary’. The former Latvian parliamentarian from 
Zeire Zion M. Laserson (1971: 113) expresses indignation that by doing so, the Jews 
jeopardised their special standing with Latvians as ‘the most loyal minority’ (more about it 
in Chapter Five).   
    *** 
Although there is a lot of truth to Laserson’s aforementioned claim that Latvians 
perceived Jews as their most loyal minority (or the least suspect, as unlike the Germans 
and the Russian minorities, they had nothing to lose with the collapse of the Russian 
Empire), the situation was hardly that straightforward. During World War One and its 
immediate aftermath, anti-Jewish sentiments were running high in most of the countries of 
Eastern Europe, even in those, like the former Habsburg lands, which had no previous 
history of pogroms.  The Jews were turned into scapegoats, charged with numerous sins, 
like helping the advance of the German troops, spying for the Habsburgs, and aiding the 
Bolsheviks. Intensified by the deprivations of the war, these accusations turned into public 
hysteria directed against the vulnerable ethnic minority. Anti-Jewish disturbances 
continued in Ukraine, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Poland during the period 
from 1918 until 1921. (Mendelson 1983; Pearson 1983). In the summer of 1920, this wave 
of anti-Semitic riots reached Latvia.  
Amidst continuing uncertainty about the outcome of the Polish-Soviet war, and the 
persistent rumours that Latvia was again under the threat of Bolshevik occupation, anti-
Semitism suddenly escalated in June 1920 in Riga, R!zekne and Daugavpils, where 
numerous attacks aimed at the personal dignity of the Jews, as well as looting and 
vandalising of Jewish businesses, took place for several days. Luckily, nobody was 
seriously hurt. The seemingly spontaneous attacks started in Vermanis Park in the centre of 
Riga, where a crowd of hooligans started harassing the Jewish passers-by, knocking hats 
off their heads, abusing them verbally, etc. Apparently, two main themes reverberated 
through the crowd: all Jews were speculators, and they were shunning service in the 
national army. The mob then started moving towards Bastion Hill at the Old City, shouting 
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‘Beat up the Jews!’. After another scuffle by the canal, the crowd of hooligans was finally 
dispersed by the police. 
On 3rd June the Interior Minister A. Bergs issued an announcement printed by all 
major newspapers, in which he claimed that ‘such disorder and riots, which remind us of 
the darkest sides of Tsarist Russia, are not to be tolerated in Latvia’. He assured the public 
that the city police were taking all necessary measures, and reported that thanks to their 
actions, there had been no serious injuries.24 
Segodnya reports on the same day in detail, describing the growing crowd of 
‘people in military uniforms’ assaulting Jewish (or supposedly Jewish) persons who 
happened to be in the vicinity of Vermanis Park. Simultaneously, attacks were carried out 
in nearby cafés and cinemas, where self-appointed ‘patrols’ confiscated money and 
valuables from the Jewish part of the public. Some gunshots were reported to have been 
fired, creating panic and chaos. Giving credit to the Minister A. Bergs for his prompt 
reaction to the events, and for his official statement directed against the hooligans, 
Segodnya stipulates that the measures, however, were not sufficient to reassure the Jews: 
Because of the events, the spirit of the Jewish population of Riga is declining. Those who 
would be able to give detailed evidence about the experienced offences and incurred losses, refuse 
to give their names for fear of further persecutions. This fact is being exploited by Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 
which claims that only one Jew showed up at the police station complaining of having received 
several punches. 
In conclusion, the newspaper writes: ‘Every decent citizen of Latvia should once 
and for all understand that the welfare of the state’s population can only be achieved by a 
joint effort of all nationalities’.25 
 The next day, 2nd June, the unrest continued in Riga. L. Fi!manis, a member of the 
Constitutional Assembly, accompanied by Rabbi Zaks26, paid a visit to President "akste to 
express their worries about the situation. "akste assured the delegation that he viewed the 
events as ‘an unacceptable phenomenon in the life of our state’, expressed his personal 
                                                
24 Bergs, A. ‘Iekschleetu ministra paskaidrojums’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, Nr. 124, 03.06.1920. 
25 ‘Vystuplenija protiv evreev v Rige’, Segodnya, Nr. 121, 03.06.1920. 
26 Segodnya only mentions the surname, but it was almost certainly the Chief Rabbi of Riga, Menachem 
Mendel Zak (Menahems Mendels Zaks). 
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sympathy towards the victims, and promised that he would do everything possible in his 
power to ensure that the government would prevent any such occurrences in the future.27 
 The riots subsided in Riga by Thursday 3rd June, but over the weekend, cases of 
vandalism and looting against Jewish shops and places of business were reported from 
Daugavpils and Rezhica (R!zekne). According to Segodnya, the offenders had travelled 
from Riga.28 The Minister for the Interior A. Bergs issued a warning to those who were 
‘trying to disgrace Latvia’ by attacking Jews, and announced that the troops had received 
orders to use their weapons without hesitation.29 The attacks were eventually curbed by the 
authorities with the help of the military.  
 The riots in Latvia were unquestionably of a much milder character than elsewhere 
in Eastern Europe at the time – no killings took place, and there were no serious injuries 
either. However, as Stranga (1997: 39) observes, it was only by a lucky chance that the 
violence did not escalate into a tragedy that would bring shame on Latvia at the moment 
when the de jure recognition was not achieved yet.  The Latvian government did not 
hesitate to condemn the attacks, and the police took immediate action. But the 
psychological damage was huge, and the nonchalant way in which the Latvian press 
responded to the attacks added insult to injury. 
With the exception of Segodnya, other Latvian newspapers relegated the reports of 
the riots to the second and third pages of their editions. True, both Latvijas Sargs and 
Latvijas Kareivis dedicated analytical articles to them, but the main theme of those articles 
can be described as ‘the Jews had it coming’. Latvijas Kareivis, commenting on the events, 
published an article, which, while describing the riots and the sentiments behind them as a 
‘typically Russian phenomenon’ that had undoubtedly taken root in Latvian society during 
its subjugation to the Russian Empire, nevertheless interprets the pogroms as something 
that Latvia could not be proud of.  The article then took a supposedly analytical turn, 
aiming to examine the ‘underlying causes’ of the riots, i.e. financial machinations Jews 
were blamed for, their alleged unwillingness to serve in the army, etc. ‘Anti-Semitism 
exists everywhere in the world (can it exist without any reason?), and if it has grown even 
                                                
27 ‘Vystupleniya protiv evreev 2 iyunya’, Segodnya, Nr. 122, 04.06.1920. 
28 ‘Evrei – chleni Uchreditel’nago Sobraniya u Glavnokomanduyushchago po voprosu o rezhitskih 
ekstsessah’, Segodnya, Nr. 126, 09.06.1920. 
29 The very same Arveds B!rgs who would later become the main ideologue of anti-Semitism in Latvian 
bourgeois circles. 
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among our peace-loving and just nation, the Jews should really start taking it into account,’  
– posited Latvijas Kareivis.30 
Summarising the lessons learned during the riots, E. Bramanov wrote bitterly in 
Segodnya that all Latvian newspapers had either kept silent or tried to reduce the pogroms 
to ‘drunken disorders’, if one did not count the diatribes of the ‘chauvinist-in-chief’ E. 
Blanks. Bramanov stressed that the Rigasche Rundschau was the only newspaper in Latvia 
to condemn Blanks’s polemical excesses against the Jews. Bramanov, like Latvijas 
Kareivis, also referred to Tsarist Russia’s customs as a source of inspiration for the 
hooligans; however, he reminded his readers how even during the ‘darkest times’ the best 
representatives of the Russian intelligentsia had not hesitated to raise their voices against 
injustice and intolerance. What one could not comprehend in Latvia, he wrote, is why 
Rainis chose to keep his silence: 
Let Rainis make a cultural appeal to the masses, let the most prominent and respected 
leaders of society and political organisations express indignation. We expect unconditional 
condemnation of the excesses, regardless of their relative size, from Latvian society, whose 
democratic tendencies we have never doubted. Instead of letters in Mr Blanks’s style, we expect an 
appeal for discipline and common work for the good of Latvia by the Latvian democratic press.31 
Segodnya’s call went unanswered. Next day, Latvijas Kareivis published an article 
‘About our national self-respect’ by the Latvian writer E. Virza, a well-known champion of 
the peasant class as the true carrier of Latvian national identity, who claimed that ‘in our 
country, every outburst of nationalism is viewed with disdain, but every chimera of 
internationalism is seen is as the supreme philosophical truth’. Virza asserted that ‘we do 
not have to hate any other ethnic groups, we do not have to organise any pogroms; but we 
have to arrange things in such a way that every ethnic group, in return for the advantages it 
enjoys in our country, will also undertake some responsibilities.’32 
During the early twenties, the newspapers Latvijas Kareivis (the official organ of 
the Latvian Army under the editorship of Aleksandrs Plensners) and Latvijas Sargs (which 
after the resignation of its founding editor A. Kroders in March 1920, was edited by K. 
Augenbergs-Ezerietis) consistently published articles on the national question and on 
                                                
30 ‘Par pehdejo deenu eelas notikumeem’, Latvijas Kareivis, Nr. 86, 05.06.1920. 
31 Bramanov, E. ‘Pochemu molchit Rainis?’, Segodnya, 12.06.1920. 
32 Wirza, Ed. ‘Par muhsu nazionalo paschapzi!u’, Latvijas Kareivis, 13.06. 1920. 
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minority-related issues; the overall tone of those articles was not minority-friendly, as the 
newspaper Segodnya constantly stressed in its reviews of the Latvian press.  
The writer and poet J!nis Akuraters, a hero of the revolution of 1905 and one of the 
most active proponents of Latvian independence, in the 1920s assumed a strictly 
nationalistic position in his articles and essays: ‘What does it mean – Latvian orientation? 
It means the evaluation of internal and external politics and the state of culture from a 
purely Latvian point of view. It means the assessment of all values from the point of view 
of our existence and prosperity.’33 
 The journalist and editor J!nis Gr"ns, the older brother of the famous Latvian writer 
Aleksandrs (J#kabs) Gr"ns, regularly expressed xenophobic and intolerant views, 
complaining of Latvia becoming ‘increasingly international’, of the growing number of 
foreigners in the streets, ‘especially young Jews’. Gr"ns claimed that ‘…our land, which 
we managed to defend against Russian-German colonisation during the Tsarist era, is now 
becoming a “place of international arrivals”’. He criticised the government for being 
excessively tolerant, and suggested deportation programmes for certain groups of the 
population.34 
Against this background, one feature in Latvijas Kareivis during the turbulent (for 
majority-minority relations) summer of 1920 stands out remarkably – the series of articles 
under the title ‘On nationalism’ by A. Kroders, who had recently resigned as the editor of 
Latvijas Sargs in protest against the attempt of the Agrarian Union to turn the newspaper 
into the main propaganda vehicle of its election campaign (Kroders 1968, Zel$e 2010). 
Kroders, one of the most prominent journalists in interwar Latvia, had established a 
solid reputation as a true Latvian patriot by editing the newly founded Latvijas Sargs, the 
press organ of the Ulmanis government published in Liep!ja during the Independence 
Wars, which had played an outstanding role in providing a ‘Latvian view on things’ for a 
population totally disoriented by the frequent change of regimes, as well as by both 
German and Bolshevik propaganda. Although he started his political career as a Social 
Democrat, Kroders eventually abandoned socialist views in favour of national patriotism, 
which he continued passionately expressing in the pages of his newspaper.  
                                                
33 Akur!ters, J. ‘Latvisk! orient!cija’, Latvijas Kareivis, Nr. 167, 10.09.1920. 
34 Gr"ns, J. ‘K!ds neatliekams jaut!jums’, Latvijas Sargs, 19.06.1920. 
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K!rkli"# (1990: 163) writes about Kroder’s ideological transformation:  
He now believes that the workers should be saved and protected from the Social 
Democratic ideology, and that the socialist party should be demolished by the 
press…Temperamental Kroders has fallen victim to the very old ‘renegade disease’. He does not 
long [any more] for social equality or the positive task of cooperation between different classes, but 
is swinging to the opposite extreme. 
Kroders, who belonged to the left wing of the LSD until 1915 ($%rmanis 1968: 59), 
would change ideological course twice more. He would support the authoritarian coup 
d’état of 1934, and would use his pen to praise the new ideology excessively. In 1941, he 
would become, albeit for a short time, the first editor of the magazine T!vija, the official 
organ of the occupying Nazi forces.  
But Kroders’s ideological swings notwithstanding, the ‘On nationalism’ series of 
1920 remains the best example of balanced analytical writing on the national question ever 
published by Latvijas Kareivis. 
Kroders sets out to explore the ideas of national equality, of the difference between 
individual and group rights, and of minority rights within a multinational state. 
Demonstrating a certain breadth of knowledge, he undertakes an earnest attempt to 
establish what kind of arrangement can be considered fair in the first place, and how it 
could possibly be implemented taking into account the often more difficult reality. This 
piece of writing stands in sharp contrast to the other works authored by Kroders on the 
same topic:  
 
First of all, national equality should be understood not as equality among ethnic groups, 
but as equality among the citizens belonging to different ethnic groups. 
… 
National freedom and equality belong to the same basic civic rights as the freedom of 
conscience, of the press, and of association. All national citizens, who live in the same state, should 
be given equal rights. A person’s rights cannot be restricted just because he belongs to the one, and 
not the other, nation.  
 
Therefore, all the limitations that were directed against so-called ethnic minority citizens 
should be eliminated at once. In the name of the nation, no one should be deprived of rights that 
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belong to everybody. … Political calculations and political sympathies must not limit the breadth 
of civic rights. 35 
 
Kroders then elaborates on what he calls ‘the complicated issue of the equality of 
languages’, again displaying an unanticipated (on the pages of Latvijas Kareivis) liberality 
of views. Kroders does not question the underlying principles of justice and equality, but 
he treats the person’s right to use his or her native language as a given (‘the free usage of 
one’s native language cannot be denied to anybody’; Meetings and associations, as long as 
they are acting legitimately, can use whatever language they wish’ There can be no doubt 
that each person should enjoy primary, secondary, and where the nation’s circumstances 
permit, also higher education in his native tongue’); his main concern is about the possible 
practical arrangements: ‘But what language should laws be issued in, in what language 
should bureaucrats correspond, in which language should the nations’ representatives 
speak in the parliament, in state offices, and in courts?’ 
These practical difficulties, claims Kroders, arise only in those states that are 
inhabited by two or more ethnic groups, like Latvia. That is when the national question 
becomes complicated, he continues, and it is not sufficient any more to talk about equality 
among citizens belonging to different ethnic groups; it is necessary to talk about equality 
among the ethnic groups themselves. Alas, posits Kroders, ‘to arrange for equality among 
different ethnic groups in a state is much more difficult than to arrange for equality among 
citizens. Sometimes, it becomes almost impossible’.  
It is clear to Kroders that ‘every nation wants to be autonomous, wants to decide 
for itself according to its own beliefs, independent of other nations.’ Apart from wishing to 
be able to develop freely, every nation wants to unite its members politically, and to have 
an impact on the life of the state. The force of such an impact, according to Kroders, 
depends on the ethnic group’s size in comparison to other ethnic groups living in the same 
state, on the stage of its cultural development, on its community and organisations, and on 
the way it is territorially positioned in the state.  
 In Latvia, continues Kroders, Germans, Russians, and Jews live next to ethnic 
Latvians; ‘and it is impossible to solve the national question in Latvia by Germans forming 
                                                
35 This and all further quotes are from: A.Kroders, ‘Par nacionalismu’, Latvijas Kareivis, 1920, Nr.118, 119, 
121, 126, 127, 130, 131; 15.07. -30.07.1920. 
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a separate state – it is easy to see why not, and we will not discuss it further’. Therefore, 
concludes Kroders, we should look for other solutions of the national question. He 
analyses the examples of Switzerland and Belgium, coming to the conclusion that although 
those countries have achieved significant equality among their ethnic groups, this is 
however far from perfect (he cites the Romansh ethnic group as being disadvantaged in 
Switzerland, and the Flemish language as being inferior in status to the French in 
Belgium).  
 Kroders believes that ‘for the purpose of fairness, all nations in all states should be 
in this or another way autonomous’. Autonomy, explains Kroders, means the possibility of 
self-rule for every ethnic group, and the right of this group to a certain independence from 
the state. The character of this autonomy can be different, he says, but the main goal is 
clear:  
 
It is possible to grant ethnic groups rights to cultural autonomy. But the law on cultural 
autonomy should be issued by the state parliament. There are also other ways of solving the 
national question; the main goal of all of them is to ensure that each nation has a right to free 
development, existence and protection.  
 
He concludes: ‘the fewer conflicts, disagreements and fights there are among the 
different ethnic groups within the state, the stronger and mightier it will be externally’.   
Symptomatically, the newspaper Segodnya, which always reacted so promptly to 
any negative opinions about minorities expressed on the pages of Latvijas Kareivis, in this 
particular case chose not to respond – perhaps suspecting a clever ruse, but most likely 
simply considering a response unnecessary as long as the writer ‘stayed in line’. Kroders’s 
theses on the national question, which could have been the start of a productive discussion, 
were left hanging in the air – both the minorities and the nationalists, for some inexplicable 
reason, chose to ignore them. Possibly discouraged by this lack of attention, Kroders did 
not attempt anything similar until 194036, when literally a month before the Soviet 
annexation he published a book in which he called the alienation of Latvian ethnic 
minorities after 1934 a big mistake, and proposed to start working immediately on the 
creation of a unified civic nation. 
                                                
36 Kroders did publish these articles as book in 1924, see Kroders, A. 1924. Par minoritatu autonomiju. R!ga: 
Latvju Kultura. 
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     *** 
The year 1921 was marked by two important milestones: Latvia finally achieved 
the long-sought international legal recognition of its status on 26th January, and joined the 
League of Nations on 22nd September. The coverage of the two historical events in the 
press provides a snapshot of majority-minority relations and differences of opinion in 
1921. 
The de jure recognition was celebrated by a festive procession of more than eighty 
professional and public organisations, accompanied by three wind orchestras, through the 
centre of Riga. It stopped by the building of the Constitutional Assembly, where the 
President of the Assembly J. !akste was given a boisterous ovation. !akste gave a short 
speech in return, stressing that a new period had started in the life of the Latvian state, and 
that the process of state-building requires all citizens to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’. The 
orchestra playing the national anthem, the procession moved to the Castle to greet Prime 
Minister K. Ulmanis, who said in his speech: All are equal in Latvia; it will know no 
difference either among languages, or confessions, or among parties. The Old Riga has 
turned into a new Riga!’37 
Most of the Latvian press articles dedicated to the de jure recognition concentrated 
on the foreign policy aspects of the historical achievement. By contrast, an article that 
appeared in Jaun!k!s Zi"as in February 1921, focused on ‘the impact of our state’s final 
recognition de jure on interethnic relations’, while in reality also using the festive 
opportunity to settle some old accounts.  
According to the author, who writes under the pseudonym Simplex, the creation of 
an independent democratic Latvian state three years ago, which made all of its citizens 
equal by taking away the privileges enjoyed by the Russians and the Germans under the 
Tsarist yoke, could not, and was not appreciated by these two minorities. Still, in the 
absence of other options, and trying not to lose their influence in the country, they 
condescended to work for the welfare of the new state. However, only a small part of 
Latvian Germans, Russians and Jews believe in the viability of the Latvian state; the 
majority of them have been all this time secretly hoping that it will not be internationally 
recognised, maintains the author. After sustaining a hard blow when Latvia was 
                                                
37 ‘Torzhestvuyushaya Riga’, Segodnya, 1921. 
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nevertheless internationally recognised, he writes, the minorities are now forced to re-
examine their values. ‘It is not impossible that a big part of them will even start feeling 
proud of Latvia’s achievement and of their own belonging to a free democratic state’, 
allows the author, immediately adding that the only part of the population that will never 
be reconciled with the idea of an independent Latvia are the Baltic Germans. The author 
concludes that ethnic Latvians, on various occasions, have demonstrated tolerance towards 
the ethnic minorities, and now, when the Latvian state has been reinforced by official 
recognition, this tendency can only grow: ‘And this is how the recognition de jure will 
have the most positive impact on relations among different people in our land’.38 
An article on Latvia’s accession to the League of Nations published by Segodnya 
provided some answers to supporters of the outlook expressed by Simplex:  
Now that Latvia has achieved the ultimate recognition of its sovereign rights in the family 
of equal free civilised peoples, all real and imagined dangers, all genuine and fictional enemies 
should stop occupying the attention of the Latvian state. It should instead direct all available energy 
towards its internal construction. After discarding the unhealthy growth of chauvinistic intolerance, 
and the suspicious division of Latvian citizens into the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ [belen’kiye and 
chernen’kiye], Latvian statesmen must involve all available positive forces, who honestly want to 
contribute, in the daunting task of economic revival.39 
    *** 
During the spring of 1921, the Constitutional Assembly witnessed intense debates 
on the project for national autonomy – or, to be precise, on the projects for national 
autonomy. The initial project, submitted by the Zeire Zion deputy J. Hellmanis (Ge!man), 
which envisaged a wide scope of autonomy for minorities, including social, economic and 
cultural rights supported by a special taxation system, was suddenly upstaged by another 
project, submitted by the Bund deputy I. Berss, which envisioned only rights for cultural 
autonomy. From there on, both projects were reviewed simultaneously by the Assembly’s 
commissions. Opinions were divided within the factions – while the Social Democrat A. 
Kur!inskis defended the Hellmanis project on the grounds that ‘cultural autonomy’ was too 
narrow a definition, one of his party’s leaders, Pauls Kalni"!, insisted on Berss’s version, 
but in ‘a wider understanding’. P. Schiemann also supported cultural autonomy, but on 
                                                
38 Simplex ‘De jure un nazionalais jautajums Latwij#’, Jaun"k"s Zi#as, 05.02.1921. 
39 ‘Latviya v Lige Nacii’, Segodnya, 24.09.1921. 
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condition that minorities  ‘keep the right to be active in the social sphere’ as well; at the 
same time he sided with Hellmanis on the issues of taxes and budgeting. The overall 
theoretical confusion did not help to clarify the issue of national autonomy, which was a 
novelty for both politicians and the general public. Moreover, the disagreement between 
the two Jewish deputies was opportunistically used by their opponents, most notably by the 
Latgalian deputy Trasuns40, who viewed national autonomy as an attempt to create ‘a state 
within a state’.41  
The idea of non-territorial cultural autonomy (NCA) for minorities, which had 
originally been conceived by the Austrian Marxists E. Renner and O. Bauer at the 
beginning of the 20th century to address population diversity issues within the territories of 
the Habsburg Empire, was in the 1920s enthusiastically embraced by other European 
minorities. The Baltic Germans (like the Estonian Edwald Ammende, author of the Law on 
Cultural Autonomy of 1925 and the founder of the European Nationalities Congress, and 
the Latvian minority thinker Paul Schiemann) were in the vanguard of the new movement. 
National-cultural autonomy was also popular with the Bund, the Jewish Social Democratic 
movement. At the initial stage of the discussion of cultural autonomy for Latvian 
minorities, conservative Latvian nationalists interpreted it as another demonstration of the 
alleged disloyalty of minorities to the state, but this was not the official stance of the 
Latvian government, which was still obviously eager to comply with international 
requirements in terms of minority protection. This can best be illustrated by an interview 
given by Prime Minister Z. Meierovics in May 1921 to the newspaper Segodnya. Asked by 
the interviewer about his personal attitude towards cultural autonomy for minorities, 
Meierovics replies that ‘the minority question will be solved in Latvia to the extent 
foreseen by the Treaty of Versailles’ and that the aim of the government’s policy on 
autonomy is to resolve it ‘in the same plane’ as in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Western 
Europe.  
Altogether, insufficient preparation, persistent theoretical ambiguities and an 
overall lack of clarity (for example, none of the advocates of cultural autonomy attempted 
to provide a definition of ‘minority’ itself, to the utter dismay of the Head of the 
                                                
40 The Latgalian faction in the Saeima, and especially Fr. Trasuns, assumed a very ambiguous position vs. 
minorities, which Laserson described as playing the role of a ‘half-minority’ when they saw fit, and being 
opposed to any cooperation with the ‘foreigners’ on other occasions (Laserson, M. ‘Peregovory s 
men’shinstvami’, Segodnya, 26.11.1922). 
41  ‘Ob avtonomii men’shinstv’, Segodnya, 11.03.1921; ‘Nacional’naya avtonomija men’shinstv’, Segodnya, 
30.04.1921; ‘Nacional’naya avtonomija men’shinstv’, Segodnya, 04.05.1921. 
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Constitutional Commission M. Skujenieks), as well as repeated disagreements among 
minority representatives themselves, resulted in the Assembly’s decision to enshrine only 
the basic principles of national autonomy in the Constitution, and to elaborate those 
principles further in a separate law (more about the fate of this law in Chapter Five). 
    *** 
In the meantime, the second government of Latvia under Prime Minister Zigfr!ds 
Meierovics (June 1921 – January 1923), like all the subsequent governments prior to 1940, 
did not include any minority representatives. Stranga (2005:134) believes that this 
exclusion, and the fact that Meierovics adopted an informal principle of ‘Latvia for 
Latvians’, can be seen as a kind of ‘dividing line’ in the life of the new democracy, despite 
the fact that minorities were not under direct attack, and nor were their rights restricted.42  
In September 1921, Latvia joined the League of Nations. This did not just make 
Latvia a fully-fledged member of the international community, but also provided an 
illusory, in retrospect, sense of collective security. Accession also signified that Latvia had 
passed the test of compatibility with Western democratic standards, including minority 
protection.  
The Latvian Constitution, or Satversme, which was modelled on the Swiss, French 
and German Weimar constitutions, was originally designed in two parts. The first part, 
regulating state institutions, was adopted on 15th February 1922. The second part was 
supposed to outline citizens’ rights and obligations, including fundamental rights. Articles 
115 and 116 would enshrine minorities’ language rights and the right to cultural autonomy 
at the constitutional level. As formulated by the Constitutional Commission’s rapporteur 
A. Kur"inskis, ‘this second part will provide the democratic content for the first part; 
without it, the first part will lose much of its importance. It is clear that if we do not have 
citizens who possess civic rights …then our citizens will not be able to utilise, develop and 
sustain the state order defined in the first part of the Satversme.’43 The second part of the 
Satversme was voted down on 5th April 1922. #ilde (1976:706) believes that the failure to 
adopt the second part of the Constitution should be viewed as an accident rather than as an 
                                                
42 Opinions differ: a survey of the Baltic countries undertaken by the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(1938: 34) dates this divide as of 1929, and characterises the situation of minorities under all the Agrarian 
Union governments prior to that date as ‘very favourable’.  
43 Latvijas Satversmes Sapulces stenogrammu izvilkums (1920-1922). R!ga, 2006, p. 494. 
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expression of conscious opposition to fundamental rights, as in reality there were only six 
opposing votes versus 62 ‘for’, and 62 abstentions (according to the Constitutional 
Assembly’s internal regulations, opposing and abstaining votes were counted together). 
Besides, the debates themselves did not concentrate upon minority rights, but mainly on 
Article 104, introducing strikes as legitimate means in the resolution of economic disputes. 
However, Stranga (2005: 134) believes that the general mood at the Constitutional 
Assembly was already starting to change, leaving the ‘idealistically democratic dream’ 
behind, not least because Latvia had already been recognised de jure by the international 
community, and accepted into the League of Nations.   
F. Ciel!ns, one of the Satversme’s authors and the Social Democrat most dedicated 
to fundamental rights, engaged in a passionate argument with A. Bergs (The Non-Partisan 
Group). Bergs generally doubted the need to include fundamental rights in the 
Constitution, referring to the example of England, which, despite not having a Constitution 
at all, remained a democratic country. Ciel!ns replies: ‘If we lived in a land like England, 
with an older cultural tradition of political life and political freedom, then I would be able 
to declare, with an open heart, that the second part of our Constitution is completely 
unnecessary, as historical traditions, civic conscience and participation are the guardians 
and guarantors of political freedom. But we are still so very, very far from the elementary 
civic democracy already in place in big and small older European countries.’44 Ciel!ns’s 
opinion notwithstanding, the Social Democrats voted for the whole Satversme without its 
second part. On 1st May 1922 the Latvian Constitution was adopted. Minority rights 
remained unprotected by the interwar Satversme; the fundamental rights section was added 
to it only in 1998 after Latvia had regained its independence. 
Another important piece of legislation passed by the Constitutional Assembly was 
the Saeima Election Law (June 1922), whose main shortcoming was the lack of a 
percentage barrier for political parties to gain representation in the Saeima. This 
encouraged further fragmentation of political life, made passing legislation extremely 
difficult, and resulted in kaleidoscopic changes of governments – all these factors 
significantly contributed to the subsequent demise of Latvian democracy. Political 
fragmentation would be very pronounced within the minority faction of the Saeima, 
seriously hindering cooperation among the ethnic minorities. 
                                                
44 Latvijas Satversmes Sapulces stenogrammu izvilkums (1920-1922). R"ga, (2006), p. 507. 
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3.3. The Parliament 
3.3.1. The First Saeima, 1922-1925 
The functioning of the Latvian Parliament was from the very start hindered by 
numerous obstacles, such as the absence of a clear majority, the extreme fragmentation of 
political parties (28 parties were represented in the Third Saeima alone), and minority 
factions’ preoccupation with their own interests. Neither could it count on popular support 
and public benevolence, as more than half of Latvia’s population lived in the rural areas, 
where social and economic problems were very pronounced but the ideas of liberal 
democracy had hardly taken hold.  
Ethnic minorities were represented in all Latvian interwar Saeimas. Invariably, the 
biggest and the best organised faction was that of the Baltic Germans, not least thanks to 
the indefatigable Dr. Paul Schiemann, who attended almost all sessions of the National 
Council, the Constitutional Assembly, and the Parliament; was active in the committees’ 
work; and spoke on all important pieces of legislation without limiting himself to 
minorities’ direct interests. According to Hiden (2004: 66), during the Constitutional 
Assembly years alone, ‘apart from political initiatives that stemmed directly from him he 
had a major personal input into the 130 laws and seventy-three parliamentary amendments 
and submissions drafted by the Committee of German Balt Parties.’ The high overall level 
of discipline and organisation among the Baltic Germans was well-known - !ilde (1976) 
describes a special filing system they used for voters, which allowed them to move voters 
from one region to another before elections in order to gain the maximum amount of 
mandates – and envied by other ethnic minorities. On the eve of the Constitutional 
Assembly election, the Russian newspaper Segodnya urged all citizens, and ethnic 
minorities in particular, to active participation, using the Baltic German community as a 
model of political activity: ‘Germans, your social discipline is too well known, there is no 
need to worry about you. Without any doubt, you will unanimously vote for your own list 
No. 1!’45 
The next day, Segodnya reported from the polling stations: ‘Germans close ranks at 
the elections. At the polling stations in the German-populated areas, more than half the 
                                                
45 Segodnya, No. 87, 17.04.1920.  
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electors have already voted by the end of the first day. Even ill and injured people are 
being carried to the polling stations.’46   
Jewish political life during the Parliamentary period was very active, but its 
influence in both legislative and administrative bodies was often undermined by the fact 
that the numerous Jewish parties could not always agree among themselves. Dribins (2002) 
observes that the Zionist parties, which protected Jewish cultural interests and were loyal 
to the Latvian State, were the most influential. He also mentions the fact that in the 
elections to the Fourth Saeima, many Jews already started voting for the ethnic Latvian 
parties, which could indicate that common state interests for them were already more 
important than ethnic concerns. Overall, writes Dribins, the Jews integrated well into the 
new independent state, and contributed to its development. (A more detailed account of 
Jewish  and Baltic German political representation during the interwar period is available 
in Chapter Five). 
Apine (2007) notes that although the Russians during the interwar years were 
Latvia’s biggest ethnic minority, their political activity remained low in comparison to that 
of the Baltic Germans and the Jews. She explains this by the Russians’ overall lower 
educational level, inferior professional status (the majority of Russians in Latvia were 
employed as low-skilled industrial and agricultural labourers), and, among Russian 
intellectuals, a certain passive reliance on higher authorities inherited from the Russian 
Empire. Feigmane (2002), similarly, explains the political weakness of the Latvian Russian 
population by their lower social status and economic underdevelopment, as well as, 
notably, by the absence of obvious leaders among them. Another significant factor 
contributing to Latvian Russians’ political inactivity identified by Feigmane (2002) is the 
fact that at the beginning of Latvian statehood, they could not count on any support from 
their ethnic kin-state. 
There was, however, a recognised need among the Latvian Russian intelligentsia 
for greater political activity and better political organisation. The biggest Russian 
newspaper Segodnya regularly published articles by K. Araba!in, K. Mansirev, and E. 
Brams (Bramanov) calling on Russians to shake off their political passivity and join 
Latvians in the process of building the new state. ‘As only Latvian citizens can participate 
in the elections for the Constitutional Assembly, and citizenship not supported by a 
                                                
46 ‘"#$%&#’, Segodnya, No. 88, 18.04.1920. 
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Latvian passport may be questioned, it is the duty of every citizen who is interested in 
rebuilding our country, to make his best effort to clarify his citizenship status and obtain a 
Latvian passport,’ wrote Segodnya on 2nd April 1920. 
The Russian parties represented in the interwar Saeimas were constantly re-
grouping and changing their respective names (as a rule, way too long and close to 
impossible to pronounce – try The Faction of Russian Orthodox, Old Believers and United 
Russian Organisations, for example, or the Faction of the Union of Russian Peasants and 
Russian Civil Servants). They could, however, be broadly divided into four major groups: 
the Old Believers (led by Meletijs Ka!!istratovs), the Russian Orthodox (headed by J"nis 
Pommers), the Russian National Democrats (under the leadership of Aleksandrs 
Bo#agovs), and the Russian Parish and Municipal Workers (represented in the Saeima by 
Leontijs $po!anskis.47 All Russian parties in the Saeima supported the idea of cultural 
autonomy for minorities; however, they were also subject to internal disagreements 
between the orthodox nationalists and the liberals – the former insisting on a strictly ethnic 
basis of party membership, while the latter wanted to be more open to other cultures. This 
inability to reach a consensus affected the Russians’ cooperation with national institutions, 
such as when, for example, they could not agree on a candidate for the Head of the Russian 
department within the Ministry of Education, or on which out of the two Russian theatres 
would receive the allocated state funding. And although the loyalty of Russians, including 
the new immigrants, towards the Latvian State was constantly growing, all the Russians’ 
activities in the Saeima were, in one way or another, limited to campaigning for Russian 
language rights in education, municipal life, and the courts (Apine 2007; Feigmane 2002).  
The general tendency of Latvian minorities to put their own interests ahead of those 
of the state can be observed both in the Parliament and City Council debates, and in the 
press of the interwar period. M. Laserson notes that ‘the Minorities Bloc voted together 
only on issues involving protection of the political and cultural rights of the minorities’, 
when it was also necessary ‘to strengthen democratic principles in General Laws of the 
country which bore no direct relation to Minority Affairs’. (Laserson 1971: 123, 138) 
Laserson also laments the political immaturity of the Jewish deputies, which was 
displayed in the ‘absence of the courage and capacity to stress a specific Jewish approach 
                                                
47 The spelling of the surname $po!anskis (also Spoljanskis, or $poljanskis) differs widely in Saeima 
transcripts. 
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in all problems affecting the political fate of the country’ (1971: 105). He notes that they 
also remained silent during the earlier discussions of a possible alliance with Bolshevik 
Russia; that they were absent during the historic National Council session on 9th October 
1919, allowing a Latvian deputy to make a joke that ‘minorities’ representatives must have 
gone to Mitau (where Bermondt’s headquarters were at the time; now - Jelgava); that no 
Jewish voices were heard on the establishment of the Latvian Economic Council and on 
the rehabilitation of industry; and that the Jews did not participate in the discussion of ‘the 
second basic problem of the Assembly, namely, the new Constitution’ (Laserson 1971: 
113). Most astonishing of all, he posits, is the fact that the Jewish deputies could not 
appreciate the significance of, and refrained from participating in, the debates on the 
Minorities Schools Law, ‘which afterwards became famous in the History and Theory of 
National Minority Rights in Europe as a model piece of legislation’ (1971: 107). 
Laserson contrasts the overall passivity of the Jewish faction towards ‘general state 
matters’ with the proactive stance of the Baltic Germans, especially Schiemann, who 
became a recognised leader of the Minority Bloc. At the same time, he notes: ‘A measure 
of psychological animosity towards the minorities was inevitable in view of the fact that 
the Germans were among them, and more precisely at their head.’ (1971: 124) 
  Tensions between the majority and minorities were exposed again in the Saeima on 
25th January 1923, when the government of J. Pau!uks, which brought together the left 
Social Democrats and the right Agrarian parties (namely, the Agrarian Union and the 
Latgalian Christian Agrarian Union), received a vote of confidence. Although Pau!uks’s 
government declaration only mentioned minorities in passing, i.e. promising that the 
government ‘will also take into account minorities’ fair requirements and will be 
accommodating towards those minorities’ national-cultural needs’, the new composition of 
the government allowed hope for a change of course, especially after the government of Z. 
Meierovics, whose attitude towards cooperation with minorities was very reserved at 
best.48 M. Laserson notes during his speech that although the coalition between the 
‘landowners from the countryside’ on the one side, and the left Social Democrats on the 
other, is not very strong politically or economically [indeed the Pau!uks government’s term 
in office was only six months], it is a coalition that is ‘based upon the principle of 
                                                
48Latvijas Republikas Saeimas Stenogramas. I. sesijas 11. s"de, 1923. gada 25. janv#r$, p. 142. This and all 
further quotes per Latvijas Republikas Saeimas Stenogramas. 1922-1934. Latvijas Republikas Saeimas 
izdevums. Kr#jum# Saeimas stenografisk# biroj#, R$g#, J"kaba iel# No. 11. 
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overarching national goals’. ‘Until now, – says Laserson – national goals have 
unfortunately been equated with hate towards minorities.’ He is, however, dissatisfied with 
the ‘bleak and vague admonition’ minorities have received in the government’s 
declaration, and points out that this was contrary to the promises of the National Council’s 
platform, in particular with the promise to enshrine minority rights in the Constitution, 
which has been never fulfilled. Laserson ends his speech with assurances that minorities 
are willing to work together with the majority, as long as they are not pushed away.49 P. 
Schiemann speaks bitterly of minorities not being invited to participate in the coalition 
talks; moreover, the government declaration ‘built of general phrases’ was sent to the 
minorities factions ‘just a few hours in advance’, denying them any chance to get familiar 
with it; therefore, ‘nothing else is left to us but to wait and see which course the 
government will take before giving it our vote of confidence’. 50 The German, Jewish, 
Russian and Polish factions abstained from the vote.  
On 26th June 1923, after the demise of the short-lived Pau!uks government, Z. 
Meierovics formed his second government, whose declaration said, among other things: 
‘In relation to minorities, the government… will take into account their fair requirements 
and will be accommodating towards minorities’ national-cultural needs. Recognising the 
general rights assigned to minorities, this government sees its next task in this field as 
putting in order the legal status of Latvian minorities within the League of Nations.’51 
The minorities were clearly not impressed by the declaration, as shown by the 
subsequent parliamentary debates.  
The speech of the Baltic German Party’s representative W. Fircks (V. Firkss) 
mainly centres on the issue of the transfer of the Lutheran St. Jacob’s Church in Riga into 
the diocese of the new Catholic Bishop of Riga, initiated by the previous government, 
against which the Baltic Germans were vigorously campaigning – to the dismay of the 
Latvians. Later on, in September 1923, the Baltic Germans even initiated the first 
referendum in the history of the Latvian state, which was ultimately declared invalid 
because of the overall insufficient number of votes – according to Hiden (2004: 92), ‘an 
honourable failure’. Meierovics in his declaration undertook to go ahead with the 
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confiscation. Fircks, therefore, declares that although otherwise the German faction would 
be ready to provide the new coalition with its ‘moral support’, it regrettably cannot vote for 
the government that promises to uphold the St. Jacob’s Church’s confiscation, and will 
abstain.52 
The next speaker, M. Nurock (Mizrahi) claims that the new coalition has the same 
‘Down with minorities’ motto as the previous one: ‘These gentlemen, who hold a patent on 
love towards the Fatherland, would rather build a wobbly government without minorities, 
than a stable one with them.’ He reminds those present that the ethnic minorities helped to 
rebuild the country during times of hardship. Nurock claims that now, when the worst is 
already in the past, minorities are being pushed aside; ‘the Moor has done his work, the 
Moor can leave’. Nurock announces that the Latvian Jewish residents who he has the 
honour of representing in the Saeima do not consider the new coalition capable of securing 
the real welfare of the state. Therefore, he concludes, the Jewish faction, ‘with a heavy 
heart, but with a clear conscience’, will vote against the cabinet.53 
A. Bo!agovs (Russian National Party) speaks along the same lines as Fircks and 
Nurock, accusing the new coalition of sticking to the previous government’s policy 
towards the minorities and claiming that the part of the declaration dealing with minorities 
is ‘widely open to interpretation’, and so it is futile to expect any changes. He concludes 
that the Russian bloc will not vote for the government.54 
M. Laserson (Zeire Zion) lists multiple grievances accumulated by the Jews under 
the rule of the previous government, especially against the unpopular Education Minister 
P. Gail"tis. He then cautions the coalition: ‘Do not think, gentlemen, that you will be able 
to do without ethnic minorities; without them you will never have a stable majority.  
Unless you carry out a coup d’état, or try to undermine the fundamental democratic 
election rights, in every new Latvian Saeima you will encounter the same ethnic minority 
problem, and the necessity of their support’.55 
M. Kallistratovs (Old Believers’ Party) reinforces the message of the previous 
minority speakers, claiming that yet again a coalition is being built in strict isolation from 
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minorities. Minorities, he says, are almost regarded as an ‘anti-state element’ [pretvalstisks 
elements]; this attitude is reflected in the media, and it pervades all aspects of state and 
municipal life. Kallistratovs concludes that he will not note vote for the government. 
At the end of the session, the second Meierovics government received 51 votes for, 
37 against, and three abstentions.56  
Ten days later, the Saeima was discussing the 1923/1924 state budget. Although 
the period from 1923 to 1929 has traditionally been viewed as a time of growing economic 
prosperity in Latvia, there were already many factors in place that would escalate the onset 
of economic depression just a few years later, such as uneven distribution of the tax 
burden, a steadily growing number of state monopolies, instability in the area of economic 
legislation (every new coalition tended to revise, and often to revoke concessions given to 
industries and trade – as a consequence, Latvia had difficulties in attracting foreign 
capital), and, last but not least, the continuing dominance of minorities in the private 
sector. These issues would continuously reverberate through the Saeima sessions, often 
getting unnecessarily politicised. Aizsilnieks (1968: 274) observes that the primary 
economic goal of increasing the nation’s prosperity was often neglected in favour of 
nationalistic and party politics.  
During this particular session on 5th July 1923, after the budget has been presented 
to the Saeima, the first speakers’ comments are directly related to the subject. Whereas R. 
B!lmanis (Social Democrats) criticises the budget for its ‘class-based taxation policy’ (i.e. 
it relies excessively on indirect taxation, thus putting the main tax burden on consumers 
and affecting less affluent parts of the population), J. Hans (Baltic German Party) draws 
attention to insufficient investment in the industrial sector, especially in the port industry. 
Hans stresses that although three quarters of the Latvian population at the time are engaged 
in the agricultural sector, the neglect of industrial development is a short-sighted policy. R. 
Kalnings (Non-Partisan National Centre) comments on various parts of the budget relating 
to different ministries and on the desirability of foreign loans.  
But when the podium is taken by J. Ver"bickis (Polish Union), his speech, with its 
starting point being the insufficient sum allocated by the budget to the Polish School 
Department, eventually drifts further and further away from the budget, turning into a long 
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account of grievances that Poles hold against ethnic Latvians, and against other ethnic 
minorities. The existing statistical data on the number of Poles in Latvia is incorrect, 
claims Ver!bickis, as during the census of 1920 many Poles declared themselves as 
Belarussians. According to Ver!bickis, not just Poles, but also many Russians and 
especially former bureaucrats of the Tsarist Empire, who do not master the Latvian 
language, have declared themselves as Belarussians for one reason only – because in 
Belarussian schools all teaching takes places in the ‘universally understood’ Russian 
language [ironically, Ver!bickis himself speaks Russian in the Saeima]. Belarussian 
schools, claims Ver!bickis, are busily recruiting new students belonging to other ethnic 
groups in order to inflate their statistics and increase their respective part of the state 
educational budget – all this with the approval of the government. Ver!bickis expresses 
indignation that the Belarussian school budget in 1923/24 exceeds the Polish one by more 
than 22,000 Lats. True, he says, ‘they have more schools than we do, but we all know very 
well what kind of children attend these schools!’ Overall, concludes Ver!bickis, Poles in 
Latvia often encounter unfair and unfriendly attitude, although they have never given a 
reason to doubt their loyalty towards the state.57  
Fr. Trasuns (Latgalian Union) predictably dedicates the larger part of his speech to 
the difficult economic situation in Latgale, which is still lagging behind other Latvian 
regions. He then shifts the focus of his attention to the previous speaker, J. Ver!bickis, 
responding to his claim that Poles are often treated with mistrust. What kind of trust the 
Poles can demand, wonders Trasuns, if they contribute to de-nationalisation 
[p!rtatuto"ana] of Latgalian children [implies that not all children in Polish schools are 
ethnically Polish], and if a recent inspection of the Polish schools discovered portraits of 
Marshal Pilsudski in the classrooms where portraits of President "akste are supposed to 
be? Trasuns criticises all ethnic minorities together for being in opposition to the budget on 
the grounds that their rights are not being respected – these claims are unfounded, he 
claims, as the budget generously covers their educational needs.58 
The most memorable speech at this budget debates is delivered by the orthodox 
Jewish representative M. Dubins (Agudat Israel). He speaks at length not so much 
reviewing the budget itself, as submitting one ministry after another (in the same order as 
they are mentioned in the budget) to criticisms ‘from the Jewish perspective’: – for 
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example, speaking of the Foreign Ministry, his focus is on excessive bureaucracy at 
Latvian consulates abroad which makes the return of Jewish refugees more difficult; the 
Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the Citizenship Law, which is unfair towards the 
Jews; the Justice Ministry makes it difficult, through its regulations, for the Jews to buy 
property; Jews encounter unequal treatment at the Agricultural Ministry; and the 
Transportation Ministry is not active enough in fighting anti-Semitic incidents on the 
trains.  
And as legitimate as Dubins’s complaints could have been, it was hardly an 
appropriate time and place to raise them in such detail – this was reflected by the next 
speaker, G. Reinhards (Christian National Union): 
Highly esteemed assembly, I hereby ask your permission to return to Latvia’s state budget 
after discussing all these ‘Jewish budgets’ – as it seemed from the speech of the previous orator 
that we were gathered here to discuss Jewish matters in Latvia. And Mr. Dubins’s initial promise to 
speak from a non-partisan perspective turned out to be an empty promise – he did not speak about 
budget in a non-partisan way, he only spoke of Jewish matters. And I therefore have to ask your 
permission to return to Latvia’s state budget. I think Mr. Dubins will not hold it against me. 59 
For the next couple of days, Dubins’s ‘Jewish budget’ became the joke of the town 
– there was hardly a local newspaper that did not mentioned it. Regrettably, the 
parliamentary discussion of the 1923/1924 budget demonstrated the minorities’ inability to 
rise above their respective ethnic groups’ interests at the moment when their input into 
overarching state matters was required; it was this kind of partisan action which made the 
majority believe that the minorities were ‘all take and no give’. 
On 7th July 1923, after protracted negotiations, Latvia’s delegate M. Valters finally 
signed the Declaration on Minority Rights; it was ratified by the Latvian government on 
28th July 1923. Although Latvian statesmen in 1918 handed out early promises of equality 
to minorities unprompted – the National Council Platform, with its direct references to 
minorities and their political rights, was formulated seven months earlier than Article 93 of 
the Treaty of Versailles (signed on 28th June 1919), which defined minorities, for the first 
time in the history of international legislation, as inhabitants of a state ‘who differ from the 
majority of the population in race, language, or religion’ - the subsequent negotiations  
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between the Latvian Government and the League of Nations caused frustration on both 
sides.  
The Polish Minority Treaty, which was signed on the same day as the Treaty of 
Versailles, and also became known as the ‘Little Versailles’, served as a basic template for 
all other minority treaties with the new and enlarged states created as a result of the Treaty 
of Versailles. Whereas twelve of these states, including Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland and others, were fully bound by the minority treaties, four other states, namely 
Albania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania only acquiesced to signing declarations to the 
Council of the League of Nations (Dickinson 1928: 10).  
The Latvian government argued that the protection of minorities was already 
enshrined in the country’s liberal constitution, and that the imposition of minority treaties 
on selected European states was a violation of the principle of equality. Furthermore, 
Latvia argued that the internalisation of minority rights through the treaties opened the 
door to foreign intervention and endangered state sovereignty. (Robinson et al., 1943: 166) 
The resulting Latvian declaration avoided the word ‘guarantee’ in relation to minorities, 
but stipulated the right of the League of Nations to re-open negotiations with Latvia if in 
the future the situation of minorities in the country was found wanting in comparison to the 
standards set in the minority treaties. (Macartney 1929: 20) Jaun!k!s Zi"as, commenting 
on the fact of the signing, observed that although at the session of the League of Nations 
Council just a few days earlier the situation on minority question was not favourable for 
Latvia, the final declaration’s text did not ‘encroach on the state’s self-respect and did not 
violate its internal order’.60  Laserson in Segodnya commented bitterly that the Declaration 
‘changed nothing’.61  
When the second Meierovics government resigned on 15th January 1924 after just 
over six months in the office (the life of its predecessor, the government of K. Pau!uks, 
was even shorter at five months), the cabinet was formed by the independent V. Zamuels 
with the support of the Social Democrats.62 The Social Democrats did not get any 
ministerial posts themselves – the coalition consisted of independents, the Democratic 
Centre, and the Non-Party National Centre. Because of the reported LSDSP involvement, 
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and the most notable absence of the Agrarian Union representatives, and perhaps also 
because of its declared goal of eliminating corruption at the state level, the government 
was often referred to as the ‘left government’. When on 25th January 1924 Zamuels read a 
very short declaration by the government composed that very morning, he stressed: ‘In 
internal politics, this government will stand on firm national and democratic foundations; 
we will counter any attacks on the Constitution of the Latvian Republic, no matter which 
side they come from, eliminating conflicts between different groups of citizens and in 
interethnic relations.’63 
By contrast, when on 16th December 1924 a new government led by H. Celmi!" 
(formed by the Agrarian Union with the support of the conservative Baltic German Party) 
presented its declaration, it contained no reference to ethnic minorities at all.  
A. Rudevics (Social Democrats), promptly comments on the fact that neither 
minorities nor nationalism were mentioned in the document: ‘…its is a peculiar 
phenomenon that precisely at the moment when nationalism is so widely discussed 
everywhere, our biggest nationalists ‘forget’ to include this question in their declaration’. 
Rudevics has a ready explanation for this unlikely memory lapse: having used the support 
of the ‘pro-Niedra’ German minority, the coalition has been forced to keep quiet about its 
nationalistic goals.64 P. Schiemann  (German Democrats), M. Laserson (Zeire Zion) and M. 
Nurock (Mizrahi) all express indignation at the omission of the minority question in the 
government declaration, and at the minorities’ habitual exclusion from the coalition talks.  
Ironically, it would be Schiemann to whom Celmi!" would turn for help just a few 
weeks later – unnerved by the failed communist coup in Tallinn in December 1924, 
Celmi!"’s government wanted to promptly pass amendments to the existing legislation on 
national defence; Schiemann promised his support in return for the government’s backing 
on cultural autonomy for minorities (Hiden 2004: 102). 
In March 1925, Minister of Justice P. Jura"evskis started a new tradition in the 
government’s dialogue with ethnic minorities, which is still occasionally used by Latvian 
politicians, inevitably causing polemics in the press. Mr. Jura"evskis made a public 
statement that he would only converse with his visitors at the ministry in the Latvian 
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language. With those who were not proficient in Latvian, he would only communicate with 
the help of an official translator. Segodnya, commenting on the announcement, complains 
about the waste of state budget resources, and stresses that as minority languages have 
certain rights in Latvia in accordance with the law, Jura!evskis, as the minister of justice, 
should have known better.65 
3.3.2. The Second Saeima, 1925-1928 
The elections to the Second Saeima, which took place in October 1925, did not 
bring along any significant changes in the composition of the Parliament. The LSDSP 
gained two additional seats, whereas the Social Democrats Mensheviks, led by M. 
Skujenieks, lost four.  Ciel"ns (1963: 280) explains this power reshuffle among the Social 
Democrats by the fact that a group led by A. Petrevics and R. Dukurs, which had joined 
Skujenieks earlier in 1925, decided to return to the ranks of the bigger party. This 
‘catastrophic loss’ sealed the fate of the Mensheviks – they became an insignificant ‘three-
man party’. There were no significant changes in the composition of the right wing of the 
Saeima, but it is important to note that the overall number of political factions grew from 
20 to 27 – a factor contributing to political instability and frequent governmental crises 
(#ilde 1976: 396-397). 
At the end of 1925, the second government of K. Ulmanis (24.12.1925. – 
06.05.1926.) won in an unprecedented, for the Latvian Parliament, competition with a rival 
government of V. Zamuels – both prospective governments presented their declarations to 
the Saeima on 22nd December.  
V. Zamuels’s prospective cabinet foresaw the Social Democrats F. Ciel"ns as the 
minister for foreign affairs, M. Skujenieks as the minister for the interior, V. Bastj$nis as 
the finance minister, and Fr. Trasuns (Latgalian Union) as a minister without portfolio. 
Zamuels’s declaration promised to fight corruption in state institutions and public life; the 
government promised to treat all residents equally regardless of their social, ethnic, or 
religious affiliation. It also contained an indirect and carefully worded reference to the 
Citizenship Law: the government undertook to expedite ‘the resolution of the legal status 
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of those residents who had close and lasting ties with Latvia’. In the field of education, the 
declaration promised to ensure cultural autonomy for minorities through a separate law.66 
M. Laserson (Zeire Zion) reminds his parliamentary audience that the previous 
Zamuels cabinet did not fulfil all its promises, in particular those related to the Citizenship 
Law. He addresses the Saeima in Russian, as is his usual custom, prompting !. Kl"ve’s 
exclamation ‘Speak Latvian! We all know that you can!’. Laserson retorts that ‘under the 
new programme for minorities’, he is asking for the Saeima’s kind permission to speak in 
the Russian language, which allows him to express his thoughts freely; this causes 
merriment in the audience.  Later on, Laserson welcomes the new promise of a separate 
law on cultural autonomy; however, he stresses, minorities do not consider this as 
something extraordinary. After all, says Laserson, ‘it would mean living up to the promises 
that we gave to ourselves and to the rest of the world in the Political Platform [of the 
National Council] in 1918, when founding the Latvian state’.67 The Jewish faction 
promises support to Zamuels’s left coalition as long as they stick to the promises of their 
declaration.  
M. Kallistratovs (Russian Old Believers) speaks along the same lines as Laserson, 
reminding Zamuels of his unfulfilled promises. He also claims that while deciding whether 
to vote for or against the Zamuels cabinet, the Russian faction ‘will not be limited by 
defending exclusively Russian interests in the Saeima’, taking into account the larger 
picture.68 Kallistratovs, on behalf of the Russian faction, promises support for the Zamuels 
coalition. 
Despite the minorities’ support, the Zamuels government did not win the vote of 
confidence from the Parliament – although 47 deputies voted for, and 44 against, there 
were also 5 abstentions; according to the Saeima’s rules of procedure, these abstentions 
were counted together with the ‘against’ votes. After the voting, a one-hour break was 
announced. 
Later that evening, another government was presented to the Parliament - one lead 
by K. Ulmanis. The future prime minister presented a surprisingly lengthy declaration, 
given the supposedly short notice, which is perhaps a clear sign that the outcome of the 
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previous vote was not entirely surprising to the Agrarian Union. The declaration, 
promising to continue strengthening the democratic foundation of the Latvian state, 
stipulated: ‘Minorities should be provided with cultural autonomy within the same limits 
as up until now. The administrative practice in relation to schooling, ethnicity, citizenship, 
land ownership and economic matters should be strictly in compliance with the law and 
with democratic requirements.’69 Although this was the only reference to minorities in the 
whole declaration, the minorities and their relations with the left-wing and right-wing 
parties in the Saeima featured prominently in the ensuing debates, which continued late 
into the night. 
F. Ciel!ns, speaking on behalf of Social Democrats, mentions the Agrarian Union’s 
(and their coalition partners’) vested interests in the Central Bank, the Agrarian Bank, and 
the Union bank.70 He also expresses doubt that that the Agrarian Union will  
wholeheartedly pursue the implementation of the agrarian reform, implying that the 
promises made to Baron Fircks in return for the support of the conservative German party 
will prevent them from doing so. 
An interesting insight into majority-minority relations and into the behind-the-
scene party struggle is provided by the speech of O. Nonacs (New Agrarian Union). 
Nonacs speaks of the ‘hateful relationship’ between the left and the right wings of the 
Saeima. The left wing, he says, re always portrayed as betrayers of the national idea, while 
the right wing as the epitome of reaction, with which no cooperation is possible. But on 
this particular night, says Nonacs, the Saeima is experiencing something unprecedented: 
two different governments are competing in a race, as if at the hippodrome. The main goal 
of both those on the left, and on the right is to discredit their respective opponent, not to 
ensure stability in the state. As for minorities, continues Nonacs, the previous speakers 
referred to them as ‘reactionary’, but were these not the same minorities with whose help 
all ‘democratic laws on civic liberties’ were passed by the Social Democrats? Was it not 
the now ‘reactionary’ minorities who were praised by the newspaper Socialdemokr!ts? 
‘You should re-read the Saeima transcripts, then you will see what you said about 
minorities in the past’ – admonishes Nonacs. He then mentions Riga City Council, where 
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he claims the Social Democrats are siding with the minorities in order to ‘isolate the 
Latvian bourgeoisie’. 71 
Nonacs claims that in the present ‘hippodrome-like race’ of the two governments, 
more minorities’ parties are on the side of the right-wing coalition than there are on the 
side of the centre-left. The reason for this, he says, is that although both coalitions give 
certain promises to minorities (and the centre-left coalition is far more generous, in fact), it 
is not so important as what is promised as who gives the promise. According to Nonacs, 
‘moderate minorities’ know that the right-wing promises stand a better chance of 
materialising, because ‘the bourgeoisie promised, promises, and will promise to minorities 
only as much as is in the interests of the Latvian state, and is in accordance with [ethnic] 
Latvians’ self-respect, and not more.’ 72 
P. Schiemann (German Democrats) retaliates bitterly that all the continuous talk 
about minorities’ own vested interests, and the frequently repeated speculations about 
‘what has been promised to them in return’, reflect more on the Latvian parties’ own 
experience in political negotiations than on minorities’ practices. Schiemann claims that 
the minorities, in pursuit of their own national interests, are willing to participate in 
common work in the interests of the state, even if it means joining ranks with the 
nationalists. Comparing the two governments in question, Schiemann observes that the 
right-wing Ulmanis government is in a better position to ensure ‘uninterrupted economic 
development’ than the Social Democrats, whose constant rhetoric of ‘class struggle’ and 
‘economic war’ undermines stability in the country. Despite various disagreements with 
the Ulmanis government’s declared goals, stresses Schiemann, the right wing’s programme 
is closer to the interests of the German minority than the ‘endless experiments’ of the 
Social Democrats.73 
 In their speeches, the Social Democrats F. Ciel!ns and V. Bastj"nis mention that 
the Ulmanis cabinet has gained support from P. Schiemann and M. Dubins (Agudat Israel) 
in return for some unknown promises. M. Dubins retorts that the Social Democrats should 
be ashamed to accuse the Agrarian Union of cooperation with minorities as if such 
cooperation was by definition a negative thing – ‘minorities are not second-class citizens, 
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are they? They fulfil the same responsibilities as other citizens, and you have no right to 
rebuke us for not voting for your government’. Furthermore, says Dubins, minorities do 
not have to be ashamed for asking for amendments to the Citizenship Law in return for 
their support, as the citizenship issue is not a purely minority issue, but concerns the whole 
state.74 
 In an open vote, the Ulmanis government gained 48 votes for, 42 against, and 3 
abstentions. The German faction and Agudat Israel supported the government along with 
the bourgeois parties; the Social Democrats, Bund and Zeire Zion voted against, while the 
Latgalian and the Russian factions split. Ulmanis’s victory was not a lasting one – his 
government survived for only four months. 
 On 4th May 1925, A. Alberings (Agrarian Union) presented his government 
declaration to the parliament. Promising to make economic development the main focus of 
the government, the brief declaration mentioned minorities under the section devoted to 
domestic policies: ‘Minorities should be provided with cultural autonomy within the 
existing boundaries.’75  
 The ensuing debates contain the customary accusations from the Social Democrats 
towards the Agrarian Union of unfulfilled promises, reactionary politics, disregard for the 
interests of the working class, and corruption in state and public life. The Social Democrat-
Menshevik M. Skujenieks strikes a somewhat different note in his speech. Skujenieks 
posits that the proposed government, just like the late Ulmanis government, is an ‘extreme 
government’ in the sense that it only represents interests of a certain part of the population, 
and is vehemently opposed to the interests of the remaining part. The life span of such 
extreme governments, says Skujenieks, cannot be long, as they polarise opinions and 
complicate matters not just within the Saeima, but also in the social and economic life of 
the country in general. Although the Albering government promises to follow a more 
centrist course, its declaration, which is full of vague and generalised statements, does not 
reflect this, leaving too much ‘in the open’. The Mensheviks, concludes Skujenieks, will 
not vote for this government. 
                                                
74 Latvijas Republikas II Saeimas Stenogramas. I. sesijas 9. s!de, 1925. gada 22-23. decembr", p. 225-227. 
75 Latvijas Republikas II Saeimas Stenogramas. III. sesijas 11. s!de, 1926. gada 4. maij#, p. 396. 
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 O. Nonacs (New Agrarian Union), expressing his party’s support for the 
government, observes that it will keep the same balance of power in the parliament as the 
previous government of K. Ulmanis – the centre-right coalition against the Social 
Democrats. But what about the other big part of the Saeima, the minorities, asks Nonacs. 
Admitting that the proposed government is a ‘national government, perhaps even more 
national than all the previous governments’, Nonacs nevertheless expresses his certainty 
that it will be able to pursue fair policies towards the ethnic minorities, as it is a duty of 
every national government to ensure that minorities ‘feel like at home’ in Latvia.76 
 !. Kl"ve’s (Agrarian Union) speech contains a half-hidden threat towards the 
‘treacherous’ section of the minorities who have allegedly helped to overturn the previous 
government: ‘naturally, those minorities who continued to support the previous 
government, can expect more favourable attitude from the government to come’. Having 
said this, Kl"ve nevertheless assures the audience that the Agrarian Union does not intend 
to ‘distinguish among the minorities’.77  
 P. Schiemann’s (Baltic German Party) attitude towards the proposed government is 
in sharp contrast with his positive stance on the previous one; apparently he came to regret 
lending his support to the Agrarian Union (whether this was because of some behind-the-
scenes promises that remained unfulfilled, or because of general disappointment with their 
overall policies, is not known). He expresses bitterness about not being invited to 
participate in the coalition talks, and indignation at the fact that the coalition is supported 
by the same forces who ‘destroyed the foundations of the previous government under the 
incomprehensible motto ‘Down with minorities!’’. The German faction will not vote for 
Alberings, concludes Schiemann.78 
 M. Nurock, speaking on behalf of the Jewish faction, promises that they will 
closely follow the new government’s policies, but will abstain from the vote. 
 J. Ver#bickis (Polish Union) announces that the Polish minority, which along with 
other minorities,was ignored during the coalition talks, will abstain from the vote.  
                                                
76 Latvijas Republikas II Saeimas Stenogramas. III. sesijas 11. s$de, 1926. gada 4. maij%, pp. 403-404. 
77 Latvijas Republikas II Saeimas Stenogramas. III. sesijas 11. s$de, 1926. gada 4. maij%, p. 410-411. 
78 Latvijas Republikas II Saeimas Stenogramas. III. sesijas 11. s$de, 1926. gada 4. maij%, p. 411. 
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 The government was confirmed with 51 votes for, and 36 votes against. There were 
no abstentions – apparently, those who had decided not to participate in the vote left the 
room. 
 At the end of 1926, a left-wing government led by the Social Democrat-Menshevik 
M. Skujenieks gained a vote of confidence in the Saeima – an event unprecedented in the 
eight-year history of the Latvian state. The new government’s declaration sparked fierce 
debates in the Parliament, during which surprising allegations were made, and many 
startling details revealed.  
 By this time, the minorities had no reason to expect any profound changes in their 
overall situation under Prime Minister Skujenieks – with his liberal views on the 
cohabitation of different ethnic groups within one ‘multinational’ state being long 
forgotten and replaced by a fear of immigration verging on paranoia, he had became a 
staunch opponent of any amendments that would relax the Citizenship Law. However, in a 
complex political game, where everything was shrouded in secrecy and negotiations 
mainly took place behind the scenes, which was so typical for the Latvian interwar 
parliament, it was precisely this piece of legislation that would secure Skujenieks’s 
coalition. 
 Skujenieks, presenting his rather lengthy declaration, stressed that most of the 
government’s efforts would be put into developing economic and financial policies, which 
would in turn ensure the future successful development of all other sectors.  He made only 
a passing reference to minority rights, promising ‘to treat all Latvian citizens justly and 
equally regardless of their ethnicity and faith’.79 
 !. Kl"ve, a tireless spokesman for the Agrarian Union, also known for his 
unsavoury business affairs80, immediately launches an attack on the government’s 
programme, taking apart one section of the declaration after another, and labelling them as 
‘contradictory’, ‘incomplete’, and ‘unrealistic’. Overall, Kl"ve casts doubt on the Social 
                                                
79 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. Sesijas 21. s#de 1926. gada 17. decembr", p. 993 
80 Kl"ve, Chairman of the Board of the Latvian Bank, was a constant target of scathing remarks (mainly from 
the left wing) referring to him abusing his powers for the benefit of the Agrarian Union and his own business 
interests. According to Ciel#ns (1963:300), one of the main reasons for the Agrarian Union’s fierce 
opposition to the Skujenieks government were Kl"ve and Ulmanis’s fears that V. Bastj$nis, the newly 
appointed finance minister who had a reputation for personal honesty and absolute intolerance towards 
corruption, would not be as convenient for them as the previous Finance Minister A. Bu%evics.  
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Democrats’ ability to deal successfully with economic and financial challenges, on the 
grounds that unlike the Agrarian Union, which he claims represents the ‘interests of 
producers’, the left-wing government will only represent the ‘interests of consumers’. 
 It is noteworthy that out of all the ministerial candidates, Kl!ve singles out J. 
Rainis-Pliek"ans, the future Education Minister, for criticism. Addressing those of the 
right-wing camp who entered into coalition discussions and supported the closed voting 
process, he promises that when Rainis takes his place at the Education Ministry, those 
education workers who support the national cause will find themselves not so happy about 
the changes. [He could have been referring to Rainis’s commitment to minority 
educational rights, to his previously demonstrated stance against casual anti-Semitism, and 
especially to his dedication to the Belarussian cause, which had already put him at odds 
with many of his ethnic compatriots in 1924.81 It is symptomatic of the profound hidden 
changes in Latvian politics over the eight years of independence that the man who had 
been previously considered the spiritual leader of the Latvian nation, and a source of 
inspiration to many national ideologists, M. Valters included (Valters’s book ‘The 
Question of Our nationality’ is dedicated to Rainis), could in 1926 be casually referred to 
as a potential threat to the nationalist cause.] 
 Kl!ve draws MPs’ attention to the minorities’ participation in the coalition: ‘Not for 
nothing has this government become known to everyone as the Nurock Cabinet!’ [Remark 
from the audience: ‘And yours – as the Dubins Cabinet!’]. Kl!ve sarcastically urges 
Skujenieks to read to the Saeima the ‘second’, ‘secret’ part of the declaration, which he 
alleges contains the coalition’s promises to Nurock in return for his ‘services in organising 
this Cabinet’. 
 However, continues the experienced demagogue Kl!ve, the most piquant and 
interesting fact is the existing relationship between the coalition and the German faction. 
Reminding the Social Democrats of their previous consistent opposition to ‘barons’ and 
‘Bermondtians’, he ‘marvels’ at the fact that ‘now the whole cabinet is based upon the 
German faction’ and speculates that the Germans’ votes have been secured in the lobby. 82 
                                                
81 See, for example, Rainis’s speech in the Saeima, Latvijas Republikas Saeimas V. sesijas 11. s#de 1924. 
gada 16. maij$, p. 347-354. 
82 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. Sesijas 21. s#de 1926. gada 17. decembr!, p. 999 
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 Responding to Kl!ve, the Social Democrat A. Petrevics retorts that if the minorities 
have given their support to the Social Democrats, then it is because they have realised that 
they will never get sufficient support from the right.  
 G. Reinhards (Christian National Union) mainly concentrates on the alleged 
connection between the new coalition and deputy Nurock in a speech full of elaborate 
metaphors. He starts by telling the Saeima that the future Prime Minister Skujenieks is ‘a 
genuine Kurzemnieks’ (inhabitant of Kurzeme, the western part of Latvia). Because, he 
continues, it is well known to everybody present that every affluent Kurzemnieks always 
has his own middleman, his own broker, his own fixer [faktermanis]. [A cry from the 
floor: ‘A Jew’!] Yes, continues Reinhards, Skujenieks also has his own middleman and 
broker, and this is our very much-respected rabbi, Mr. Nurock [cheers and laughter in the 
audience]. But what is the price of Nurock’s services, Reinhards asks dramatically. The 
price will be very high, he answers, so high, that it could not have been mentioned in the 
coalition’s programme, but ‘had to be written on a separate sheet, signed and stamped; and 
is now hidden in Nurock’s pocket’. We know what the price was – it was the Citizenship 
Law, he triumphantly announces. Before concluding his speech, he addresses Nurock, 
warning him that he should not trust the new government’s assurances [A retort from 
Laserson: ‘As if only you could be trusted!’].83 
 The next attack on Skujenieks is launched by ". B#odnieks (New Farmers and 
Smallholders), who expresses disbelief that this ‘socialist-Jewish government’ will provide 
any support for farmers. As for the ministerial candidates, B#odnieks’s main objection is to 
the future prime minister. Mentioning the notorious ‘paper in Nurock’s pocket’, he draws 
the Saeima’s attention to Skujenieks’s inconsistent stand on the Citizenship Law question, 
and reminds his audience how with ‘righteous anger’ Skujenieks has always protested 
against attempts to amend the Citizenship Law in the past. B#odnieks adds:  ‘Although I 
should acknowledge that Mr. Skujenieks is very tolerant, and is one of the most broad-
minded deputies here, it is very hard to trust somebody who changes his political beliefs so 
quickly’.84 
 The Latgalian MP J. Trasuns (Progressive Peoples’ Union) reveals further details 
on the background of the ‘Nurock government’. Claiming that it is ‘comical’ to say that the 
                                                
83 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. Sesijas 21. s$de 1926. gada 17. decembr!, p. 1005-1006. 
84 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. Sesijas 21. s$de 1926. gada 17. decembr!, p. 1011. 
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‘Latvian cause’ has been damaged due to the alleged fact that Rabbi Nurock has put 
together a government, he reminds the audience how the Zamuels government was 
overthrown by the Agrarian Union with a one-vote majority - that one vote being 
Nurock’s. According to Trasuns, at that time both Nurock and Dubin obtained certain 
guarantees in writing [from the Agrarian Union]. Those promises, however, have never 
been fulfilled. Hence it is not fair to throw accusations at the new government, stresses 
Trasuns, and Skujenieks is the last person to deserve it, as in the past he really tried a 
‘different politics’ than the majority of the Saeima, but had, in the long run, to yield to the 
common practices.85 
 The Social Democrat-Menshevik V. Holcmanis defends the new government’s 
position on cooperation with the minorities against Kl!ve’s attacks. His line of defence, 
however, reveals the rather cynical approach of the Mensheviks towards such cooperation 
as a purely tactical device. Holcmanis asks rhetorically whether there has ever been a 
single government that did not cooperate with minorities, and whether it is possible at all 
to form a coalition in the Saeima without the minorities’ participation. Until a coalition is 
possible between the Agrarian Union and the Social Democrats, he points out - a coalition 
that the Agrarian Union does not want - minorities will be a part of every coalition. And if 
the present government is called the ‘Nurock government’, then the previous government 
under Alberings should have been called the ‘Dubin government’. ‘And if we have to 
choose between Nurock and Dubin, then, it seems to me, our sympathies are with the 
democratically inclined Nurock rather than with Dubin, who is Mr. Ulmanis’s right hand-
man,’ – concludes Holcmanis.86 
 V. Fircks (Baltic Germans) attests that the German faction did not participate in 
coalition talks, did not give any promises to anybody, and did not receive any promises in 
return. Therefore, the German faction reserves the right to act of its own free will, which 
will be used in accordance with the faction’s principles and economic platform. 
 M. Dubins (Agudat Israel) speaks in the name of the Jewish faction, except for the 
deputy Nurock. Drawing attention to the two parties comprising the new coalition, the 
Social Democrats and the Social Democrats-Mensheviks, Dubins claims that neither of 
them can be considered a friend of minorities. According to Dubins, on previous 
                                                
85 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. Sesijas 21. s"de 1926. gada 17. decembr!, p. 1024. 
86 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. Sesijas 21. s"de 1926. gada 17. decembr!, p. 1029. 
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occasions, including the voting during the attempted amendments to the Citizenship Law, 
the Social Democrats were often absent, negatively affecting the outcome of the vote. As 
for the Mensheviks, continues Dubins, the newly self-appointed minority rights’ defender 
Holcmanis was not so friendly to minorities when he was the minister of justice.87 But, 
exclaims Dubins, who has done more against the Jews and other minorities than the future 
prime minister? Dubins alleges that during the discussions on the amendments to the 
Citizenship Law, Skujenieks ‘was consciously not telling the truth’ when claiming that the 
amendments would result in 250,000 new citizens. Or, continues Dubins, if Skujenieks 
really believed it himself, then all that money spent on state statistics is wasted money. 
Dubins also expresses doubts that ‘the Jewish people’ will be grateful to Nurock for his 
role in Skujenieks’s coalition. 
 From Holcmanis and Skujenieks, Dubins moves to attacking other MPs who are 
supposedly pro-coalition. Mentioning that K. Di!lers has published many articles on 
minorities’ legal status, he enquires why the views that Di!lers expresses in his articles are 
always so different from the ones he reveals in his private conversations with M. Laserson 
[also a lawyer]. This causes jovial exclamations in the audience.  
 Dubins criticises Trasuns for his lack of principles, asserting that he voted for the 
Ulmanis government in the past in exchange for a place on board of the Latvian Bank. His 
next comment, ‘It was stupid on the part of Mr. Ulmanis to give you that place. It should 
not have been done’, somewhat gives away Dubins’s own proximity to Ulmanis.  
 It is very regrettable, continues Dubins, that the Citizenship Law has become a 
constantly used bargaining tool. Now it is the Social Democrats who are trying to earn 
capital from it, he claims. ‘You only got Nurock’s support because of the Citizenship Law. 
This is very bad. If Nurock came to you because of his political ideas, because he agreed 
with your programme, it would be a different matter. But he only came because you had 
showed him a ‘corner of the page’ of the Citizenship Law.’ He concludes: ‘When you, the 
left wing, start to haggle with our rights, then this socialism is very weak.’88 
 Dubins also claims to possess credible information, reportedly supplied by P. 
Jura!evskis (Agrarian Union) that the promise of amendments will never be carried out, 
                                                
87 Holcmanis held the post of Minister of justice in the Pau"uks cabinet, 27.01.1923. – 27.06.1923. 
88 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. Sesijas 21. s#de 1926. gada 17. decembr$, p. 1036-1038. 
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because the moment the Citizenship Law is re-opened, the government will be toppled. 
According to Dubins, the previous promise, given by the Zamuels government, was not 
carried out because it proved impossible to ensure a majority in practice – members of the 
Parliament simply disappeared into the lobby, called in sick, etc. 
 The results of the vote of confidence were 52 votes for, 35 against, 2 abstentions, 
and another 10 MPs, including the whole of the German faction, simply leaving the room. 
The government was supported by the democratic centre. The Jewish faction became 
divided over the Skujenieks government: whereas the Zeire Zion (Laserson) and the Bund 
(Maizels) voted for, the Agudat Israel (Dubins) left the room; two of the Russian deputies 
voted for, and two were not present.  
  The Social Democrats had indeed been actively lobbying for what they correctly 
saw as a rare opportunity to finally form a government. Recalling the days preceding this 
historic vote in the Saeima, Ciel!ns (1963) claims that the day before the vote of 
confidence, it came to his and Skujenieks’s knowledge that at the Agrarian Union 
headquarters, Ulmanis and Kl"ve were offering political favours and money in return for 
votes against the left-wing government. Feeling that the vote was in the balance, Ciel!ns 
immediately approached the Russian deputies #po$anskis (Russian Parishes) and 
Ka$istratovs (Old Believers), as well as the Jewish MP Nurock (Mizrahi), who were all 
considered to be democrats. According to Ciel!ns, he addressed each one of them in turn, 
describing ‘the existing threat of fascism to the democratic order’, and hence also a threat 
to the cultural rights of minorities. He stressed that if a new government were not 
appointed promptly, the Parliament’s reputation, already tarnished by haggling and 
corruption, would be further damaged. Promising that the left-wing government would 
‘within the limits of the possible satisfy your demands in schooling, theatre and other 
cultural matters’, Ciel!ns urged them to contact Skujenieks immediately and lend him their 
support (Ciel!ns 1963: 302-303). It needs to be said here that when one considers the 
numerous references in the newspapers, and all the comments during the Parliamentary 
session the next day, Ciel!ns’s account of Nurock’s degree of involvement in the coalition 
talks seems very understated.  
 Ciel!ns (1963:303) also attests that Skujenieks had a conversation with P. 
Schiemann, during which the German MP let him know that it was quite possible that the 
German faction would not follow the right wing during the vote of confidence, saying that 
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‘the German faction does not want to appear as a blind appendage of the right wing 
majority in all instances and always.’ Hiden (2004:158) also writes that Schiemann 
‘strongly rejected Fircks’s call for a permanent alliance with the bourgeois parties in the 
Saeima, as well as his argument that social democracy would undermine the German 
Balts’ existence by taking Latvia eastwards’; polemics among the two of them on the 
question were especially dynamic during the course of 1927. However, contrary to 
Schiemann’s hints about the Germans’ possible support during the vote, the Saeima’s 
transcripts show that during the voting process all members of the German faction, 
Schiemann included, appeared as ‘not present’.  Apparently, Fircks was not persuaded, and 
Schiemann complied with the faction’s discipline. Over the next year, however, in Hiden’s 
(2004: 150) words, ‘the German fraction became of crucial importance to the electoral 
arithmetic behind the social democrat M!r"eris Skujenieks’ cabinet’ by adopting 
‘benevolent neutrality’ towards its policies’. Schiemann in particular provided crucial 
support to the Foreign Minister F. Ciel#ns during the ratification of both the Latvian-Soviet 
non-aggression pact, and the bilateral trading agreement with the Soviet Union of 1927.  
 Skujenieks, whose first government lasted for 13 months, kept his promises. 
Contrary to Dubins’s predictions, amendments to the Citizenship Law were finally passed 
on 20th May 1927. As a result of the amendments, about 4,000 Jews acquired Latvian 
citizenship (Dribins 2002: 70), a far cry from Skujenieks’s predicted 250,000.  
In May 1927, the Saeima passed a law stipulating the independent status of the 
Herder Institut (in existence since 1921) as a private Baltic German higher education 
establishment, which was an important achievement for the German minority in their quest 
for cultural autonomy. 
    *** 
18th November 1928 marked the 10th anniversary of the Latvian state. Mass 
celebrations took place all around the country, culminating in a rally and a military parade 
on the Esplanade, the central boulevard of Riga. Prominent politicians and national leaders 
addressed the public on the pages of newspapers, reminiscing about the Independence 
Wars and the deprivations of the first years of the new state, as well as praising the later 
significant political and economic achievements. It is however hard not to notice, despite 
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the overall celebratory tone, how many of the authors express growing concerns about 
political instability and widespread corruption.89  
 M. Skujenieks, in the jubilee issue of the newspaper Jaun!k!s Zi"as, reminds his 
readers about the horrors of Russification experienced in the past, summarises the state’s 
achievements in overcoming it in all spheres of public life, and concludes that without any 
doubt, ‘had Latvia not belonged to the Russian Empire, then social and political 
transformations would have happened much sooner.’90 
 To commemorate the tenth anniversary of the founding of the state, a monumental 
volume (over 800 pages) entitled ‘The Latvian Republic during the Ten Years of Its 
Existence’, with numerous plates and illustrations, was produced under the editorship of 
Dr. A. B!lmanis.91 Apart from the articles on Latvian history, geography, agriculture and 
industry, arts and education, the publication notably contained a section on ethnic 
minorities, where the chapter on Baltic Germans was authored by P. Schiemann, the 
chapter on Jews by M. Laserson, on Russians by E. Tichonickis, on Poles by J. 
Ver"bickis92, and on Belarussians by K. Jezovitovs (in the order they are presented in the 
book). This section on minorities provides a snapshot of both minority-majority relations, 
and of the particular situation of each respective Latvian ethnic minority after ten years of 
independence. 
 E. Tichonickis on the whole describes the situation of Russians in independent 
Latvia as continually improving (although he is critical of the Agrarian Reform, which 
reportedly has not had an impact on the difficult economic situation of Russian peasants-
smallholders). But it is hard to avoid the impression from his writing that this apparent 
improvement is both badly needed and long overdue, not least because the author 
constantly compares the Russians’ situation with that of the other minorities, and these 
comparisons are almost always not in the Russians’ favour. For example, the author 
expresses regret that Russian residents play a less significant part in the country’s 
economic and industrial life than prior to the World War, explaining this by the fact that 
many big Russian-owned enterprises were destroyed during the conflict. Tichonickis 
                                                
89 See, for example, Di"lers, K. ‘Valsts desmit gadi’, Jaun#k#s Zi$as, 17.11.1928; B%odnieks, A. ‘Zemneeciba 
valsts neatkaribas swehtkos’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 17.11.1928; Bachmanis, K. ‘No idealisma l!dz 
materialismam’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 17.11.1928. 
90Skujeneeks, M. ‘Ko nedrihkstam aismirst’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 17.11.1928. 
91Bihlmans, A. (red.) Latvijas Republika desmit pats!v#$anas gados. Golts un Jurjans, (1928). 
92 Tichonickis and Ver"bickis also appear in the Saeima’s transcripts as ‘Tihonickis’ and ‘Ver&bickis’. 
Chapter 3: An Equal Among Nations, 1918-1934 
 
 174 
recognises that ‘in the cultural sense, Latvian Russians are behind Latvians and Germans’, 
drawing attention to the still high level of illiteracy among the Latvian Russians. The 
author cites statistics (which are somewhat shocking, especially in comparison with the 
titular nation) that in 1925 only 60 per cent of Russian men, and 45 per cent of Russian 
women were literate. Still, insists Tichonickis, it is a great improvement on the average of 
35 per cent in 1920. Lamenting the fact that there are not many scientists and writers 
among Latvian Russians (he counts about ten Russian professors in Latvian universities, 
and five or six locally published writers), he takes pride in the fact that the Russian-
language newspaper Segodnya is one of the biggest published outside Russia; he also 
praises the significant achievements of the Russian Drama Theatre in Riga. 
 Whatever Tichonickis’s grievances about his ethnic compatriots’ precarious 
situation, he does not attempt to put the blame on others. ‘For the sake of fairness, it should 
be recognised that there are favourable conditions for the cultural development of the 
Russians in democratic Latvia,’ asserts Tichonickis. More importantly, he admits that ‘if 
the number of Russian representatives in the Saeima and in municipalities is two times 
smaller than their respective proportion among the population, it is Russian electors’ 
passivity that is the main reason behind this’.93  
 Overall, concludes Tichonickis, ‘looking back at the first ten years of the new 
Latvian State, the Russian minority can with great satisfaction testify that democratic 
principles in Latvia have a solid unshakeable base.’94   
J. Ver!bickis, writing about the Latvian Poles, asserts that they ‘have been living 
alongside Latvians for centuries, establishing the very best relations and friendship, while 
preserving their own faith and cultural and linguistic peculiarities’95. According to 
Ver!bickis, these friendly relations have been further enhanced since Latvia gained 
independence. The author observes that the Agrarian Reform, however, has not improved 
economic conditions for Latvian Poles [as would be expected, since Poles were among the 
biggest landowners in Eastern Latvia prior to the reform].  Polish political representation in 
Latvia is more or less proportional, concludes Ver!bickis.  
                                                
93Tichonickis, E. 1928 ‘Krievi Latvij"’, in: B#lmanis, A. (red.) Latvijas Republika desmit past!v"#anas 
gados. R#ga: Golts un Jurj"ns. pp. 51-52. 
94 Ibid. p. 52  
95 Ver!bickis, J. ‘Po$i Latvij"’, in: B#lmanis, A. (red.) Latvijas Republika desmit past!v"#anas gados. R#ga: 
Golts un Jurj"ns, p. 52. 
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  K. Jezovitovs, on behalf of the Latvian Belarussians, stakes an interesting claim 
saying that ‘…among other ethnic minorities, Belarussians take a special position as they 
are not oriented towards the ‘united minority front’, but rather seek closer ties and a better 
mutual understanding with Latvian democracy’96. There are two reasons behind 
Belarussians’ separation from the other Latvian minorities, according to Jezovitovs. First, 
that Belarussians are constantly forced to fight off assimilationist attempts on the part of 
the other two Slavic nations, Russians and Poles, who do not recognise Belarussians as a 
nation in their own right. Second, that Belarussians have strong disagreements with the 
Baltic Germans on the question of land distribution. Jezovitovs attests that Belarussians 
have no political parties of their own, but many of them are members of the Latvian 
political parties.  
But it is the articles written by Schiemann and Laserson that stand out in this 
jubilee edition by their critical content and somewhat bitter tone, allowing an closer insight 
into the state of minority-majority relations in Latvia by 1928. 
 Schiemann opens his article with the statement that the founding of the Latvian 
state ten years ago caught Baltic Germans absolutely unprepared. ‘This idea was totally 
alien to them,’97 claims Schiemann. He continues that although certain efforts aimed at 
independence could be observed during the First Russian revolution, it seemed that these 
were not taken seriously even by the Latvian people themselves. The main demands, it 
seemed to the Baltic Germans, consisted of the need for democratisation of the local 
administrative system, and for an agrarian reform. Schiemann posits that this initial 
disagreement on the country’s political ideology has been the cause of all the difficulties 
that were in the way of ‘state thinking’ and of good relations between the two mutually 
dependent nations [Balts and Letts] during the first years of independence. Latvians and 
Germans, he writes, have been living side by side without actually knowing each other, 
largely because their intelligentsias were strangers to each other. Schiemann posits that 
although the topic is impossible to avoid, it would now be futile to pose the question of 
who exactly is to blame for the existing state of affairs. He does try, however, to provide if 
not some answers, then at least some explanations for the status quo.  
                                                
96 Jezovitovs, K. ‘Baltkrievi Latvij!’, in: B"lmanis, A. (red.) Latvijas Republika desmit past!v"#anas gados. 
R"ga: Golts un Jurj!ns, p. 53. 
97 Schiemanis, P. 1928 ‘Baltijas v!ci un Latvijas valsts’, in: B"lmanis, A. (red.) Latvijas Republika desmit 
past!v"#anas gados. R"ga: Golts un Jurj!ns. p. 47. 
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 Schiemann lauds the Latvian intelligentsia for its cultural work among its own 
people, which has proved to be an enormous force, but ‘has not been immediately apparent 
to outsiders’98. He draws attention to the inherent political differences between the 
traditionally conservative Balts and the Latvian intelligentsia, who he claims were attuned 
to the various Russian leftist parties, from whom they often borrowed their way of 
thinking. 
 Schiemann describes how until the Great War, the Balts considered the Baltic 
States’ belonging to Russia as an irrefutable fact, where to try to change something would 
be total madness. The World War, with its persecution of Germans, he continues, caused 
the Baltic Germans to distance themselves from the Russian regime. Schiemann admits 
that the subsequent German occupation brought with it an illusion of the establishment of 
German dominance on the Baltic Sea coast. But according to Schiemann’s interpretation, 
this – illusory - dominance meant good news for Latvians too, as it introduced, ‘contrary to 
all hopes and expectations, a sudden opportunity for both nations, Germans and Latvians, 
to leave the Eastern cultural space and enter the more appropriate Western European 
cultural space’99. He concludes that the illusion was too short-lived for the Baltic Germans 
to grasp all the potential internal and external political problems that it had created. Once it 
was shattered, ‘the Baltic Germans’ political ideology lost all its foundations’100.  
 Schiemann admits that the Agrarian Reform has been a direct cause of conflict 
between the Balts and the Letts; whereas the Baltic Germans view the reform as an attempt 
to infringe on minority rights, the majority of Latvians do not agree with this. 
 However, continues Schiemann, ‘the fact that Latvia, unlike the majority of the 
newly founded national states, was forthcoming towards the specific cultural needs of its 
ethnic minorities, has greatly facilitated the Germans’ getting used to the ‘state mode of 
thinking’ [valsts dom!"ana]101.  
 The conclusion of Schiemann’s article is carefully worded; he hints that some of 
the past conflicts have been, at least to some extent, resolved, and that there is indeed hope 
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for a better future in German-Latvian relations. Speaking about the implementation of 
school autonomy, Schiemann refers to ‘various disagreements’ in earlier years, but attests 
that at present minorities’ school autonomy can be considered accomplished. This way, he 
claims, the German faction’s hands are being ‘untied’, and ‘it is increasingly being given 
an opportunity to rise above its own narrow ethnic interests, and to give its undivided 
attention to bigger, overarching national tasks’. And this opportunity for the Balts and 
Letts to start working together, according to Schiemann, is no small achievement of the 
past ten years. It is quite difficult to gauge whether he speaks in earnest, or with a hint of 
irony.102 
M. Laserson starts his article with an excursion into the recent past of Russian 
dominance in Latvia, when the Pale of Settlement effectively separated the Latvian and 
Latgalian Jewish communities from each other.  By erasing this dividing line, claims 
Laserson, the Latvian State has created new favourable conditions for Jewish cultural 
development. This cultural development has been particularly facilitated by the 
introduction of school autonomy. But if there are evident accomplishments in the Jewish 
educational and cultural life, the situation is different in the economic sphere, continues 
Laserson. After independent Latvia had lost a big part of its cargo transit through seaports 
and railways, the economic situation of Latvian Jews, who were mostly involved in trade 
and commerce, has sharply deteriorated. The implementation of the Agrarian Reform, 
claims Laserson, has not been as benevolent towards the Jews as it has been towards the 
Latvians when it comes to land distribution, especially in Latgale. As a result, a large 
percentage of the Jewish rural population has been impoverished, and has started migrating 
into bigger cities. Laserson accuses Latvians of ‘economic anti-Semitism’: ‘The 
numerically dominant nation has not solved its own economic problems yet, and is thus 
inclined to see competition everywhere, even where it cannot exist.’ 103  
Laserson finishes on an optimistic note: ‘There are new tendencies and trends in 
minorities’ relations with the dominant Latvian nation. They should transcend the cultural 
domain and expand into the economy…It seems that after ten years of independence this is 
starting to be acknowledged in Latvian circles as well… At this moment an understanding 
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is developing that Latvia’s prospects are wider and more important than the narrowly 
interpreted [ethnic] Latvian interests.’104 
Compared with the other fulsome contributions to this book, it is notable that the 
furthest that either Schiemann or Laserson were willing to go in striking a celebratory note 
was to reservedly acknowledge the recent positive ‘trends’ in majority-minority relations, 
and to express cautious hope about the future. As elaborate as the celebrations of the 10th 
anniversary of national independence were, it seems that not all the country’s residents 
fully shared in the excitement. 
After the fall of Skujenieks’s government in January 1928, mainly due to the 
discontinued support from the Democratic Centre party, which started leaning more 
towards the right (!ilde 1976: 408), the next government was formed by the leader of the 
Democratic Centre P. Jura"evskis. According to Hiden (2004: 154), Schiemann was 
reluctant to let the Skujenieks government fall without a specific cause, but he was forced 
to yield to the combined pressure from Fircks and another member of the Baltic German 
Party, K. Keller. The Baltic German E. Magnuss made a spectacular comeback as the 
cabinet’s justice minister after ten years in the political wilderness. 
The Jura"evskis government would only be in office for ten months; after the Third 
Saeima was elected, it would be replaced by the government of H. Celmi#" (01.12.1928. – 
26.03.1931), another representative of the Agrarian Union, with the support of the New 
Farmers and Smallholders, the Latgalian faction, and of a part of the ethnic minorities.  
 
 Celmi#" presented his second government’s declaration to the Third Saeima on 
30th November 1928; the section pertaining to minorities’ affairs read: ‘The government 
will expedite adoption of the School Law while observing and not restricting existing 
norms applying to minority schools.’105  
 
M. Nurock, commenting on the government’s declaration, mentions that the 
amended Citizenship Law is in reality being implemented at a very slow pace; he also 
provides numerous example of discrimination against Jews claiming that Jewish merchants 
are treated like ‘stepchildren’ by the Latvian Central Bank, and that the path to the civil 
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service for the Jewish intelligentsia and Jewish workers is closed. Nurock argues that the 
government declaration contains standard phrases on the status quo in the school area, and 
also speaks of some national-cultural autonomy for minorities. We, the minorities, insists 
Nurock, think, however, that the final goal is nothing short of the true national autonomy, 
as a legal institution with rights to self-taxation, as proclaimed at the national congresses in 
Geneva.  
 
This government would last almost throughout the Third Saeima – !ilde (1976: 
409) attributes its longevity to Celmin"’s own political prowess, and the high level of 
professionalism among his cabinet’s ministers. 
3.3.3. The Third Saeima, 1928-1931 
The year 1928 brought significant changes in Latvian political life; these changes 
would have a long-lasting effect and would arguably contribute to the future parliamentary 
crisis. The balance of power in the newly elected Third Saeima was quite different from 
the previous one. For the first time in independent Latvia’s history, the communists 
abandoned their strategy of boycotting the parliament, and stood for elections under the 
name of the Party of Workers and Peasants, gaining a total of six mandates. The 
communist faction in the Saeima was headed by Linards Laic#ns, a romantic poet who 
prior to 1918 was a member of the National Democratic Party, widely credited for its 
unwavering support for the widest possible autonomy for Latvia from the early days of 
national struggle onwards (both the liberally-minded A. Fr$denbergs and the staunch 
nationalist E. Blanks had been members of this party in the past). Ciel#ns (1963: 405) 
posits that previously, the communist-leaning electorate traditionally gave their ballots to 
the Social Democrats – the fact that the six seats that the communists had gained were 
exactly what the Social Democrats had lost, now holding only 25 mandates, seems to 
support his theory. The Social Democrats’ position in the Saeima was irrevocably 
weakened, making it impossible to form a left-wing government in the future. Ciel#ns also 
alleges that allowing the illegal Communist party to stand for elections under an assumed 
name was a clever ruse by the bourgeois parties, who hoped to undermine the Social 
Democrats’ faction. Ciel#ns names A. Bergs and K. Ulmanis as the main driving forces 
behind the decision by the Political Police not to start an investigation into the origins of 
the Party of Workers and Peasants. Dunsdorfs (1978: 253), commenting on Ciel#ns’s 
version of events, observes that he failed, either on purpose or because of his true 
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ignorance of the fact, to mention that the Communist election campaign was financed by 
Soviet Russia through the Transit Bank.  
Ciel!ns concludes that by allowing the communists to enter the Saeima, Ulmanis 
achieved a double goal – not only did he successfully diminish the Social Democrats’ 
influence in the Parliament, but he also, at the same time, significantly strengthened the 
Agrarian Union’s position. The fact that during the Third Saeima, both of the appointed 
prime ministers and the elected state president were members of the Agrarian Union, 
seems to support this notion. 
 ". Kl#ve recalls that during the election campaign meetings in the countryside in 
1928, one could observe a ‘new phenomenon’: much stronger criticisms of the Social 
Democrats voiced by the working classes. Contradicting Ciel!ns’s conviction that the 
admission of communists to the parliament was a conscious political move on the part of 
the Agrarian Union, Kl#ve claims that ‘Ulmanis was surprised by the communists’ 
significant achievements… he believed that there would be no communist followers in the 
countryside…’ Kl#ve, dismissing other possible contributory factors, such as rising 
unemployment, the first signs of economic depression and the poor harvest of 1928 (all of 
which affected the countryside most), is quick to blame his political rivals for the 
communists’ success: ‘However, it turned out that the Social Democrats, with their social 
policies oriented towards urban workers, have not managed to attract rural residents, and 
have ended up alienating them. In voting for the communists, it seems, landless peasants 
were guided by a feeling of hatred towards the affluent lifestyles of the Social Democrats’ 
leaders, which made them indistinguishable from the bourgeoisie.’106 But their shared 
dismay over the communists’ success did not apparently narrow the rift between the 
Agrarian Union and the Social Democrats, as Kl#ve continues:  
‘From the standpoint of our Social Democrats, Latvia was doomed to remain an 
agrarian country, without significant industry and therefore without the vast urban working 
masses, a source of strength for the Social Democrats, for a long time. Hence there was no 
sufficient base in Latvia that would allow the Social Democrats and their ideas to hope to 
win a ruling position. It would be quite different if Latvia had been an autonomous part of 
Russia. Then, so the Social Democrats think, industries would have been widely developed 
in Latvia, and factory workers would have overpowered the bourgeoisie and the farmers.’ 
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Kl!ve stresses repeatedly that the Agrarian Union had every reason to believe that the 
Social Democrats were secretly against the independent and democratic Latvian 
republic.107 
Another blow dealt to the leftist bloc in the Parliament, according to Ciel"ns (1963: 
407-408), was the fact that Skujenieks’s small group could not be considered socialist 
anymore, but rather radical-centre; this ideological shift would soon be acknowledged by 
the group members’ abandoning the name of Social Democrats-Mensheviks, and starting 
to call themselves the Progressive Union instead. The Mensheviks’ congress on 14th 
December 1929 passed a resolution to cease the activities of the Social Democratic 
Menshevik Party on the grounds that there was no longer a need for the two Social 
Democratic parties in Latvia. Former Mensheviks also stated that all their past political 
decisions, as well as their future aspirations, were in fact based upon the democratic 
bourgeois national standpoint, and therefore it was not feasible to keep the Social 
Democratic name of the party. From then on, it was asserted, the Progressive Union would 
represent only the interests of the new farmers and smallholders, who had always been part 
of their electorate. The newly created Progressive Union appealed to Social Democrat-
Menshevik electors to vote for the new party.  
It is arguable precisely which year - 1928, 1929 or 1931 - can be said to have 
marked the beginning of the rapid deterioration of Latvian democracy. It seems beyond 
doubt that the elections of 1928 exacerbated the pre-existing ideological tensions in the 
Saeima and pushed the parties on both sides of the political spectrum towards further 
radicalisation (the Democratic Centre, which had initially supported the left-wing 
government, soon afterwards withdrew their support and sided with the right wing, which 
was one of the main reasons behind the demise of the Skujenieks government just 13 
months after its appointment). The Social Democrats, after the left-wing government’s 
resignation in January 1928, remained in opposition until the end of the Third Saeima. 
According to Ciel"ns (1963:434), being in permanent opposition to the government 
eventually pushed the Social Democrats, especially their younger generation, further to the 
left. #. Kl!ve, who lost his Saeima mandate in the 1928 elections, joined the circle of the 
Satversme’s critics and protested loudly against the minorities’ dominance in the economic 
sector. Besides, it was in 1928, at least according to Ciel"ns (1963: 407-408), that one of 
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the previously staunchest supporters of liberal democracy, M. Skujenieks, had turned coat 
and joined the centre-right.  
Contrary to this, the evaluation of the Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs (1938: 34) 
states that the previously ‘very favourable’ situation of minorities in Latvia ‘on the whole 
deteriorated gradually from 1929 onwards’.  
In 1930, the worldwide economic crisis reached Latvia. Latvian exports, which had 
been hitherto steadily growing, fell from 273 million Ls in 1929 to 247 million in 1930, 
taking a further plunge to 163 million in 1931. The value of all industrial production, 
which had peaked at 450 million Ls in 1929, started to decline in 1930 and had reached its 
lowest point of 290 million by 1932.108 Arguably, ethnic Latvians were hit harder by the 
crisis than the Latvian Germans, Jews and Russians as they were mainly employed in the 
state sector, whereas ethnic minorities were significantly more active as private 
entrepreneurs; hence they had larger savings and could still benefit from the foreign credit 
lines and loans. As Dribins (2002: 70) astutely observes, the minorities-dominated private 
sector’s resilience actually cushioned the depression’s effect on the Latvian economy 
overall, but this fact was completely overlooked by the right-wing parties who instead 
tended to blame the crisis on the minorities’ economic and financial success.   
!ilde (1976: 563) writes that a new outbreak of extreme nationalism came along in 
1931, when the Perkonkrusts (Thundercross) union, or, as it was originally called, 
Ugunskrusts (Firecross) was founded. !ilde regards it as a continuation of the National 
Club, as in a similar fashion, Perkonkrusts turned against ethnic minorities’ economic 
power, and against Marxism and internationalism. The union adopted the slogan ‘Latvia 
for Latvians, work and bread for Latvians’, and its programme foresaw granting political 
rights to ethnic Latvians only. According to !ilde, it attracted part of the ‘nationalistically 
inclined youth’, and the circulation of its newspaper, which bore the same name as the 
organisation itself, reached 15,000 copies.  
Notably, Perkonkrusts also took a strong stance against corruption in state 
institutions and among Parliamentarians, paying particular attention to the Agrarian Union 
and its leaders. Allegations were often made against K. Ulmanis and ". Kl#ve in the 
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newspaper Perkonkrusts in connection with the Union Bank, the Agrarian Bank, and the 
‘Lats’ company, which were all frequent recipients of extensive credits and loans from the 
Central Bank. (!ilde 1988: 83) 
K. Ulmanis became prime minister for the sixth time in March 1931, with the 
support of the Latgalian faction. This government lasted for eight months. 
 
3.3.4. The Fourth Saeima, 1931-1934 
 
Elections to the Fourth Saeima in October 1931 delivered a majority to the 
bourgeois parties for the first time in independent Latvia’s history, eliminating the need for 
the support of ethnic minorities, which hitherto had been a constant factor in Latvian 
politics. M. Skujenieks, analysing the results of the elections, observed that contrary to the 
general tendency in the rest of Europe at the time, Latvian extremists on both sides of the 
political spectrum had sustained significant losses, whereas the centre had gained in 
strength. Both Communists and Social Democrats lost votes; if in 1928 the socialist camp 
had gained 34.9 per cent of the total votes, in 1931 this decreased to 27.1 per cent. Right-
wing parties lost one third of their electorate, or 26,000 votes (the National Union was hit 
the hardest, losing almost a half of its voters). The Agrarian Union gained just 12.2 per 
cent of the total votes, a 2.8 per cent decrease on the 15 per cent secured in the 1928 
elections. The electoral support base for the centre parties, on the other hand, doubled in 
size – in 1928, 9.8 per cent of electors voted for them, and in 1931, 18 per cent. Skujenieks 
explained the success of all the three centre parties (Democratic Centre, Progressive 
Union, and New Farmers) by their consistent nationalist policies, which he believed had 
chimed with the general mood of the public. Skujenieks was quick to explain away the fact 
that all ethnic minorities without exception had gained votes in the 1931 election (their 
joint gain being 20,578 extra votes, or a 1.48 per cent increase) by mistakes in the Social 
Democrats’ policies towards them. Skujenieks claimed that by being too accommodating 
to minorities’ demands, the Social Democrats had achieved the opposite goal of 
stimulating ‘minorities’ chauvinism’.109  
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 Latvian political life during 1931 was largely dominated by the so-called Dom 
Affair, which brought the already strained relations between Latvians and the Baltic 
Germans under new duress. Built in the beginning of the 13th century, the cathedral (also 
known as St. Mara’s), situated on the main square of the Old City, had been in the 
possession of the German Lutheran Congregation Union since 1888. M. Skujenieks was 
apparently the main promulgator of the draft law, which was submitted to the Saeima in 
March 1931, and which aimed at ‘returning’ the cathedral to the state’s possession and at 
putting it under the supervision of the War Ministry. The two main reasons for the 
expropriation, cited by Skujenieks in the Saeima, were the alleged historical injustice of 
the cathedral’s belonging to the Germans in the first place, and the lack of a dedicated 
place of worship for Latvian war veterans. (Bilmanis (1951:349) mentions that during the 
Dom Affair, the 38,513 German inhabitants of Riga claimed the cathedral ‘for their 
exclusive use’ against 242,731 Latvians). After prolonged debates in the Parliament, the 
draft law was rejected (notably, the National Union also voted against it). In response, the 
centre parties, namely the Progressive Union (M. Skujenieks) and the Democratic Centre 
(J. Breik!s) initiated a popular referendum on the question of requisition of the Cathedral. 
Although the referendum, which was held in September 1931, failed, the Cabinet of 
Ministers, under Article 81 of the Constitution, passed amendments to the Law on 
Lutheran and Catholic Cathedrals from 1923. Although those amendments formally left 
the Cathedral in the possession of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, control over it was 
effectively taken away from the German Congregation, whose representatives were now in 
the minority on the newly elected Board. Insulted Germans abandoned the cathedral 
(according to a Latvian newspaper, taking most of the valuable inventory with them110). 
Two complaints on the matter were filed by the Balts with the German Reichstag, causing 
a wave of indignation among Latvians, who rightfully considered it an invitation to a 
foreign power to meddle in their sovereign state’s affairs. Altogether, the Dom Affair 
significantly deepened the rift between Baltic Germans and Latvians, and as Hiden 
(2004:187) observes, both sides were equally to blame. Hiden describes how for P. 
Schiemann (who for health reasons had been away from Latvia for most of the time during 
which the conflict had been unfolding) the loss of the Cathedral was also an affront to his 
own stated political line of the necessity of ‘restraining oneself nationally’, and which, as a 
result of the aforementioned developments, many Baltic Germans now considered to be a 
failure. The fact that M. Skujenieks, who had always stressed the valuable Baltic German 
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contribution to the Latvian state’s life in the past, was now personally leading the assault, 
considerably added to the sting. 
Understandably, the 1932/33 budget debates in the Saeima, in the midst of the 
economic crisis, again sparked controversy, with Skujenieks’s government coming under 
intense criticism from the left and from the national minorities. Whereas the Social 
Democrats predominantly berated the government for allegedly putting most of the 
economic burden upon the shoulders of the working class, minorities were largely 
concerned about the deterioration of democratic practices under the so-called ‘national 
government’, and especially about the worsening relationship between them and the 
Latvian ethnic majority. 
P. Schiemann (Baltic Germans) delivers an uncharacteristically dark speech, which 
in retrospect fills one with a sense of foreboding. He speaks broadly about the worldwide 
depression, his understanding of its causes, and the effect of the economic downturn on 
Latvia. He issues a warning to those Latvians who tend to blame the current economic 
difficulties on ‘bad politics’ and advocate a new Satversme and new, ‘better’ men in 
power. ‘There are already all kinds of constitutions in place in the world, proletarian and 
plutocratic, monarchic and republican, dictatorial and democratic, absolutist and liberal – 
and not one of them is capable of protecting its own state against the devastating effects of 
the global crisis,’ – asserts Schiemann.111 
Obviously influenced by the popular at the time writings of Sigmund Freud (1930) 
and Carl Jung (1931) on the psychoanalysis of society as a whole, and claiming that the 
worldwide crisis is not just a political and economic crisis, but a global spiritual crisis as 
well, Schiemann traces its origins to WWI, labelling the current psychological state as ‘war 
psychosis’. The nature of the psychosis, he continues, is a ‘peculiar sense of community’, 
developed during the war when all other considerations, ethical, moral, cultural, any 
human considerations, in fact, were subordinated to the interests of that community. 
During war, continues Schiemann, this sense of community manifests itself as hatred 
against another community and the desire for its annihilation. According to Schiemann, for 
the previous generation, which was ‘surprised’ by the World War, this phenomenon was 
unfamiliar, and it took them time to adapt, whereas the present generation took this state of 
affairs for granted. Obviously referring to German National Socialism in the first place, 
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Schiemann claims that this war-borne psychosis has become a cornerstone of politics for 
young people all around the world; it has been transplanted to the post-war world and to all 
of its activities. Hatred has permeated state politics and nationalist movements, and has 
infused partisan beliefs, he observes. Shifting his focus back to Latvia, which he says is 
also affected by this global phenomenon, Schiemann claims: 
National feeling and party politics are based upon hatred toward the others. Negatively 
charged national feelings are now raised as a state banner. If just 12 years ago everybody was in 
agreement that the sovereign power in the Latvian state belongs to the Latvian people, i.e. to the 
whole body of its citizens, now, contrary to the Satversme, only the ethnic Latvian state and its 
interests are being recognised.112  
Schiemann mentions A. !"ni#$’s educational policies, which he believes are 
mainly oriented towards alienating minorities from the state, in support of his argument. S. 
Trofimovs (Russian Farmers and Russian Municipal Workers’ Party) in his speech 
characterises the education minister’s policies as ‘dangerous’.  
Fending off his critics, Skujenieks published an article about his government’s 
priorities which was reproduced in all leading newspapers with a subtitle which 
summarised his new politics remarkably well: ‘Not a single step is being taken that is not 
acceptable from a Latvian point of view’. Skujenieks credited his own government not just 
with the numerous ‘innovations’ in education, but also with achieving independence from 
the minority factions in the Saeima, without which, he claimed, passing important 
legislation, like the Law on Grain Monopoly, would not be possible. ‘It goes without 
saying, – writes Skujenieks – that various parties and groupings can have different 
opinions on all kind of matters, and that they should be respected’. But after this curt nod 
to pluralism, he concludes on an entirely different note: ‘At the same time, being petty and 
practically insignificant, these so-called ‘demands’ are only an impediment to the work of 
the state.’ 113 
It seems beyond doubt that Skujenieks’s startling metamorphosis from a liberal 
democrat committed to the principles of equality and equal participation to a chauvinistic 
supporter of ‘Latvia for Latvians’, by 1931 was almost complete. His second, right-wing 
                                                
112 Latvijas Republikas IV Saeimas III sesijas 12. S"de 1932. gada 27. maij%. p. 453. 
113 ‘Ministru presidents M. Skujeneeks par waldibas stahwokli’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 31.05.1932 
Chapter 3: An Equal Among Nations, 1918-1934 
 
 187 
government, which came to power in December 1931 and lasted until March 1933, became 
known as the most hostile towards minorities’ rights in the history of the democratic 
Latvian republic.  
 The nationalistic course was especially pronounced in education, and the newly 
appointed Education Minister A. !"ni#$ was a strong proponent of the prompt 
‘Latvianisation’ of education and of culture in general. According to %ilde (1985: 257), ‘it 
all went in the opposite direction from the one determined by Rainis, who was the 
Education Minister within Skujenieks’s first government’. 
 Presenting his government’s declaration to the Saeima on 4th December 1931, 
Skujenieks spoke mainly of the unprecedented economic hardship experienced at that 
moment by the Latvian people and of the necessary measures in order to combat the crisis: 
‘Current conditions worldwide, not just in our country, are very difficult. In order to 
overcome these difficulties, big sacrifices will be required from the widest sections of the 
community’s residents. The foremost task of this government is to spread the burden 
created by the crisis justly among all citizens, putting more weight on the shoulders of 
those groups who can manage it more easily.’114 There was no mention in the declaration 
of the new government’s stance on policies towards ethnic minorities. The ensuing 
parliamentary debates, however, were largely instigated by the minority speakers.  
 If Skujenieks’s aforementioned statement planted a suspicion in minority minds 
that those ‘groups’ who were supposed to shoulder most of the burden of the crisis were 
actually minorities themselves, their fears were further fuelled by the comments of J. 
Breik$s (Democratic Centre). Breik$s stressed the necessity of cutting existing state 
subsidies, mentioning that ‘these subsidies are indeed very wide, and statistics show that 
they are mainly benefitting ‘foreign peoples’ at our Latvian residents’ expense, especially 
in education, as well as in other fields. Taking this into account, it seems to us that the 
present government will really follow a course favourable towards Latvian residents; that 
hitherto-existing subsidies will finally be scrapped under the pressure of the crisis.’115 
 P. Schiemann (Baltic German Party) mentions the discussions on the necessity of a 
‘national government’ that permeated the recent public discourse. He claims that the 
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‘national government’ motto sounds great if it designates a government that does not take 
into account just separate groups’ interests, but cares instead for the wellbeing of the whole 
nation in accordance with the Latvian Constitution. However, he continues, this national 
slogan is bad if the real goal is to ensure the wellbeing of a particular community and to 
harm other groups of residents. ‘If you think that now is the right time to marginalise and 
leave out those national groups which belong to our state’s living organism, then it will 
inevitably harm everybody’s interests.’116 He concludes that the German faction cannot 
vote for the government. 
 M. Nurock (Mizrahi) expresses concern that at a time when the economic situation 
is critical, when it is crucial to create a broad coalition government (with the exception of 
‘one particular group’, i.e. the communists) which would enjoy the support of the whole 
Saeima, the new government comes out with the slogan ‘Down with minorities!’ He draws 
the Saeima’s attention to the fact that this way, more than twenty per cent of the population 
are being effectively excluded from the legislative process without further ado. ‘Thus there 
are first and second-class citizens. One class is declared as being supportive of the state, 
and the other – as a disloyal class, which could at best be ‘allowed’ to give their votes to 
the ‘national government.’117 Nurock ends his speech with a statement that it will not be 
possible for Mizrahi to vote for such a government. 
 J. Ver!bickis (Latvian Polish Union) announces that recently a ‘new era’ has 
dawned not just for the Parliament, but for the political life of the country in general. 
Minorities, he claims, are not trusted anymore with any kind of responsibility. ‘Minorities 
are now regarded as second-class citizens; it is same with their MPs, they are not trusted 
with any responsibilities at all.’ And it is very symptomatic, he continues, that this is not 
the outlook of one particular faction, but of the whole Saeima. ‘Not only did nobody try to 
involve minorities in the coalition talks, but the government’s declaration did not contain 
any information on its intentions with respect to the minorities question, or on how it 
intends to protect minorities’ rights.’ Ver!bickis continues: ‘…and this despite the fact that 
there have been numerous signals in the society and in the press that this government will 
curtail minority rights.’118 Under these circumstances, he concludes, the Poles will not vote 
for this government. 
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 L. !po"anskis (Latvian Parishes and District Governments’ Russian Workers’ 
Union) supports all those MPs from the minorities who have previously spoken expressing 
their negative opinions on the future government. He notes that obviously nobody is asking 
for minorities’ support anyway, as it is not necessary for the government to be approved. 
But !po"anskis insists that with the minorities being an integral part of the Saeima, their 
opinion of the government should be voiced and heard. !polanskis observes that ‘we are 
not being spoken to anymore. It is out of fashion. There was a different fashion not so long 
ago. Then Mr. Skujenieks was very talkative, and insistently invited minorities to support 
his coalition, not taking ethnic allegiances into account.’119 He announces that the Russian 
MPs will not vote for the government.  
 M. Dubins (Agudat Israel) ironically observes that Skujenieks wants to assemble a 
Latvian national government at any price. Is this the same prime minister who once sided 
with the minorities, he asks rhetorically. Was that government not a national government 
as well? Like Nurock, he stresses the necessity of working together in times of economic 
hardship. Dubins claims that it is a very badly chosen moment to push away the minorities 
away and to create a ‘national’ government. He reminds his audience that the minorities 
possess better commercial contacts with other countries, and that it would be easier for 
them to secure foreign loans. Dubins observes that although the Skujenieks programme did 
not contain any direct references to the minorities, the subsequent comments of J. Breik#s 
have made it apparent that the national government will be acting ‘at the minorities’ 
expense’. ‘We know how Mr. Skujenieks treats minorities. Therefore do not expect 
minorities to vote for this government,’ concludes Dubins. [Exclamation from the 
audience: ‘Not necessary, either!’].120 
 When the debates are resumed on 30th December, A. Breik#s (Democratic Centre) 
takes the floor in order to respond to the minority speakers. He denies that the budget cuts 
were planned exclusively ‘at minorities’ expense’, mentioning a decrease in the number of 
state departments, and the liquidation of several embassies and representations abroad. 
Breik#s insists that the minorities should take the difficult economic situation into account, 
and claims that the biggest ‘abnormalities’ can be found within the Education Ministry. 
School boards need to be decreased in size, he insists.  
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 K. D!"ens (Social Democrats) responds to Breik#s, stating that the Social 
Democrats are of a somewhat different opinion on the cuts relating to the minorities’ 
education budget. He claims that over the 12 years which have passed since the Law on 
Minorities’ Schools was adopted, those hopes that the Social Democrats invested in 
minorities’ school boards have not been realised, and that the disappointments have been 
many. But nevertheless, he continues, the Social Democrats’ position on minorities’ school 
autonomy remains unaltered. ‘We cannot be the oppressors just because we were the 
oppressed before’, he says. D!"ens reminds Breik#s that prior to cutting the subsidies for 
the minorities’ school boards, one should take into account that these boards are not just in 
charge of schools, but are also responsible for all the minorities’ educational and cultural 
affairs. D!"ens outlines possible alternative measures, and promises to submit a detailed 
proposal at a later stage.121 
 Unexpectedly, another Social Democrat, F. Ciel!ns, takes the floor in order to add 
to what has been said by D!"ens: ‘Mr. D!"ens here has said on behalf of our faction that 
the Social Democrats recognise the necessity of ensuring cultural-national rights for 
minorities by the state; but we also want to tell our minorities something else. If certain 
minorities try to turn this national-cultural autonomy apparatus into something that to a 
certain extent starts to be in opposition to the Latvian State on the one hand, and to Latvian 
democracy on the other, then a time will come when the Social Democrats will stop 
protecting Latvian minorities. [Ciel!ns must have been referring to the Polish, Lithuanian, 
Russian and German minorities; all of them had lately been accused in the press of keeping 
too close ‘cultural contacts’ with their respective kin states]. Ciel!ns complains to the 
Saeima that none of the previous education ministers have bothered to supply minorities’ 
schools with history textbooks written from the standpoint of the Latvian democratic 
republic. He claims that some Polish schools in Latvia use history textbooks printed in 
Poland, and ‘don’t we all know how history is taught in Poland’.122 
 P. Schiemann responds to Breik#s, arguing that despite what he said about the 
minorities not being willing to cut their own expenses, the German faction is always trying 
to find a way to save money. But one thing that should not be sacrificed is the school 
boards, he says, because they are crucial to maintaining minorities’ cultures. As for 
Ciel!ns’s accusations, he says, ideological convictions do not come from schools alone, 
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and the school administration does not exercise full control over the beliefs of its students. 
‘You are speaking about the national movement which came from the neighbouring 
German state, and which found strong support among our German youth. But this 
movement does not have any political nature with a view to changing the existing state 
order; it is just a strongly expressed nationalism – the same nationalism which can be 
observed among your young people, and not just among the young people, but here in the 
Saeima too.’ And only society itself, continues Schiemann, can overcome these ideological 
trends. ‘But if you want to take away our autonomy, to send all our children into the same 
school with the same clichéd spirit, then you can be sure that all these movements that do 
not allow you peace of mind today, will not only fail to shrink, but will also grow 
disproportionately. Autonomy does not hinder development of loyalty towards the state; on 
the contrary, it fosters it, and makes it possible. A de-nationalised state would push those 
minorities who are good citizens today into a different camp.’123  
 V. Lapinskis (Latvian Polish Union) responds to Ciel!ns, categorically denying his 
accusations about the Polish schools and teachers being involved in anti-state propaganda.  
He refers to the parliamentary investigative commission (where Polish representatives 
were not allowed), which has recently visited the Daugavpils and Ilukste regions, without 
any results. Lapinskis assures the Saeima that ‘We Poles have always been, and still are, a 
loyal section of residents.’124 
 The minorities’ fears of the new Skujenieks government’s policies turned out to be 
not without grounds. Early in the following year, on 18th February 1932, the Cabinet 
adopted the new Regulations on the State Language:  
 Article 1 established the Latvian language as the state language of the Latvian 
Republic. 
 Article 2 made the Latvian language’s usage obligatory in the army, navy and all 
other state and municipal offices and enterprises; as well as in private persons’ interaction 
with those. Footnote 1 made a caveat that the use of language in the parliament was 
regulated by its Rules of procedure. Footnote 2 allowed, until the next municipal elections 
in 1935, the use also of the German and Russian languages, with the permission of the 
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chairman, or at least by demand of one-third of members, during the sessions of municipal 
administrative offices. If at least one member demanded it, all speeches were to be 
translated into Latvian. 
 Article 3 allowed usage of the German and Russian languages, both during 
sessions and in communication with residents, in those municipal administrative offices 
where according to the latest census one specific ethnic minority exceeded fifty per cent of 
the local population. All speeches delivered in German or Russian during the session were 
to be translated into the Latvian language if so demanded by at least one member. 
 Article 4 allowed free use of any other language during public meetings, and 
religious services; in commercial communication; in the press, publishing, and 
educational establishments. 
 Article 5 regulated that all applications submitted by public and commercial 
organisations, firms, private persons and legal entities to state or municipal organisations, 
as well as accompanying, related reports, notifications, correspondence and documents, in 
case the originals were in a foreign language, were to be accompanied by translations into 
the Latvian language (with the exception of books). 
 Article 6 obliged all public and commercial organisations, firms and legal entities 
to discuss and approve all applications in the state language during their business 
activities, board sessions, and meetings. 
 Article 7 ordered names of all trading and industrial enterprises, firms, agencies, 
associations, unions, and organisations, as well as their stamps, seals and shop signs to be 
displayed in the state language. Other languages were acceptable alongside the state 
language, but in a secondary position.  
 Article 8 regulated that all geographical names in official communication were to 
be used in the state language exclusively.125 
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Prior to the adoption of the Regulations of 1932, language usage in Latvia had no 
legal basis (the Latvian Constitution of 1922, for example, did not contain a reference to 
the state language or languages), with very few exceptions.  
For example, the Regulations of 1921 requested all state institutions and their 
officials to accept petitions and applications in the Latgalian dialect from organisations and 
private persons. The Regulations also granted the right to use the Latgalian dialect in 
bookkeeping, correspondence, advertising and signboards to all Latgalian state and 
municipal institutions. (!ilde 1976: 378) These rights were therefore revoked by the 
Regulations of 1932.  
The use of languages in the Saeima was regulated by its Rules of Procedure. 
German and Russian were allowed to be used alongside the Latvian language, with two 
caveats: all written communication had to be in Latvian, and those deputies who spoke in 
languages other than Latvian were responsible for submitting the transcripts of their 
speeches in Latvian translation to the Saeima’s secretariat.  
In other spheres of public life, such as in the courts, state and municipal agencies, 
postal offices, railway stations, etc. language use was largely at the discretion of officials, 
and by and large the attitude towards it was very flexible. In civil procedures, all written 
documents in foreign languages were to be translated into Latvian, but verification of the 
accuracy of the translation was often omitted by mutual consent. (Loeber: 1993)  
Understandably, after fourteen years of such relaxed language practices, minorities 
did not quite ‘see it coming’, despite growing voices of dissatisfaction among the titular 
nation, who considered this tri-lingual situation to be damaging not just to the Latvian 
language, but to the Latvian image and reputation abroad. Besides, the newly adopted 
Regulations were to come into force as early as on 4th March 1932, less than three weeks 
later.  
 P. Schiemann (Baltic German Party) immediately proposed amendments to the 
Regulations that would postpone their implementation until 15th April 1932. Defending his 
position against J. Breik"s (Democratic Centre), who accused Schiemann of being willing 
to ‘procrastinate’ about this ‘so liberal a law that it only recognises the already existing 
practices’, Schiemann reminds the Saeima that the Minorities’ Education Departments 
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within the Ministry of Education enjoy the status of state organisations. According to the 
new regulations, they would also have to use the Latvian language exclusively. Schiemann 
states that for him it is impossible to imagine that anybody present would conceive of 
ordering the Head of the German education department to communicate with the German 
students’ parents in any language different from their native tongue. He enquires whether it 
would not make more sense to amend the Regulations before they came into force, and 
warns the Saeima that if his proposal gets voted down, the German faction will have no 
choice but to interpret the motives behind it as villainous and hateful.126 
 F. Ciel!ns responds by announcing that the Social Democrats will support the 
German faction’s motion. [J. Breik"s from his seat: ‘That was to be expected!’] It was to 
be expected indeed, continues Ciel!ns, because the Social Democratic faction recognises 
that in the matter of minorities’ language rights a certain tolerance should be observed. 
Especially in Latvia, he claims, where minorities constitute 25 per cent of the population, 
this matter should be resolved in such a manner as to avoid inflaming tensions among the 
different ethnic groups.127 
 J. #terns (Progressive Union) is indignant about both the minorities’ protests and 
Ciel!ns’s excessively tolerant attitude. He posits that for the finely-educated Ciel!ns 
communicating in different languages presents no difficulty, whereas he, #terns, is forced 
to leave the Saeima’s main auditorium every time when Schiemann, for example, gives a 
speech, because he always speaks in German, which is incomprehensible to #terns. The 
same goes for the speeches by Schiemann’s colleague, V. Fircks. #terns expresses 
disappointment that there is no majority in the Saeima that would submit a proposal to use 
only the Latvian language in its proceedings. #terns also makes an interesting claim (from 
a purely factual point of view)  – according to him, almost every Saeima member 
understands Latvian; all MPs speak Latvian when they act as rapporteurs on draft laws, 
but the moment they start speaking as deputies, they switch to their own language.128 He 
suggests that in addition to the Regulations, the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure should be 
amended as well.129 
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 S. Vittenbergs (Agudat Israel) expresses his opinion that the new regulations are ill 
suited to Latgale, which has been an integral part of Latvia only for the past 14 years, and 
therefore the Latvian language proficiency of its population is not adequate. He claims that 
it is unfair to expect Latgalians, among whom there are many illiterates not capable of 
signing their own name, to be able to communicate with state and municipal institutions in 
the Latvian language. Vittenbergs observes that the new education minister is quick to ban 
and prohibit, but that he does not show much initiative in making sure that every citizen 
has a chance to learn the Latvian language. He proposes to postpone the Regulations’ 
enforcement in Latgale until 1935.130 
 In response, !terns confronts Vittenbergs with some handy statistics: the proportion 
of literate Russians in all Latvia in 1920 was only 41 per cent, whereas in 1930 it was 
already 62. In Latgale, the percentage of Russians who could read was 34 in 1920, and 75 
in 1930. !terns also jokingly draws everybody’s attention to Vittenbergs’s inconsistent 
position on language – on the one hand, he insists that each ethnic group should use its 
own language. On the other hand, Vittenbergs himself speaks in the Saeima in the 
‘beautiful Latvian language’.131 
 M. Nurock (Mizrahi) speaks bitterly:  
After a long time the word ‘foreigners’ has started to be used again. It was brought back to 
life by the Latvian people, alongside whom we had suffered under the Tsarist yoke. Forgotten are 
the wartime proclamations of freedom, the new national legislation, minority rights, protection of 
minorities, self-determination and preservation of the national character! And who are these so-
called ‘foreigners’? They are those who had put down roots here centuries ago, and who 
contributed to our Motherland’s economic and cultural development no less than the majority 
nation; those who after the proclamation of the state helped to restore the devastated land, to 
increase exports, to reconstruct industry, to invest capital, and to foster mutual trust.132 
 Nurock posits that despite the fact that many minorities’ representatives speak 
better Latvian than some ethnically Latvian youngsters, it is nevertheless unjust to compare 
Latvia to other countries, because even during the Russian Empire there was already a tri-
lingual tradition in place in Latvia. Nurock reminds his audience that even under the Tsar, 
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Latvians were able to communicate in their own language with the municipalities. He 
states that up until now Latvia could be proud of its fair solution of the minority question, 
and recollects how the papers on minority rights’ recognition in Latvia that he and 
Schiemann delivered at international conventions in the past have always earned ovations 
from the audience. And now, he continues, we are destroying our own good reputation. 
The Latvian nation’s ‘foreign part’ does not ask for privileges, he says, but for equal rights. 
We appeal to the majority nation’s objectivity and healthy state-oriented thinking.133 
 At the end of the debates, the proposed amendments were passed to the Public 
Rights Commission for review. They would resurface in the Saeima one more time, on 10th 
May 1932, when they would not be put to the vote on the grounds that the proposed 
extended deadline of 15th April had already passed.  
 The deterioration of minority rights in general, and of language rights in particular, 
during the interwar period in Central Europe is customarily linked with the establishment 
of authoritarian regimes in the majority of these countries in the 1930s. It therefore seems 
significant that the first legal act curtailing minority rights was already introduced in Latvia 
at the beginning of 1932, when Latvia was still a democratic republic. 
     ***  
3.3.5. Atis !"ni#$, ‘The Minorities’ Oppressor’ 
Skujenieks’s ‘national government’ is perhaps best remembered because of the 
radical course taken by the Education Minister A. !"ni#$ [sometimes also !eni#$], who 
issued a series of decrees tightening up the use of the Latvian language in schooling and 
effectively reversing many of the existing provisions for minority schooling, citing the 
need to build a ‘united nation’. According to %ilde (1985: 257), under !"ni#$’s leadership 
‘it all went in the opposite direction from the one determined by Rainis, who was the 
Education Minister in Skujenieks’s first government’. 
A writer and a former schoolteacher, !"ni#$ was a member of the Democratic 
Centre party. !"ni#$ had a long-standing reputation for pedagogical excellence among the 
Latvian intelligentsia. M. V"tra (1955: 208) describes the schools !"ni#$ and his wife A. 
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R!mane-"#ni$a ran in pre-independence Latvia as ‘the only oases in German-Russian 
Riga, where Latvian youngsters could speak and study in their mother tongue…’ Latvian 
writers, poets and scientists worked as teachers in K#ni$%’s school, attests V#tra. The 
Democratic Centre party adopted a nationalistic course at its congress in 1932, and "#ni$% 
endeavoured to keep it up in government. Once appointed as the education minister, he 
eagerly got down to work, busily issuing decrees regulating different aspects of national 
education and publishing emotional articles in the newspapers about the poor state of 
education and the desperate need for reforms.  
Regulation No. 2796 of 09.06.1932 on ‘Testing of the state language’s knowledge 
of the schoolteachers belonging to ethnic minorities’ obliged all principals and teachers at 
ethnic minorities’ schools to pass a test in the Latvian language, orally and in writing, with 
those 50 years old and older being exempt. 
Regulation No. 2813 of 10.06.1932 ‘On the composition of the student bodies in 
ethnic minorities’ gymnasiums and vocational schools’ stipulated that only the children of 
parents belonging to those ethnic groups whose language was the instruction language at a 
given school were allowed to study in those schools. Children of all ethnic backgrounds 
were allowed to study at gymnasiums and vocational schools with the Latvian language of 
instruction.  
Decree No. 815 of 13.02.1933 ‘On usage of textbooks published abroad in schools’ 
stipulated that those foreign textbooks which had equivalents published in Latvia could be 
used only until 1st August 1 1933; for those textbooks which had no counterparts published 
in Latvia yet, the term was extended until 1st August 1934. 
Decree No. 816 of 13.02.1933 banned the usage of three particular textbooks in 
schools due to their ‘biased content’. The books listed were a German Reich Geography 
textbook published in Munich and Berlin, a European geography textbook published in 
Munich and Berlin, and a History in Pictures textbook published for German minority 
schools in Libau (Liepaja) in 1932. 
Decree No. 66 of 02.06.1933 dismissed the Director of the Riga State German 
Classical Gymnasium, V. Vulfius, from his position for ‘pedagogically and 
administratively unacceptable actions’. The detailed list of his actions revealed the use of a 
Chapter 3: An Equal Among Nations, 1918-1934 
 
 198 
‘political radio transmission’, interruption of normal school routine without registering it in 
the school journals, and the unwarranted celebration of a holiday not recognised by law 
(the date in question was 22nd May 1933 – on that day in 1918 the German army had 
recovered Riga from Stu!ka’s Bolsheviks – an occasion ethnic Latvians had mixed 
feelings about, and which they were not eager to commemorate). Decree No. 65 rebuked 
two officials on the German School Board, and twenty-five school administrators of 
different German schools for  ‘a wilful celebration’ on the same day. 
A circular of 14.06.1933 stipulated that teaching of the Latvian language, Latvian 
history, and Latvian geography in minority schools was not up to standard; cited the lower 
remuneration of those subjects’ teachers in minority schools in comparison with Latvian 
schools as a cause, and ruled that teachers of these subjects in minority schools should 
have their pay equalised with the pay received by their peers in Latvian schools. 
A decree of 15.06.1933 removed minority school boards and schools from direct 
subordination to the Minister of Education and his Secretariat, stipulating instead that they 
should be reporting to the respective departments of the Ministry. 
A. "#ni$% became a minister amidst economic depression, when the education 
sector, along with the rest of the state apparatus, was suffering significant budget cuts. 
Among the numerous problems he faced, the issue of further cuts to the already 
overcrowded Latvian state schools (especially in the countryside) was perhaps the most 
challenging. Another paramount concern of "#ni$% was the continuing, in his view, 
Russification and Germanisation (in Latgale, also Polonisation) of Latvian and minority 
students alike, which reportedly caused their increasing alienation from Latvian cultural 
and political reality and further weakened minorities’ loyalty towards the Latvian state. 
"#ni$% came up with a seemingly blitzkrieg solution for all these problems at once 
– a proposal to merge the Latvian and minorities’ state-funded schools in those regions 
where Latvian schools were overcrowded, and minority schools sparsely attended, and to 
leave it to minorities to maintain their private schools by their own means in the future, 
with an occasional grant from the government. In February 1933, the Cabinet of Ministers 
submitted amendments to this effect to the Law on Educational Institutions, and to the Law 
on Minority Schools. The earlier attempt by the government to pass amendments under 
Article 81 of the Constitution had failed, mainly due to the extensive press campaign 
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against it undertaken by the minorities. But A. !"ni#$, introducing amendments to the 
Saeima in February 1933, stresses the fact that the government has voted for the proposed 
amendments unanimously. According to !"ni#$, both laws adopted in 1919 (The Law on 
Latvian Educational establishment and The Law on Minority Schools, which together 
provided ethnic minorities with the means to exercise cultural autonomy from the state; 
this autonomy was not stipulated explicitly in the Constitution or any other piece of state 
legislation) are outdated and in need of urgent revision. At the time the laws were passed, 
he claims, the newly born Latvian state did not have much to offer in terms of education, 
as its school system had not been developed yet. There were no textbooks available, and no 
proper curriculum. Under those circumstances, continues !"ni#$, it was logical to allow 
minorities to develop their own school system by allocating a portion of the state budget 
for this purpose. But in the past few years, Latvian schools have blossomed, and in terms 
of curriculum and its implementation they can now safely compete with minority schools. 
Besides, new conditions require new approaches, stresses the minister. 
Referring to the language reform of the previous year, !"ni#$ posits that if before 
merging the Latvian and the state-supported minority schools did not look viable, now the 
necessary conditions have been created for the successful transition of minority 
schoolchildren from minority primary schools to Latvian secondary schools.  
But is it in the first place desirable that youngsters of different ethnicities study 
together, he asks rhetorically. He then provides his own answer: no matter how much good 
is done by children continuing to study in the environment most comfortable for them, the 
benefits of a unified school system are still greater. And not just because it allows pupils to 
be better prepared for subsequent higher education in the Latvian language, but, more 
importantly, because ‘starting from school, they grow together, start feeling like citizens of 
the same state, and establish close, even friendly relations.’134  
There are already existing examples of children from different ethnic backgrounds 
attending the same schools, insists !"ni#$. But those schools up until now have not been 
the Latvian schools, but the German and Russian ones. If this is possible with the German 
and Russian languages of instruction, it should be possible with the Latvian language of 
instruction as well, concludes the Minister.  
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Finally, !"ni#$ recognises that financial considerations are yet another major 
driving force behind the draft law. In the present situation, according to the Minister, there 
are often about ten secondary schools in total in the small towns like Ludza and R"zekne, 
with minority schools being half-empty, and Latvian schools overfilled. Comparing 
primary schools, !"ni#$ claims that more often than not there are fewer pupils in a whole 
minority school, with four grades and eight teachers employed, than in one grade of a 
Latvian school. He considers it to be undemocratic, and a waste of existing resources, and 
therefore proposes the new law as a remedy. As for the private minority schools, he 
stresses, the draft law foresees a possibility for them to receive allowances from both 
municipalities and the state; here the Latvian state demonstrates an obliging attitude not 
very common in other democratic states, asserts !"ni#$. 
P. Schiemann (Baltic Germans), responding to the minister, posits that in the 
situation of an overall budget deficit, minorities would be ready to discuss austerity 
measures pertaining to schools – but ‘within reason’. However, it was clear to everybody 
present from the Minister’s speech, he claims, that financial considerations are only 
secondary for the government, while ‘cultural domination’ is their primary goal. 
Schiemann rightfully objects to !"ni#$’s interpretation of the 1919 laws as temporary and 
transitory in nature. He insists that primary school alone is not sufficient for developing an 
understanding and appreciation of one’s national culture. As for !"ni#$’s argument in 
favour of better relations between children of different ethnic backgrounds, Schiemann 
acknowledges that the fact that ‘our youth is so very much separated from each other’ 
presents a great concern indeed, and asserts that minorities ‘always think about how to 
improve relations’. He is convinced, however, that these relations cannot be possibly 
improved by taking away rights to education in one’s mother tongue.  
K. D"%ens (Social Democrats) questions the notion of cultural unity frequently 
used by A. !"ni#$. Is it the cultural unity of all Latvia, or the cultural unity of ethnic 
Latvians, he asks? If it is the former, he continues, than Minister !"ni#$ has every right to 
pursue it, and to make sure that schools of all ethnic backgrounds follow programmes 
which relate to Latvia, Latvia’s interests, Latvia’s past, present and future. In case of the 
latter, D"%ens considers it utterly unreasonable to ask minorities to foster the development 
of the Latvian culture. [the Social Democrats have decisively distanced themselves from 
!"ni#$’s ‘nationalistic course’ during their party congress in 1933.] 
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In response to D!"ens, K. Skalbe (Democratic Centre) announces that the 
purported difference between the culture of Latvia and Latvian culture is ‘a thing of the 
past’. Our views on the matter, he says, have become clearer and more advanced, i.e. there 
is no difference whatsoever between the two because of the Latvian language, which 
covers all of the Latvian territory. Non-Latvians, the later arrivals, do not live anywhere in 
Latvia compactly, and therefore it should be only natural for them to be willing to learn the 
Latvian language, continues Skalbe. ‘We have a state of ethnic Latvians (latvie!u valsts) 
here, which is the same as the Latvian state (Latvijas valsts), as our language covers the 
whole territory,’ says Skalbe.135 
#!ni$%, responding to his critics, retorts: ‘I will tell you more: whatever education 
law we adopt, life goes its own way, and minorities will study at those schools that are 
more convenient. But in the Latvian Latvia it will be more convenient to study together 
with the Latvians.’136 
At the end of the debates, two proposals were submitted regarding the amendments 
to the Education Law: to vote in an open ballot (K. Kir%teins, K. Bachmanis and others), 
and to cast a secret ballot (P. Schiemann, M. Kallistratovs, S. Vitenbergs, V. Fircks and 
others). In accordance with Article 133 of the Saeima Rules of Procedure, a secret ballot 
took place, where out of 94 MPs present, 25 voted for the passing of the two draft laws to 
the commissions, 64 voted against, two abstained, and three ballots were not valid.  
J. Breik%s (Democratic Centre) comments bitterly on the results of the vote: ‘This 
vote – over sixty ballots against the vital interests of the Latvian people – causes the 
biggest indignation among the Latvian nation; therefore from this high tribune and from 
the bottom of my heart I protest against it. Mr. Ulmanis, stop laughing! Your vile laughter 
deeply insults me today.’137 
The vote on the Minorities’ Schools Law was also a closed one, and also took place 
on the initiative of minority deputies. Results were similar to the previous vote: 24 votes 
for, 63 – against, one abstention, and one invalid ballot note. 
                                                
135 Latvijas Republikas IV Saeimas V sesijas 2. s!de 1933. gada 3. febru&r', p. 70. 
136 Latvijas Republikas IV Saeimas V sesijas 2. s!de 1933. gada 3. febru&r', p. 78. 
137 Latvijas Republikas IV Saeimas V sesijas 2. s!de 1933. gada 3. febru&r', p. 82. 
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At the end of the session, M. Skujenieks informed the Parliament that after the 
amendments to the two laws had been voted down, he could see clearly that his national 
government did not have the necessary support, and therefore could not continue its work.  
On 22nd March 1933 A. B!odnieks presented his government’s declaration to the 
Saeima, promising first and foremost to concentrate on the hard economic challenges 
facing the state. In order to deal with these problems more effectively, he promised that his 
government would be taking into account the opinions of society at large, of the press, and 
of the dissenters. Minorities were not mentioned explicitly; in terms of education policy, 
the government’s course was promised to be strictly ‘nationally democratic’ and aimed at 
supplying the state with citizens possessing practical skills, especially in the agricultural 
sector. Educational policies would continue to be implemented by A. "#ni$%, who was 
nominated as candidate for Education Minister again. 
During the ensuing parliamentary debates, V. Fircks (Baltic Germans), expressing 
surprise and indignation at "#ni$%’s appointment, promises that the German faction will 
not support the government and will remain in ‘fervent opposition’ to A. "#ni$%.  
M. Nurock (Mizrahi), also dismayed at "#ni$%’s presence in the government,  
observes resentfully that if before Latvia, in comparison with the other countries, could be 
proud of its relationship with its ethnic minorities, these days are long gone. He will note 
vote for the government. 
M. Dubins (Agudat Israel) promises to vote against; he adds sarcastically that Mr. 
B!odnieks should not have wasted time on writing his own declaration, but could have just 
as well used the Skujenieks’s declaration from a year-and-a-half ago, as the two are 
identical. 
Having seemingly survived the demise of the Skujenieks government in his post as 
Education Minister, "eni$% would nevertheless meet his own trials and tribulations only 
shortly afterwards. On 28th June 1933, during the protracted 1933/34 budget debates, the 
budget of the Ministry of Education came under the close scrutiny yet again. But it was 
Minister "#ni$% himself who sustained a vicious attack from the Agrarian Union delivered 
by J. Leji$%-Leja. Mr. Leji$%, a devoted member of the party steadily rising through the 
ranks, opens his speech with a surprising, considering all the preceding heated debates in 
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the Saeima on the issue, statement that ‘it seems that at the moment there is not the 
slightest need to amend the education law passed by the National Council’, and that in the 
years to come there will be plenty of opportunities to do so without a rush, especially after 
the economic situation has improved. Mr. Leji!" then closely examines various ambiguous 
facts from the minister’s past: #$ni!" applying, whilst being an education minister, for a 
Ls 2000 grant from the Cultural Fund for the publication of his complete works; him 
arranging for a ‘good position’ for his son; #$ni!"’s attempts at real estate property 
speculation at the beginning of the Latvian statehood, and other alleged instances of 
nepotism and cronyism. Leji!" also maintains, most interestingly, that the minister’s 
relationship with the ethnic minorities is not what it seems: ‘no matter how big a national 
hero he was, he always had something to discuss with the minority deputies’.138 
J. Leji!"-Leja recollects in his memoir (1971: 82): ‘I did not want to deliver that 
speech. I was trying to avoid it by saying that although A. #eni!" is a demagogue, I do not 
know anything about him, and therefore cannot possibly speak. K.U. [K%rlis Ulmanis] said 
that all colleagues would help me with gathering the information. H. Celmi!" supplied 
most of the information. The attack on A. #eni!" was brutal…It was during the debates on 
the Education Ministry’s budget, as we could not find a better occasion…The attack was 
purely personal.’ 
J. Leji!" also sheds some light on the real motives behind the A. #eni!"’s demise, 
which according to him was orchestrated solely by the Agrarian Union: ‘I have soon 
realised what was the matter. A. #eni!" was strongly disliked by our minorities; K.U. 
wanted to show them that we dislike him too, in this way retaining the minorities’ favour.’ 
(Leji!" 1971: 83) Moreover, Leji!" claims that in 1932, during the vote on the Language 
Law, Ulmanis encouraged his faction deputies’ absence during the open vote in the 
Saeima. Leji!" refers to the ‘general’ (apparently, J. Balodis) telling him that ‘if the vote 
was a closed one, he [Ulmanis] would definitely vote against it’ as voting for the law 
would present an obstacle to a coalition with minorities in the future (1971:70). Leji!" 
extrapolates that ‘obviously, K.U. had already had 15th May [15th May 1934 – the date of 
the authoritarian coup led by Ulmanis] in mind: it could only happen if he was the prime 
minister. He could only become one with the minorities’ support.’ (Leji!" 1971: 70-71)  
                                                
138 Latvijas Republikas IV Saeimas VI sesijas 24. s$de 1933. gada 28. j&nij%, p. 983. 
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J. Leji!" defends Ulmanis’s stand on the Language Law and the Education Law, 
insisting that it had nothing to do with a lack of patriotism on his part, but was purely a 
matter of political tactics aimed at retaining the support of ethnic minorities for agricultural 
legislation, as well as at preventing M. Skujenieks from running as a candidate in the 
upcoming presidential elections. (Leji!" 1971:81)139  
On 16th June 1933, Prime Minister B#odnieks informs the Saeima that A. Keni!" 
has submitted a resignation letter. K. Skalbe, an unyielding supporter of $%ni!"’s reforms, 
observes that ‘at the departure of the disagreeable minister, all faces on the right wing were 
glistening with pleasure’. Ardently defending $%ni!" against ‘petty accusations’ of those 
looking for ‘a mote in his eye’, Skalbe nevertheless acknowledges that perhaps $%ni!"’s 
reforms would have stood a better chance if his tactics had been  ‘steadier, smoother and 
thus more consequent’.140 
A. $%ni!" became known as the ‘minorities’ oppressor’ in modern Latvian history, 
labelled as such by the left, the right and the ethnic minorities alike. A rare exception was 
&. Un'ms (1964: 81-82), who attempted to dole out some historical justice to the former 
education minister:  
With regards to $eni!", he was not the one to define the Democratic Centre’s politics. And 
the Democratic Centre was not a nationalistically chauvinistic party. At a time when ministers were 
changed more often than gloves, $eni!" also once became a minister. It is true that $eni!" as a 
politician was ardently nationalistic, with bigger personal sympathies towards the Slavic and 
Roman cultures rather than towards Germanic culture. But he could not, and simply was not able to 
destroy minorities’ cultural autonomy, as it was defined by the law. Within a parliamentary system, 
a minister cannot cancel or amend a law. …It was different political groupings that displayed 
dictatorial tendencies. The Democratic Centre and the Progressive Union were for the 
parliamentary system.141 
It seems impossible now to establish precisely what $%ni!"’s real goal was, i.e. 
whether he earnestly aimed at creating a unified Latvian nation by putting Latvian and 
                                                
139 E. Dunsdorfs (1978:268) believed that the fact that Leji!" had always remained an ardent defender of the 
Agrarian Union despite never being a personal favourite of K.Ulmanis adds credibility to his account of 
events. 
140 Skalbe, K. ‘$eni!am aizejot’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 20.06.1933. 
141 In my opinion, the fact that Un'ms himself was an apologist for the authoritarian regime of K. Ulmanis 
lends additional credibility to his evaluation of A. $eni!"’s activities as a Minister. 
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minority children in the same schools (something which has never been achieved since; 
moreover, the very idea remains highly polarising in Latvia until today), or whether he, as 
Schiemann suspected, had the ultimate goal of ethnic Latvians’ ‘cultural domination’ in 
mind, or perhaps a bit of both. It cannot be contested that the reasons !"ni#$ cited as 
justification of his suggested reforms were indeed the real ones: there was a deep 
segregation within Latvian society along ethnic lines (and it can be successfully argued 
that this was largely conditioned, from an early age on, by the segregated school system). 
It is also indisputable that the country was in dire straits economically in 1933, which 
made severe cuts to the education budget inevitable, and !"ni#$’s position as a minister 
hardly an enviable one. He could scarcely take a step he could take without causing uproar 
from one part of the population or another (or, as actually happened, from both).  And here 
I would like to give Minister !"ni#$ the benefit of the doubt for a moment – is it 
conceivable that his intention to ‘kill two birds with one stone’, i.e. to solve a budgetary 
conundrum, and to bring Latvian and minorities’ children together, was dictated by what 
he understood as ‘everybody’s best interests’? Was it not the intention itself, but rather his 
ruthless and callous approach to the task of implementing it (from the Saeima’s debates 
over the law amendments one may surmise that no consultations had been held with the 
minorities when the action plan was conceived, and that their opinion on the matter was 
never taken into account) which caused such an extremely negative reaction on the 
minorities’ part? Understandably, the minorities were furious – the education laws of 1919 
formed the only existing legal base of cultural autonomy so overtly promised by the 
founders of the Latvian state; besides, the minorities had put an incredible effort into their 
education system in the intervening years, and their whole cultural life revolved around 
their educational institutions. To simply tell them to give them away at the moment of need 
was a serious miscalculation on !"ni#$’s part. Would the outcome have been different if 
the matter had been handled with more caution? The answer to this hypothetical question 
is – probably not, as it is quite certain that if the discussions on the issue with the minority 
representatives were held prior to formulating the draft law, very few concessions would 
have been reached, as the whole idea of having a uniform school system by putting 
children of different ethnic backgrounds together was perceived as abominable by the 
wider population, ethnic Latvians and minorities alike. One can argue here that perhaps 
some concessions would have been reached nevertheless – after all, it was only proposed 
to merge schools in those regions where the attendance of minority children was waning, 
and the Latvian schools were overcrowded (although the minorities understandably feared 
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that this was just a start, and there was more to come). But more likely, !"ni#$’s 
endeavour was doomed from the start, and he himself was made an unknowing pawn in a 
different political game. But looking back at the ill-fated education reform of 1933 and the 
upheaval it caused, and comparing it to the education reform of 2004 and current debates 
on education in Latvia, one can sometimes wonder whether in fact the baby got thrown out 
with the bathwater. 
    *** 
Whilst the assiduous and brusque A. !"ni#$ was trying to reform the existing 
education system in the way he saw fit in the new circumstances, M. Valters was 
attempting a revision of the foundations of the Latvian economic sector.  In 1933, this 
former socialist and liberal published a book on the planned economy, mainly inspired by 
Mussolini’s achievements in the area.142 Lamenting the lingering economic crisis and 
growing unemployment, Valters claims that current difficulties could be much sooner 
overcome in ‘a strong state’, rather than under the currently ruling ‘oversimplistic 
neoliberalism’ (Valters1933: 22). ‘Down with the private enterprise and with “economic 
liberalism”!’ he calls unabashedly (Valters 1933: 23). Not unlike !"ni#$, Valters explains 
the allegedly desperate need for the change, which in his view validates state’s 
intervention, by the new developments signifying the maturity of the Latvian nation: 
‘Social interests have now bound the nation together; the nation is not a sphere of 
individuals anymore…. Those interests define the life of the nation and therefore our 
position on economic freedom should not be limited to the individual, it should be 
extended to the nation. The new economy …seeks to incorporate individual economic 
forces into the struggle for national goals.’ (Valters 1933:24) Valters’s ideological 
transformation seems to be complete – a former liberal and a democrat, he now firmly puts 
national interests above individual freedoms.  
 E. Blanks also advocated immediate reforms in his book published in 1932.143 
Accusing Latvian politicians of corruption, he claimed that after first having made capital 
out of the national idea, they had now moved on to exploitation of the ‘second idea of our 
age’, democracy. ‘We have founded our state upon the firm belief in democracy; and the 
                                                
142 Valters, M. 1933. No sabrukuma uz planveidoto saimniec!bu. Latvijas atjauno"anas probl#mas. Latvijas 
n$kotne. R%ga.  
143 Blanks, E. 1932. Latvijas d#mokratija un vi%as vado%i. R%g&. 
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future of our state was bound to democratic ideas, no matter how simplistically or vulgarly 
understood.’ But the Latvian people do not have trust democracy anymore, because the rift 
between the ideas that their state was founded upon and real life has simply become too 
big. Announcing that ‘the era of democracy is dying before coming of age’, Blanks insists 
upon ‘radical constitutional reforms’, warning that otherwise Latvia might be in serious 
danger. (Blanks 1932: 25-26) 
 E. Blanks, perhaps inadvertently, also pinpoints the fundamental reason behind the 
triumph of the nationalistic course amidst political and economic uncertainties: ‘If the 
national principle was taken out of the Latvian state ideology, it would be hard to find any 
other principle that would justify our national existence.’ (Blanks 1932:20) 
On 9th February 1934, a group of deputies from the Democratic Centre (J. Breik!s, 
K. Kir!teins, B. P"pi#a, K. Skalbe and G. Zemgals) submitted a draft Law on Commercial, 
Industrial, Insurance and Private Credit Companies’ language of business and organisation 
of workforce. The draft foresaw that starting from 1st September 1934, all business 
correspondence and accounting were to be conducted in the Latvian language. But more 
importantly, also from 1st September 1934, 50 per cent of the workforce of all commercial, 
industrial, insurance and private credit companies were to be ethnic Latvians, and then 
from 1st November 1934 – the proportion of ethnic Latvians was to rise to 80 per cent. 
Breik!s, P"pi#a and Skalbe defended the draft law in the ensuing debates, stressing that 
ethnic Latvians were suffering most from the unemployment, whereas the minorities still 
enjoyed a relatively high standard of living. M. Dubins, responding to the draft, enquired 
sarcastically whether in return the minorities would get guaranteed 20 per cent 
employment in the State sector. He also expressed indignation that G. Zemgals, a former 
President who had sworn to represent all the people of Latvia without discrimination, 
would lend his signature to such a project. Altogether, the Saeima’s debates sounded tired. 
The draft law was voted down before it could be passed to the committees for revision. 
On 2nd March 1934, the B$odnieks government resigned after the failed vote of 
confidence in the Saeima initiated by the Agrarian Union. F. Ciel%ns (1963, II: 499) recalls 
that the Social Democratic faction reacted to the B$odnieks government’s departure ‘with 
stormy applauses and mocking cheers’, having no idea that they were in fact saying 
goodbye to last Latvian democratic government. Despite his initial success in getting the 
B$odnieks cabinet out of the way, Ulmanis encountered unprecedented resistance from 
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bourgeois parties to his possible premiership. The rumours of an impending coup d’état 
had been around for several months, and Ulmanis’s well-known authoritarian tendencies 
made him a particular threat. For once, the New Farmers of A. B!odnieks, the Progressive 
Union of M. Skujenieks, and the Democratic Centre of J. Breik"s stood united – they 
would not support the government coalition if Ulmanis were nominated as Prime Minister. 
Ironically, it was the minorities’ support that allowed K. Ulmanis to become prime 
minister on 17th March 1934. Perhaps blinded by his past declarations of opposition to the 
loathed #$ni%"’s reforms, the minorities could not see that they were not lending their 
support in the usual trade-off between their own cultural interests and the Agrarian Union’s 
protection of agriculture-related legislation. Instead, they had unknowingly sided with 
K&rlis Ulmanis against Latvian parliamentarian democracy – a decision that would 
ultimately end their cultural autonomy permanently (and indeed something of which they 
had been forewarned that day by none other but the Social Democrat F. Menders, who, 
with a remarkable foresight, predicted that the minorities were playing a dangerous game 
by supporting the Agrarian Union, and that without the Social Democrats’ backup in place, 
their the cultural autonomy would soon expire).144 But why Menders and his faction 
resigned themselves to the role of passive spectators and did not attempt to avert Ulmanis’s 
accession to power is a question that remains unanswered to this day. F. Ciel$ns (1963) 
argues that contrary to the commonly accepted view that the success of the coup was 
conditioned by the overall political situation in Europe and deepening economic crisis, the 
blame lay with Menders and the left wing of the Latvian Social Democratic Party. In the 
absence of a united Centrist democratic bloc, it was the Social Democrats’ primary 
responsibility, as the main opponent to the Agrarian Union in the Saeima, to guard 
parliamentarian democracy from the authoritarian threat, insists Ciel$ns. 
 The coup d’état on 15th March 1934 carried out by Prime Minister K. Ulmanis with 
the support of the general J. Balodis and the Latvian army, effectively ended the 
democratic period in the interwar history of independent Latvia. Another prominent 
politician who at the last moment joined the conspirators was M. Skujenieks, whose name 
and political reputation lent extra legitimacy to the ensuing authoritarian rule (on 
Skujenieks’s possible reasons for joining the conspirators according to different sources – 
more at the end of this chapter). 
                                                
144 Latvijas Republikas IV Saeimas VIII sesijas 19. s$de 1934. gada 17. mart&. p. 808. 
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 The coup was carried out on the night of 15th May 1934, during which all members 
of the Social Democratic faction, as well as some representatives of the Democratic Centre 
and of minority factions were arrested. The conspirators did not meet any resistance, a 
couple of shots fired in the air by B. Kalni!" notwithstanding. A decree signed by Prime 
Minister K. Ulmanis and the War Minister, General J. Balodis, which cited ‘a threat of 
civil unrest endangering public safety’ imposed martial law in Riga from 23:00 PM on 15th 
May 15, and from 01:00 AM on 16th in the rest of Latvian territory.145 The decree was 
published alongside the ‘Government’s Manifesto’, which assured the public that ‘Our 
actions are not directed against Latvian democracy, but directed at ensuring that the 
political parties’ infighting does not smother the people’s spirit and the people’s will. The 
government only wants to create, as soon as possible, such conditions that would allow 
that spirit and that will to flourish unencumbered.’ The goal was to return not just to a 
prosperous Latvia, but to a Latvia where ‘our original national Latvian culture will 
blossom, where all things Latvian will triumph and all things alien will disappear.’146 
 
Summary 
The brief period of Latvian democracy described in this chapter is incredibly rich in 
terms of historical events, of complexity of both the internal politics of Latvia and of the 
larger European political scene, and of the sheer variety of ideas, beliefs, and viewpoints 
from all sides of the political spectrum.  
The kaleidoscopic changes of government and the proliferation of political parties, 
further complicated by the lack of transparency (virtually all important political decisions 
seemed to be made offstage, with the parties trying to keep the exchanged promises secret) 
and by personal struggles for influence, obscure the main trends and tendencies in the 
country’s political development  – at times, one cannot see the wood for the trees. 
But three major developments, closely interrelated, can be clearly traced: the 
continuous deterioration of majority-minority relations, the radicalisation of both the left 
and the right wings of the political spectrum; and the gradual corrosion of liberal 
democratic values and parliamentary rule.  
                                                
145 ‘Rihkojums par kara stahwok#a izsludinaschanu’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 16.05.1934 
146  ‘Waldibas manifests’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 16.05.1934 
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 To a large extent, these developments were influenced by external factors and 
closely mirrored developments elsewhere in Europe, where the core nations and their large 
and small ethnic minorities continued to regard each other with suspicion, while the 
mechanisms of the League of Nations proved too weak to offer any protection or 
guarantees of stability; where representative democracy proved to be extremely 
cumbersome to execute; where the small nations started feeling threatened by the 
expansionist ambitions of the bigger states portending border revision, and where by the 
late 1920s almost all successor states had turned into dictatorships. The Great Depression 
amplified the already existing discontent.     
The parliamentary debates described in this chapter clearly indicate a growing 
frustration among ethnic Latvians with the insufficient – or even failed, in their opinion – 
integration of ethnic minorities into the life of the new state, which they tended to blame 
on their own ‘excessively liberal’ policies. The deteriorating security situation in Europe in 
general, the threat of fascism, and the triumphant march of authoritarianism made Latvians 
deeply suspicious of their national minorities (and in this latter instance, they were looking 
in the wrong direction). Communist Russia was always considered a threat, but now 
Germany also became an aggressive authoritarian state. As for Latvia’s relationship with 
Poland, which was still considered a guarantor of stability in the region, it was anything 
but simple. Latvia tended to view Poland, with whom, prior to World War Two, it had 
shared a border, with ‘considerable suspicion’, questioning its real intentions in the region 
and fearing possible designs on Latgale (Stranga 1994: 47). As a result of external threats, 
both real and imagined, the trend was set of viewing the Russian, German, and Polish 
communities of Latvia as a potential ‘fifth column’, pushing them to the margins of 
political life and increasing their sense of alienation.  
Undeniably, there was also a certain growth of Latvian minorities’ own ethnic 
nationalism in response to the nationalist fever that overtook their kin states at the time 
(with the exception of Latvian Jews, who felt increasingly threatened by the spreading pan-
European anti-Semitism and therefore had to tread very carefully). This minority ethnic 
nationalism was further fuelled by ethnic Latvians’ suspicions and often-unfair 
accusations. It seems impossible to disentangle all causes and consequences here, 
especially in retrospect, but what remains abundantly clear is that, by the early 1930s, 
majority-minority relations in Latvia were in a state of deadlock. 
Chapter 3: An Equal Among Nations, 1918-1934 
 
 211 
The question remains - how did things actually deteriorate so fast from the initial 
liberal declarations of building democratic Latvia together upon the principles of equality 
of 1918, to the impotence of parliamentary democracy and the xenophobia of 1934?  
Hope (1996: 41) observed that there was ‘a touch of the unreal in the egalitarian 
colour of democracy which appeared overnight after centuries of feudal servitude’. The 
lack of political experience in general, and of practicing representative democracy in 
particular (the short experience of a handful of Latvians representing their provinces in the 
Russian State Duma and at the all-Russia Constituent Assembly notwithstanding) are often 
cited as reasons behind the quick demise of the Latvian democracy. The Latvian 
constitution, as Lieven (1993: 64) observed, was too democratic for its own good; to 
uphold these generously declared principles in the face of a complex reality proved to be 
impossible. And perhaps it was the absence of any previous experience of autonomous 
inclusive political institutions that, to some extent, prevented the multiethnic population of 
Latvia from forming an overarching national identity, unlike, for example, their northern 
neighbours the Finns and their Swedish minority, who got united around a common sense 
of territorially-based nationhood.  
The fragmentation of political parties, with their often-irreconcilable views and 
goals, and constant fighting for the electorate made political stability an unachievable goal. 
Internal disagreements and continuous splintering into factions plagued the left, the centre, 
and the right alike.  
Ethnic minorities suffered from the same affliction, often unable to find consensus 
within their own respective group and incapable of agreeing common policy with the 
others. In the Baltic German faction, the liberal Paul Schiemann constantly had to appease 
the conservative Fircks and others; in the Jewish faction, there was constant infighting 
between the Orthodox, the Zionists, the Socialist Zionists, and the Bund. In the Russian 
faction, there was often no agreement between the Russian Orthodox and the Old 
Believers, and between the National Orthodox and the liberals. On many occasions, as 
demonstrated earlier in this chapter, instead of setting common goals and presenting a 
united front, each minority tried to claim a special status with the Latvians and obtain 
special favours.  
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The Latvian Social Democratic Party, being the most popular party during the 
parliamentary era and having the largest representation in the Saeima, proved unable to 
capitalise on its own popularity. Caught up in its narrow ideology of promoting the 
interests of the working class, it failed to address the concerns of wider society. Having 
spent most of its time in opposition, the party did not offer many constructive solutions, 
being either unable or unwilling to accept wider political responsibility. Sturmthal (1944: 
14), examining the crisis of European labour during the interwar crisis, distinguishes 
between pressure groups and political parties, where the former ‘feel responsible only for 
the welfare of the particular group or faction it represents’, and the latter further ‘the 
interests of the whole society into which particular interests are integrated’. In this sense, 
both the LSDSP and the Latvian minority parties largely acted as pressure groups. 
Another puzzling phenomenon is the remarkable radicalisation of views among the 
Latvian intelligentsia, who, despite being a numerically small group, had a huge impact on 
public opinion and on the nation-building process. Almost everybody who was anybody in 
Latvian politics had been either a Social Democrat, a National Democrat or a liberal prior 
to independence. An astounding number of these people succumbed to chauvinistic ethnic 
nationalism, some also to reactionary anti-Semitism, within the course of just a few years.  
Later yet, some of them would betray democracy altogether by supporting the authoritarian 
regime.  
J. Akuraters, a famous Latvian poet and essayist, had been a Social Democrat and a 
hero of the Revolution of 1905. During the 1920s, he was one the main proponents of the 
so-called ‘Latvian orientation’, which presupposed the subjugation of the interests of 
Latvian minorities to the interests of the welfare of the core nation. H. Asars went from 
being a Social Democrat to the leading columnist of the chauvinistic newspaper Latvis, 
whose publisher, the politician A. Bergs, a famous anti-Semite, had been a dedicated 
liberal prior to Latvian independence. J. Jankavs, a talented essayist and a fervent Social 
Democrat, the protégé of P. Stu!ka himself, during the democratic years became one of 
Latvia’s first anti-Semitic theoreticians. The ideological metamorphosis of A. Kroders, 
another Social Democrat, has already been described earlier in this chapter. And of course, 
we must not forget the main Latvian theoreticians on the national question, M. Skujenieks 
and M. Valters, whose ideological transformations are described elsewhere in this thesis. 
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Dribins (1997) distinguishes between those Latvian intellectuals who spent World 
War One in Latvia and those who spent it as refugees in Russia; this line of argument was 
further developed by Za!e (2008). According to this view, those who had spent the war 
years in Russia developed radical anti-Russian and anti-imperial views; they actively 
promoted Latvian independence and constructed an ‘image of the ideal national state’ as a 
‘perfect realisation of Latvianness’ (Za!e 2008: 60). Upon their return home, they were not 
prepared to make any ‘ethnic compromises’ and their views grew more radical. Those 
intellectuals who had spent the war in Latvia reportedly did not share such radical views 
and ‘promoted the concept of a nation consisting of everyone who lived on Latvian 
territory at the time, including non-ethnic Latvians’ (Dribins 1997: 129). 
I would like to challenge this ‘radical refugee’ theory, and offer an alternative 
explanation. First of all, the division into radical ‘refugees’ and tolerant ‘home’ 
intellectuals simply does not work when applied more broadly.  For example, Skujenieks, 
Valters, Bergs, and Kroders had all spent the war years in Latvia. On the other hand, other 
Social Democrats, who had spent the war in Russia, like V. Bastj"nis and K. Lorencs, and 
also, for a shorter time, F. Ciel#ns, did not get the ethnic nationalist bug –while the once-
moderate Latvian Social Democrats P. Stu$ka and J. Dani%evskis, after spending the war in 
Russia, turned communist.   
It seems to me that a possible key to understanding this phenomenon of the 
intellectuals’ radicalisation is offered by J. K"rkli&% (1990), a famous journalist of the 
interwar period and also a Social Democrat in the past, in his memoir. K"rkli&% describes 
how many ex-socialists turned ‘dead against’ their former party members, and stresses that 
this was often not out of political conviction. For instance, K"rkli&% mentions how H. 
Asars, upon his return to Latvia, ‘as befitted an old revolutionary’, first of all tried, 
unsuccessfully, to secure employment at the newspaper Soci!ldemokr!ts. Within a couple 
of years, writes K"rkli&% (1990: 163), Asars was already employed by the bourgeois 
newspaper Latvis, being ‘the most fervent denier of socialism there’.  
In other words, I would like to suggest that being absent from Latvia during a 
crucial period of the fight for independence when the political elite was formed, and 
finding out upon one’s return that all key positions in the new state had already been taken, 
is a more likely cause of discontent on the part of the refugees and a more plausible 
explanation of their later radicalisation.  
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The ‘old revolutionaries’, as it often happens, could not adjust so easily to the 
realities of peaceful times; the construction of the new state, and especially the convoluted 
political games which accompanied it, required an entirely different set of skills. For 
example, Akuraters, after serving as a member of the National Council, left politics 
altogether. Valters, one of the ‘fathers’ of Latvian independence, was forced out of active 
politics into diplomacy; after an internal conflict within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he 
found himself stuck in the position of Latvian Consul General in the diplomatic backwater 
of Konigsberg (now Kaliningrad) for several years, a situation which he understandably 
loathed – he would only be rescued from there in 1934 by the authoritarian government of 
K. Ulmanis, to which he lent his ideological support (!ilde 1985: 206). Kroders was ousted 
from Latvijas Sargs by the Agrarian Union. Skujenieks stayed in politics and occupied the 
post of prime minister twice; he was personally well respected in the Latvian political 
world, by friends and foes alike. However, after the split with the LSDSP in 1926, his 
faction in the Parliament did not fare particularly well, with the majority of the ‘renegades’ 
returning to the big party soon after. His next political venture, the Progressive Union, had 
only three seats in the Saeima and was often mocked by fellow parliamentarians for 
Skujenieks’s inability to control the votes of his peers.  
 A. Bergs had himself never been a revolutionary, but sympathised with the 
Revolution of 1905, was one of the leaders of the National Council, and, according to 
Ciel"ns (1963 (III): 143-144), was one of the most active contributors to Satversme during 
its elaboration. However, his political party, under different names, continued to lose 
popular support: it had six mandates in the Constitutional Assembly, four in the First 
Saeima, three in the Second, two in the Third, and none in the Fourth. At the same time, as 
an heir to the famous Latvian real estate magnate, Bergs had run into financial difficulties, 
and his fortune was now dwindling. It is only logical to suppose that Bergs’s own political 
and personal misfortunes contributed to his notorious statement that ‘Satversme is not 
faring well’ [Satversme neiet], as well as to his growing intolerance towards the national 
minorities, in particular the Jews.  
Still, one ought not to get carried away with generalisations. There were plenty of 
Latvian leftist and liberally inclined politicians who stayed consistent in their views 
regardless of where they had spent World War One, or of how successful they were in their 
politics or business affairs. But the tendency of those dissatisfied with the reality of 
independent Latvia to fall back on ‘national patriotism’, which was more often than not 
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defined in negative terms – anti-foreign, anti-liberal, anti-Semitic, etc., brings to mind 
Schopenhauer’s famous definition of national pride (which he aptly calls ‘the cheapest sort 
of pride’) as a last resort of those who have failed elsewhere. (Schopenhauer 2006: 35)  
Stranga (1997: 36) offers a very interesting insight into the expansion of Latvian 
ethnic nationalism during the interwar republic, claiming that it  ‘started to blossom when 
the state had already been created, when nationalism as such had no goal any more; this 
belated nationalism attempted to compensate, with a re-doubled and unnecessary effort, for 
the omissions of the past’. The reasons behind it notwithstanding, the betrayal of the ideals 
of democracy, fairness, and justice by those members of the Latvian intelligentsia whom 
the general public revered as ‘independence fighters’ served as a powerful catalyst for the 
disintegration of democracy in Latvia.  
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Chapter Four: The Citizenship Law of 1919 and Minority Bargaining 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
‘Let the page of history be quoted where any nation, 
ancient or modern, civilized or savage, is mentioned, 
among whom no difference was made between the 
citizens on account of their extraction…’  
                (John Adams) 
 
 
The Latvian National Council’s Platform had famously declared that power in the 
Latvian Republic belonged to Latvia’s people. But who exactly were those people? The 
Citizenship Law adopted by the National Council on 23rd August 1919 provided an answer 
to this question: 
 
As a Latvian citizen shall be considered every subject of former Russia, irrespective 
of nationality and creed, who lives on Latvian territory, hails from districts forming the 
territory of Latvia, or who belonged already to such districts, in accordance with the 
Russian law, prior to August 1, 1914, and has up to the day of promulgation of the present 
law acquired no other citizenship.(Article 1)1  
The Latvian Citizenship Law of 1919 was, therefore, based both on jus soli, and on 
jus sanguinis. Jus soli, which grants citizenship on the basis of being born within a 
particular territory, has traditionally been regarded as more progressive (and more aligned 
with the principle of civic citizenship) than jus sanguinis, which bestows citizenship 
through descent. The distinction between civic and ethnic conceptions of nationhood 
loosely corresponds to the distinction between citizenship awarded on the basis of jus soli 
and on that of jus sanguinis, although many pieces of citizenship legislation in the world 
                                                
1 Likums par pavalstniec!bu: (lik. r!k. kr"j. 1919. g. 127. num. un 1927. g. 93. num.). Papildin"jumi likum" 
par pavalstniec!bu [1930. g. 5. febru"r!]. R!ga: 1930. The English text quoted as per: Flournoy Jr., R.W. and 
Hudson, M.O. (eds.) 1929. A Collection of Nationality Laws of Various Countries as Contained in 
Constitutions, Statutes and Treaties. New York, London, Toronto, Melbourne, and Bombay: Oxford 
University Press, p. 405. 
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employ both principles in different combinations, and the demarcating lines are sometimes 
blurred; overall, jus soli and jus sanguinis are perhaps best regarded as ideal types.       
 
Liebich (2007) asserts that in pre-modern Europe, both in the West and in the East, 
jus soli, rooted in the ‘communal citizenship’ of the estate system, was the prevalent 
principle. As it happened, World War One and subsequent international treaties radically 
changed the European concept of citizenship. 
 
When in the aftermath of WWI the map of Europe was re-drawn, nine new 
sovereign nation-states came into being, namely Austria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, 
Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. When 
the Allied and Associated Powers negotiated peace treaties with the defeated, the main 
principle applied in the nationality clauses of the Treaty of Versailles (28.06.1919), the 
Treaty of St. Germain (10.09.1919), and the Treaty of Trianon (04.06.1920) was the 
territorial one. However, as the main driver behind these states’ creation was the 
recognition of the right of small nations to self-determination, certain ethnic concessions 
were made – whereas the Treaty of Versailles took place of birth as a criterion for 
citizenship in addition to ‘habitual’ or ‘ordinary’ residence, the Treaties of St. Germain and 
Trianon explicitly mentioned ‘race and language’ as a criterion for the right of option. As 
Liebich (2007: 23) observes, ‘henceforth, territoriality, like social status in an earlier 
period, became a criterion of the past and ethnicity took the lead in regards to citizenship.’  
 
The citizenship laws adopted by the new European countries were initially based 
on both jus sanguinis and jus soli, like the Polish Citizenship Law of 31st January 1920, the 
first Estonian citizenship law (‘Resolution Concerning the Citizenship of the Democratic 
Republic of Estonia’, adopted by the Estonian National Council on 26th November 1918), 
the Lithuanian Provisional Citizenship Law of 9th January 1919, and the Act on Hungarian 
Nationality (originating from 1879, it remained in force until 1948; the Hungarian Act was 
also in force in Croatia and Slavonia until 1928 when a Yugoslavian Citizenship Law was 
adopted). Consequently, though, these laws were repeatedly amended or replaced in order 
to reinforce the jus sanguinis principle. In Estonia, for example, a new Citizenship Law 
was adopted in 1922. If the Resolution of 1918 had created the initial citizenry, the Law of 
1922 defined the rules of succession – in accordance with jus sanguinis. The explanatory 
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note to the new law justified the application of the jus sanguinis principle as an attempt to 
‘secure the state from an influx of suspicious persons’. (Rohmets 2006: 298) 
 
According to Cobban (1945), Central Europe thus bade farewell to the theory of 
self-determination ‘as it found expression in the American Revolution and in the first 
period of the French Revolution’, where it had been a ‘simple corollary of democracy’: 
 
In Central Europe the nation came to possess very different attributes. The idea of the 
culture nation, as we have seen, acquired priority over the political conception of the nation. 
Nationality was regarded as an objective rather than a subjective fact. National self-determination 
no longer implied an element of choice on the part of individuals: it was decided at birth. Strictly 
speaking, indeed, it ceased to be self-determination at all. The individual did not determine his 
nation; rather, the nation determined the individual. 
        (Cobban 1945: 53) 
 
Cobban describes this widespread trend as ‘the substitution of national determinism 
for self-determination’; national determinism, according to him, may be regarded as ‘a 
perversion of true self-determination’– introduced into political practices at the time, it 
arguably led to numerous practical difficulties. He asserts that in a less blatant form this 
distortion of the original principle was already present in the Versailles Treaty (Cobban 
1945: 54).    
 
By the mid-twenties, the jus soli principle was being increasingly regarded as an 
outdated remnant of the European feudal past. Jus sanguinis was widely found to be much 
more fitting for the era of nation-states. Even in an ‘Old’ European country like Britain, 
where jus soli had remained at the base of nationality legislation for centuries, and in the 
United States, another bastion of the ‘uniform citizenship by birth’, there were sparkling 
debates on the necessity for change.2   
 
The fate of the Latvian Citizenship Law of 1919 was no different from its other 
European counterparts – it would be repeatedly amended, in response to internal and 
                                                
2 See, for example, Henriques H.S.Q. and Schuster E.J., 1917. ‘ “Jus Soli” or “Jus Sanguinis”’, in: Problems 
of the War, Vol. 3, Papers Read before the Society in the Year 1917, pp. 119-131. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press on behalf of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law; Scott, J.B. 1930 
‘Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis’, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 24, No.1 (Jan. 
1930), pp. 58-64. 
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external, real and imagined threats, and for various bureaucratic and administrative 
reasons. Each of the four Latvian interwar parliaments would review it several times; it 
would inevitably come up during budget hearings, and in conjunction with government 
declarations, becoming a subject of elaborate epithets and tropes: ‘a chronic issue of 
Latvian politics’, ‘the most controversial issue in Latvian parliamentary life’, ‘the Jewish 
Law’, and the Van’ka-Vstan’ka3 of Latvian legislation. This most troubled piece of 
legislation of the interwar period would be amended in 1921 (three times), in 1927, 1930, 
1932, 1938, and in 1940 (three times; the last amendment of 30th July 1940 was signed by 
the Soviet appointee President A. Kirhen!teins). 
 
It is important to keep in mind that in 1918, when the National Council started 
debating the issue of Latvian citizenship, there were still no international legal norms 
regulating the issue in place, apart from the general de facto recognition that succession 
states were expected to grant citizenship to those habitually residing in their territories in 
order to avoid mass statelessness.4 But during what has become known as ‘the great 
unmixing of people’, practically all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe faced a 
particular predicament: as a result of the upheavals of the Great War, many of their 
original, antebellum residents were scattered abroad, while refugees from the neighbouring 
countries were still present in great numbers.  
 
In 1914, there were 2.6 million residents in Latvia, whereas in 1918 there were no 
more than 1.6 million; approximately 730,000–760,000 of Latvia’s residents had been 
uprooted and had fled to Russia, Finland and the unoccupied Baltic territories (Aizsilnieks 
1968: 20, 164; "ilde 1976: 42).5 Immediately after the war (more precisely – while Latvia 
was still occupied by the German forces), the refugees, accompanied by displaced people 
(including prisoners of war from both sides), started to arrive in Latvia from the East. The 
culmination of this was reached in 1921, when 95,000 refugees, optants (those exercising 
their right to option in nationality) and displaced persons entered Latvia.6 Until 1922, there 
                                                
3 Va!ka-vsta!ka - a Russian tilting doll, which springs back upright immediately after being brought down. 
4 There would be no such international norm in place until 1930, when Article 1 of the Hague Convention 
stipulated that ‘It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals’. This principle has 
remained in place until now – Article 3 of the European Convention on Nationality of 1997 posits: ‘Each 
State shall determine under its own law who are its nationals’. 
5 Skujenieks (1922: 294) estimates the number of wartime refugees from Latvia at 850,000, providing a 
footnote that the census of 1917 in R#ga was not carried out thoroughly. 
6 This figure is provided by J. Ozols, the editor of the Iek"lietu Ministrijas V#stnesis, who wrote a report on 
the Ministry of the Interior activities for the jubilee edition Latvija desmit gados (1928). Skujenieks (1922: 
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were also people travelling in the opposite direction – Ozols (1928) mentions Russian 
emigrants returning to their homeland from Europe and the United States to personally 
witness the greatness of the Bolshevik revolution (in 1921 alone, 135,000 people travelled 
through Latvia to Russia). But as early as spring 1922, Latvia started witnessing a constant 
stream of people escaping from Soviet Russia into Western Europe and across the Atlantic. 
According to the data of the Ministry of the Interior, in the period from November 1918 
until September 1928, a total of 236,229 refugees, displaced persons and optants arrived in 
Latvia. Another 248,743 (including 65,000 refugees from Soviet Russia) proceeded via 
Latvia to other destinations; many of them were stranded in Latvia for months and years 
awaiting the necessary travel documents and financial assistance from the Red Cross and 
other international organisations. (Ozols 1928). 
 
In this mayhem, separating those who had historical ties with Latvia from those 
who ended up in Latvia by accident was a formidable task. The Citizenship Law of 1919, 
which established permanent residence in Latvian territories prior to August 1914 as a 
necessary criterion for eligibility for Latvian citizenship, and the accompanying directives 
of the Ministry of the Interior, were primarily centred upon this task.  
 
The first draft of the Citizenship Law was reviewed by the National Council in 
August 1919. The draft envisaged granting Latvian citizenship to ‘all persons, irrespective 
of their ethnicity, belonging to the Latvian territories prior to August 1914’, which was a 
generous provision for its time, and arguably much more generous than the subsequent 
Latvian Citizenship Law of 1994. However, its insufficiently precise wording put one 
particular ethnic group in a disadvantaged position. After the assassination of Alexander II 
in 1881, the legal status of Jews had deteriorated, and those outside the Pale of Settlement 
(which included the Jews of R!ga, Jelgava and Liep"ja) were not allowed to stay there 
unless they were employed in their registered profession (Dribins 2002). This regulation, 
which remained in force until February 1917, was not always enforced thoroughly by the 
Russian authorities, who often turned a blind eye, but it nevertheless kept many Jews off 
the official registers, thus making them unable to prove that they ‘belonged’ as required by 
the draft law.  
 
                                                                                                                                              
210) mentions an even larger figure – according to him, 197,114 refugees returned to Latvia from Russia in 
1921 and 1922. 
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The Jewish deputy F. Lackijs (United Jewish Socialist Party) proposed an 
amendment to the draft to read ‘who resided in’ the Latvian territories instead of ‘who 
belonged to’ the Latvian territories. This proposal gained only 18 votes in favour, among 
them Paul Schiemann’s (who also circulated a letter explaining the necessity of the 
amendment to the Council’s members) and A. Bo!agovs (Russian National Democratic 
Party). The law was passed with its original wording.   
 
The next day, Jaun!k!s Zi"as published an article ‘Withstanding the pressure’, 
which painted the previous day’s session in a very dramatic light: 
 
During the National Council’s session on Saturday 23rd August, while debating the 
citizenship issue, Latvian statehood was put under considerable pressure from the minorities’ side. 
Their main objective was to remove all obstacles to free access to Latvian citizenship. The draft 
law was undergoing its third reading on Saturday. Citizenship is not envisaged for those who did 
not, according to Russian law, belong to the districts encompassing Latvia prior to 1st August 1914. 
The draft law envisages that such persons can submit a petition for citizenship to the Minister of 
the Interior, which is a pure formality. This formality is necessary just so that not all new arrivals 
will be able to obtain Latvian citizenship, but only those who truly want to become Latvian 
citizens. The minorities, however, consider this requirement to be a chauvinistic step towards 
driving out the foreign element from the community of Latvian citizens. For example, many Jews 
have not had rights to be legally registered here; therefore this limitation will also affect them, 
which is, in the minorities’ opinion, anti-democratic. 7  
 
The author concludes his article with speculation that all other considerations aside, 
the Baltic Germans, for one, ‘will be too proud to petition the Interior Minister’.  
 
Interestingly, another article, by E. Blanks, which appeared in Jaun!kas Zi"as a 
few days later, presented the motives of ethnic Latvians behind the Citizenship Law in a 
slightly different light. Blanks, referring to the precariousness of the Latvian situation, 
while it was still at war with Russia and not safe from Germany either, claimed that ‘what 
is being defined as chauvinism is that the state wants to sift out those Russian and Jewish 
elements who came to Latvia by chance during the war years and who have not made any 
                                                
7 Jaun!kas Zi"as Nr 76, 25.08.1919 ‘Iztur"t spiedienu’. 
Chapter 4: The Citizenship Law of 1919 and Minority Bargaining  
 
 
 
222 
sacrifices in the fight against the Bolsheviks’.8 At this point, Blanks apparently still 
believed, which was not the case with his later writings, that unity between Latvians and 
their minorities could be achieved after a successful ‘sifting out’:  
 
…We however hope that after several conspiracies have fallen through, our ill-wishers will 
abandon their attempts to sell out Latvian freedom. When this happens, the wall that exists between 
the Latvian people and the minorities will fall down. In all aspects, this wall’s collapse is totally 
dependent upon the minorities’ attitude towards Latvian sovereignty.9 
 
This early altercation between majority and minority deputies during the debates on 
the Citizenship Law at the National Council in 1919, when Article 1 was passed with its 
original wording despite active objections from the minority bloc, was just the start of a 
years-long saga in the history of Latvian lawmakers. The Citizenship Law would become a 
trump card in the political game which would be used by all players, majority and minority 
parties alike, when it suited their interests – which very often had little, or nothing at all, to 
do with the citizenship issue per se.  
 
In May 1921, the Legal Affairs Committee of the Constitutional Assembly rejected 
a draft amendment to the Citizenship Law submitted by the Minorities Bloc. The original 
draft amendment stipulated that Latvian citizenship was to be automatically granted to 
those who had resided in Latvia until August 1914, as well as to those who were residing 
in Latvia at the moment of the independence declaration on 18th November 1918. While 
the amendment was being reviewed by the Committee, it was modified to grant citizenship 
only to those who had been residing in Latvia for a period of not less than five years prior 
to 1st August 1914 and who had not yet acquired citizenship of another country. When the 
final version of the amendment was presented to the Constitutional Assembly, it was voted 
down by 55 votes to 27, with 20 abstentions (the Social Democrats and minorities voting 
against, the Agrarian Union abstaining). On 20th May 1921, L. Fi!manis (Jewish National 
Democratic Party) submitted a proposal to return the draft amendment to the Legal Affairs 
Committee for a second, substantive review, taking into consideration the Regulations of 
                                                 8 E. Blanks, ‘Chauvinisms’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, Nr 81, 30.08.1919. 
9 E. Blanks, ‘Chauvinisms’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, Nr 81, 30.08.1919. 
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the Russian Ministry of the Interior of 1893 (one regulation forbidding Jews to settle 
outside the Pale of Settlement, the other extending their term of stay by another year, and 
recommending against forcible expulsions) and the so-called Stolypin Regulation from 
1907 (allowing those Jews who settled outside the Pale of Settlement prior to 1906 and had 
acquired a family and household, to stay put). The proposal was rejected, with only the 
Social Democrats and minorities’ representatives voting in favour. The draft amendment 
was returned to the Committee without any specific instructions. On the next occasion, it 
was reviewed by the Constitutional Assembly on 30th September 1921.  
 
During the debates, F. Menders (LSDSP) proposes increasing the qualifying 
residency period from five years prior to 1914 to twenty, thus granting citizenship to the 
Jews who settled in Latvia in the 1880-1890s [known in Latvia as vosmidesyatniki – not to 
be confused with the identical term designating a 19th century intellectual movement in 
Russia] and their descendants. P. Schiemann (Baltic German Democrats) calls for the 
Assembly to follow the example of Poland and Bulgaria and to grant citizenship to every 
person residing in Latvia at the moment of the announcement of state independence. J. 
Pau!uks (Agrarian Union), responding to Schiemann, draws attention to the fact that the 
whole rationale behind the Latvian Law on Citizenship was ‘to give those who do not feel 
organic ties with Latvia an opportunity to opt out of Latvian citizenship’ [an argument that 
would be continuously recycled by the opponents of extended citizenship rights in the 
years to come]. Pau!uks, however, has no objections to granting citizenship to 
vos’midesyatniki. M. Skujenieks (Social Democrats Mensheviks) sides with Menders, 
supporting the twenty-year proviso. According to Skujenieks, granting citizenship to all 
those people who had been residing in Latvia for just five years prior to 1914 would be a 
mistake – those were precisely the years when the Latvian population was growing fast; 
later those people left Latvia, and if they are willing to come back, then it is only because 
of the improved life conditions here.  
 
The Menders/Skujenieks proposal was put to the vote, and was accepted 
unanimously, with only the German faction abstaining. The amendment was passed on the 
second reading. 
 
L. Fi"manis, in an interview to the newspaper Segodnya, summarised the existing 
state of affairs: ‘This partial solution of the citizenship issue is not, and cannot be 
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satisfactory. Nevertheless, I welcome this decision as a first step by Latvian society 
towards the just demands of Latvian minorities.’10  
 
The third reading in the Constitutional Assembly witnessed further attempts by the 
minorities to rectify the situation.  
 
M. Dubins (Agudat Israel) and A. Bo!agovs (Russian National Democratic Party) 
submit a proposal to decrease the residence requirement from twenty years to five, as was 
initially suggested by the Legal Affairs Committee. ". Trons (Jewish Zionists), M. Dubins, 
J. Hellmanis [Ge#man in another transcription] (Zeire Zion) and I. Berss (Bund) propose 
granting the right to those who currently reside outside Latvia but satisfy all other 
requirements stipulated in the law, to acquire Latvian citizenship on condition that they 
will be returning to Latvia within a year of the promulgation of the law, thus ensuring that 
all war-time refugees can freely return to their homeland. F. Trasuns (Latgalian Christian 
Agrarian Union) suggests excluding descendants of vos’midesyatniki from the scope of the 
law on the grounds that many of them have since left Latvia. J. Pau#uks (Agrarian Union) 
and F. Menders (LSDSPS) argue against Trasuns’ proposal as unjust. 
  
Both the proposals from Dubins and Bo!agovs, and from Trasuns, were rejected, 
with 76 and 69 votes against respectively. The proposal by Trons et al. got only 19 votes in 
favour, and was also rejected.  
 
On 7th October 1921, the Constitutional Assembly passed the amendment to the 
Law on Citizenship, adding a proviso that in order to qualify for Latvian citizenship, a 
documental proof of twenty years’ residence in Latvian territories prior to WWI should be 
submitted.  Article 1.1 of the Citizenship Law now read as follows:  
 
Likewise shall be considered as a citizen of Latvia every citizen of former Russia, 
irrespective of nationality and creed, who lives on Latvian territory, has up to the time of 
promulgation of this Article 1.1 not adopted another citizenship, and (a) prior to August 1, 
1914, has been permanently residing on Latvian territory at least twenty years, (b) or who 
                                                
10 ‘Latvija i evrei. Intervyu s dep. Fishmanom’. Segodnya, 02.10.1921. 
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prior to the year 1881has been permanently residing on Latvian territory, (c) or who is a 
descendant of persons mentioned in clauses (a) and (b). 
 The rights granted by this article shall not be extended to persons who have evaded 
service in the national Latvian army.11 
 
The amendment further diminished the possibilities for many members of the 
Latvian Jewish minority to acquire Latvian citizenship; it was difficult enough for some of 
them to provide any documental proof of ‘belonging’; to provide documental proof of 
permanent residence for twenty years was often beyond their reach.  
 
The next time the Citizenship Law came onto the agenda was during the 2nd session 
of the First Saeima, on 16th June 1923.  
 
M. Nurock (Jewish United National Bloc), speaking during the debates on the 
declaration of the second government of Z. Meierovics, draws attention to the fact that the 
future prime minister has included a new paragraph in the declaration, promising to make 
minority rights consistent with the requirements of the League of Nations. Nurock notes 
that other countries, like Czechoslovakia and Romania, have dealt with the citizenship 
issue ‘in accordance with the League of Nations’, granting citizenship to all residents at the 
time of either the start of the war, or the announcement of state independence. In Latvia, 
however, continues Nurock, many personal tragedies have occurred due to the Citizenship 
Law and re-evacuation [repatriation] provisions. Nurock offers his personal example for 
consideration: ‘Today, I have the honour of being a member of our country’s legislative 
body. But had I not returned [to Latvia] prior to 7th October 1921, I would have had to 
remain, for all time, outside my Fatherland despite the fact that my forebears starting with 
my great grandfather were rabbis of Tukums and are buried there.’12 Speaking on behalf of 
the national minorities, Nurock claims that:  
 
We are always ready to undertake full responsibilities, but we also demand full rights. Let 
small Latvia follow big England’s example! The citizens of the newly conquered colonies are 
                                                
11 ‘Satwersmes Sapulze’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 08.10.1921. The English text quoted as per: Flournoy Jr., R.W. 
and Hudson, M.O. (eds.) 1929. A Collection of Nationality Laws of Various Countries as Contained in 
Constitutions, Statutes and Treaties. New York, London, Toronto, Melbourne, and Bombay: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 406-407. 
12 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas II. sesijas 21. s!de 1923. gada 26. j"nij#, p. 585.  
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pliant and ready for sacrifices in the name of England. If we here enjoyed the same relations, then 
we would also have the certainty that in an hour of peril we would, shoulder to shoulder, sacrifice 
everything for the existence of the Latvian State.13 
 
The citizenship issue was brought up again during the state budget debates of July 
1923, when M. Dubins launched an attack on the Ministry of the Interior. 
 
Dubins claims that ‘…such a Citizenship Law as the one which exists in our 
country cannot be found in any other country. We have been so democratic, and we have 
gone so far that on 7th October 1921 we passed a law that allowed citizenship to those who 
had been living here for forty years. What we did is we granted citizenship to those who 
had been living here in 1880. This is how far our democracy goes!’14  Responding to a 
caustic remark by F. Trasuns, Dubins bitterly retorts: ‘I think I have lived in Latvia just as 
long as you have, and have just as many rights to Latvia as you do, as I was born here.’15 
 
In May 1924, the Saeima instructed the Cabinet of Ministers to revise and extend 
the Citizenship Law. On 28th October 1924, the draft amendments to Article 1.1 of the 
Law, which reduced the 20-year residence requirement to 10 years, were submitted to the 
Saeima’s Public Affairs Committee. Besides decreasing the required number of years of 
residence, the amendments also set a statute of limitations for citizenship applications. On 
20th March 1925, the amendments were presented for discussion at the Saeima.  
 
The rapporteur F. Ciel!ns (LSDSP) opens his speech with the statement that the 
Citizenship Law passed by the National Council on 23rd August 1921 was a ‘rather strict 
and harsh law’, which left one part of the people living in Latvian territories outside its 
scope, ‘regardless of the fact that those persons had been living in Latvia for decades and 
had economic and social ties to Latvia’.16 He continues that the Saeima’s Public Law 
Committee, after discussing the draft law, had acknowledged that it would be desirable, 
and necessary, to go even further [in relaxing restrictions] than foreseen by the draft. The 
Committee acknowledged that even a 10-year residence requirement was not necessary, 
and that being a permanent resident prior to 1st August 1914 would be sufficient for 
                                                
13 Ibid.  
14 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas II. sesijas 27. s!de 1923. gada 5. julij", p. 762.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas VII. sesijas 18. s!de 1925. gada 20. mart", p. 798.  
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eligibility for automatic citizenship. According to Ciel!ns, the main motive behind the 
Committee’s resolution was an unwillingness to create a rather large number of stateless 
people.  
 
The Public Law Committee, announces Ciel!ns, has recognised that the status quo 
cannot be justified from a legal point of view, as the common practice within international 
law is, largely, to provide citizenship to all residents at the moment of the state’s 
proclamation. Ciel!ns continues that holders of the so-called Nansen passports (he cites 
data from the Ministry of the Interior that the number of those former Russian citizens 
stands at 18,000; Ciel!ns notes, however, that as not all of them were residing in Latvia 
prior to the war, the actual number was even lower) have to apply for residence permits 
annually; they are put in a legally disadvantaged position which causes them suffering, and 
this cannot be justified in the long term. If at the beginning of its existence, the Latvian 
State, stresses Ciel!ns, perceived itself as insufficiently strong and insufficiently secure, 
and there were reasons to worry about possible lack of loyalty on the part of those who did 
not perhaps originate from Latvia, and therefore had no real ties with Latvia, then those 
times are long gone. Now, when so many years have passed since the foundation of the 
state, when Latvia has fortified its positions both externally and internally, there are no 
possible reasons to think that those persons may be ‘noxious and dangerous’ for Latvia. 
…Therefore, summarises Ciel!ns, taking into consideration general, juridical, as well as 
political motives, the Public Law Committee has recognised that the Citizenship Law 
should be improved further than was done within the scope of the draft submitted by the 
Cabinet of Ministers on 28th October.   
 
Stressing that it is a common mistake to think that the possible beneficiaries of the 
amendments were exclusively people of Jewish nationality, whereas there are also Poles, 
Lithuanians and a certain number of ethnic Latvian colonists from the Pskov and 
Novgorod regions of Russia who stand to benefit from the proposed amendments, Ciel!ns 
concludes:  
 
I have to say that these amendments will eliminate the injustice created by the Citizenship 
Law of 1919.  By eliminating the existing injustice we will only prove that the Latvian State has 
grown strong, that it is fair towards everybody who was living in Latvian territories prior to the 
war, who have ties with the Latvian territories. This law will give them an opportunity to adopt 
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Latvian citizenship and by doing this to take equal participation in the creation of Latvia’s 
statehood, and to undertake all those rights and obligations that Latvia provides for its citizens.17  
 
It is noteworthy that Ciel!ns, in fact, equates formal citizenship with ‘equal 
participation in the creation of Latvia’s statehood’. The next speaker, L Fi"manis (Jewish 
United National Bloc), reiterates the point, appealing to Parliament members with an 
affirmation that although the citizenship question has come to be viewed in Latvia as an 
essentially ‘Jewish matter’, it is, from a legislative point of view, not a minority matter, but 
a matter of the state: ‘Citizenship is not a privilege; it is an inalienable right, regardless of 
ethnicity. But here it is being turned into a political matter, and as long as politics are 
concerned, then, of course, the Jew takes centre stage.’18 He adds bitterly that when the 
Russian reactionaries of the Tsarist government made scapegoats out of minorities, it was 
at least understandable, but when it happens in the free democratic Latvian republic, ‘it is 
just too sad and too difficult to accept’.19 
 
M. Dubins (Agudat Israel) expresses a similar sentiment and observes that at the 
time ‘we felt weak’ and it was forgivable to pass such a law, but within two years the 
mistake has become obvious. ‘We are always intimidated by the threat of too many 
minorities present here, and that they can spoil everything. …. But look at 
Czechoslovakia… By giving rights to all residents, the state can only grow stronger. Then 
all residents feel like children, not like stepchildren. Everybody who becomes a citizen 
feels that he should stand by the state,’ – he pleads with his audience.20  
 
Dubins then attacks M. Skujenieks, who as the Head of the State Department of 
Statistics, has warned in a previously published article that if the residence requirement 
were reduced to 10 years, Latvia would be flooded with 230,000 foreigners.21 According to 
the explanation provided by Skujenieks to the Saeima’s Committee of Public Affairs, says 
Dubins, that was the number of people presently outside Latvia who would be able to 
return if the amendments were passed. Dubins sarcastically invites Skujenieks to actually 
read the draft law, pointing out that it would only affect those already present in Latvia.  
                                                
17 Latvijas Republikas Saeimas VII. sesijas 18. s!de 1925. gada 20. Mart#, p. 801. Translation mine. 
18 Ibid., p. 801. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p. 802. 
21 Darba Balss 27.10.1922. 
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A month later, on 21st April 1925, when the Saeima resumed discussions of the 
draft amendments, M. Laserson (Zeire Zion) expresses optimism from the tribune that the 
day has come when the law will finally be passed [apparently, among minority deputies 
expectations were running high]. Recalling how during one of the previous sessions, the 
Chair of the Public Law Committee, J. Goldmanis (Agrarian Union) commented: ‘Here 
comes the Jewish Citizenship Law!’, Laserson states: ‘Although I am a Jew, I am going to 
speak about the Latvian Citizenship Law, not about a Jewish Citizenship Law, as Mr 
Goldmanis does.’22 Laserson, a law professor, then delivers an in-depth analysis of the 
legal background to the citizenship issue. The Latvian Citizenship Law, says Laserson, is 
based upon the principles of both jus sanguinis and jus soli. Jus soli, he continues, is being 
increasingly – and unjustly – recognised as outdated in the field of international law 
studies. Lasersons refers to the work of the French jurist A.G. de Lapradelle, whose book 
La Loi Polonaise de 1920 sur la Nationalité et les Traités de Versailles (1924) criticised 
the treatment of minorities in Poland and defended the principle of domicile as a basis for 
awarding citizenship. Laserson draws everybody’s attention to the fact that permanent 
residence should in no way be confused with ‘registration’: 
 
Our existing administrative practice is such that the registration requirement is only applied 
to minorities, not to ethnic Latvians. It needs to be said out loud that although our Citizenship Law 
is based upon both principles, jus sanguinis is applied exclusively to ethnic Latvians. But if it is a 
minority representative, than we start to question him about belonging, about registration, about 
how many years he has lived there, and whether he is a true inhabitant of Kurzeme or not. Then we 
also aim to distinguish between Kurzeme Jews, and foreign Jews.  But let me tell you that this 
difference is not very pronounced, and that you would never be able to determine it legally.’23  
 
Laserson concludes that the amendments under review will not really change 
anything; nor do they contain any revolutionary principles. He also accuses the Social 
Democrats Mensheviks of changing their position on the citizenship issue in view of the 
upcoming elections: ‘The Mensheviks, who will stand as a separate party, need to prove 
that they are not worse chauvinists than the Latvian bourgeois parties, that they are not 
                                                
22 Saeimas VIII. sesijas 1. s!de 1925. gada  21. apr"l", p. 36. 
23 Saeimas VIII. sesijas 1. s!de 1925. gada  21. apr"l", p. 36. 
Chapter 4: The Citizenship Law of 1919 and Minority Bargaining  
 
 
 
230 
much different…Mr. Skujenieks is constantly trying to prove that our state is endangered, 
that citizenship will be handed out to thousands of Jews and Russians, etc.’24 
 
Skujenieks responds to Laserson, calling his accusations about the persecution of 
minorities in Latvia ‘incomprehensible’, as in Skujenieks’ own opinion, very few countries 
in Europe can be found where the minorities’ situation is as favourable as in Latvia; 
however, Latvia must be protected from the ‘millions of Russian emigrants who have 
flooded Europe’.25 
 
Dubins counters Skujenieks by arguing that since the amended Law will not apply 
to those who arrived in Latvia after 1914 and 1918, it can only increase the number of 
Latvian citizens by six, eight or a maximum of nine thousand people, not more. He once 
again asks why, in this case, Skujenieks, being the Head of the State Statistics Department, 
was speaking demagogically about 250,000 potential new citizens? 
 
A summary of the debates is provided by the rapporteur F. Ciel!ns: ‘The draft law 
has been criticised from both sides. On the one side, it has been criticised for going too far, 
and on the other – for changing too little.’ Responding to those who thought that the law 
was going ‘too far’, Ciel!ns rebukes Skujenieks for ‘spending a lot of time criticising the 
law’ and expresses support for the view that out of 18,000 Nansen passport-holders only a 
part will become Latvian citizens, estimating the total figure at no more than 10,000.  
 
The draft law was then put to a vote, and was defeated, with 40 votes for vs. 43 
votes against. 
 
When in December 1925, K. Ulmanis (Agrarian Union) delivered his second 
government’s declaration to the Saeima, he announced that ‘minorities should be provided 
with cultural autonomy within the same limits as up until now. Administrative practice in 
relation to schooling, ethnicity, citizenship, land and economic matters should be strictly in 
compliance with the law and democratic requirements.’26 This part of the declaration did 
not spark debates on the citizenship issue at the time, but later it became apparent that 
                                                
24 Saeimas VIII. sesijas 1. s!de 1925. gada  21. apr"l", p. 37. 
25 Saeimas VIII. sesijas 1. s!de 1925. gada  21. apr"l", p. 39. 
26 II. Saeimas I. sesijas 9. s!de 1925. gada 22/23 decembr", p. 193. 
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minorities had perceived the statement as a veiled promise to treat minority citizenship 
applicants fairly at least in practice.  
 
As P. Schiemann puts it in his response to the government declaration, ‘to say just a 
few words about national needs, it is absolutely clear to us that what is said in the 
declaration may both mean a lot, or mean nothing at all. Nor do we believe that we will be 
able to satisfy our just national demands while the harsh legislative act [the Citizenship 
Law] is being strictly obeyed and implemented.’27 However, continues Schiemann, the 
minorities’ national demands can be satisfied only in an atmosphere of mutual 
understanding, and the only way to this mutual understanding lies through mutual work for 
state welfare. [N. Maizels (Bund) exclaims from his seat: ‘Even with the nationalists?’]. 
Yes, declares Schiemann firmly, ‘even with the nationalists, because it is the nationalists, 
above all, that we [the minorities] have to convince that our demands in no way contradict 
the national interest, which we deeply respect’.28 
 
The declaration of the next Prime Minister, A. Alberings (Agrarian Union), 
presented to the Saeima on 4th May 1926, made just a cursory nod to the minorities: 
‘Minorities should be provided with cultural autonomy within the same limits as up until 
now.’29 Just three weeks later, on 24th May 1926, a group of left-wing parliamentarians (N. 
Maizels from the Bund, and K. B!meisters, J. Rudzis, F. Menders , E. Morics, B. Kalni"# 
and A. Petrevics – all LSDSP) submitted the following legislative initiative: ‘The 
Citizenship Law should be amended to include every person currently residing in Latvia 
who was a permanent resident within Latvian borders prior to 1st August, 1924.’ The 
initiative would not resurface again, presumably having been lost while being passed from 
one parliamentary committee to another.  
 
M. Dubins brought up the citizenship issue again during the 1926-27 budget 
hearings in June 1926, referring to the promises made by the previous government of K. 
Ulmanis in its declaration of 1925. ‘The government indicated in the declaration that it 
wanted to solve the citizenship issue through administrative measures; that it would be 
possible to grant citizenship to those who were still in the position of foreigners through 
                                                
27 II. Saeimas I. sesijas 9. s$de 1925. gada 22/23 decembr%, p. 218. 
28 Ibid. 
29 II. Saeimas III. sesijas 11. s$de 1926. gada 4. maij&, p. 396. 
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the Cabinet of Ministers. But has it happened?’30 No, says Dubins, and sets out the figures 
to prove it: before Ulmanis’s government came to power, about 100 people had gained 
citizenship through applications to the Cabinet of Ministers. Since the procedure was 
supposedly simplified, that number has increased to 120, 130 or a maximum of 140 people. 
If it continues at this rate, it will go on like this for approximately another 25 years. 
Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the citizenship issue cannot be resolved through 
administrative measures, concludes Dubins. The moment is ripe to finally set things right, 
he says, and even Mr. Skujenieks, who used to be the greatest opponent of the 
amendments, is now inclined to admit that he, Dubins, was right from the start. Therefore, 
as even former opponents no longer object, Dubins expresses the hope that the 
amendments will not cause big discussions this time around, and that the Saeima will be 
able to vote positively ‘one of these days’. 
 
However, it was not until November 1926 that the Citizenship Law was reviewed 
again in the Saeima; on that occasion, the debates were remarkably reminiscent of those 
that would be provoked, some seventy year later, by the Citizenship Law of 1994. 
 
The rapporteur N. Maizels starts his speech by calling the Citizenship Law a 
‘chronic issue’ of Latvian political life, which has attracted a lot of attention in both 
society and the press. Nevertheless, he continues, nobody can say that the issue has been 
clarified.  The main misunderstanding, says Maizels, concerns the issue of naturalisation. 
Many find the Latvian Citizenship Law very liberal – and perhaps it is, concedes Maizels, 
for those who want to naturalise. But naturalisation means a new citizenship for 
immigrants who came to the country after it had already gained independence, stresses 
Maizels, and we are talking here about people who had been living in the Latvian 
territories prior to state independence, which is a totally different issue. To those people, 
claims Maizels, a principle of international law that clearly stipulates that citizens of a 
newly founded state are those citizens of the predecessor state who resided within the new 
state’s boundaries at the moment of independence, should be applied instead. 
Unfortunately, continues Maizels, ‘this democratic principle was not taken into account 
and introduced in Latvia. The basis of the Law of 1919 was the archaic principle of 
‘registration’ borrowed from the old Tsarist jurisprudence; this principle does not 
                                                
30 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas III. sesijas 22. s!de 1926. gada 1. j"nij#, p. 811.   
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withstand any criticism from a modern democratic standpoint.’31 According to Maizels, the 
amendments of 1921, which substituted the principle of ‘registration’ for a ‘period of 
residence’, in practice have changed very little, because the introduced residence period 
requirement of 20 years defeated the purpose of the law. He calls everybody’s attention to 
the fact that the citizenship issue is being raised two or three times by each Saeima, and 
that there are few people left who believe amendments are not necessary. Maizels yet again 
emphasises the point that the citizenship issue is not a ‘minority issue’: ‘This is a painful 
question. And it is not a minority question, but a principal, constitutional state question. 
Every state should be able to define the body of its citizens. This question should be 
answered clearly. A situation where tens of thousands are not citizens of any state is not 
acceptable.’32 A true socialist, the Bund deputy Maizels also brings a social angle to the 
citizenship issue: in his interpretation, these are the poorest layers of society, workers who 
have the most at stake, as they are not in a position to either ‘negotiate’ their citizenship or 
‘facilitate’ the process with the help of money.  
 
Unexpectedly, a lethal blow was then dealt to the draft law by K. Di!lers (Radical 
Democrats), a prominent lawyer and later a law professor at the Latvian University 
specialising in state law. 
 
Di!lers starts his speech along the same lines as Maizels, stating that it is difficult 
to speak about the citizenship issue as it is surrounded by so many preconceptions. 
Preconception number one, according to Di!lers, is the widespread opinion that the 
citizenship question is a minority rights issue; and that everybody who does not support the 
suggested amendments from which minorities would benefit, is immediately branded an 
opponent of minority rights. This is a false proposition, insists Di!lers:  
 
I think that we should understand the terms ‘national minorities’, or our ‘ethnic minorities’ 
as meaning  ‘our citizens’ regardless of which ethnic group they belong to. We are all equal 
citizens. This is guaranteed to us by our democratic constitution, and I think there is absolutely no 
reason to say that Latvian citizens belonging to a national majority have a propensity to limit in any 
way, or to oppress those Latvian citizens who belong to national minorities. ’33  
 
                                                
31 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. sesijas 16. s"de 1926. gada 30. novembr#, p. 778. 
32 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. sesijas 16. s"de 1926. gada 30. novembr#, p. 778. 
33 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. sesijas 17. s"de 1926. gada 3. decembr#, p. 781. 
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That said, Di!lers moves over to the next ‘preconception’, namely ‘thinking that 
extending the grounds for citizenship acquisition is a somewhat democratic principle, 
which all democrats should defend; and that if one gets it into one’s head to disagree with 
it, one immediately comes into opposition with some democratic principle.’ Not at all, says 
Di!lers. Acquiring citizenship is, on the one hand, a legal act. On the other hand, in 
Latvia’s particular situation, i.e. after the state has been in existence for quite some time, 
and the citizenship issue has been satisfactorily solved, to grant citizenship to an entirely 
new group of people is not a legal issue any more, but a political issue. And it should not 
be mixed up with any democratic principle, admonishes Di!lers.  
 
Preconceptions put aside, Di!lers summarises the status quo by claiming that the 
Citizenship Law of 1919 and the Amendments of 1921 ‘have already resolved the 
citizenship issue’:  ‘I could say that Latvian citizenship, in accordance with those 
legislative acts, is being applied to all those persons who have any relevant ties with the 
Latvian territory’. 34 
 
Di!lers then dismisses the specific reasoning in favour of amendments that has 
been previously articulated by minority representatives: the ‘archaic registration principle’. 
This is not vital, says Di!lers, as it is only one of the three applicable principles, along with 
birthright and belonging. Another objection he raises against the amendments is that they 
aim at granting citizenship to those who only resided in Latvia for six months prior to 
independence without so much as asking whether they are willing to become citizens:   
 
Possibly, among those persons are emigrants who do not want to become Latvian citizens. 
I assume that among Russian emigrants living in Latvia there are also monarchists who do not want 
to become citizens of a democratic Latvia. But the draft law suggests granting citizenship to people 
who may not even accept it when given; or they may turn out to be very bad citizens, to be 
elements hostile to democratic Latvia. 35 
 
Finally, he moves to the concluding part of his speech, stressing again that the 
citizenship question is not a legal, but a political matter, and blatantly contradicting his 
earlier assurances that ‘we are all equal citizens’:  
                                                
34 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. sesijas 17. s"de 1926. gada 3. decembr#, p. 782. 
35 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. sesijas 17. s"de 1926. gada 3. decembr#, p. 783. 
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 If we amend the Law and expand the body of Latvian citizens in this way, quite possibly 
we will increase the number of ethnic minority members in Latvia. It is understandable that 
minorities are trying to increase their own numbers so that they can have a bigger influence in the 
life of the state; this is an understandable political aspiration. If the state accommodates this 
aspiration and increases the number of Latvian citizens through the proposed legislation … then the 
state will have taken a political step towards increasing the number of citizens belonging to ethnic 
minorities. In no way do I want to adopt a hostile position towards ethnic minorities. I regard them 
as citizens just as I regard everyone else, but we need to be clear about whether we, with such a 
political step, want to fortify the minority element. If we do it consciously, then we can do it, but it 
is not a democracy question, and neither is it a question of necessity.36  
 
The last part of Di!lers’s speech is dedicated to those ethnic Latvians ‘scattered 
abroad’, whose number he estimates at 300,000:  
 
If we speak about expanding the Citizenship Law to a new group of potential citizens, 
which will result in an increase in those belonging to ethnic minorities and in an amplification of 
their influence; then using the occasion I would like to remind you that the Latvian state’s task is 
first of all, in my opinion, to do something significant in order to bring those ethnic Latvians, who 
are still in exile, back to Latvia.37  
 
To bring those people home, posits Di!lers, is not just an obligation of the Latvian 
state, it is its right to first of all bring those belonging to the Latvian nation to Latvia, so 
that all flock together, just as Jews flock to Palestine. This, he insists, must be done ‘before 
we grant citizenship to ethnic minority groups to whom Latvia, after all, is not a national 
abode’. Only then, concludes Di!lers, can the Latvian state afford to think of increasing the 
number of citizens belonging to ethnic minorities.38 
 
With his prolonged speech, Di!lers ingeniously dismantled the case that it had 
taken minority deputies years to build, with only the Social Democrats lending them 
occasional support. In just one intervention, he managed to cast doubt on the applicability 
of ideas of democracy and principles of minority rights to the citizenship issue; questioned 
                                                
36 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. sesijas 17. s"de 1926. gada 3. decembr#, p. 784. 
37 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. sesijas 17. s"de 1926. gada 3. decembr#, p. 785. 
38 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. sesijas 17. s"de 1926. gada 3. decembr#, p. 785. 
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the sustainability of the legal aspect of the proposed amendments; intimidated the audience 
with an image of a horde of future citizens hostile to the state; raised the alarm about the 
possible amplification of minorities’ influence in the life of the state; and finally, in a 
brilliant diversion, substituted the issue of citizenship with the entirely different (but sacred 
to every nationally-minded ethnic Latvian) issue of ‘leavers’ – those Latvians who had 
settled in various regions of Russia over a period of decades in the quest for better life 
conditions. (Incongruously, while the plight of those people received much sympathy from 
ethnic Latvians back at home, those Latvian Jews who had moved to Russia for exactly the 
same reasons [and who were actually fleeing from much fiercer oppression] were regarded 
as traitors who did not deserve a chance to return).  
 
Strictly speaking, none of Di!lers’s theses were new or original – all these ‘anti-
minorities’ arguments had been continuously regurgitated by Latvian nationalists for the 
previous eight years in public discourse and in the press. Many of these arguments had 
made their way into the Saeima itself, where, albeit in a much more implicit fashion, they 
would be used against the Minorities Bloc in the heated debates. But having these 
arguments recited by Di!lers, the country’s foremost expert on national legislation and a 
much-respected man of impeccable democratic credentials, in his clear and cohesive 
manner and from the tribune of the national parliament, was an entirely different matter. 
All pretences were dropped – majority-minority relations were transferred into a harsh new 
realm.  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the next speaker, K. B"meisters (LSDSP), speaks in a 
somewhat apologetic tone: observing that many people have come to believe that it is the 
minorities who are most interested in the Citizenship Law’s amendments, he says:  
 
I have got to say that, possibly, to a large extent the Cabinet of Ministers is now granting 
citizenship to those who do, for the most part, belong to ethnic minorities. But we should not forget 
that not only among minorities, but also among the members of our ruling nation, Latvians, there 
are still those for whom the citizenship question has not been solved.39  
 
                                                
39 Latvijas Republikas II. Saeimas IV. sesijas 17. s#de 1926. gada 3. decembr$, p. 787. 
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Referring to a recent article in the newspaper Latvis, B!meisters quotes the 
following numbers: out of 119 people who were granted citizenship at the latest session of 
the Cabinet of Ministers, 38 were Jewish, 30 Latvian, 19 German, 16 Russian, plus some 
Lithuanians and Poles. According to B!meisters, those figures alone prove that a large – 
around one quarter – percentage of all citizenship applicants actually come from applicants 
of Latvian ethnic origin. Expressing regret that more precise statistics about new citizens 
and their ethnic composition are not available and that one has to rely on newspaper 
clippings, Bumeisters nevertheless expresses the certainty that the three biggest ethnic 
groups who would benefit from the amendments are Jews, Latvians, and Russians; then 
Germans, Poles, and, finally, Lithuanians. So it would not be right, he says, to treat the 
citizenship question as a minority question, when it should rather be treated as a question 
affecting all ethnic groups residing in Latvia. Bumeisters then nods to the class aspect, 
claiming that the citizenship question has become ‘a social evil’ in Latvia, affecting mostly 
the economically disadvantaged segments of the population who have no financial means 
to ‘facilitate’ the acquisition of citizenship. 
 
Another interesting point raised by B!meisters is his claim that under the current 
state of affairs, ‘the acquisition of citizenship is largely dependent upon the benevolence 
and mercifulness of the officials of the Ministry of Interior’. In conjunction with the 
numerous references made by other speakers to ‘citizenship being sold and bought’, and 
about easier ways of acquiring citizenship for people of means (Dubins in the 20th March 
1925 session; Laserson on 21st April 1925), this suggests that not only was the whole 
existing mechanism of citizenship acquisition corrupted, but also that the fact of corruption 
was well-known to the public.   
 
B!meisters also provides an insight into the behind-the-scenes dealings 
surrounding the Citizenship Law. The Social Democrats, he re-affirms, have always been 
committed to the eradication of this ‘social evil’ (referring to the lack of citizenship among 
many Latvian residents). However, he continues, some political forces in Latvia use it as a 
bargaining tool: 
 
If they are in need of minorities’ support, then our right-wing political groupings hand out 
promises to solve the citizenship question in a practical fashion. We do not even need to look into 
the distant past for the proof – just last summer, when we [the Social Democrats and the Bund 
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deputy Maizels] submitted a proposal about a solution to the citizenship question, it was rejected 
by the Saeima. But when Dubins, a member of Ulmanis’s coalition, submitted a similar proposal, 
then the right wing looked at it differently and voted for it. [Interruptions from right-wing 
deputies]. Yes, you passed it to the committee…But even this, certainly, was only possible because 
certain promises had been given. When the Ulmanis Cabinet needed a couple of extra votes in 
order to raise customs duties, then he promised to expedite the resolution of the citizenship 
question and reach a favourable settlement by giving his support to reviewing the matter again. Our 
leading political groups treat the citizenship issue as a last resort: when nothing else helps, when 
they are going down, then they turn to the minorities and say: ‘We will support a speedy solution to 
the citizenship issue, just please vote with us!’40 
 
P. Jura!evskis (Democratic Centre) calls the citizenship question ‘the most 
controversial issue in Latvian parliamentary life.’ He expresses his unequivocal support for 
the point of view that the Citizenship law should not grant citizenship to those ‘who could 
not be possibly be of use to the state, but who would only burden the state with yet new 
responsibilities towards them.’  
 
M. Skujenieks (Union of Social Democrats-Mensheviks and Farm Workers) 
reminds the audience that on many previous occasions he already had the opportunity to 
point out that the suggested amendments ‘are out of place’, because apparently the 
question which has caused so many heated debates…is in its essence much less acute in 
Latvia than in other countries. Besides, he says, the draft law was prepared in haste, and is 
not worthy of the Saeima members’ consideration for the following reasons: posed as a 
‘minority question’, it does not pay attention to other former residents of Latvia…such as 
the ‘sea folk’ [fishermen] and Latvian colonists living abroad, who due to certain 
circumstances had difficulties in contacting a Latvian consul in their respective country in 
order to use their option of becoming Latvian citizens. Skujenieks continues that the 
proposed draft law wants instead to grant Latvian citizenship to those who in 1918, 1919 
and 1920 had an opportunity to acquire Latvian citizenship but who did not want to do so, 
as they were hostile towards Latvia. This draft law also wants to open Latvia’s doors to a 
horde of political emigrants hostile to Latvia. Skujenieks believes this is ‘out of place’.  
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Latvia’s situation is not exceptional, claims Skujenieks. According to the latest 
population census, he says, there are approximately 33,000 stateless persons in Latvia, who 
have arrived in the country over the last decade and, because the current state of order in 
Russia is not acceptable for them, decided to settle here. Everywhere in Europe, he says, 
these people live as nansenists. So they do now in Latvia…If we were to grant citizenship 
to them, says Skujenieks, they would only use it for extra comfort. He recalls how at the 
time of the first Riga city council elections in 1919, there were tens of thousands of people 
of ‘other ethnicity’ stating that they did not want to become Latvian citizens, but wanted to 
be Russian and German citizens. Now, when Latvia has strengthened her position, they 
have changed their minds, continues Skujenieks. 
 
Skujenieks also cites some statistical data as evidence that the existing law is in fact 
‘very tolerant’. First of all, he says, the number of Latvian citizens has grown lately - from 
94 per cent of all residents in 1920 to 96.5 per cent in 1925. The number of citizens of 
Latvian ethnicity has not changed, but the number of citizens of other ethnicities has 
grown: in 1920 only 79 per cent of Germans were citizens, but now – over 85 per cent; the 
percentage of citizen-Russians within the same time has grown from 86 to 96, and of 
Belarussians – from 91 to 97.  
 
Skujenieks is categorically against the first article of the amendments which 
proposes to grant citizenship to all those residing in Latvia on 1st January 1914. January 
1914, he argues, was a time when Latvia was experiencing an economic boom, and 
hundreds of thousands had arrived here from other regions – from Russia, from Lithuania 
and from Poland – in order to work in Latvian industrial enterprises. They have since left 
our country, says Skujenieks, but we would once again open our doors to them with these 
amendments. Skujenieks cautions: ‘The first article of the amendments…opens Latvia’s 
doors to an absolutely unpredictable number of people; and it is a big open question 
whether they are useful for our country economically, culturally or politically.’ 41 
 
The next speaker, Pau!uks (Agrarian Union), resorts to the perennial nationalists’ 
argument that ‘we cannot be so inhumane as to push our citizenship upon those who live 
here and are possibly just waiting to get out of Latvia but cannot do so because the eastern 
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borders are closed,’ and puts forward a proposal to remove the status of urgency of the 
amendments.42  
 
J. Breik!s (Democratic Centre) is concerned about a ‘big category of World War 
invalids’ who could acquire Latvian citizenship if the amendments were passed, 
simultaneously obtaining rights to a state pension and thus putting an extra burden on the 
state resources. Breik!s, along with Skuenieks and Pau"uks, is against the status of urgency 
for the law.  
 
The rapporteur N. Maizels, responding to all speakers, first of all tries to fend off 
the criticism of the draft law as being insufficiently well-prepared. While acknowledging 
that proponents of the amendments constituted a majority in the Saeima committee which 
developed the draft, he nevertheless asks where the opponents were all the time that the 
draft was in preparation, and why they never stopped by at the committee to voice their 
criticisms and objections. As for the disputed status of urgency in reviewing the draft law, 
Maizels acknowledges that the urgency came about because of ‘a certain political and 
psychological reaction’ to the systematic stalling of the amendments in the Saeima over the 
past five years. Responding to the objection made earlier by Breik!s, about the amended 
law allegedly granting citizenship to those who have evaded military service in the past, 
Maizels points out a discrepancy in his argument – on the one hand, he says, Breik!s is 
worried about those who eschewed military service becoming citizens; on the other, he is 
also concerned that the number of war invalids under the care of the state social services 
would grow.  
 
Speaking of the ‘they did not want to become Latvian citizens in the past’ 
argument, Maizels notes that it was discussed thoroughly at the committee. It should be 
recognised, he says, that at the moment of the independence proclamation, a certain part of 
the Latvian nation was less ‘ecstatic’ about it than others. And there are a certain number 
of ethnic Latvians who did not take part in the fight for independence; does this mean, says 
Maizels, posing a rhetorical question, that we should now deprive those people of their 
citizenship? Furthermore, says Maizels, the fate of Latvian independence was not decided 
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in 1918 alone – it was also determined during the struggles of 1915, and those workers 
who made sacrifices back then are now denied Latvian citizenship based on the fact that 
they were not officially ‘registered’ as Latvian citizens. Where is the justice in this, 
exclaims Maizels? Concluding his speech, he expresses the hope that the Saeima will 
decide to satisfy the ‘rightful claim of thousands of people’. 
 
The Saeima then voted down Pau!uks’s proposal to return the draft law to the 
committee, and proceeded to review it article by article.  
 
F. Ciel"ns, on behalf of the LSDSP faction, expresses dissatisfaction with the 
proposed amendments, especially with the creation of a new Article 1.2  – in his opinion, 
this new article would unnecessarily complicate the law itself and its subsequent practical 
application. He proposes cancelling the submitted amendment and putting those additional 
conditions which it stipulates as addendums to Article 1 of the existing law instead. With 
regards to the content of the aforementioned amendment, says Ciel"ns, the Social 
Democrats fully support granting automatic citizenship to those who now reside in Latvia, 
who had been living here prior to the war, who possess ties to Latvia, and who have not 
adopted another state’s citizenship. However, the Social Democrats strongly oppose the 
idea of granting citizenship to those who used to live in Latvia, but who over the past 
seven years, when there was already peace in Latvia, have chosen to remain abroad. Here, 
he says, we should also consider social motives – unemployment is rife in Latvia, and there 
is absolutely no need to aggravate the existing situation by bringing more people from 
abroad. Therefore, in the name of the LSDSP faction, Ciel"ns submits the following 
proposal: 
 
To cross out both the first, and the second draft amendments, and to formulate the 
following addendum instead: To express Article 1 of the Citizenship Law from 1919 as: 1.1. Also 
every citizen of the former Russian state, regardless of ethnicity and creed, who at the moment of 
this article’s promulgation is residing in Latvia, and who has not adopted another country’s 
citizenship, and a) who prior to 1st August 1914 had been residing in Latvia for at least six months, 
b) or who had been a permanent resident within the Latvian borders before 1881, c) or who is a 
descendant of persons mentioned in clauses a) and b).43 
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Pau!uks (Agrarian Union) takes the floor next, claiming that the proposal just 
voiced by Ciel"ns is unacceptable both in its form and in content. He contends that the 
proposal absolutely changes the content of the draft law by removing an entire group of its 
potential beneficiaries. According to Pau!uks, if the Saeima were to accept the proposed 
changes, than some of the people would lose the citizenship that they acquired under the 
Law of 1919.  
 
P. Schiemann proposes yet another version of an amended Article 1:  ‘all former 
citizens of Russia, who have not adopted another state’s citizenship, and who had been 
permanent residents in Latvia for six months prior to or since 1st August 1914, if within 
one month since the Law’s promulgation they inform their city authorities or a regional 
police department accordingly.’44 
 
Maizels, responding to the speakers, acknowledges that it would be better not to 
create a new sub-article 1.2, but just to correct the existing Article 1, as proposed by 
Ciel"ns. However, the Committee could not pursue that option because of the two existing 
categories of citizens, divdesmitganieki and asto!desmitgadnieki, whose privileges over 
the others, the Committee believed, it did not feel right to remove. Maizels also draws 
Pau!uks’s attention to the fact that the amended law will not have backdated validity, so his 
concerns about existing citizens being suddenly deprived of their citizenship are 
unfounded. Maizels, on behalf of the Committee, objects to both Ciel"ns’s and 
Schiemann’s proposals on the grounds that they both contradict the draft law’s content. 
 
The Chairman of the Saeima P. Kalnin# put three proposals to the vote: the above-
mentioned proposals by Ciel"ns and Schiemann, and another one by Skujenieks, which 
simply reads ‘To cross out Article 1.1 and the footnote’. Ciel"ns was voted down, but both 
Skujenieks’s and Schiemann’s proposals went through. Voices from the audience:  ‘Jews 
have earned some applause!’  
 
The Saeima then proceeds to review Article 1.2 of the draft law. V. Firks (Baltic 
German Party) proposes to cross out Article 1.2 and to replace it with a following footnote 
to Article 2: ‘Citizens who due to violation of Article 2 have lost their rights to Latvian 
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citizenship, but who have not adopted another state’s citizenship, can regain those rights if 
within three months since the promulgation of these amendments they return to Latvia, or 
register as Latvian citizens at one of the Latvian diplomatic offices abroad.’ Notably, Firks 
asks for a secret ballot. 
 
Ciel!ns categorically objects to Firks’s proposal [‘Or is it Pau"uks’s proposal – it is 
really hard to tell’, he sarcastically remarks, causing laughter in the audience].   
 
Maizels refuses to comment on Firks’s proposal without having discussed it with 
the Committee. In the meantime, P. Kalni#$ announces that several signatures have been 
collected in support of the secret ballot – those of K. Kellers (Baltic German party), 
V.Firks, R. Vittenbergs (Agudat Israel), J. H%ns (Baltic German Party), P. Schiemann, A. 
Alslebens (Baltic German Party), E. Ticho#ickis and J. Pommers (Bloc of Russian 
Orthodox Voters, Russians and United Organisations), and I. Jupatovs (Old Believers). 
Firks’s proposal is put to the vote, and is passed. Then the Speaker asks the members of the 
parliament to vote for the draft law in its entirety on the second reading.  It is voted down, 
drawing a round of applause from the left wing. 
 
During the next Parliamentary session on 7th December 1926, Maizels, B&meisters 
and others submit a proposal to return the draft law to the Public Law Committee with the 
aim of developing, within a week, amendments to the Citizenship Law which would 
stipulate that ‘everybody who had been residing in Latvia prior to 1st August 1914, and 
who is residing in Latvia now, is considered to be a Latvian citizen.’45 This proposal gains 
only 47 votes, and is therefore rejected. 
 
On 17th December 1926, Skujenieks presented his government’s declaration to the 
Saeima. What followed can probably be considered the liveliest session of the interwar 
Saeima, when many truths were uncovered and mysteries revealed. The government’s 
declaration only mentioned minorities in passing: ‘In its work, the government will be fair 
towards all Latvian citizens regardless of ethnicity and creed.’46 However, it was precisely 
the ‘cooperation with minorities’ that became unexpectedly central to the ensuing debates.  
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It was A. Kl!ve (Agrarian Union) who first brought the issue up: ‘I have to point 
out that the minorities are very much involved in this cabinet. Not for nothing has it 
become known in society as Nurock’s cabinet.’ A remark from the audience ‘And yours – 
as Dubins’s cabinet!’, followed by laughter. Kl!ve dismisses this insult as ‘unfounded’ 
because, according to him: 
  
…We [Agrarian Union] always, on all occasions, wanted to keep a certain line of 
understanding with the minorities. [Disturbances in the audience]. And Mr. Di"lers should also be 
aware that since the moment of Latvia’s independence we at the Agrarian Union have always 
followed that line of understanding with the minorities. Because of this determination, we have 
heard many admonitions from you and from your predecessors; you accused us of selling Latvia to 
the minorities… but now it seems that you agree with our policies…47 
 
Kl!ve then poses a direct question – why has the so-called ‘second part’ of the 
government’s declaration, a secret part allegedly containing promises to minorities which 
had been traded for Nurock’s help with the cabinet arrangements, not been made public? ‘I 
think it is because there are people in this House, including Mr. Di"lers, who would not 
vote for you then.’48 
 
The most piquant detail, continues Kl!ve, is that the new cabinet is based upon the 
support of the German faction. He recalls how the Social Democrats, Ciel#ns in particular, 
have continuously opposed the ‘barons’ and ‘Bermondtians’. Look how you have been 
played by fate, he says, it often wreaks vengeance on your previous words and actions.  
 
All in all, summarises Kl!ve, this will be a government which is based exclusively 
upon the left wing, and which on top of that excludes the whole region of Latgale [neither 
left nor right-wing parties from Latgale were involved in the cabinet discussions]. Worst of 
all, this government has come to power when the country is in the direst economic 
situation, and it would be an illusion to expect that a left-wing government will lend any 
help to producers; it will concentrate on consumers instead. He concluded ominously: 
‘Therefore we at the Agrarian Union, who have always defended, and will always defend, 
the interests of the producers, cannot grant our trust to this government. We also undertake 
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to do everything possible in the future to make the lifetime of this government as short as 
possible.’49 There is a round of applause from the right wing. 
 
G. Reinhards (Christian National Union) declares that he wants to talk not about 
the content of the government’s declaration, but about its provenance. In his highly 
metaphorical speech, Reinhards refers to the well-known – in the past – practice of 
landlords in Kurzeme and Zemgale (where Skujenieks’s family is originally from) using a 
middleman [somebody from the audience helpfully suggests ‘A Jew!’]. Skujenieks, claims 
Reihhards, has also used a middleman while forming his coalition. This middleman, 
according to Reinhards, was the ‘highly respected Chief Rabbi of Jelgava, Mr. Nurock 
[exclamations and laughter from the audience]. Reinhards, continuing to speak in Aesopian 
language, questions whether the price Skujenieks had to pay for Nurock’s ‘services’ is not 
too high, especially considering that it would not just be Skujenieks paying it, out of his 
own pocket, but all Latvian people would have to pay it, under his government. Reinhards 
addresses Nurock:  
 
We know what has been promised for your good services. The pay-off is the Citizenship 
Law, which has already been voted down by this House three times… All this time the present 
prime minister [Skujenieks] has been its most vicious and determined opponent. But now he has 
handed out this promise [to amend the Law], but it is not included in his declaration!50  
 
The next speaker, A. B!odnieks (New Farmers’ and Small Holdings Owners’ Party) 
reinforces the rumour:  
 
We all remember the anger and indignation expressed by the prime minister [Skujenieks] 
towards the Citizenship Law amendments! ...It is true that many bourgeois [pilso!i]51, who have 
promised to vote for the amendments [sic], who wanted to find a solution to this painful problem, 
have trusted Mr. Skujenieks’s ‘holy anger’ and his statistics, and were too afraid to vote in favour 
of the amendments…We all know, it is not a secret, that the new head of the government, Mr. 
Skujenieks, has promised those left-wing minorities who are friendly towards him that he will pass 
the [amendments to] Citizenship Law. If it is true, as the previous speaker has said, that Rabbi 
Nurock already has a signed promise to pass the Citizenship Law in his pocket, then we have to 
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wonder that somebody who all this time has been protesting against the amendments, who swore 
that they would never happen, and who warned that hundreds of thousands of ‘unwanted elements’ 
would flood Latvia, has changed his views so suddenly.52 
 
Somewhat echoing Kl!ve’s speech, B"odnieks stresses that farmers and small land-
holders have nothing good to expect from the Social Democrats, who with all their words 
and actions up to now have already proved to be in opposition to farmers. Therefore, his 
party will definitely not support the government, he says.  
  
V. Holcmanis (LSDSP) responds to Kl!ve’s speech, questioning Kl!ve’s 
presentation of the new government’s association with minorities as of a ‘mortal sin’. A 
mortal sin it is [sic], agrees Holcmanis, but was our previous government innocent of it? 
And is it possible at all to form a government without minorities’ participation in this 
Saeima? As long as the Agrarian Union and the Social Democrats cannot reach a common 
understanding – and this is something they are not willing to do – minorities will inevitably 
play a part in any coalition, continues Holcmanis. And if the press is now talking about the 
‘Nurock government’, then the government of Alberings, he says, was known as the 
‘Dubins cabinet’. ‘And if we have to choose between Nurock and Dubins, then our 
sympathies belong to the democratically-inclined Nurock rather than to Dubins, who is 
Ulmanis’s right-hand man.’53 And if it is true, continues Holcmanis, that other minorities, 
notably the Germans, are also benevolent and neutral in their attitude to the new 
government, than it seems that the government may be standing on the right path. 
 
‘The government which stands today in front of us is not the one for which the 
German faction can take responsibility’, cautiously announces V. Firkss (Baltic German 
Party) ‘The German faction stands on a bourgeois [pilsonisk#] platform, and therefore we 
do not support any experiments in social and economic fields which are usually associated 
with a radically left government.’54 
 
But considering the current crisis in the country’s economy, the German faction 
considers it necessary to minimise the interregnum and portfolio-bargaining time, so that a 
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government can undertake full responsibility for further developments. The German 
faction has not participated in these coalition talks, stresses Firkss, it has not given or 
received any promises, and will therefore reserve the right to exercise its ‘free will’ in 
relation to this government, in strict accordance with its platform and convictions.  
 
M. Dubins (Agudat Israel) speaks on behalf of the Jewish faction (Mr. Nurock 
excluded) and confronts the prime minister-to-be: 
 
 I remember the moment when we were discussing the Citizenship Law. And if he 
[Skujenieks] believed in what he was saying, then I should say that all the money we provide for 
his statistics is money thrown away. I do not say that he had evil intentions. But if he knows that 
250,000 [new citizens] will not come, and still comes to us with the wrong data, then I cannot trust 
such a prime minister, and cannot vote for him. And if Mr. Nurock supports Mr. Skujenieks as a 
prime minister, then I am not sure whether the Jewish people will thank him for that.55 
 
Dubins then turns his attention to Di!lers and his attitude towards minorities, 
alleging that Di!lers, who does not speak often in the Saeima during the sessions, in private 
conversations with M. Laserson expresses totally different views on the matter than in his 
newspaper interviews [animation in the audience, exclamations]:  
 
It is very sad that all this squabbling over the Citizenship Law happens every time. And I 
am very sorry that the Social Democrats decided this time to earn [political] capital by using it. 
You have only got Nurock’s support because of it [the Citizenship Law]. This is very bad. If Mr. 
Nurock had joined you on ideological grounds, supporting your programme, it would have been 
different. But he only joined you because you allowed him a glimpse of the Citizenship Law. … I 
know for a fact that when the Law comes up for review, the government will be ousted. That’s 
what has been promised to me by Mr. Jura!evskis behind the scenes. Let us remember the Zamuels 
government, which also promised to settle the matter of the Citizenship Law. But what happened 
when this question came under review? Zamuels could not rally the majority any more – one 
person stepped out into the lobby, another stayed at home, and the necessary majority was not 
there.56  
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Dubins concludes his speech with the assertion that the Jewish faction, with the 
exception of Mr. Nurock, does not believe that Mr. Skujenieks is the one who will defend 
minorities’ interests, and will therefore abstain from voting for his government. Dubins 
was the last contributor to the debates, after which, with 52 votes for, 35 against, and 2 
abstentions, Skujenieks’s government was confirmed. 
 
Just a month later, in January 1927, a group of MPs (Schiemann and Dubins among 
them) submitted the next draft amendments to the Law, which aimed to reconcile the jus 
soli and jus sanguinis principles. According to the MPs’ proposal, Article 1 of the Law, 
‘Every subject of former Russia, regardless of ethnicity and creed, who resides within 
Latvia’s borders, originates from the regions included within Latvia’s borders, or, in 
accordance with the Russia’s laws belonged to these regions prior to August 1, 1914 and 
has not acquired any other citizenship up to the date of this law’s promulgation’, was to 
omit, in the future, the words ‘who resides within Latvia’s borders’ altogether, and was to 
gain a footnote which would allow those who still resided outside Latvia to claim their 
citizenship rights within six months of the amendments’ promulgation by either returning 
to Latvia, or by registering as Latvian citizens in one of the Latvian representations abroad, 
or by informing the Minister of the Interior about their wish to retain their Latvian 
citizenship.  The MPs proposed to introduce a new Article, which would stipulate that 
‘Likewise, every subject of the former Russian state, regardless of nationality and creed, 
who resides within Latvia’s borders, and who has not, at the moment of these amendments’ 
promulgation, acquired any other citizenship and who had been residing within what now 
counts as Latvian territories for at least six months prior to August 1, 1914, counts as a 
Latvian citizen.’57  
 
By a unanimous vote, these amendments were passed for elaboration to the Public 
Affairs Committee, and re-surfaced in the Saeima on 29th April 1927.  
 
The rapporteur N. Maizels (Bund), in his introductory speech, describes the 
Citizenship Law as a van’ka-vstan’ka. According to Maizels, this proposal is different 
from any of its predecessors, because it is not just based on the demands of a certain 
political group, but also takes into account both the previous experience of the Saeima in 
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debating amendments to this law, and the practical experience of the Ministry of the 
Interior with the existing law’s implementation. Importantly, the rapporteur reminds the 
Saeima that it was him, Maizels, who suggested forwarding the proposed amendments to 
the Public Affairs Committee four months earlier, and discloses the fact that this was done 
with the knowledge [and, obviously, approval] of M. Skujenieks. Skujenieks, stresses 
Maizels, after long discussions came to the conclusion that amendments were necessary; 
this had happened before any rumours of a new coalition started.  
 
Moving on to the substance of the proposed amendments, Maizels divides them 
into three parts. Part one, he says, protects the rights of those people who lived in Latvia 
before the war. Part two deals with Article 2 of the 1919 Law, the right to an option 
[opt!cija]. Part three is amendments and extensions of Article 7 of the 1919 Law, which 
concerns the rights of citizens’ wives and family members to citizenship. According to 
Maizels, practically all citizenship applications, submitted in their thousands to the 
Ministry of the Interior, are being submitted by those who had lived in Latvia prior to 
1914. The Ministry itself, says Maizels, is hoping for ‘a desk cleanly swept’ (reinen tisch; 
reinen tisch machen mit) in the resolution of the matter.58  
 
The proposed article, continues Maizels, is at the same time an extension (in 
numbers of the people it applies to), and a restriction (in time; as all citizenship 
applications should be received by 1st February 1928). As for the right to option, out of the 
three proposed amendments, two are ‘restricting’ and only one, aimed at seamen, is 
‘broadening’. 
 
When it came to voting, there was no quorum in the Parliament, and the session 
was closed. 
 
The next time the draft amendments came back, on 6th May 1927, the session 
started with Pau!uks (Agrarian Union), Di"lers (Radical Democrats), Petrevics (Social 
Democrats) and Skujenieks (Social Democrats Mensheviks), taking the floor several times 
each, and arguing about legal technicalities, about the potential number of new citizens the 
law could create, and about who said what during the previous parliamentarian sessions 
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dedicated to the Law. Several interesting details surfaced during their heated polemical 
exchanges. 
 
Pau!uks, who speaks for longest, objects to the proposed one-year time limit for 
exercising the right to option – in a country as small as Latvia, he says, this is excessive; if 
somebody needs a whole year to become a Latvian citizen, then they must have some 
hidden motives: 
 
Gentlemen, we must make sure that what happened in 1919, when we were gladly willing 
to make everybody citizens of our state, does not happen again! Those times were hard times for 
our state, as there was still war on our territories, and we needed citizen-soldiers! ...At that time, 
very few people among the minorities became Latvian citizens. The majority of them accepted 
foreign citizenship, such as Lithuanian, Belarussian, etc. Now you want to do the same thing 
again…Is this really aimed at satisfying a real need? No, this is favouring one particular minority, a 
certain group who wants to ensure the possibility of Latvian citizenship for its members, who are 
obviously not willing to become Latvian citizens yet.59 
 
Pau!uks, at the same time, assures his audience that he is not trying to say that at 
present, the minorities do not want to be loyal Latvian citizens. On the contrary, he says, as 
over the past eight years there have been many positive changes in Latvia, now most of 
them are willing to be loyal citizens, and they probably are. But to reach a common 
understanding on the question of citizenship, according to Pau!uks, is impossible in such a 
heated atmosphere – heated because the Social Democrats have turned it into a ‘coalition 
issue’. Besides, he continues, ethnic minorities should first achieve understanding among 
themselves in their own midst (instead of one ethnic group gaining an unfair advantage 
over the others), and then seek understanding with the Latvian groups – both socialist and 
bourgeois.  
 
As for the Agrarian Union, continues Pau!uks, unlike the Social Democrats, it is 
always looking for peace and common understanding. He then sheds light on the story 
behind the ‘national government’ of Z. Meierovics, and the role of the left wing in 
supporting the cabinet: 
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There have been times when we sat together with the minorities. Those were the times 
after the hard trials – 16th April 1919, when the state interests demanded it. Then we did it – we sat 
together with the minorities, the Jewish and German representatives, in one office, and we worked 
together. You know what the results of this common work were – they were good and clear. And 
who upset this balanced situation? It was the Social Democrats, and the left wing of the 
Constitutional Assembly overall, who wanted, demanded, and insisted upon founding of a national 
government, and who also promoted this point of view in society and in the press. 60 
 
Pau!uks then turns his attention to Nurock, and his insistence on the promises about 
the amendments to the Citizenship Law, handed out by the coalition partners to him 
earlier, being kept. Describing Nurock’s ‘inappropriate perseverance’ in holding Latvian 
MPs to their promises, he compares him to the Merchant of Venice [he obviously means 
Shylock, not Antonio] – who, according to Pau!uks, was also a ‘shopkeeper’, who 
‘behaved similarly’, and ‘had one refrain – I demand this, you have promised!’. Just like 
Shylock, says Kl"ve, Nurock insists on fulfilling a promise that cannot be fulfilled.61 
 
A. Petrevics blames the heated atmosphere surrounding the amendments to the 
Citizenship Law on the newspapers who are scaring the public with their forecasts that an 
amended law will ‘open the gates of Latvia’ to 250,000-300,000 people who have not been 
Latvian residents before: ‘It would be understandable if somebody who knows nothing 
about the matter came to such conclusions… But this is being said by influential people, 
by journalists, and especially by the Saeima deputies, who I am sure do know the truth, 
who can easily find out that these figures are wrong…These people should be more 
responsible for their own words’.  According to Petrevics, this kind of manipulation of 
public opinion with false statistical data is a remnant of Tsarist Russia’s undignified 
propaganda against certain minorities, and especially against Jews, which led to bloodshed 
in the past. 62 
 
Skujenieks responds to the previous speakers and attempts to deflect those 
accusations made against him personally. Many existing misunderstandings, both in the 
press, and in the Saeima, he says, arise from the confusion between two separate issues, 
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two separate parts of the Citizenship Law amendments. The first part deals with awarding 
citizenship to those stateless people who live in Latvia, and who also prior to the war lived 
in Latvia, continues Skujenieks. The second part, he says, has always been an attempt to 
award citizenship to those who do not reside in Latvia now, have not been residing in 
Latvia since after the war, who live abroad, and who were given an option to Latvian 
citizenship while continuing to live abroad. Skujenieks stresses that it was the second, not 
the first part of the amendments that he has always been opposed to, and for a good reason 
– because nobody could with any certainty predict just how many people will be able to 
gain Latvian citizenship if this second part of amendments went through. 
 
I have always thought, I still think, and I will always think in the future that these numbers 
can be very big. I do not want to vex this house with the cumbersome calculations, but I would like 
to point out one consideration, namely that prior to the World War there were at least 2.552,000 
people residing in Latvia, whereas there are only 1.850,000 people living here now. This is a 
difference of 700,000 people, who used to live here before the war, and who do not live here now. I 
do not in the least want to assume that all of them will all be able to obtain citizenship on the basis 
of the right to option clause. But for a big part of them it will be possible, as there are hundreds of 
thousands stateless people in all corners of the world now; we cannot tell just how closely they 
were connected to Latvia, and whether they will be able to produce some proof of their connection 
which will give them a right to citizenship.63 
 
As for the other part of the amendments, argues Skujenieks, it can only be applied 
to those people who live in Latvia now, and all these articles that have been published 
lately in our press about Latvia’s doors being opened to all foreigners, are simply untrue. 
The first part of the amendments to the Citizenship Law under discussion, insists 
Skujenieks, opens the doors to nobody who is not in Latvia already.   
 
K. Di!lers, in his speech, mainly reviews legal technicalities, criticising some of the 
existing formulations in the proposed amendments for being imprecise and/or not concise 
enough, and proposing various additions, like making criminal convictions another basis of 
denying citizenship to otherwise eligible candidates. He also says: ‘What is being carried 
out in relation to the Citizenship Law, can be called bargaining [andele]…Therefore I 
think that it would be good to solve this question once and for all, so that Mr. Dubins does 
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not have to frequent the Ministry of Interior also for the next two or three years, and that 
all those who have rights to Latvian citizenship get it according to legislation.’ 
 
Pau!uks and Skujenieks speak again, insults are exchanged, there is uproar in the 
audience, exclamations from both the left and on the right wings: ‘Scoundrels, liars, 
cheats!’, ‘These are all lies!’. Finally, F. Ciel"ns (Social Democrats) takes the floor. He 
informs the audience that he wants to address the draft law from a general viewpoint, 
without going into legal technicalities. Ciel"ns’s speech, however, is a remarkably concise 
account of the past events and ideological differences surrounding the notorious law: 
 
…When the Latvian state was founded, we did not find it possible, for known, historically 
understandable reasons, to completely clarify the legal status of all the people who at the time 
resided in Latvian territories. That time in 1919, we adopted a Citizenship Law that excluded a 
certain category of people from the body of citizens: people who had been living here for years, 
possibly for decades, and we did not grant them citizenship. Such an approach has not been used in 
international law at the creation of new states previously; and from the point of view of 
international principles it is totally absurd, as it creates a certain number of residents who do not 
belong to any state. And if such people are created in their thousands, then sooner or later this 
situation must be set right by internationally accepted means [starptautisk! ce"!]. 
  
If eight years ago we could find historical justifications for this rigorous rule, such as that 
our state was based upon national principles, and that we were in dire circumstances, then now, 
when we will soon celebrate the 10th anniversary of our state’s existence, it is totally out of place to 
talk about such dangers and fears for our Latvian republic because we might grant citizenship to a 
few thousand people who reside in Latvia and were connected to it through family and other ties. 
…. 
Secondly, it seems to me that that with this act we will not weaken, but will rather 
strengthen our state. On founding our state, we incurred a certain amount of injustice from a legal 
point of view, we created a certain group of dissatisfied people, who have been living in Latvia for 
years and decades, who pay all their taxes and duties in Latvia, who fulfil the same obligations, 
apart from service in the army, as Latvian citizens, but who we have not allowed to take part in 
elections. Neither in municipal, nor in parliamentary elections. If we avert this injustice, we will 
grant people satisfaction, and this will only strengthen our state.64 
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Ciel!ns concludes his speech by stressing that by passing these amendments the 
Latvian state will also obtain greater international prestige. 
 
The result of the debates on 6th May 1927 was that the draft law was passed on the 
second reading, 50 votes for, 43 against, no abstentions.  
 
The third reading of the draft law took place on 20th May 1927. This how Latvijas 
Kareivis described the galvanised atmosphere at the Parliament: 
 
The Saeima’s agenda promises this to be a big day. All seats and standing places are taken. 
Most of the visitors are those belonging to ethnic minorities [cittaut!bnieki]. Members of the 
Cabinet are present in their seats. The first item on the agenda, the Law on accommodation for 
agricultural labourers, does not attract general interest. …Excitement is expected during the 
debates on the amendments to the Citizenship Law on the third reading.65 
 
M. Dubins accuses Latvian newspapers of spreading rumours that Jews from all 
over the world want to come to Latvia. ‘I would like to assure you that the whole world 
will not come to Latvia. Certainly there will be some [Jews] left over in England, 
Germany, and France. Who will really come? Only those people will come who have some 
ties to Latvia.’66 Dubins argues that those who have been living in Latvia since 1918 have 
earned their right to be citizens, and that nine years is a long time. K. Di"lers points out to 
Dubins that he, Dubins, could have raised the issue of granting citizenship to all residents 
on two previous occasions: in 1919 at the National Council, and in 1921 when the 
Constitutional assembly amended the Law, but chose not to. According to Di"lers, it is 
hard to take Dubins’s bravado nine years after the fact seriously.  
 
The Citizenship Law amendments were finally passed on the third reading – with 
52 votes for, 43 against, and no abstentions. The Social Democrats, the minorities and the 
Latgalian faction voted for. The bourgeois parties and the Democratic centre voted against. 
The amended law now read: 
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Article 1. Every subject of the former Russian Empire, without distinction of 
nationality and religion, residing within the limits of Latvia, or who is a native of the 
regions included in the territory of Latvia, or who belonged to the aforesaid regions on the 
strength of the laws of Russia before August 1, 1914 – is considered a citizen of Latvia, 
provided he or she has not become a citizen of another state before the publication of this 
law.  
Article 1.1. Likewise every subject of the former Russian Empire, without 
distinction of nationality and religion, who has resided within the limits of Latvia since 
January 1, 1925, has not become subject of any other state before the coming into force of 
these amendments and supplements, and – 
(a) Has lived within the limits of Latvia at least for six months before August 1, 
1914, or 
(b) Has had permanent residence within the limits of Latvia up to 1881, or 
(c) Is a descendant of persons mentioned under (a) and (b). 
The privileges mentioned in this paragraph shall be enjoyed by persons who, 
satisfying the above-mentioned requirements, file a petition with the Minister of the 
Interior for a Latvian passport before February 1, 1928. The privileges mentioned in this 
paragraph shall be denied to persons who lived in Latvia during the years of 1918, 1919 
and 1920, and, being of military age, did not report at the mobilization proclaimed by the 
temporary Latvian government. 
Article 2. Persons temporarily resident outside the limits of Latvia but otherwise 
satisfying the requirements mentioned in paragraph 1 do not forfeit their claim to Latvian 
citizenship, if they return to Latvia within twelve months from the date of publication of 
this law, if they register themselves as Latvian citizens with one of the Latvian diplomatic 
representatives abroad, or communicate their desire to remain Latvian citizens to the 
Minister of the Interior.67 
 
P. Jura!evskis (Democratic Centre) announces that the passed amendments are not 
in accordance with the ‘will of the majority of the people’ and promises that the 
Democratic Centre will initiate a popular referendum on the amendments. 
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On 27th May 1927, the Democratic Centre submitted an initiative on a popular 
referendum to the state president. The initiative was signed by twenty-two Latvian MPs 
(including the Democratic Centre, the New Farmers and Smallholders, and others), which 
was twelve signatures short of the required thirty-four (not less than one-third of the 
Saeima, according to Article 72 of the Satversme). The Agrarian Union, contrary to the 
earlier speculations in the press, did not support the referendum. The referendum, however, 
was allowed to continue to its next stage – the collection of public signatures, with the aim 
of collecting the signatures of at least 10 per cent of the electorate.  
 
In July 1927, Prime Minister M. Skujenieks gave a press interview in which he 
updated the public on the new citizenship acquisitions. According to Skujenieks, since the 
amendments were passed, the number of applications for citizenship submitted to the 
Ministry of the Interior had not reached ten [sic]: 
 
The number of citizenship applications to the Ministry of the Interior has significantly 
decreased lately. This, without any doubt, can be explained by the fact that those people who have 
rights to citizenship have already exercised those rights earlier, and the overall number of optants is 
not at all big. I believe that based on the new law, the number of Latvian citizens could increase by 
6-8,000 people, and in any case by no more than 10,000.68 
 
Two weeks later, Latvijas Kareivis informed its readers that the number of 
citizenship applications at the Ministry of the Interior had reached 70; an employee of the 
Ministry provided possible explanations for the still-low numbers, and of the precautions 
taken: ‘Evidently, the majority of people are still waiting for the results of the popular 
referendum. All these applications are filed separately, so that if, as a result of the 
referendum, the law is overturned, than the new passports can be annulled promptly. 
Besides, there will be a special footnote in all passports issued based on Article 1.1 of the 
Law’.69 
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Latvian newspapers avidly reported on the collection of signatures and the 
polemics surrounding the new law. A. Bergs in Latvis called for his readership to vote 
against the law: 
Latvia, with all the rights that belonging to it provides, is a joyful accomplishment of our 
nation [m!su tautas] through arduous fighting; a fulfilment of our centuries-long endeavours. We 
cannot light-heartedly share this accomplishment with any ‘chance’ people. The opposition to the 
Citizenship Law’s amendments is a healthy instinct on the part of our people who are defending 
their achievements and their rights. We do not doubt that this healthy instinct will be demonstrated 
strongly enough during the people’s voting, and will ensure a victory.70  
Segodnya described the referendum as an ‘irresponsible undertaking’, which could 
not possibly be explained by state interests, but rather by narrow partisan interests. 
According to Segodnya, the referendum had been organised in order to weaken the existing 
government coalition.71 
 
MP K. Balodis, a man of many talents ranging from theology to economics and 
finances, criticised the new law on the pages of Jaun"k"s Zi#as for not taking into account 
the ‘interests’ of Latvian Jews: 
 
Essentially, further awards of Latvian citizenship are also not in the best interests of the 
existing Latvian citizens-Jews…The problem of Russian Jews should be solved on a larger scale: it 
is clear that because of shrinking trade, the majority of Jews should switch from trading to 
industrial labour and agriculture…Poor Latvia should first endeavour to bring back up industrial 
and agricultural production so that it can support those middlemen-traders who already live here. 
This is why the new Citizenship Law should be rejected.72 
 
The Rigasche Rundschau reminded its readers that 2,000 Baltic Germans were still 
without Latvian citizenship, and warned its readers against contributing signatures for the 
referendum, as it would inadvertently hurt those people, some of whom could have 
qualified for citizenship under the new law.73 
 
                                                
70 Quoted as per: ‘Citu domas. Pavalstniec!bas likumliet" “Latv!” raksta A. Bergs’, Latvijas Kareivis, 
05.07.1927. 
71 ‘Citu domas. Pret tautas nobalso#anas’, Latvijas Kareivis, 05.07.1927. 
72 Quoted as per: ‘Citu domas. Par pavalstniec!bas likumu’, Latvijas Kareivis, 08.07.1927. 
73 ‘Citu domas’, Latvijas Kareivis, 20.07.1927. 
Chapter 4: The Citizenship Law of 1919 and Minority Bargaining  
 
 
 
258 
As the collection of signatures continued, Prime Minister Skujenieks repeatedly 
assured the public that there was no reason to fear an invasion of foreigners: ‘All this 
recent hustle and bustle surrounding the Citizenship Law is absolutely unnecessary. The 
number of people who gain rights to Latvian citizenship based on the new law is 
negligible. The view that the new law will flood the country with foreigners is mistaken’.74 
 
The necessary 112,000 signatures were collected; and in December 1927 the 
referendum took place. However, less than one quarter of the electorate showed up at the 
polling stations, indicating that despite the hysterical anti-amendments campaign mounted 
by the press, the Latvian electorate was not as obsessed with the citizenship issue as its 
lawmakers. The referendum had to be annulled, and the amended Citizenship Law 
remained in force. This was not, however, the end of the Citizenship Law saga. 
 
*** 
 
Just one year later, when H. Celmi!" (Agrarian Union) presented his second 
government’s declaration to the Third Saeima on 30th November 1928 (the section 
pertaining to minority affairs promised  ‘to expedite adoption of the School Law while 
observing and not restricting existing norms applying to minority schools’75), the 
Citizenship Law came on to the agenda again.  
 
M. Nurock first criticises the declaration for containing ‘standard phrases’ on the 
status quo in the school education area, and raises – again – the question of national-
cultural autonomy for minorities.  He then informs the audience that the amended 
Citizenship Law is in reality being implemented at a very slow pace, and provides 
numerous example of discrimination against Jews, claiming that Jewish merchants are 
treated as ‘stepchildren’ by the Latvian Central Bank, and that the path to the civil service 
for the Jewish intelligentsia and Jewish workers is closed.  
 
During the same session, an addendum to the Citizenship Law (of a purely 
technical substance), in accordance with Article 81 of the Constitution, was submitted. The 
first of the two proposed new articles, 8.2, regulated the deprivation of citizenship in the 
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case when a person had left Latvia illegally, or had otherwise resided abroad, with an 
expired Latvian passport, for a period of over six months. The other article, 8.3, foresaw 
deprivation of citizenship for those who had acquired citizenship by supplying false 
information or forged documents, or who had otherwise called witnesses who supplied 
false information. The proposal was forwarded to the Legal Affairs Committee. On 8th 
October 1929, the amended Citizenship Law was published in accordance with the Article 
81 of the Constitution.76 
 
These two clauses were amended again in February 1930, changing Article 8.2. to 
read ‘three years’ instead of ‘six months’, and limiting the possibility of the deprivation of 
citizenship awarded based on false information to a period of five years after the 
acquisition of citizenship.77 
 
However, just ten months later the Citizenship Law was reviewed in the Saeima 
again, this time in its substance, in what seems to have been a curious attempt by 
Skujenieks to redeem himself as a Latvian nationalist. On 19th December 1930, the MPs 
M. Skujenieks (Progressive Union), J. !terns (Progressive Union), K. Balodis (Latvian 
Labour Union and People’s Association), J. Pab"rzs (Progressive People’s Union) and K. 
Kir#teins (Faction of Democratic Centre and Non-Partisan Public Servants) submit the 
following draft amendments to the Citizenship Law: 
 
1. The first sentence of Article 4 to conclude with the words ‘and if they speak Latvian’. 
2.  To supplement Article 4 with a new (5.) footnote: 
‘Footnote 5: Proficiency in the Latvian language is not tested in those older than 60 
years.’78 
 
According to Skujenieks, proficiency in the Latvian language is the ultimate 
criterion of a person’s connection to Latvia. Debates flare up. A. Petrevics (Social 
Democrats), while agreeing in principle that Latvia’s citizens should be proficient in 
Latvian, points out that it is not fair to say that Latvian minorities do not want to speak 
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Latvian, as, with the exception of old people, they want to and do study the Latvian 
language. A big obstacle, according to Petrevics, is the lack of places at Latvian-language 
schools. He gives an example of a secondary school in R!zekne, which received about 100 
applications from minority students, but was forced to reject them due to the lack of places. 
Also, until very recently Latgalian residents had very few opportunities to practise Latvian, 
he says. Besides, argues Petrevics, proficiency in the Latvian language per se does not 
define a loyal citizen. He concludes: the Social Democratic faction considers this 
requirement unfounded and will vote against it. 
 
N. Maizels (Bund) also stresses that proficiency in the Latvian language is a very 
useful and a necessary thing. But he reminds Skujenieks that 30 per cent or more of 
Latgalian residents are illiterate, and as such cannot be required to demonstrate any 
language proficiency. Maizels advises Skujenieks to channel his energy towards the 
eradication of illiteracy, which is more important. Maizels also claims that demands for 
compulsory language proficiency are reminiscent of the methods used during 
Russification, and warns that such measures will ruin the atmosphere of solidarity among 
the Latvian peoples. According to Maizels, he himself speaks Latvian in the Saeima only 
because he is not forced to do so. 
 
G. M"lbergs (New Farmers and Smallholders) accuses Skujenieks of double-
dealing, reminding deputies how it was Skujenieks’s government that extended citizenship 
to minorities, and claiming that now Skujenieks, out of a guilty conscience, is ‘trying to be 
a nationalist at any cost’. 
 
The draft was voted down (29 for, 44 against). M"lbergs adds ironically that if all 
the mistakes made by Skujenieks during his government were to be corrected now, the 
Saeima would be able to do nothing else, as Skujenieks’s sins against nationalism are so 
numerous. 
  
The next ‘technical’ amendment to the Citizenship Law was made, in accordance 
with Article 81 of the Constitution, on 13th April 1932 – it extended the one-year deadline 
for citizenship applications from seamen stipulated in Article 2.1 until 1st January 1937, 
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and introduced two other changes of purely administrative character. This was the last 
amendment to the Citizenship Law made by the democratic Latvian government.79 
  
There would be four more amendments made to the Citizenship Law in the 
remaining eight years of Latvia’s independence; these were aimed at political, rather than 
ethnic, enemies. They make chilling reading, as they allow one to follow the country’s 
tragic path towards its loss of statehood. 
  
The amendments from 21st September 1938, signed by K. Ulmanis, State President 
and Prime Minister, aimed at attracting new army recruits, and at banishing communists 
from the body of citizens. They added a footnote 2 to Article 4 allowing Latvian 
citizenship to be awarded to those who, although not having resided in Latvia for the 
required period of five years, had served, or were still serving, in the Latvian army subject 
to the approval of the Minister of the Interior. The second amendment changed the 
wording of Article 8.1, giving the Cabinet of Ministers the right to deprive of Latvian 
citizenship those who 1) eschewed military service or 2) engaged in activities that were 
hostile to Latvia.80 
  
The next amendment, from 18th April 1940, aimed at slowing down the exodus of 
the population at uncertain times – it introduced a new Article 8.4, which gave the 
Cabinets of Ministers powers to deprive those who had illegally emigrated abroad, of 
Latvian citizenship.  
Similarly, on 13th July 1940 the Citizenship Law was amended to add a second part 
to Article 9 – as an obviously desperate measure, it stipulated that those Latvian citizens 
who had acquired foreign citizenship without permission from the Latvian government 
could be punished with a prison term of up to one year, or with property confiscation, or 
both.81 
 
 The amendments from 30th July 1940, most likely aimed at the Latvian diplomatic 
corps stationed in foreign countries, stipulated that those who had resided abroad for more 
than three years without a travel passport, or with an expired travel passport, or who had 
                                                
79 ‘P!rgroz"jumi likum! par pavalstniec"bu’, Vald!bas V"stnesis, 20.04,1932. 
80 ‘P!rgroz"jumi likum! par pavalstniec"bu’, Vald!bas V"stnesis, 23.09.1938. 
81 ‘Papildin!jums likum! par pavalstniec"bu’, Vald!bas V"stnesis, 13.07.1940. 
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not returned to Latvia, or refused to return within a period established by the government, 
could be deprived of Latvian citizenship.82 Those amendments were already signed by the 
head of the short-lived puppet government installed by the Soviet Union, State President 
A. Kirhe!teins. Thus concluded the 21-year-long saga of Latvian interwar citizenship. 
  
                  *** 
 
The history of the Citizenship Law of 1919 and its subsequent amendments is vital 
to understanding the dynamics of majority-minority relations in interwar Latvia. This 
generally liberal piece of legislation was in line with the citizenship legislation in other 
Central and Eastern European countries at the time; it was somewhat stricter than the 
Estonian law of 27th October 1922 (which granted citizenship to all Russian subjects 
residing in Estonia up until 24th February 1918), but arguably more relaxed than the 
Lithuanian provisional law of 9th January 1919 (which bestowed citizenship on the 
descendants of those whose ‘parents and ancestors had lived in Lithuania since ancient 
times’, or otherwise on those who had been residing in Lithuania for  least ten years up 
until 1914 as long as they possessed real estate or were permanently employed). 
 
The Law of 1919 granted citizenship to 1,504,30883 people out of the total 
population of 1,596,13184, or 94.25 per cent. By 1925, this number had grown to 
encompass 1,779,59385 people, or 96.46 per cent of the total population. In 1925, there 
were 31,668 foreigners, or 1.72 per cent of the total population, residing in Latvia, and 
33,544 stateless persons, or 1.82 per cent.86 Moreover, ethnic Latvians constituted only 76 
per cent of all citizens, while ethnic minorities made up the remaining 24 per cent. The 
biggest discrepancy between the number of residents and number of citizens can be 
observed among the Jews – they constituted 5.2 per cent of the whole population, but only 
4.5 per cent of citizens. During the five years after the promulgation of the law, the number 
                                                
82 ‘Papildin"jums un p"rgroz#jums likum" par pavalstniec#bu’, Vald!bas V"stnesis, 30.07.1940. 
83 Skujeneeks, M. 1927. Latvija. Zeme un eedz!vot#ji. Tre!ais p"rstr"datais un papildinatais izdevums. Rig": 
A. Gulbja apgadneec#ba, p. 329. 
84 Skujeneeks, M. 1927. Latvija. Zeme un eedz!vot#ji. Tre!ais p"rstr"datais un papildinatais izdevums. Rig": 
A. Gulbja apgadneec#ba, p. 214. 
85 Skujeneeks, M. 1927. Latvija. Zeme un eedz!vot#ji. Tre!ais p"rstr"datais un papildinatais izdevums. Rig": 
A. Gulbja apgadneec#ba, p. 328. 
86Skujeneeks, M. 1927. Latvija. Zeme un eedz!vot#ji. Tre!ais p"rstr"datais un papildinatais izdevums. Rig": 
A. Gulbja apgadneec#ba, p. 328. 
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of citizens among ethnic minorities in Latvia continued to grow, with the Estonians and 
Lithuanians being the most active in the acquisition of citizenship: 
 
 
Ethnic group Percentage of 
citizens in 1920 
Percentage of 
citizens in 1925 
Increase in the 
percentage of 
citizens 
Latvians 99.27 99.36 0.09 
Germans 78.93 85.08 6.15 
Russians 86.54 94.21 7.67 
Belarussians 91.71 96.80 5.09 
Jews 77.31 83.36 6.05 
Poles 73.71 87.66 13.95 
Estonians 54.98 85.92 30.94 
Lithuanians 31.28 69.15 37.87 
 
Table 1.  Changes in the percentage of citizens among ethnic groups in Latvia, 1920-1925. Source: 
Skujeneeks, M. (1927).  
 
 
In short, neither the content of the legal provisions, nor the actual situation with 
citizenship in the interwar republic can be used as plausible explanations for the notoriety 
of the Citizenship Law of 1919, for the upheavals it caused and the polemics it sparked. 
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Straume (1992: 73) correctly observes that although the amendments of 1927 affected less 
than one per cent of the population, ‘reading the newspapers and the Saeima transcripts of 
the time, one gets the impression that it was precisely the Citizenship Law upon which 
Latvia’s future depended’. Incredibly, after nine years of bitter battles in the Parliament 
and in the press (and not just between the majority and ethnic minorities, but among the 
ethnic Latvian parties as well), only about 4,000 Jews acquired Latvian citizenship post-
1927 (Dribins 2002: 70), a far cry from Skujenieks’s predicted 250,000. What made the 
Citizenship Law into the crux of Latvian political life in between the wars? I would like to 
offer a two-fold explanation to this question. The first has to do with the huge symbolic 
importance that Latvian ethnic minorities, who had taken both President Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points and the promises of equality contained in the National Platform of 1918 at face 
value, assigned to the issue of citizenship. The second explanation is rooted in the theory 
of ethnic bargaining. I will address both explanations in turn. 
 
It is hard to underestimate the significance of citizenship as one of the identities 
available to an individual. Marshall’s (1950: 18) definition of citizenship as ‘a status 
bestowed on those who are full members of a community’ says it all – there is no higher 
degree of recognition of a special bond between an individual and a community than the 
one awarded by citizenship. Moreover, ‘societies in which citizenship is a developing 
institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be 
measured and towards which aspirations can be directed’ (Marshall 1950: 18). Clarke 
(1994: 3) observes that out of all partial identities available to humans it is only citizenship 
that is ‘exclusively, solely and fully political’. Comparing citizenship to class identity, 
Clarke (1994: 24) observes that ‘citizenship contains within it the idea of equality, but 
class is inherently unequal’. Brubaker (1992: 23) identified another fundamental aspect of 
citizenship as being both an instrument and an object of social closure. ‘To be defined as a 
citizen is not to qualify as an insider for a particular instance or type of interaction; it is to 
be defined in a general, abstract, enduring, and context-independent way as a member of 
the state’ (Brubaker 1992: 29). 
 
Citizenship studies are famously triadic: Marshall, whose ‘Citizenship and Social 
Class’ (1950) probably remains the most influential study in the field to this day, 
established three key elements of citizenship, namely civil, political, and social. These 
three parts closely overlap with Joppke’s (2010: vii) division between the status, rights, 
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and identity dimensions of citizenship. In one of the latest contemporary studies of 
citizenship, Joppke observes that although these three key elements are closely interlinked, 
and changes in one inevitably lead to changes in another, to regard this process of change 
as successive causation is ‘too endogenous’ and  ‘captive to a naïve functionalism’, not 
least because citizenship is also subject to specific legal regimes and political dynamics; at 
the very minimum, the interdimensional influences should be combined and balanced with 
those of external variables (Joppke 2010: 151).  
 
It seems that the founders of the Latvian state in 1918 guaranteed equal rights to 
ethnic minorities in earnest, at a moment when the sentiments of coming into nationhood, 
of becoming a part of the new Eastern Europe – liberated from its imperial past – or better 
still, a part of Old Europe, where Latvians believed their country rightfully belonged (and 
as a matter of fact, Baltic Germans fully shared this conviction), were running high. When 
the time came to define the country’s citizenry, an effort was made to observe the existing, 
de facto, international norms which aimed to avoid creating large numbers of stateless 
persons (and indeed no large numbers of such persons were created in Latvia). At the same 
time, the provisions of the law were ‘ethnicity-blind’. And one may speculate that although 
the unfortunate wording of Article 1, requiring proof of ‘belonging’ to Latvian territories, 
in practice excluded a part of the Jewish population from the citizenry, it should have been 
clear to all interested parties at the time that the potential numbers involved were 
inherently small. So how did it all escalate into a full-blown inter-ethnic conflict and 
prolonged struggle among political parties from such a seemingly benign beginning?  
 
But if ethnic Latvians earnestly believed back in 1918 that a new era had dawned in 
Europe, and that in Woodrow Wilson’s words ‘all well-defined national aspirations should 
be accorded the utmost satisfaction’, so did Latvia’s ethnic minorities.  Latvia freed from 
imperial Russia’s yoke was going to be a paragon of democracy, fairness, and equality – of 
which the institution of Latvian citizenship was going to be the embodiment. So when the 
draft citizenship law excluded a part, albeit a very small one, of the Jewish population from 
the body of citizens, the Jews were not prepared to swallow the pill. As the most 
discriminated-against ethnic group in Latvia under the previous Russian domination, they 
felt that in democratic Latvia, proper justice must be served, and were not willing to taint 
their participation in the life of the new state with an unfair compromise. As M. Laserson 
wrote in Segodnya, ‘There can be no harmony while one of the interested parties, which is 
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in a stronger position, is trying to convince the other party that it actually does not possess 
any rights, and can therefore only count on the moral uprightness of the stronger party’.87 
 
Besides, if the law itself was ‘ethnically blind’, its practical implementation 
certainly wasn’t. There is abundant evidence of complaints in the press, and during the 
parliamentary sessions, about the preferential treatment of ethnically Latvian citizenship 
applicants. Moreover, not only were ethnic Latvians favoured for the acquisition of 
citizenship, but also entirely different norms and procedures were applied to existing 
citizen non-Latvians. In 1921, for example, a special inter-departmental commission 
(which included representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor General’s Office, 
the Ministry of Defence, the Riga Prefect’s Office, and the Passport Department) was 
created at the Ministry of the Interior with the goal of thoroughly inspecting the Latvian 
passports issued to ethnic non-Latvians, and the supporting identity documents. This 
initiative prompted Segodnya to draw a comparison with Tsarist Russia: ‘As in the ‘good 
old times’, there will be a public announcement asking vigilant citizens to inform on 
suspicious persons, who will then be asked to prove on what grounds they are enjoying 
Latvian citizenship. The occupation of these suspicious persons will also be examined’.88 
 
Shortly before the cultural autonomy laws were to be reviewed by the Saeima in 
1923, Laserson published an article about the basis of equal treatment, asserting that ‘the 
balance between a legal right and its factual enforcement is of crucial importance’. ‘…The 
creators of modern minority rights were aware of this, continues Laserson, they understood 
that it is not only rights that are important, but also facts’. Laserson quotes Article 58 of 
the Treaty of Trianon: ‘Hungarian nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic 
minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other 
Hungarian nationals’ [Laserson’s italics]. He insists: ‘We need not just the legally 
protected status for minorities; we need the same civic treatment and security. I stress: not 
just rights, but also the same actual treatment…Because in the absence of the latter, the 
former becomes a legal mockery’.89 
                                                
87 ‘Liga nacii I men!hinstva’, Segodnya, 06.04.1922. 
88 ‘Reviziya latviiskh pasportov” inorodtsev’, Segodnya, 02.09.1921. 
89 Lazerson, M. ‘Ravnoe obhozhdenie’, Segodnya, 29.12.1923. 
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One can only ponder why the Jewish minority, supported by the Baltic Germans 
(above all, by P. Schiemann) and the Russians (on this issue, despite numerous 
disagreements on other matters, the minorities stood united) chose to make the debates on 
the Citizenship Law into the crucible of Latvian democracy.  Why did they not, for 
example, do this with the laws on cultural autonomy, or the minority language laws – 
which they also attempted to pass, but with not even half the same fervour; these would 
arguably have benefitted a much greater number of people? There are two possible 
answers to this question, I think. One, as already mentioned above, is that the minorities – 
perfectly reasonably – perceived citizenship as a cornerstone of their admission to the life 
of the state on a par with everyone else, in right and in fact. With this cornerstone missing, 
no matter what else they attempted to build, it would be based on quicksand. The Law on 
Citizenship was for Latvian minorities, above all, a matter of principle. 
 
The second answer lies in the fact that the ethnic Latvian side came to regard the 
Citizenship Law either as a ‘last bastion’ of Latvian national sovereignty, or as a test of 
Latvian ‘national character’ (which would be belittled by yielding to the pushy minorities), 
or both. Even the crème de la crème of the Latvian intelligentsia, like Skujenieks and 
Di!lers, fell prey to these preconceptions, and on many occasions uncharacteristically 
abandoned any common sense. Skujenieks’s obsessive preoccupation with the potential 
numbers of new immigrants that an amended Citizenship law would allegedly bring into 
Latvia, endangering its core population, is indeed, to use a definition given by Horowitz 
(2000: 194) of ‘census games’, a ‘splendid example of the blending of group anxiety with 
political domination’. In short, in no time the citizenship question became a matter of the 
utmost importance to both opposing parties. This made the Citizenship Law into a trump 
card of Latvian interwar politics, into a universal bargaining tool unabashedly used by both 
sides for their own ends. 
 
This latter observation brings us to the issue of ethnic bargaining. There is a 
plethora of theories linking democratic politics with ethnic mobilisation (Dahl 1971; 
Rabushka and Shepsle 2008; Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1980, 2007). Chandra (2001: 338-
339) provided an excellent summary of the ‘five principal propositions’ that emerge from 
this body of work: ‘(1) Demands made by ethnic groups are indivisible; (2) Demands made 
by ethnic groups are zero-sum; (3) Demands made by ethnic groups are motivated by a 
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desire for relative rather than absolute gains; (4) Demands made by ethnic groups are about 
high stakes because they concern resources that affect future bargaining power; and (5) 
Demands made by ethnic groups are inseparable from a larger conception of selfhood and 
therefore cannot be treated as discrete issues.’ Each of the aforementioned propositions, 
which differentiate an ethnic group’s claim from the one made by an interest group, 
making it much harder for the opposing party (-ies) to satisfy, has been proven to result in 
a bargain failure. Chandra himself actually challenges the five assumptions on the grounds 
that contrary to the common ‘primordialist’ assumption, ethnic groups’ boundaries and 
preferences are not stable over a prolonged period of time, and he applies a constructivist 
approach based on social choice theory instead. Chandra’s own interesting contribution to 
the theory of ethnic bargaining notwithstanding, it seems strikingly obvious how the 
original five propositions resonate with the case of the Latvian Citizenship Law of 1919. 
 
(1) The indivisibility of minority demands, which are usually oriented more towards 
symbolic rather than material gains, means that they cannot be satisfied partially. In 
the Latvian case, no concessions to ‘vos’midesyatniki’– or promises of speeding up 
naturalisation ‘through administrative measures’ attempted by the majority as 
partial solutions – could appease the minorities and resolve the situation. 
(2) The zero-sum game proposition refers to a situation when one group’s gain results 
in the other group’s loss (or, in any case, is perceived by that group as a loss). In 
ethnic Latvians’ perception, extending citizenship to those who, in their 
understanding, had dubious historical ties to the country and had not helped along 
in winning its independence, meant both diminishing the prestige of this hard-
fought-for citizenship, and depleting the already scarce material resources, thus 
way depriving the core nation of its due. 
(3) The relative vs. absolute gains proposition is closely related to the issue of equality. 
It stipulates that minorities usually seek not an absolute gain for themselves in 
terms of a certain status, but rather a relative gain of equal status with the majority, 
or, in Chandra’s (2001:342) words, ‘the primary objective of each group is to 
maximise not its absolute welfare but the distance between its own position and 
that of others’. In the eyes of minorities, the problem with the Citizenship Law 
itself, and with its practical implementation, was first of all in the fact that it 
disadvantaged mainly only ethnic minorities. One may argue here that if significant 
Chapter 4: The Citizenship Law of 1919 and Minority Bargaining  
 
 
 
269 
numbers of ethnically Latvian non-citizens had been created through the law as 
well, the minorities would hardly have had a case.  
(4) The future-bargaining-power proposition holds that the stakes in ethnic groups’ 
bargaining are always incredibly high, making parties’ demands intractable. As 
Horowitz (2000: 147) put it, ‘ethnic groups do not compete in merely one task or 
one game but in lifelong games’. The Citizenship Law happened to be the first 
issue on which majority and minority interests in Latvia collided; over the years 
that followed it proved to be an indispensible tool in the backstage negotiations; 
being perceived as vital by all interested parties, it amplified minorities’ influence 
on other policy issues. To ‘undersell’ their demands on citizenship, in the 
minorities’ perception, would make them appear weak and would relegate them to 
an inferior negotiating position in all future debates.   
(5) The larger-concept-of-selfhood proposition implies that the bargaining process is 
hampered by the fact that minorities treat their claims as an intrinsic part of their 
larger identity, whereas the opposing side looks at them as discrete issues. As 
Horowitz (2000: 147) observes, ‘to lose out in competition and comparison to 
others who are differentiated on a birth basis is to be afflicted with an apparently 
permanent disability’. This statement can be unequivocally applied to the policies 
and strategies of Latvian ethnic minorities during the interwar period. 
 
 
In one of the latest studies of the theory of ethnic bargaining, Jenne (2007) 
introduces the integrationist versus the segregationist dichotomy, i.e. ‘the rights of groups 
to integrate into majority society versus their rights to self-rule (usually on a territorial 
basis). She then defines integrationist rights as ‘the rights of minorities to equal standing in 
the majority-dominated society’, which are used ‘to justify demands ranging from non-
discrimination to affirmative action to cultural or linguistic autonomy’ (Jenne 2007: Notes 
1 & 4 on p. 205). Jenne therefore firmly puts cultural autonomy within the sphere of 
integrationist rights. Now, not everybody takes such a benign view of the integrational 
potential of non-territorial cultural autonomy (see, for example, Nootens 2005; Barry 2001; 
Bauböck 2005). But the fact that Latvian ethnic minorities made the Citizenship Law, and 
not the laws on cultural autonomy, or the laws on minority languages’ status, into a prime 
object of their aspirations and political struggle during the interwar period, proves that the 
main tendency displayed by minorities during that period was an integrationist one. 
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The successful passing of the amendments in 1927 under the left-wing government 
of M. Skujenieks, to which minorities lent their not-unconditional support, proved to be a 
Pyrrhic victory for them. Although one may say that justice was served, the practical 
results, expressed in the number of new citizens resulting from the amendments, were 
negligible. Skujenieks, who struck a bargain with Nurock and others in order to have his 
government confirmed, suffered political humiliation when repeatedly accused by fellow-
Latvians of inconsistency in his views on citizenship and a lack of integrity. Arguably, that 
sped up his radicalisation, and prompted him to adopt a harsher stance towards minorities, 
which resulted in restrictive policies on language and education during his second, right-
wing government just a few years later. The minorities themselves got caught up in 
coalition games and inadvertently aided the authoritarian coup of 1934 by giving their 
votes to the last democratic government under K. Ulmanis. In short, nobody was a winner. 
 
Despite its notoriety during the interwar years, the Citizenship Law of 1919 is 
largely forgotten, and is by and large ignored by Latvian historians. To the best of my 
knowledge, apart from Straume (1992), and Goldmanis (2005), it has never been 
examined. Straume’s paper challenges the ‘golden age’ myth prevalent in the historical 
accounts of the First Republic in the early 1990s: 
 
Some of our essayists have created a myth about supposedly perfect interethnic relations 
during the interwar republic. This is totally wrong. For example, there were many more polemics in 
the Latvian and minority press in 1932 than in 1990, and they were much sharper, and more 
hateful. All this together lent a rather dramatic flare to the citizenship question as such, regardless 
of the fact that ethnic proportions among the population were incomparably more favourable than 
now.  
 
(Straume 1992: 75) 
The Citizenship Law of 1919, unlike the Latvian Constitution of 1922, was not 
deemed suitable for post-1991 use because of the dramatically changed demographic 
situation in Latvia over the Soviet years. (Indeed, Straume paper’s concluding part, 
subtitled ‘What can we learn from it’, highlights only three articles of the 1919 Law which 
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would be ‘useful’ in the modern-day situation, namely Article 8 on the unacceptability of 
dual citizenship; Article 4 on a citizenship award for special services; and amendments of 
1938 to Article 8 stipulating grounds for the deprivation of citizenship.) Instead, a new, 
much more restrictive citizenship law was passed in 1994, which resulted in over 700,000 
thousand non-citizens, whose legally unique status was determined by a separate law. The 
only aspect of legal continuity employed was that the Law of 1994 limited automatic 
citizenship to the citizens of the interwar republic and their direct descendants. 
 
Ironically, the question of citizenship has yet again become the most divisive issue 
in Latvian politics, and has been identified by many scholars as the primary source of 
interethnic tensions in post-Soviet Latvia (G. Smith et al., 1994; Lieven, 1994; Pabriks and 
Purs, 2002). More on this in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter Five:  P. Schiemann, M. Laserson and Cultural Autonomy 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
As we have seen from the previous chapters, the theoretical legacy of Skujenieks 
and Valters on the national question came into deep contradiction with their later actions as 
political practitioners in the independent Latvian state. Blanks got increasingly radical, and 
then disappeared from public view altogether, while Stu!ka, after the failure of the Latvian 
Soviet, resigned himself to Soviet jurisprudence.  
 
There were two other prominent Latvian thinkers of the beginning of the 20th 
century who remained faithful to their declared ideals, in theory as well as in practice, 
throughout their lives. Both Paul Schiemann and Max Laserson, who have frequently 
appeared in the previous chapters as representatives of Latvian ethnic minorities in the 
Saeima, were dedicated democrats and champions of minority rights; both were active on 
the Latvian political scene not just through their activities in the parliament but also 
through numerous publications in the press, and at international level. Although the two 
men shared a firm commitment to parliamentary democracy and to the advocacy of 
minority rights both domestically and internationally, they did not always see eye to eye. 
Their personal disagreements both on practical issues like the legal basis and the actual 
implementation of cultural autonomy for ethnic minorities in Latvia, and on more 
fundamental matters such as the impact of non-territorial cultural autonomy (NCA) on 
state sovereignty, which were further exacerbated by the pressure put on them by their 
respective ethnic communities, not only shed an interesting light on the dynamics of 
intergroup minority relations (vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis the state) in interwar 
Latvia, but also have deep resonance with the modern debates on minority rights. 
 
The most pronounced difference between the works of Schiemann and Laserson, 
and their Latvian counterparts Skujenieks, and especially Valters, whose books on the 
national question were reviewed in Chapter Two, is their ability to develop their argument 
from the particular to the general, avoiding the temptations of the familiar and the 
parochial, and transcending national borders. Nowadays, Latvia is largely viewed as a case 
study for political theorists rather than as an active contributor to the debates. The highly 
original contributions made to international political theory by Schiemann and Laserson 
demonstrate that this was not always the case. 
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During the 1920s, both Schiemann and Laserson enthusiastically supported the 
cultural autonomy for minorities which was guaranteed by the Education Law and the Law 
on Minorities Schooling of 1919; both fought tirelessly in the Saeima for amendments to 
the Citizenship Law of 1919 and other pieces of legislation which they perceived as 
inimical to the principle of equality and as infringements on minority rights. Schiemann, as 
editor-in-chief of the biggest Baltic German daily Rigasche Rundschau, contributed 
numerous editorials on subjects related to democracy, equality, nationalism and minority 
rights; as well as promptly reacting to the views expressed by his ideological opponents in 
the newspapers Latvijas Sargs and Latvijas Kareivis. Laserson, a frequent contributor to 
the anti-Bolshevist Russian-language newspaper Segodnya, wrote on the same range of 
topics, and, as a professional lawyer, reviewed all relevant pieces of Latvian legislation, 
putting them in a wider context of international law and explaining their practical 
implications. 
 
This chapter will examine the relational interplay between the Baltic German and 
the Jewish communities of the interwar republic (represented by Schiemann and Laserson 
respectively), their stance toward the majority nation (and, to some extent, their stance 
toward other Latvia’s ethnic minorities), and will assess how this influenced the overall 
state of majority-minority relations in interwar Latvia. For this purpose, I will first apply 
the theoretical framework of the quadratic nexus, described in Chapter One, and will then 
proceed to explore the ‘fifth element’ itself, i.e. the aforementioned relational interplay 
between the Baltic Germans and the Jews, which, I believe, further enhances the nexus and 
makes an important contribution to our understanding of ethnic politics. 
 
I will also provide a brief overview of the theoretical legacy of Schiemann and 
Laserson – when by 1925, the once–so-promising development of cultural autonomy for 
minorities in Latvia had stalled, these Latvian minority thinkers, frustrated by the futility of 
their efforts to implement cultural autonomy in ‘one separate country’, turned their 
attention to the pan-European minorities movement, and developed theoretical frameworks 
which nowadays would undoubtedly be categorised as post-nationalist. Schiemann was 
one of the founders of the European Nationalities Congress (est. in 1925), while Laserson 
was a delegate. As already mentioned before, their views on minorities vis-à-vis the state 
differed to some extent – it is even more interesting to compare their theoretical legacy 
when one takes into consideration that they were both influenced by their experience as 
minority leaders and parliamentarians in Latvia.  
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5.1 Setting the Scene: Interwar Latvia According to the Quadratic Nexus 
 
The First Dimension of the Nexus: Nationalising State 
Turning attention to the first side of the nexus, which Brubaker designated as the 
‘nationalising state’, it needs to be said that at the beginning of Latvian statehood, the 
nationalising trend had not manifested itself explicitly. As already described in earlier 
chapters, the newly created democratic Latvian Republic guaranteed cultural rights to the 
ethnic minorities living on its territory; from the very start the founders of the state assured 
the minorities of their intention to build a united civic Latvian nation, where people of all 
ethnic backgrounds were welcome; these principles were enshrined in the document 
known as the National Council Platform.  Notably, all these events took place two months 
before the Paris Peace Conference began on 18th January 1919, therefore seven months 
ahead of the Polish Minority Treaty, with the first in the series of treaties aimed at the 
protection of the newly created national minorities being signed on 28th June 1919, thus 
without any direct pressure from the outside world, and of ethnic Latvians’ own accord. 
 The Law on Latvian Educational Institutions and the Law on Minority Schools in 
Latvia from 1919 taken together secured minorities’ control over their own education and 
cultural affairs.  
This somewhat idealistic, ‘multicultural’ vision of the new statehood elaborated by 
the novice Latvian lawmakers however, was soon tested by various practical challenges. 
Some of these challenges were specific to the particular Latvian situation, like the high 
level of fragmentation among the political parties that led to frequent changes of 
governments, while others arose due to changes on the international scene.  
 
The Second Dimension: National Minorities  
 
As observed by one of the contemporary critics of NCA, Walter Kemp (2005: 214), 
‘one problem with the nationality principle is that it assumes that national groups are 
homogeneous’, while in reality members of a national group do not necessarily share the 
same interests or political views. The two ethnic communities in question, the Baltic 
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Germans and the Latvian Jews of the interwar period, serve as a perfect illustration of such 
internal diversity. It is customary to speak about the high level of fragmentation within the 
ethnically-Latvian political parties during the interwar period – in fact, minorities’ political 
life was just as fragmented. 
 
In 1920, Latvians comprised 72.8 per cent of the population, the rest being made up 
of the six largest ethnic minorities, i.e., Russians (12.6 per cent), Jews (5 per cent), 
Germans (3.6 per cent), Poles (3.4 per cent), Lithuanians (1.6 per cent), and Estonians (0.6 
per cent).1 In this respect, Latvia was not different from the rest of Eastern Europe during 
the interwar period - in fact, Latvia’s percentage of ethnic minorities, far from being 
exceptional, at 27-28 per cent stood slightly lower than the average percentage of 29.2 for 
all Eastern European states (Pearson 1983: 148).  
 
As already described in the previous chapters, the minorities’ reactions to the 
founding of the new state ranged from a negative attitude on the part of conservative Baltic 
Germans to a sceptical one on the part of the Jews, and indifference on the part of Latvian 
Russians.  Overall, this notable lack of enthusiasm on the part of the national minorities at 
the moment when the new state was born but its fate was still far from certain, bears 
witness to the fact that they did not share the national aspirations of ethnic Latvians, but 
assumed the passive role of onlookers. This wary cautiousness, however, had a number of 
plausible explanations. Conservative Germans were offended that their carefully nurtured 
idea of the Latvian and Estonian territories being united under Baltic German leadership 
had been cruelly snatched away; besides, considering the long history of animosity 
between them and the Latvians, they had suddenly been put in a precarious position. More 
liberally inclined Germans, the Jews and the Russians, although not opposed to the idea of 
an independent Latvian state, nevertheless felt threatened by the new order of things, 
despite Latvian assurances of protection of minority rights. Everybody was entering 
unchartered waters – especially taking into account the deep existing segregation among 
Latvian ethnic groups in all spheres of public life, and the inevitable resulting lack of 
communication. The Latvian national movement leading the path to independence had a 
strictly ethnic membership; minorities did not participate in the foundation of the new 
state, but were presented with the fact of its existence. Mutual trust could not arise out of 
nowhere; the promises of equality made by the Latvians were reassuring, but minorities 
questioned their underlying motives. 
                                                
1 Source: Skujeneeks, M. 1927. Latvija. Zeme un iedz!votaji. R!ga: A. Gulbja apg"dniec!ba. 
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The Third Dimension of the Nexus: External Homelands  
Moving now to the ‘external homeland’ factor: it certainly did not help ethnic 
accord in Latvia that between the world wars, three of the Latvian ethnic minorities had 
powerful kin-states, namely Russia, Germany and Poland. Two of them, the Russians and 
the Germans, also happened to be the former historical ‘oppressors’ of the ethnic Latvian 
nation, while the Polish landlords in Latgale, the eastern part of Latvia, had formerly been 
in a privileged position. Communist Russia was always considered a threat, but over the 
course of a few years Germany also became an aggressive authoritarian state. As for 
Latvia’s relationship with Poland, which was at the time still considered a guarantor of 
stability in the region, it was anything but simple. Latvia tended to view Poland, with 
whom, prior to World War Two, it had shared a border, with ‘considerable suspicion’, 
questioning its real intentions in the region and fearing possible designs on Latgale 
(Stranga 1994: 47). As a result of external threats, both real and imagined, the trend was 
eventually set of viewing the Russian, German, and Polish communities of Latvia as a 
potential ‘fifth column’, pushing them to the margins of political life and increasing their 
sense of alienation. Undeniably, there was also a certain growth of Latvian minorities’ own 
ethnic nationalism in the 1930s, in response to the nationalist fever that overtook their kin 
states at the time. This minority ethnic nationalism was further fuelled by ethnic Latvians’ 
suspicions and often-unfair accusations.  
Indeed, when it came to ‘external homelands’, minorities could hardly put a foot 
right – for example, the minorities’ faction, led by the Baltic German Schiemann and the 
Russian delegate Pres!akovs, was initially opposed to the Armistice Treaty with a non-
democratic government of Bolshevik Russia. This did not earn minorities any kudos with 
ethnic Latvians – instead, they were immediately accused by the nationalistic writer J"nis 
Akuraters of monarchical sympathies: he based this assumption on the fact that both these 
minorities had been in a privileged position under the Russian Empire. ‘They only want 
peace with a “democratic Russia”, because their democratic Russia is hiding under the 
masks of Kolchak and Denikin,’ claimed Akuraters.2  This Jesuitical casuistry would 
become a favourite weapon used by ethnic nationalists against the minorities during the 
interwar period – whatever position minorities took on Soviet Russia, they were promptly 
accused either of being Bolshevists, or monarchists. For example, the openly anti-
                                                
2 ‘Par Tautas Padomes s#di’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, No. 114 08.10.1919. 
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Bolshevik editorial team of the biggest Russian-language daily Segodnya was often 
portrayed by their Latvian counterparts as a ‘clique of monarchists’. 
 
The Fourth Dimension of the Nexus: International Society 
 
I will now move on to the fourth aspect of the nexus, international organisations 
and international law. Max Laserson (1971: 128), recollecting Latvians’ benevolent 
attitude towards the minorities at the time when the law on minority education was being 
passed, writes: ‘This situation changed completely, however, when the question of national 
minority rights passed from the field of internal legislation to that of international 
security’. When Latvia joined the League of Nations in September 1921, it was, along with 
other new and enlarged European states, required to sign a minority treaty guaranteeing 
fair treatment of its ethnic minorities. This did not go down well with the Latvian 
government, which argued that minorities’ protection was already enshrined in the 
country’s liberal constitution, and that the imposition of minority treaties on selected 
European states was a violation of the principle of equality. Furthermore, Latvia argued 
that internationalisation of minority rights through the treaties opened the door to foreign 
interventions and endangered state sovereignty. (Robinson et al., 1943: 166) Whereas 
twelve of these states, including Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and others, 
were fully bound by the minority treaties, Latvia - along with Albania, Estonia, and 
Lithuania - only acquiesced to signing declarations to the Council of the League of Nations 
(Dickinson 1928: 10). Latvia’s negotiations with the League of Nations were protracted 
and unhappy. The resulting Latvian declaration avoided the word ‘guarantee’ in relation to 
minorities, but stipulated the right of the League of Nations to re-open negotiations with 
Latvia if in future the situation of minorities in the country was found wanting in 
comparison to the standards set in the minority treaties (Macartney 1929: 20). The 
declaration was finally signed in July 1923, but not before Latvia’s chief negotiator, M. 
Valters, had tried to get the minorities to agree to waive their rights to any international 
guarantees, thus proving to the world that they were happy in Latvia. Laserson (1971: 130) 
attests that in February 1923 Valters had two unofficial meetings with the minorities’ MPs, 
but failed to convince them. The Baltic Germans were hoping to perhaps file complaints 
related to the Agrarian Reform, which they considered to be an anti-German measure, and 
‘the Jews and Russians were likewise not in any great hurry to sell their international 
birthright for a series of local rights and laws’ (Laserson 1971: 131). 
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It is noteworthy that Latvian minorities were generally not happy with the position 
taken by the League of Nations’ negotiator, M. da Gama, vis-à-vis the Latvian 
government. Laserson, for example, wrote at the time that da Gama had failed to take into 
consideration that the process of legalisation of minority rights in Latvia, clearly 
demonstrated by the Law on Minority Schooling, was already under way; instead of 
capitalising on these existing achievements, da Gama went after relatively minor rights, 
like the right to observe religious holidays and other similar issues, thus never proceeding 
to discuss questions of cultural autonomy. From the point of view of ethnic minorities, 
these demands were too unambitious. On the other hand, da Gama’s version of the 
declaration foresaw the right of third parties to interfere with the provision of minority 
rights in Latvia, which was perceived by the ethnic Latvian majority as an infringement 
upon Latvia’s state sovereignty.  Therefore, both the minorities and the majority ended up 
being dissatisfied with the declaration, albeit for directly opposing reasons; while Valters 
opportunistically used this ‘mutual’ dissatisfaction against the declaration as such. 
Notably, Laserson also complained, in one of his articles, of the ‘veil of secrecy’ 
surrounding the whole affair, and the absence of public discussions and debates.3 
 
The sharp-tongued Laserson (1971: 124) commented that ‘the link between the 
outer world and the Minorities did not serve to make them more popular within the 
country. On the contrary, the old distrust of the Latvians towards their one-time masters 
the Germans and Russians was awakened afresh’. Both lost their former dominance, he 
writes, being overnight transformed ‘from wolves to sheep and doing their best to appear 
down-trodden and oppressed’. This, concludes Laserson, made them even less popular. 
Siding with the Latvians’ enemies backfired for the Jews: ‘The common interests of the 
minorities compelled the Jewish Delegates to join with the others, and so we too were 
made to feel the sting of Latvian nationalism; even though historically speaking this had 
not previously been directed against the Jews and from time to time, in the course of 
negotiations for the setting up of a new Government, the Seim [sic.] deputies and Latvian 
statesmen used to proclaim that the Jews were the most faithful minority because they 
made no political demands and lacked any territorial romanticism of restoration’. 
(Laserson 1971: 124) 
 
                                                
 
3 Laserson, M. ‘Veleno podozhdat’, Segodnya, 11.07.1923. 
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Another international organisation that should be mentioned in this regard is the 
Nationalities Congress founded in 1925 in Vienna, of which Schiemann was one of the 
founders, and Laserson a delegate. Another Latvian Jew, the leader of the religious 
Zionists M. Nurock, was also a delegate to the Congress. By then, Latvian minorities were 
largely disillusioned with the League of Nations, whose mechanisms had proved too weak 
to offer any protection or guarantees of stability; they heartily welcomed the Nationalities 
Congress, which they perceived as a new beacon of hope in the field of minority rights. 
The mere fact that the Germans were in the vanguard of the Congress made it unpopular 
with the Latvian government by association. Other Latvian ethnic minorities, however, 
followed the developments at the Congress with avid interest, and a special correspondent 
of the biggest Russian-language daily Segodnya provided detailed accounts of the 
Congress’s sessions. 
 
5.2. The Fifth Element 
The Baltic Germans 
 
The Baltic German community was by far the best-organised ethnic group in Latvia 
at the time. In fact, other minorities both envied and admired the high level of their internal 
organisation and discipline. Indeed, stories were circulated about the Baltic Germans 
carrying their sick and disabled to the polling stations on stretchers, so that not a single 
vote would be lost.4 As a result, both at the Constitutional Assembly and at all four 
Saeimas, the Baltic Germans consistently held more seats than their respective share of the 
population would have warranted. (For comparison, the Russians were consistently under-
represented, while the Jews and the Poles managed to secure proportional representation).  
One comes to admire the high level of discipline of the German community even more if 
all internal divisions are taken into account. Along social-economic lines, the Baltic 
Germans were divided into four major ‘hermetically sealed’ groups: the nobility; the 
middle class and the Literaten; the merchants; and the artisans and craftsmen (Hiden 2004: 
10). Politically, they were divided into the right-wing conservatives, the moderate centre-
right and the liberals. 
 
                                                
4 During the elections to the Constitutional Assembly, Segodnya wistfully reported: ‘Germans close ranks at 
the elections. At the polling stations in the German-populated areas more than half the electors have already 
voted by the end of the first day. Even ill and injured people are being carried to the polling stations.’ 
(‘Vybory’, Segodnya, No. 88, 18.04.1920).  
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Table 2. Baltic German Representation in the interwar Latvian Saeima.  
 
 
These groups took opposing stances on Latvia’s independence: whereas German 
conservatives attempted to claim a special status as the second sovereign nationality, P. 
Schiemann recognised the Latvian nation-state without reservations (minority rights 
guarantees notwithstanding, obviously). There were no socialists among the Baltic 
Germans. In the Saeima, the German parties tended to vote with the Latvian Agrarian 
Union and the centre parties.  
 
The centuries-long history of animosity between ethnic Latvians and their German 
‘oppressors’ consistently marred Latvian-Baltic German relations during the interwar 
period. The Agrarian Reform of the 1920s, which expropriated the German landlords (until 
then some 40-50 per cent of the Latvian rural population was landless (Plakans 1995)) was 
an imperative economic measure in a country devastated by the war; however, there was 
also a motive of historical justice behind it (Aizsilnieks 1968: 234). The Agrarian Reform, 
and the subsequent expropriation of two churches belonging to the German congregation, 
the Jakob Kirche in 1923 and the Dome Cathedral in 1931, all of which the Baltic 
Germans perceived as ethnic discrimination, only deepened the rift. Despite that, there was 
a limited, largely ‘off-the-record’ support for the Baltic Germans among some cultured 
Latvians, for many of whom German had been, at least in the past, a mother tongue. That 
allowed the Baltic German conservatives to stubbornly maintain futile hopes for some kind 
of special treatment from the Latvians, in recognition of their outstanding role in the 
cultural and economic life of the country. It also allowed them to look down on other 
Political Orientation Name of the Party Represented by 
Conservative centre-right The German Balt People’s Party  
Wilhelm von Fircks 
(Vilhelms fon Firkss) 
Moderate centre-right  The German Balt Reform Party 
Edwin Magnus (Edv!ns 
Magnuss) 
The Liberals 
The German Balt Democratic 
Party 
 
The Progressive Party 
Paul Schiemann 
 
Eduard Rosenberg (Eduards 
Rozenbergs) 
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Latvian ethnic minorities, whom they, just like ethnic Latvians, considered to be culturally 
inferior and politically immature.   
 
Paul Schiemann (1876-1944) 
P. Schiemann (1876-1944) is by far the most internationally acknowledged Latvian 
thinker of the interwar period. His erudition and unwavering commitment to liberal ideals, 
his loyalty towards the democratic Latvian state, his relentless energy as a Latvian 
parliamentarian, his ability to rise above tribal interests and political manipulations, and 
the daring originality of his theoretical work put him in a category of his own. Hiden 
(1999) compares Schiemann to another ‘distinguished son’ of Riga, Isaiah Berlin, and 
wonders whether Schiemann’s intellectual legacy would be more widely recognised if he 
had had a chance at fellowship at an Oxford college. But strictly speaking, apart from the 
line ‘Isaiah Berlin was born in Riga, capital of Latvia’, which unfailingly appears at the 
beginning of every edition of Berlin’s books, there is very little connecting the famous 
philosopher to Latvia; his intellectual legacy was never based in Latvian soil, having other 
sources of inspiration. Such was not the case with Schiemann, who considered Latvia to be 
the only place of his true belonging. And Berlin notwithstanding, Schiemann remains the 
most internationally accredited Latvian thinker.   
 
A number of articles, monographs, book chapters and doctoral theses have been 
dedicated to Schiemann in German (see Garleff 1969, 1976, 2980, 1994; Rimscha 1956, 
1982, 1998); Kause 1976, 1980, 1982, 2001; Loeber 1973), and in Latvian (Aps!tis 2000; 
"imkuva 2000; Dribins 2005; #jabs 2007). To the English reader, Schiemann remained 
largely unknown until the publication of the sweeping, scrupulously researched monograph 
by John Hiden (2004). Hiden follows Schiemann’s life path and intellectual development 
in general, but his main focus is on Schiemann’s legacy in the theory of minority rights, 
and its possible implications for today’s Europe. More recently, #jabs (2009) has 
undertaken a critical examination of Schiemann’s intellectual legacy and his liberal 
position.  
 
Elsewhere in this thesis, I concentrate mainly on Schiemann’s political activities in 
Latvia, most of all on his role as a recognised minorities faction leader in the Latvian 
parliament during the interwar years. This sub-chapter will examine, in brief, Schiemann’s 
intellectual legacy – his contribution to minority rights theory, his concept of the a-national 
state, and his liberal political convictions. For this purpose, I will draw heavily on the 
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works of John Hiden (1999, 2004, 2007, 2012), whose minute and subtle assessment of 
Schiemann’s writings was indispensable for my analysis. I will then attempt to critically 
evaluate Schiemann’s theory of the a-national state first by comparing it to the original 
NCA model developed by K. Renner and O. Bauer (here I owe an intellectual debt to E. 
Nimni, who initiated and moderated modern debates on the NCA, as well as writing 
countless commentaries and introductions to the theory, and to his co-authors), and then by 
placing it within contemporary debates on social justice, sovereignty, and minority rights.  
Finally, I will use !jabs’s (2009) thought-provoking article as a starting point in providing a 
summary of Schiemann’s overall political beliefs and his place in the Latvian liberal 
politics of the time.  
 
Hiden (2004:129) notes that Schiemann ‘particularly disliked’ two aspects of the 
legacy of the 19th century in Europe – ‘the veneration of the state’, and the merger between 
the idea of the nation, or Volk, and a particular territory; he was convinced that ‘the World 
War was ignited by these two principles’ (Hiden 2004:129). Schiemann’s preoccupation 
with the causes of World War One and its calamitous long-lasting effects on European 
politics was echoed in many of his articles and essays, as well as in his speeches at the 
Saeima. One of his big hopes was that the newly created Baltic States would make it their 
task to uphold the spirit of national tolerance, much needed in all of Europe. He was also 
convinced that in the absence of an existing pan-European legislative framework for 
minority rights, the newly created Baltic States, which from the very start recognised the 
multi-ethnic nature of their populations and showed a general political will in 
accommodating diverse cultural interests through cultural autonomy, could serve as a kind 
of experimental laboratory for a future and better Europe (Hiden 2004).  
 
In 1918, Schiemann gave his unequivocal support to the independent democratic 
Latvian state; for the next fifteen years he would put his formidable energies into the task 
of ensuring that the Baltic German community became an integral part of the newly 
founded state, always leading by example. Schiemann was a member of the National 
Council, the Constitutional Assembly, and all four interwar parliaments, hardly ever 
missing a session. He was active in the parliamentary committees’ work, and was 
instrumental in drafting and debating key pieces of legislation (it is notable that although 
he was the recognised leader of the minority faction in the Parliament, his interests as an 
MP were never limited to the issues directly affecting ethnic minorities, as was the case 
with many of his peers) – Hiden (2004:66) mentions some 130 laws and 73 parliamentary 
amendments and submissions by the Baltic German parties that Schiemann had a ‘major 
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personal input’ into, in addition to his own political initiatives. He spoke on all the 
important pieces of legislation in the Parliament, without limiting himself to minorities’ 
direct interests. He also became the recognised leader of the Minorities Bloc. At the same 
time, he continued as the editor-in-chief of the influential Rigasche Rundschau, the biggest 
German daily in Latvia. Hardly a day went by without Schiemann publishing a political 
pamphlet, or an analytical article on a current piece of legislation, or a polemical response 
to his Latvian counterparts from Jaun!k!s Zi"as, Latvijas Sargs or Latvijas Kareivis. 
 
Nevertheless, Schiemann often found himself ‘between a rock and a hard place’ 
when he tried to navigate between the interests of the Baltic German community 
(especially the demands of its conservative part) and the tasks of the Minorities Bloc in the 
Saeima, while at the same time trying to keep good working relations with the Latvian 
majority. It was Schiemann’s often-frustrating experience with the practical 
implementation of cultural autonomy in Latvia which made him turn to the wider pan-
European minority politics and that inspired his theoretical work on minority rights and 
relations between cultural and state communities.  
 
The Nationalities Congress, which Schiemann co-founded in Vienna in 1925, was 
created as a kind of pan-European ‘minorities parliament’ aiming at providing a platform 
for discussing minority issues and for bringing them to the attention of European 
governments – something that minorities felt the League of Nations failed to provide. The 
Nationalities Congress, willing to become a respectable partner for governments and 
international institutions, introduced strict criteria for membership, which was limited to 
Europe: no specific country cases could be discussed at the Congress; a declaration of 
loyalty towards the country of citizenship was required along with a promise to abstain 
from any separatist or irredentist claims; tolerance towards other minorities within the 
same state was required, as well as a certain level of members’ representation and 
organisation at home (Hirschhausen 2010:91). 
 
Two distinct groups competed for leadership at the Nationalities Congress: the 
liberal-democratic wing advocating the idea of cultural autonomy for minorities, which 
was influenced by the Baltic German tradition, the ideas of Austrian Social Democracy, 
and Zionist theory; and the right wing, consisting of conservative German representatives 
and the Ukrainian, Slovenian and Hungarian delegates, who saw the main goal of the 
minority movement as the strengthening of ties between minorities and their kin states. 
This latter stance would ultimately triumph and lead to the Congress’s eventual demise, 
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but during the first decade of its existence it was the ideas of the liberal wing that formed 
and shaped the public perception of the Nationalities Congress. (Hirschhausen 2010; Hiden 
2004). And none of those ideas created quite such a stir as Schiemann’s theory of the a-
national state. 
 
Schiemann’s thinking on minority rights and his theory of the a-national state 
would remain forgotten for decades, just like the NCA model of Renner and Bauer which 
had inspired it. However, after the collapse of the Socialist bloc in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the late 1980s, and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Empire in the early 
1990s, after which a number of ethnically-mixed countries either reclaimed democracy or 
gained independence (or, as in the case of the Baltic countries, regained their lost 
statehood), bringing majority-minority relations to the fore again, these theories eventually 
resurfaced. Obviously, the problem remains as urgent and confounding as ever, 
demonstrating ‘how little we have advanced in the interim period in accommodating the 
collective rights of national minorities within a single state’ (Nimni 2005:2). Over the past 
decade, political scientists, philosophers and historians have been critically re-evaluating 
the interwar school of thought on minority rights and cultural autonomy, placing it within a 
contemporary theoretical framework and looking for possible modern applications.5  
 
After the NCA model was brought back from the past, it was only logical that 
interest in the interwar Nationalities Congress should be revived as well (see Housden 
2004; Hirschhausen 2010; Smith and Hiden 2012). Schiemann’s theory of the a-national 
state intrinsically links the two.  
 
Schiemann’s theory of the a-national state is based on two major sources: the idea 
of non-territorial cultural autonomy (NCA) developed by Austrian Social Democrats and 
previously mentioned described in Chapter One and Chapter Two, and the juridical 
concept of plural sovereignty elaborated by Leon Duguit, Hugo Krabbe and Harold J. 
Laski at the beginning of the 20th century. Whereas the former was conceived in the late 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and aimed at resolving ethnocultural tensions among its 
multinational population without revising actual geographical borders, the latter questioned 
                                                
5 See, for example, the English translation of the Die Natiotalitätenfrage un die Sozialdemokratie, in Bauer, 
O. 2000 The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy. Nimni, E. (ed.) Minneapolis, London: 
University of Minnesota Press, with a substantial introduction by the editor; Nimni, E. (ed.) 2005 National 
Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics. New York: Routledge; Hiden, J. and Smith, D.J. 2012 
Ethnic Diversity and the Nation-State. National cultural autonomy revisited. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
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the indivisible sovereignty of a liberal democratic state. Both theories effectively brought 
the territorially based sovereign nation-state - a type of political association that reigned 
supreme then, and continues to do so now - if not under direct attack, then under very 
scrupulous examination.  
 
It was from the podium of the second Nationalities Congress in 1926 that 
Schiemann delivered his first public speech on the a-national state, astonishing those 
present by insisting on the necessity of the separation of the nation and the state, thus 
putting an end to the nation-state in its recognised form. Hiden (2004:134) describes the 
‘storm of applause’ from the audience, and the enormous interest from the media that 
Schiemann’s original speech attracted, as well as the predictable negative reactions. A 
Dutch newspaper quoted lengthy passages from the speech, explaining to its readership 
that Schiemann’s ideas were more ‘evolutionary’ than revolutionary, and that the aim of 
his theory was a long-term reform movement rather than immediate changes. 
 
In 1927, Schiemann further elaborated his views on the possible future of the 
nation-state in his programmatic article ‘Volksgemeinschaft und Staatgemeinschaft’.6  
 
The two terms in the title designated the two different types of nation: whereas the 
Volksgemeinschaft is a ‘people’s community’ united by common culture, the 
Staatgemeinschaft is a ‘state community’ which unites communities of different people 
residing in the state. Schiemann’s theory is undeniably inspired by Renner and Bauer, 
whose line of thinking he closely follows, but it also contains original elements that 
warrant closer attention.  
 
In order to separate legal spheres of influence between the Volksgemeinschaft and 
Staatsgemeinschaft, Schiemann continues to use the analogy of the separation of the state 
and the church. ‘The state as such belongs to no nationality’, he claims (Schiemann 
1927:39). He supports the ‘personality principle’: belonging to a specific nationality is 
determined by free choice, and is self-descriptive; it is also possible to choose to declare no 
nationality at all.  
  
The legal status of the Volksgemeinschaft within the state, just as in Renner and 
Bauer’s theory, is one of a corporation in public law, which has the right to collect taxes. 
                                                
6 Schiemann, P.  1927. ‘Volksgemeinschaft und Staatgemeinschaft’, Nation und Staat, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 
21-41. 
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Schiemann introduces yet another term, the ‘total nation’ (Gesamtnation), which 
designates the entire ethnic group regardless of which state they belong to (e.g. Germans). 
Schiemann’s project of separating ethnicity from the territorial state foresees that the 
Gesamtnation will assume certain trans-border responsibilities for its own cultural matters 
(for example, Germans in the Reich have duties towards German cultural institutions 
worldwide). But the Gesamtnation is not to be equated with the kin state, which has no 
right to interfere at all. In ethnically mixed states, no contributions received from all 
taxpayers can be diverted to one particular Volksgemeinschaft.   
 
According to Schiemann, it is not just ethnically mixed states that should be 
interested in building supranational Gesamtnations, but also those ethnically homogeneous 
states which have co-nationals living outside their borders. The same quid pro quo 
principle, which serves both as an excellent selling point and a built-in guarantee of the 
system’s stability, was advocated by Bauer (2000:270) as a principle which allows one ‘to 
maintain the population of one’s nation by according the minorities of other nations the 
possibility of preserving their nationality, and in return claiming this right for the 
minorities of one’s own nation’.   
 
In comparison to its main sources of inspiration, works by Renner and Bauer, the 
‘Volkgemeinschaft und Staatgemeinschaft’ comes across as sketchy – Schiemann 
concentrates almost entirely on philosophical and normative aspects of his theory of the a-
national state, while remaining vague on its proposed legal structure and the practical 
aspects of the theory’s implementation. Nevertheless, he formulated his own concept of a 
dual overarching international structure (the Gesamtnation, and the international council of 
the Volksgemeinschafts of territorial states, akin to the already existing Nationalities 
Congress), and, significantly, a concept of a third type of nation, a ‘common political 
nation’ emerging alongside the Volksgemeinschaft and the Staatgemeinschaft. Both these 
concepts have no parallel in either Renner’s or Bauer’s thinking, but both may be 
compared to the organisational structures of Christian confessions (and are indeed 
compared by Schiemann himself to the Catholic Church).   
 
It should be understood, though, that the publication of Schiemann’s article in 1927 
was more a staking of a claim in the hope of inspiring further debates than a presentation 
of a fully developed theory. Hiden (2004) mentions that Schiemann, in response to his 
numerous critics, attempted to address various practical aspects of the a-national state. 
There can be no doubt that Schiemann would subsequently have brought his theory to its 
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full fruition, had it not been for historical developments in the 1930s, which worked not 
just against Schiemann’s concept, but against any open democratic debate and indeed 
against democracy itself.  
 
It should be also noted that, predictably, Schiemann’s theory demonstrates 
ideological differences with its Austro-Marxist source of inspiration. Like Austro-
Marxists, Schiemann regards nations as primarily cultural communities. Like them, he also 
sees those communities as organic growths with an irresistible pull – they are communities 
of feeling, not communities of reason (for Renner (2005:26), for example, the nation is ‘a 
community of intellectual and emotional life…a purely inward community’). There is, 
however, a substantial difference between their respective approaches to the question. 
Renner and Bauer are primarily concerned with social justice and equality, and they see 
national culture as a uniting factor in overcoming social stratification. Their final goal is a 
guarantee of equal access to the national culture for all members of the nation. Bauer 
(2000:93), for example, is convinced that thanks to the increased productivity of a 
democratic socialist society, ‘the entire population can be included in the national 
community of culture’; moreover in such a society it is not merely a possibility but a must. 
For Renner (2005:22), it is the proletariat that will transform the national question from a 
question of power into a question of culture. Schiemann, on the other hand, does not view 
culture as a universal bond for all the nation’s members; he distinguishes between the 
educated classes, who fully utilise the national culture and have ‘ideals’, and the masses, 
for whom this culture is limited to the national language, customs and character.  He does 
not perceive it as an injustice of any kind; the only conclusion he derives from this status 
quo is the importance of the middle class as the ‘bearer of the national culture’. 
Schiemann, of course, is being consistent in his political views, as he was never a socialist; 
however, it seems to me that his indifference towards inequality of access to the national 
culture sits uncomfortably with his commitment both to the personality principle, and to 
pluralistic sovereignty. 
 
The widespread assumption that Schiemann was a liberal democrat without any 
socialist leanings is vigorously challenged by !jabs (2009), who, critically evaluating 
Schiemann’s liberal position and particularly his concept of the a-national state, raises two 
principal objections. The first is that ‘his defence of liberal ideas is inseparably linked to a 
particular hierarchy of national cultures’, putting a premium on German culture as a 
safeguard of liberal values (!jabs 2009: 496). Secondly, !jabs claims that Schiemann’s 
theory of the a-national state is not ‘fully liberal’ as it contains ‘a significant Marxist 
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element’, casts doubt on ‘the integrative potential of the democratic state’ and overloads 
‘ethnocultural communities with the positive values of participation and integration’ 
(2009: 497) !jabs calls this reported discrepancy in Schiemann’s political views his 
‘strange Baltic liberalism’. 
 
I will argue that Schiemann’s liberalism, on both counts, was neither strange nor 
tainted by Marxism – on the contrary, in his convictions as much as in his failings, 
Schiemann was the epitome of a classical liberal. The hierarchical ranking of specific 
cultures was an intrinsic part of the classical liberalism of the 19th century (see, for 
example, Mill’s (1958: 233-236) passage on the Bretons and the French, the Basques and 
the Spanish, Welshmen, Scots and Englishmen; as well as on Macedonia and Greece, and, 
finally, on Russia and Europe). This deep-rooted conviction of the superiority of a certain 
culture (usually one’s own) inspired the idea of a civilising mission towards other people 
(perfectly compatible with the utilitarian idea of the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number), which allowed many political theorists to make a link between liberalism and 
colonialism (Young 2004:92; Doyle 1986:276). Many Latvian liberals and democrats, 
from Valters and Skujenieks to Blanks and Akuraters, repeatedly demonstrated their 
conviction of the superiority of Latvian culture in relation to other cultures (usually 
Russian and Jewish, but at times German too); even the Bolshevik Stu"ka repeatedly 
stressed the superiority of Latvian ways in comparison to Russian ones. But unlike his 
ethnic Latvian counterparts, who were ready to discard any ‘foreign’, especially Russian, 
cultural influences, Schiemann only strove to employ the Baltic Germans’ undeniable 
cultural, administrative and economic achievements for the greater good of the Latvian 
nation in its entirety – in addition to, rather than in place of, other cultures. 
 
!jabs claims that Schiemann ‘clearly deprives the state of any ethical and cultural 
value’ (2009: 506), and that by doing this he displays the ‘Marxist view of the state’. I 
would like to argue here that the classical Marxist position does not so much deprive the 
state of ethical and cultural values as completely rejects it as an instrument of bourgeois 
oppression. In fact, it is not a Marxist, but a liberal position that is very ambivalent towards 
the state. Did any classical liberal thinker, concerned with individual freedoms, view the 
state as anything more than a ‘necessary evil’? In the second half of the 20th century, 
liberals attempted to revitalise the idea of Rousseau’s social contract by expanding the 
scope of the government’s powers in order to ensure the maximal well-being of its citizens, 
but the resulting ‘welfare state’ still remains a widely contested subject. At the same time, 
liberal nationalists and multiculturalists, such as Miller, Tamir, and Kymlicka, attempted to 
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imbue the concept of the national state with ethical and cultural meaning by maintaining 
that a set of overarching national values such as democracy, equality and tolerance could 
serve as a foundation for a united political nation, while also allowing for cultural diversity 
among its members.   
 
Some liberal theorists, however, remain sceptical about the integrative potential of 
a nation-state as long as culture and ethnicity remain its constituent parts. In striking 
similarity to Schiemann’s views, Walzer (1982:17) speaks of ‘the sharp divorce between 
the state and ethnicity’. Although obviously favouring what he calls ‘Liberalism 1’ (which 
Walzer describes, abbreviating Taylor’s (1982) account, as ‘committed in the strongest 
possible way to individual rights and, almost a deduction from this, to a rigorously neutral 
state’), as opposed to ‘Liberalism 2’ (‘committed to the survival and flourishing of a 
particular nation, culture, or religion, or of a (limited) set of nations, cultures, and 
religions’) Walzer makes several caveats. What makes Liberalism 1 suitable for the United 
States, where it serves as an official doctrine, he says, is the absence of strong territorially-
based minorities – ‘there is no privileged majority and there are no exceptional minorities’ 
(Walzer 1994: 99-101). Walzer chooses Liberalism 1 over Liberalism 2 (‘for us, not for 
everyone’; ‘here, not everywhere’) in part because he believes that immigrants to the US, 
by departing from their native countries, have already made the choice to leave their old 
ways behind and to take cultural risks (1994:102-103). As for other nation-states, where it 
suits ‘the needs of a long-established majority nation’, Walzer claims that although 
‘tension and conflict are inherent in Liberalism 2, this is not a sufficient reason to reject it’, 
as long as the ‘basic rights’ of minority cultures are respected (1994:101). Walzer also 
recognises that ‘state neutrality is often hypocritical’, and always incomplete (1994:102).  
 
Schiemann’s ‘strange Baltic liberalism’, to borrow !jabs’s term, expresses itself not 
so much in his ‘patrician’ attitudes towards other cultures or his allegedly ‘Marxist’ 
leanings, but rather in his insistence on pursuing liberal ideals through expressly 
communitarian means. And in this sense, he is part of a larger liberal community. 
Moreover, this phenomenon of ‘strange Baltic liberalism’ definitely deserves its title, as 
not only Schiemann, but also many of his ethnic Latvian, Latvian Jewish and Latvian 
Russian counterparts suffered from the same affliction. I will explore this issue further in 
the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
 
Paul Schiemann did not have the chance to bring his theory of the a-national state 
to full fruition – as it happened, he was betrayed many times over: by developments in his 
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native Latvia, where an authoritarian coup of 1934 put an end to minorities’ cultural 
autonomy; by the metamorphosis of the Nationalities Congress, which within a few years 
was transformed from an international organisation for minority rights into ‘a tool of 
nationalistic and expansive German politics’ (Hirschhausen 2010:98); and by the general 
rise of nationalistic sentiment in Europe, above all in the Reich, which inevitably led to the 
radicalisation of Baltic Germandom, particularly of its youth. In March 1933, Schiemann 
resigned from his position as editor of the Rigasche Rundschau on account of ill health, 
and departed for Vienna. In the autumn of the same year, he would relinquish his 
parliamentary mandate as well, thus ending his distinguished career as one of the most 
prominent politicians in interwar Latvia. He would return to his homeland in 1938, after 
the Anschluss. For the next few years he would live with his wife in a Riga suburb in 
modest conditions and relative isolation, before passing away in 1944 after witnessing the 
loss of Latvia’s independence and two subsequent occupations, by the Soviets and the 
Nazis.  (Hiden 2004) 
 
The Jews  
 
The internal divisions in Jewish political life in Latvia closely mirrored those in the 
rest of Central and Eastern Europe. The main dividing line, to paraphrase E. Mendelsohn 
(1983: 44), was the question of ‘here’ and ‘there’, or, in other words, whether the Jewish 
question could be resolved more successfully by staying in the diaspora, or by returning to 
the ancestral home in Palestine, or, alternatively, by seeking some other territory with a 
view to creating a sovereign state. Zionism was opposed both by the socialists (who 
believed that the Jewish people should fight for their political and social rights where they 
were) and by the Orthodox Jews (who did not oppose the idea of return in principle, but 
believed that it could not be done without divine intervention). Notably, the Orthodox Jews 
also opposed cultural autonomy in the diaspora as a secular institution, insisting instead on 
the traditional Jewish practice of Shtadlanut, or intercession – in other words, lobbying for 
the interests of the common Jewish people with the authorities.  
 
Another dividing line separated religious and secular Jews: the former insisted on 
the primacy of religious identity, whereas the latter put forward an idea of a Jewish 
national identity. 
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The language question was also extremely divisive – proponents of staying in the 
diaspora (indefinitely, or until the coming of the Messiah) advocated Yiddish as the 
traditional daily language of Eastern European Jews, reserving a place for Hebrew as the 
language of religious ceremonies. The Zionists, on the other hand, saw Yiddish as a low 
dialect developed under oppression, and wanted to revive Hebrew as a language of daily 
communication, which would carry a huge symbolic meaning of both liberation and a 
reconnection with the historical past. There was also another group, the so-called 
assimilationists, who supported neither Yiddish nor Hebrew and believed that Jews should 
be acculturated into their respective host nations.  
 
And finally, even the Jewish socialists were divided – there were Social Democrats 
and there were Zionists; there were Marxists and non-Marxists among them. 
 
Table 3. Jewish Representation in the interwar Latvian Saeima.  
Name of the Party Political Orientation Represented by 
The Bund 
Closely aligned with the 
Social Democrats. Socialist, 
secular, pro-diaspora and 
pro-Yiddish. Voted with the 
Social Democrats. 
 
Noah Maizels (Noahs 
Maizels) 
The Agudas Isroel 
Conservative Orthodox, pro-
diaspora, Pro-Yiddish, 
Shatdlanut. 
Mordechai Dubin 
(Mordehajs Dubins), 
an archetype of a Shtadlan. 
The Jewish National 
Democrats (only until the 2nd 
Saeima) 
Wealthy middle class and 
professionals, inclined 
towards 
assimilation/acculturation 
with the Latvians, and 
therefore pro-diaspora but 
both anti-Yiddish and anti-
Hebrew. Voted with the 
Agrarian Union and the 
centre parties. 
 
Leopold Fi!man (Leopolds 
Fi!manis) and Paul Mintz 
(Pauls Mincs) 
The Zeire Zion 
Socialist Zionist, secular, 
pro-Hebrew and anti-
Shatdlanut. Voted with the 
Social Democrats. 
 
Max Laserson 
The Mizrahi 
Religious Zionists, pro-
Hebrew, with close contacts 
with the World Jewish 
Congress. Usually voted with 
the Socialists. 
 
Marcus Nurock 
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Max Matatyahu Laserson (1887-1951) 
 
Max Laserson, the leader of the Latvian socialist Zionists, cuts an intriguing figure. 
Born in Mitau (now Jelgava), Latvia, and having studied studied law at the universities of 
St. Petersburg, Heidelberg and Berlin, in 1917 he became a Deputy Director of the 
Department of National Minorities of the Ministry of Interior in the Provisional Russian 
Government of A. Kerensky. Upon his return to Latvia in 1920, he represented Zeire Zion 
in the first three interwar Parliaments (Zeire Zion lost elections to the fourth one). Laserson 
was one of the most prominent and energetic members of the Saeima, where, along with 
Schiemann, he was active in the Constitutional and the Public Law Committees, as well as 
in the minorities’ faction. Along with the leader of the orthodox Mizrahi M. Nurock, he 
represented Latvian Jews at the Minorities Committee of the League of Nations. Laserson 
was also active at the precursor of the World Jewish Congress, the Comité des Délégations 
Juives, which was founded in Paris in 1919. An ardent proponent of the League of Nations 
and the international regime of minority rights protection, Laserson assiduously argued 
against adversaries of these ideas in the pages of the biggest Russian-language daily 
Segodnya in the course of the 1920s.  
 
Schiemann first presented his theory of the a-national state, discussed earlier in this 
chapter, at the 2nd Congress of Organised European National Groups in 1926. One year 
later, at the Third Congress, Laserson gave a paper on the state, minorities, and 
sovereignty. The main theses of this paper were later developed into a book.7   
 
According to Laserson, the modern understanding of state sovereignty implies a 
system based upon the rule of a majority nation (he notes that Switzerland is an exception). 
This is the current interpretation of Rousseau’s ‘general will’.  
 
This existing concept of sovereignty is being challenged on several fronts. It is 
being undermined by developing economic ties with the rest of the world, as no modern 
state is as self-sufficient as an ancient Greek polis, which enjoyed complete economic 
autarky. At the same time, the fixed structures of unitary sovereign states with their 
                                                
7 Laserson, M. 1927. Staat, Souveränität und Minorität. Riga-Berlin: Bernhard Lamey. 
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homogeneous populations are being invaded by other ‘national collectives’, while the 
population of the state as a whole is being increasingly recognised as a collective of 
persons that are no longer necessarily bound to a specific territory. Most importantly, state 
sovereignty is being challenged by an increasing body of international law, as well as by 
domestic legislation aimed at the protection of ethnic minorities. According to Laserson 
(1927: 84), ‘nationality has stopped being a plain characteristic of an atomised individual, 
and is now based on the new positive and elaborate public law which applies to whole 
groups of the population’.  
 
National minority law is at the moment only at an emerging stage, continues 
Laserson. But in conjunction with international law, it takes a stand against the territorially 
bound sovereign state: ‘while international law influences the state from above, domestic 
minority law affects it from below’. Minority law is nothing other than a ‘domestic 
equivalent of international law’. (Laserson 1927: 4) 
 
Laserson does not view either ‘sovereignty’ or the state’ as fixed concepts, 
stressing that the understanding of both has changed constantly over the course of human 
history. The development of the concepts of the state and sovereignty is not necessarily a 
linear process, he stresses; moreover, different views on both statehood and sovereignty 
can exist within the same society at the same time among different social strata. He 
identifies various stages in the development of the concepts of statehood and sovereignty, 
like, for example, a ‘religious stage’ during the Middle Ages, when the Church represented 
the highest authority in the land; and the gradual development of the modern sovereign 
territorial nation-state during the ‘metaphysical stage’ resulting in what he describes as ‘the 
state floating above society’ (Laserson 1927: 24).  
 
Laserson predicts that the next stage of transformation, which he calls a ‘positivist 
stage’, will be characterised by the following attributes: the concept of the nation will 
change and will no longer be identical to the territorial nation; state territory will stop 
being a necessary attribute of the state, and the very term ‘sovereignty’ will cease to exist.   
 
Laserson’s paper was hardly a success at the Nationalities Congress. Although the 
debates that ensued demonstrated a pronounced disagreement on political, terminological 
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and theoretical issues among the delegates themselves, practically all of them agreed that 
Laserson ‘was going too far’.8  
 
The fact that the abrasive Laserson, unlike his more subtle and diplomatic peer 
Schiemann, refused to make concessions on the topics viewed as ‘sensitive’, certainly did 
not help him in winning over his audience. On the contrary, Laserson, who never minced 
words in general, made sure to hit each nail on the head, such as when he spoke of the 
‘decline of sovereignty’ and the ‘abandonment of the territorial principle’ at a time when 
the Congress was distancing itself from any possible border disputes. While Schiemann’s 
theory of the a-national state, which had received a much kinder reception at the Congress 
just a year earlier, clearly implied devolution of state sovereignty, it did not use terms like 
‘decline’ and ‘death’; Schiemann also never questioned the territorial integrity of existing 
states, asserting that the state would keep sovereignty over its territory. It seems that 
Laserson’s blunt vocabulary choices and insistence on questioning the territoriality 
principle were the causes of his undoing. 
 
Although the delegates at the Nationalities Congress of 1927 by and large found 
Laserson’s theses on the state, state sovereignty and national communities untenable, 
several decades later his theory was vindicated. Nowadays so many scholars question 
sovereignty and the territorial nation-state, and speak about the decline of sovereignty and 
the rise of a post-sovereign and post-national world, that Suny (2011: 113) has been 
recently prompted to argue that the death of the nation state has been ‘greatly exaggerated’ 
and that the significant changes in state sovereignty and national identification 
notwithstanding, it is premature to speak, as Appadurai (1996: 21) did, of the ‘terminal 
crisis’ of the nation-state. Increasing globalisation, the plight of stateless nations, and, 
above all, the foundation of the European Union, with member states voluntarily 
transferring some powers to the overarching EU institutions, have stimulated a radically 
new way of thinking about the relationship between the state and the nation (Habermas 
1992, 1996; Gottlieb 1993; Appadurai 1996; MacCormick 1996, 1999; Sassen 1996; 
Keating 1996; Harty and Murphy 2005).  
  
Many contemporary writings on the topic bear a remarkable resemblance to 
Laserson’s theses of 1927. For example, Gottlieb (1993: 340), speaking of creating a ‘new 
                                                
8 See ‘Der III. Kongress der Organisierten Nationalen Gruppen, Nation und Staat, 1927, Volume 1, Issue 1, 
pp. 58-60. 
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space for nations’, questions the ‘undeniable’ ties between sovereignty and territory, and 
supports his argument by recalling the distant times when secular and religious 
sovereignties were in different hands, in striking similarity to the ‘religious stage’ of 
sovereignty described by Laserson in 1927. Gottlieb (1993: 35) writes: ‘The coinage of 
independence has been devalued in the modern world. It is ironic that so many peoples 
clamour for it in an era in which the movement of capital, ideas, technologies, and persons 
has reduced the real significance of statehood, and when the sovereignty of states is 
steadily being eroded.’ MacCormick (1999: 191), describing the new order represented by 
the European Union and the opportunities it presents, writes that ‘it is possible to escape 
from the apparent conceptual necessity for some single repository [i.e., exclusive territory] 
of absolute institutional sovereignty (as distinct from underlying popular sovereignties)’ – 
which one can compare with Laserson’s ‘abandonment of the territorial principle’ and 
‘sovereignty of nationalities’. 
 
During the authoritarian coup of 1934, Laserson was imprisoned, along with the 
Latvian Social Democrats, at the internment camp in Liep!ja. Upon his release, he 
emigrated first to Palestine, and then in 1938-39 (dates vary across different sources), via 
France, to the United States. Laserson settled in New York, where he taught at Columbia 
University, and was also involved with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
In addition, he was an active contributor to the Institute of Jewish Affairs, founded in 1940 
by a Lithuanian Jewish lawyer, Jacob Robinson, which quickly became what Sznaider 
(2011: 88) describes as ‘a clearinghouse of information on the Nazi attempt to destroy the 
Jews of Europe’. Laserson died of a heart ailment in 1951 in New York. 
  
Overall, it may be said that this Latvian Jewish minority thinker, who demonstrated 
exemplary intellectual courage in swimming against the tide, shared the common fate of 
those who are ahead of their times – misunderstood by the majority of his contemporaries, 
he received no recognition for his theoretical work during his lifetime, and his legacy is 
largely forgotten. Certainly in Latvia, as in the Western world, Laserson earned recognition 
after World War Two for his works on the history and politics of the Soviet Russia and for 
his contribution to the volume ‘The Jews in Latvia’9. His book ‘"ussia and the Western 
World’ was positively reviewed by Hans Kohn and ran to several editions.10  
                                                
9 Bobe, M. (ed.) 1971. The Jews in Latvia. Tel Aviv: Association of Latvian and Estonian Jews in Israel. 
10 See, for example, Laserson, M. 1945. Russia and the Western World. The Place of the Soviet Union in the 
Comity of Nations. New York: The Macmillan Company; Laserson, M. 1950. The American Impact on 
Russia-diplomatic and ideological-1784-1917. New York: Macmillan Co.; Laserson, M. 1943. The 
development of Soviet foreign policy in Europe, 1917- 1942: a Selection of Documents. New York: Carnegie 
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The Unlikely Allies, or Distanzliebe  
 
The closest alliance formed in Latvia’s minorities front was between the Baltic 
Germans and the Latvian Jews. There are several possible reasons behind this particular 
combination. Firstly, as observed by Laserson (1971: 98-99), the Baltic Germans regarded 
the presence of Jews in Latvia as a benefit – let us not forget that despite their influence, 
numerically the Baltic Germans were only the third largest minority in the country at 3.6 
per cent; the five per cent represented by the Jewish minority meant a welcome further 
reduction in the ‘overwhelming weight of the Latvian majority’. There was also cultural 
affinity, especially with the Jews from outside of the former Pale of Settlement, like, for 
example, the Jews of Kurland and a big part of the Jews of Riga, who were heavily 
influenced by German culture; this was further reinforced by the fact that in the Europe of 
the time, Germany still served as a ‘spiritual centre of sorts for the Ashkenazi Jews’ 
(Laserson 1971: 132). An additional consideration for the Baltic Germans was the fact that 
unlike themselves, the Russians and the Poles, the Latvian Jews had never been in a 
dominant position in the past, but had been even more oppressed than ethnic Latvians 
themselves. That fact alone made many Latvians regard the Jews as their ‘most loyal 
minority’.  Furthermore, the sizeable German and Jewish minorities lived side by side in 
most of the new and enlarged European states, which logically brought them into the 
vanguard of the European minorities movement (at the Nationalities Congress, the Jews 
(25) formed the second largest group of members, surpassed only by the Germans (74); 
Hirschhausen 2010: 93). Finally, since the Baltic German and Jewish communities were 
the most politically active among ethnic minorities in Latvia, and were represented in the 
Saeima by two such outstanding leaders as Schiemann and Laserson, this cooperation was 
very natural.  
However, we will see that this political symbiosis was not an easy one. Similar to 
the relationship between the German and Jewish communities in the Czech lands, the 
affiliation between the Baltic Germans and the Latvian Jews can be best described as 
Distanzliebe.11  
                                                                                                                                              
Endowment for International Peace. Inexplicably, a recent edition of Russia and the Western World 
(Kessinger Publishers 2007; reprinted in 2010) gives the name of author as Max Laskerson. 
11 A term coined by one of the leading Jewish intellectuals of Prague, Max Brod (1884-1968), as quoted in 
Mendelsohn (1983: 136). 
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In 1925, the Baltic Germans together with some Russian and Polish members of the 
Parliament complained about the Agrarian Reform to the League of Nations. Although 
their appeal was rejected as unfounded, it caused outrage in the Latvian press. Both the 
Russian and the Jewish blocs had initially abstained from any participation in the debates 
on the Agrarian Reform, but then in a seemingly unexplained twist of events, jointly 
signed a petition to the Agrarian Commission of the Assembly, which was rejected as 
‘reactionary’. Laserson (1971: 112-13) expressed indignation that ‘by appending their 
signatures to it, the members of the Jewish bloc entered into moral and political association 
with the opponents of the agrarian reform’ and thus had compromised their special 
standing with Latvians. He concludes that ‘it is hard to understand why the Jewish 
delegates had to identify themselves in the eyes of the Latvian masses with the long-term 
oppressors of the latter.’ Overall, Laserson observes: ‘A measure of psychological 
animosity towards the minorities was inevitable in view of the fact that the Germans were 
among them, and more precisely at their head.’ (1971: 124) 
Despite the aforementioned fact that in the 1920s ethnic Latvians widely perceived 
Jews as their most loyal minority (or, at the minimum, as the least suspect), it did not mean 
than there was no animosity towards the Jews in the Latvian society. During World War 
One and its immediate aftermath, anti-Jewish sentiments were running high in Latvia as in 
the most of the countries in Eastern Europe, even in those, like the former Habsburg lands, 
which had no previous history of pogroms.  The Jews were turned into scapegoats, charged 
with numerous sins, like helping the advance of the German troops, spying for the 
Habsburgs, and aiding the Bolsheviks. Intensified by the deprivations of the war, these 
accusations turned into public hysteria directed against the vulnerable ethnic minority. 
Latvia did not escape the wave of anti-Jewish sentiment that swept across Central and 
Eastern Europe during World War One and its immediate aftermath. Anti-Jewish 
disturbances, which continued in Ukraine, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and 
Poland during the period from 1918 until 1921 (Mendelson 1983; Pearson 1983), reached 
Latvia in the summer of 1920, when in the cities of Riga, Daugavpils and R!zekne, Jewish 
properties were vandalised, and those who looked Jewish were stopped in the streets and 
cruelly mocked, while their money and valuables were unceremoniously confiscated by the 
hooligans. Luckily, though, nobody was seriously hurt.   
Another constant source of animosity among ethnic Latvians towards the Latvian 
Jewish minority was the choice its many members made in favour of the Russian language 
as their daily language of communication, and their penchant for Russian culture in 
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general. Seeing it as a sign of betrayal, Latvian nationalists increasingly held it against the 
Jews (a recurrent theme in the writing of the nationalist writer E. Blanks, who famously 
claimed that ‘our Jews are unacceptable to us in the first place as the Russian Jews’, and 
many others). This peculiar ‘national jealousy’ was also reflected in the newspaper 
published by the Social Democrats-Mensheviks, Darba Balss: 
Whether you walk along the street, or ride in a train, or in a tram, there are sounds of the 
Russian language everywhere…A stranger newly arriving in Latvia might get the impression that 
the majority of local residents are Russians. But if we take a closer look at these ‘Latvian Russian’ 
faces, it becomes obvious that these supporters of everything Russian are nobody else but our own 
Jews.12 
 
The Latvian Social Democrats earnestly tried to fight the pervasive anti-Semitic 
stereotypes. However, this most popular party with the biggest faction in the Saeima was 
not just supported by the urban and rural proletariat, but also counted among their electors 
the petty bourgeoisie and the intellectuals (who supported SD because of their leading role 
in Latvians’ national emancipation in the past) and the poorest part of the Latvian peasants 
(the latter hoped that their support for SD would accelerate the Agrarian reform). 
According to Laserson (1971: 124), these Social Democratic ‘satellites’ ‘preserved their 
prejudices against the Jews’. The Social Democrats and the Bund used to participate in all 
elections with a common candidates’ list - the only example of interethnic political party 
cooperation in interwar Latvia, as all other parties’ membership was strictly ethnic. 
Laserson attests that during the Saeima and municipal elections, there was a widespread 
practice of crossing out the Bund candidates’ names; the ethnically Latvian SD candidates 
which were below them on the list would get elected instead. Laserson claims that it was 
largely due to this practice that the Bund eventually started its own election list.  
 
In other words, neither the Baltic German nor the Jewish minority in Latvia felt 
fully secure in their own right; when attempting cooperation, among themselves, or with 
other ethnic minorities, they always entered treacherous waters, and the consequences were 
often unpredictable. In Latvian interwar politics, one plus one did not necessarily equal 
two; it could easily result in minus one or even minus two. Schiemann and Laserson did 
their best to rise above the factional struggle of their own communities and to act in pursuit 
                                                
12 Kolonels, ‘M!sm"ju ‘krievi’, Darba Balss, 23.01.1922. 
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of the overarching minority interests, and the principal interests of the Latvian democratic 
state, but they often ended up on opposing sides.  
 
During the summer of 1922, when the Constitutional Committee of the Assembly 
was reviewing draft laws on minority languages, Schiemann and Laserson assumed 
conflicting positions. Laserson was convinced that the question of the use of minority 
languages, which he called ‘the most important question of self-determination’, required 
one principal law which would enshrine the rights of ethnic minorities to use their 
respective languages in the state administration and in the courts. He argued that if the 
draft laws on the rights of German, Russian and Jewish languages were discussed 
separately, then the committee and the plenary of the Assembly would be guided not so 
much by principles of justice, but by existing Germano- or Russophile currents; in other 
words, decisions would be dictated by affinities in the case of some ethnic groups and 
languages, and by repulsion in the case of others. The only way to avoid this, stressed 
Laserson, was by adopting a single uniform law that would have been ‘maximally 
favourable towards all’.13  
 
Schiemann, on the other hand, was just as categorical that ‘such a generalisation 
would not give anything to each separate minority’, and that a uniform law as suggested by 
Laserson should be ‘most energetically resisted’. When dealing with bureaucracy, 
explained Schiemann, it is absolutely impossible to regulate the right to make oral 
statements or submit written petitions consistently for all minorities. ‘Such a generalisation 
would offer nothing to a single minority, and would place an unbearable burden on public 
bureaucracy,’ posited Schiemann. Besides, time is an issue, stressed Schiemann, the whole 
issue should be sped up before the Constitutional Assembly finished its work: ‘if we just 
passed one separate language law now, more would be achieved for the interests of all 
minorities in general than if we continued discussing general theory for another half a 
year’.14 
 
In the end, nobody was a winner – neither the Law on the German minority 
language, nor the language laws for the other minorities were ever passed. 
 
                                                
13 Laserson, M. ‘Zakon o yazykah men’shinstv’, Segodnya, 30.06.1922. 
14 Schiemann, P. ‘Die Sprachengesesze’, Rigasche Rundschau, 30.06.1922. 
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In 1922, Schiemann also supported the idea of a separate law on cultural autonomy 
for each respective minority. His proposal to this effect gained the support of the 
Constitutional Assembly, and in March 1922 the Baltic German and the Jewish autonomy 
draft laws were accepted for review. The Russian draft law was submitted two months 
later. However, the Constitutional Assembly did not manage to review the laws, and the 
matter was postponed until the election of the First Saeima. 
 
In 1923, the German faction finally deemed the time right, and submitted their 
separate draft law on cultural autonomy to the Public Law Committee of the Saeima. 
Schiemann still remained adamant that a separate law for each minority was preferable; the 
fact that he was elected chair of the subcommittee, where the Social Democrat A. 
Petrevics, who was sympathetic towards the idea of cultural autonomy, also sat, allowed 
hope for success, despite the Agrarian Union continuing to give the whole project the cold 
shoulder. (Hiden 2004: 99-100) 
 
The draft law submitted foresaw the public incorporation of the Baltic German 
Autonomous Council, the right of the Council to collect taxes and to create a national 
register of its members. It specified the organisational structure of the Council and its 
regional bodies, the use of German language in administration and public life, and 
reiterated the principles of minority schooling.  
 
All these proposals were initially met with fierce opposition from the Latvian 
majority. The right to self-taxation and the creation of a national register, which 
Schiemann believed to be the two pillars of cultural autonomy, were either deemed too far-
reaching as an attempt ‘to create a state within a state’, or questioned on the technical side 
– there were many objections to the national register based upon the ethnicity record in the 
passport made according to the owner’s instructions. The Latvian opposition demanded 
‘documental proof’ instead.  Among the Baltic Germans themselves, there was no 
agreement whether inclusion on the register had to be compulsory. 
 
The German draft subsequently made it through the deliberations of the Public Law 
Committee, but after it was passed to the Education Committee, things started to look glum 
again. The Chair of the Committee, K. Skalbe, whom Schiemann labelled as a ‘reactionary 
of the purest kind’ (Hiden 2004: 102) was fervently opposed to the project, his position 
fortified by the loud protests voiced by the Association of Secondary School Teachers, and 
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the Union of Latvian Schoolteachers. Skalbe appeased the opposition by making sure that 
the draft law ‘disappeared’ from the agenda (Adamovi!" 1927: 22). 
 
This experience made Paul Schiemann change his mind – or at least his tactics. He 
now put his faith in the general law on minorities’ cultural autonomy, so passionately 
advocated by Laserson. However, Schiemann failed to convince his conservative 
colleagues that such a law stood a better chance with the Latvian Parliament – Fircks 
described such a possibility as ‘detrimental to our historic position in the country and our 
influence among the population’ (Hiden 2004: 104). Laserson writes that the conservative 
Baltic Germans believed – naively – that the Latvians would agree more easily to their 
project of national autonomy in order ‘to atone for their agrarian ‘cruelty’ (1971: 133) As 
for cooperation with the Russians, Laserson claims that the Germans believed that because 
of the long common frontier with Bolshevik Russia, the ethnic Latvians would oppose the 
autonomy for Latvian Russians. (1971: 133). As for the Jewish autonomy, the Baltic 
Germans believed it stood little chance because of dormant anti-Semitism and because ‘the 
Jews in Latvia are in any case not mature enough to receive true cultural autonomy’ 
(Laserson 1971: 134). 
 
In the meantime, the Latvian Poles submitted their autonomy project to the 
Parliament (similar to the Russian autonomy project, it was closely modelled on the 
German one), and finally, in January 1925 the Jewish project was submitted as well 
(notably, Schiemann appended his signature to the draft). It was the draft of the Jewish 
autonomy that drew most attention and was widely covered in the press. 
 
Schiemann, Laserson and Maizels all sat on the sub-commission of the Public Law 
Committee that dealt with the Jewish project. At the sub-commission, they faced a staunch 
opponent in the person of Arveds Bergs, a representative of the National Centre, also 
known for his increasingly anti-Semitic views. During the deliberations it quickly became 
clear that the Latvian majority was not keen on a far-reaching and strictly defined 
autonomy, as most objections were raised in relation to the right to self-taxation (instead, a 
proposal was made to allow minorities to collect ‘voluntary contributions’), and to the idea 
of a national register for each minority, which in their opinion threatened to create parallel 
structures to the state. In fact, no agreement could have been reached on these two issues 
among the Jews themselves. The Aguda was opposed to the idea of a ‘secular’ list, 
insisting that whenever a person converted to another religion, he or she had to be struck 
off the register; they even proposed creating two registers for the Jews.  The two parties 
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who advocated the widest autonomy possible were the Mizrahi and the Zeire Zion; the 
only difference between them was whether to include religious functions under the 
autonomy – while Nurock insisted that for the Jews culture and religion were inseparable, 
the Zeire Zion and the Bund argued that autonomy had to be secular, and that non-religious 
Jews should not have to pay for the ‘religious needs of the others’.15 Tensions were 
running so high, that during the discussion at the Committee about the possible inclusion 
of religious functions, Laserson left the room, delegating his role to L. Fi!man from the 
National Democratic Party (it was eventually decided to keep religious functions separate).   
 
Predictably, it was the language issue that caused the biggest upheaval.16 Both the 
Aguda and the Bund argued for Yiddish as the minority language, while the Mizrahi and 
the Zeire Zion insisted on Hebrew. Many prominent Social Democrats, including the 
national poet J. Rainis, his wife (also a poet) Aspazija, M. Skujenieks and F. Ciel"ns 
sympathised with the latter as a ‘progressive’ language (Laserson 1971: 148); however, the 
general prevailing opinion was that it was Yiddish that was the daily language of the 
working masses. The National Democratic Party was not keen on either Hebrew or 
Yiddish, and suggested a free choice of language instead (this did not go down well with 
the Social Democrats). A proposal was made by the Jewish consultative body Beirat not to 
fix the language question in the law until the Jewish autonomous institution was elected.17 
For many of the draft law clauses, the Jewish factions submitted their own parallel 
versions, which made the elaboration of the law extremely difficult and time-consuming 
and caused Laserson to state later that the Jewish law would not have been approved even 
if the German one had gone ahead (Laserson 1971: 137). 
 
Schiemann also took a stand on the question of the language of instruction for 
Jewish schools: he claimed that as a truly secular institution the Jewish autonomy should 
be based on just one language – in this way opposing Laserson, who, desperate to push the 
law ahead, started to concede the inevitability of both Hebrew and Yiddish. In an article 
rebuffing Schiemann, Laserson claimed that the Jewish autonomy could not be judged by 
normal standards because of the unique history of the Jewish people. Later, Schiemann 
changed his position and supported the Jewish National Democrats in their advocacy of a 
free choice of any language (including other minority languages) according to the choice 
of parents. In Latgale the Baltic Germans supported the National Democrats’ proposal 
                                                
15 ‘Russkaya i evreiskaya avtonomii’, Segodnya, 26.03.1925. 
16 As astutely observed by Mendelsohn (1983: 251), ‘nowhere else in the East European diaspora was the 
language situation in Jewish schools so complex as it was in Latvia’.  
17 ‘Evreiskii Beirat o evreiskoi avtonomii’, Segodnya, 29.01.1925.  
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stipulating Russian as the language of instruction, to which Laserson commented that ‘the 
cultural imperialism of Germans led them to the absurdity of expecting the Latvian 
Government to acquiesce in supporting the Germanisation and Russification of Jewish 
children with its resources’ (Laserson 1971: 136).   
 
All this disorderly confusion aggravated the already tense situation, much to the 
consternation of the Latvian majority. Mar!ers Skujenieks, the Social Democrat- 
Menshevik, acidly commented on the Jewish autonomy at the Public Law Committee in 
March 1925:  ‘The Germans at least have a common language, which cannot be said about 
the Jews, who speak at least five different languages. For all nations, language and religion 
are the main determinants of belonging to a nation. There is no solidarity among Latvian 
Jews on either of these’.18   
 
One by one, the minorities’ autonomy draft laws were dismissed from the Saeima’s 
agenda. By the end of 1925, it was clear for both Schiemann and Laserson that minority 
autonomy in Latvia was, at least for the time being, out of reach. Hiden (2004: 105) 
explains Schiemann’s insistence on a general law on cultural autonomy by reference both 
to ‘wide European developments’ and to ‘his frustration with the Saeima’. Although 
Laserson was an early proponent of collective action on the part of Latvian minorities, by 
1925 he was also increasingly frustrated both by the international situation with regard to 
minority rights and by its domestic status. It is no coincidence that the two most vociferous 
minority representatives in Latvia started searching for new solutions at the international 
level around the same time, becoming active at the newly founded European Congress of 
Nationalities in Geneva. And it is indicative both of Schiemann’s recent experience in 
Latvia, and of his tentative certain ideological reconciliation with Laserson, that speaking 
at the Nationalities Congress in Geneva in 1925, he stressed that ‘it is important that one 
minority helps another to achieve its goals. If they succeed, the question of loyalty will not 
arise anymore’.19  
 
As already mentioned before, after 1925, both Schiemann and Laserson, although 
remaining highly optimistic about the chances of the Nationalities Congress changing the 
status quo in the field of minority rights in Europe, started developing theoretical 
frameworks that nowadays would undoubtedly be classified as post-nationalist.  
                                                
18‘Russkaya i evreiskaya avtonomii’, Segodnya, 26.03.1925. 
19 Nikolskii, B. ‘Poslednii den’kongressa menshinstv’, Segodnya, 22.10.1925. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The unlikely alliance between the Baltic German and the Jewish communities of 
interwar Latvia, reviewed in the previous section of this chapter, illustrates how the 
complicated interplay between minority communities within the same state influences, 
shapes and alters their respective relations with the eponymous nation, other ethnic 
minorities present (in our case – with Latvian Russians and Poles), with the external 
homelands, and international organisations. Sometimes, minorities may provide support to 
other ethnic groups out of solidarity, perhaps with strategic foresight, but with no 
immediate gain in view for themselves; at other times, minorities form alliances when they 
think that their own cause will be best served by presenting a united front, and promptly 
disengage when they feel that this cause may be tarnished by association with others; a 
minority, or minorities, may also not seek direct contact or association with another 
minority, but simply ‘jump on the band-wagon’ and use this minority’s (as well as its 
respective kin-state’s, and the international community’s on its behalf) existing 
achievements (in negotiating with the majority nation, or in securing a special status) as 
precedents in their own bargaining strategy. In short, this fifth relational field unfailingly 
informs the other four. 
 
Moreover, this impact often lingers long after a particular minority has ceased to 
exist in a given country, or has been significantly changed in composition.20 The Baltic 
German community in Latvia virtually vanished in 1939, when on Hitler’s orders they 
were relocated to ‘German territories’ (read – to the newly occupied Poland) – a 
development enthusiastically greeted by many ethnic Latvians at the time.21 However, fifty 
years later, when Latvia regained independence in 1991, the perspective shifted, and the 
Baltic Germans were granted some belated recognition. For example, a Latvian history 
book published in 2005 explicitly states: ‘From the present-day perspective, it is absolutely 
clear that the departure of the Baltic Germans was an irreplaceable loss. …With their 
                                                
20 This phenomenon is traditionally overlooked by political scientists. A notable exception that I came across 
is Esman’s (2009) nuanced study of the ‘Russian’ diaspora in Israel – for example, he explains the guarded 
attitude of the Sephardim towards the 1990s influx of ‘Russian’ Jews by their ‘bitter memories of their earlier 
days in Israel when they or their parents were patronised by the Ashkenazic establishment, their culture 
demeaned, and their economic prospects blunted’ (Esman 2009: 74). 
21 Only 10,000 Baltic Germans chose to remain in Latvia. After Latvia’s annexation by the Soviet Union in 
1940, majority of those left. In 1941, the final wave of Baltic German emigration depleted the number of 
those residing in Latvia to appx. 1,500. (Bleiere et al. 2005: 194). 
 Chapter 5: P. Schiemann, M. Laserson and Cultural Autonomy 
 305 
departure, an intellectual vacuum started to form in Latvia, which was further reinforced 
by later Stalinist deportations, the Holocaust, and the residents’ mass exodus after yet 
another occupation in 1945’ (Bleiere et al. 2005). Notably, Latvian historian R. Cer!zis, in 
a study entitled ‘The German Factor in Latvia (1918-1939). Political and Inter-Ethnic 
Aspects’, tentatively draws a parallel between the ‘German factor’ in interwar Latvia and 
the ‘Russian factor’ in Latvia today (Cer!zis 2004:3).  
 
As for the interwar Jewish community of Latvia, it largely perished during the 
Holocaust. According to the last census carried out in interwar Latvia in 1935, the Jews 
constituted 5 per cent of the population, or about 94,000. In the course of 1941, about 
70,000 of them were exterminated in Nazi-occupied Latvia. Those who escaped death, i.e. 
those who fled eastwards to the Soviet Union, those who were serving in the Soviet Army 
and survived the war, those who were liberated from the Nazi concentration camps, and, 
finally, part of those Jews who were repressed and deported in 1940 by the Soviets – 
altogether about 14,000 – returned to Latvia after World War Two. (Dribins 2002). But 
from the summer of 1945 onwards, the Latvian Jewish community kept being replenished 
by settlers of Jewish ethnic background from other parts of the Soviet Union. After the 
Citizenship Law of 1994, which restricted automatic citizenship to the citizens of the 
interwar republic and their direct descendants, had been passed, only 45 per cent of the 
14,000-strong Latvian Jewish community were eligible for automatic citizenship.22 This 
data bears witness to the fact that over the course of almost five decades, the de facto 
composition of the Jewish community was irrevocably changed. 
 
This fact, however, was willingly overlooked by the nationalising (yet again) 
Latvian state, which readily recognised the Jewish community of 1988 as a successor to 
the interwar community, and has never since questioned its credentials (which was not the 
case with the other post-war ethnic minorities in Latvia). I believe that there are several 
possible explanations for this benevolent attitude. Firstly, the idea of the ‘restoration’ of 
the Jewish community resonated with Latvians’ own pledge to restore the Latvian interwar 
state, lending it extra legitimacy. Secondly, similar to the interwar state, albeit for different 
reasons, the ‘dissident’ (opposed to the Soviet regime) Jews were regarded as Latvia’s 
most loyal minority. Thirdly, during the national awakening of the 1980s, and in the early 
90s, comparisons between the plight of the Jewish people and the fate of ethnic Latvians 
                                                
22 There is no available ready statistical data on the size of the Jewish population in 1994. I arrive at this 
arbitrary number by subtracting the approximate number of Jewish emigrants through the period from 1989 
until 1994 (appx. 8,840) from the total size of Jewish population in 1989 (22,900); i.e. the birth and death 
rates are not accounted for. 
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were rife, and allusions were often made to the similarity between the new Latvian state 
and Israel.23 Fourthly, there was an acknowledgement of the contribution made by some 
Jewish intellectuals (in particular M. Vulfsons) to the Popular Front movement. The last, 
but not the least consideration, was the Holocaust itself – as to whether it was an act of 
repentance or political correctness, opinions differ. I personally tend to think that both 
played a role.  
  
In any case, the Jewish community (under the initial guise of the Latvian Society 
for Jewish Culture) was the first to be re-established in Latvia in 1988, paving the way for 
other ethnic communities – by the end of the year, with the support of the Popular Front, 
the Association of the National Cultural Societies of Latvia (the LNKBA in its Latvian 
abbreviation) was established, uniting 18 newly created cultural societies and providing a 
platform for national minorities to discuss issues of cultural autonomy.  
 
The most recent example of the relational interplay between different ethnic 
minorities, the Latvian state, and international society is perhaps the latest round of 
discussion on the issue of the restitution of Jewish properties in Latvia in 2012.  Actively 
lobbied for by the United States, and explicitly supported by the Secretary of State H. 
Clinton during her visit to Latvia in June 2012, the restitutions provoked heated 
controversy in Latvia, causing the downfall of Justice Minister G. B!rzi"#, a representative 
of the right-wing nationalistic bloc in the parliament. Significantly, in the heat of the 
moment, the Latvian media reported ‘that after the question of the restitution of Jewish 
properties came to the fore, the Latvian Russian community and the Latvian Roma 
Association have also started expressing an interest in property restitutions’.24 
 
I believe that the history of the Latvian minorities’ struggle for cultural autonomy 
during the interwar period, with the Baltic Germans and the Jews being in the forefront, 
and the relational interplay between these two ethnic minorities residing in the same state 
is essential for the analysis of interethnic relations in Latvia. It enhances our understanding 
of the forces at work in ethnic politics, both in the past and at present, by allowing us to 
                                                
23 Later on, this peculiar affinity also manifested itself as an attempt by many Latvian politicians to present 
the mass deportations of 1941 and 1949 as the ‘Holocaust of the Latvian people’.  
24 ‘Latvijas iedz$vot%ji neatbalsta $pa#uma atdo#anu kopien%m’, 13.08.2012, available at: 
http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/viedokli/432220-iedzivotaji_neatbalsta_ipasuma_atdosanu_kopienam . 
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study these politics in a continuous historical perspective - this way addressing certain 
limitations of the more selective approach of post-Soviet studies, which has largely 
dominated the field.  
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Chapter Six. The ‘Latvian Latvia’, 1934-1940 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
On 15th May 1934 Prime Minister K!rlis Ulmanis, with the support of the Latvian 
army, carried out an authoritarian coup d’état, disbanding the parliament, banning all 
political parties (including his own Agrarian Union) and introducing a state of emergency. 
The conspirators did not meet any resistance (apart from the proverbial gunshot in the air 
by the Social Democrat Bruno Kalni"#), and no blood was shed. Two years later, in 1936, 
Ulmanis would also usurp the position of State President. For the remaining six years of its 
independence, like many other European countries during this period that became known 
as the ‘crisis of democracy’, Latvia would remain an authoritarian state.  
 
The six-year dictatorial reign of K!rlis Ulmanis has been extensively studied, 
analysed and interpreted in Latvia. Early, largely uncritical (and also unreferenced) 
accounts of Ulmanis’s rule were given by E. Virza (1935), $. Un!ms (1934, 1953), and A. 
B%rzi"# (1963, 1973). Ulmanis also features prominently in the memoir of J. Lejin# (1971), 
a member of the Agrarian Union, and a member of the Fourth Saeima; the image of the 
People’s Leader painted by Leji"# is somewhat less flattering than that of his predecessors. 
Not surprisingly, the most unforgiving accounts of Ulmanis’s regime came from the Social 
Democrats and former parliamentarians V. Bastj!nis (1964) and F. Ciel%ns (1964, Vol. 3). 
A proper critical biography of Ulmanis by E. Dunsdorfs was published in 1978; in 1994, I. 
Ronis published a collection of documents which included protocols of Ulmanis’s 
interrogation by the NKVD, Ulmanis’s diaries written in a Soviet prison, and other 
documents, prefaced by an extended essay by the author where he recounts and interprets 
the historical events leading up to Ulmanis’s arrest in 1940. An important contribution to 
the field was made by A. Stranga (1998), who compared the Ulmanis regime to other 
authoritarian regimes of the time, and analysed its impact on different sectors of the state, 
including transformations in the relationship between the state and ethnic minorities. 
Stranga is perhaps the harshest critic of the regime to date, believing that ‘it would be 
difficult to find a venue of public life where the regime proved its superiority to 
democracy’ (Stranga 1998: 221). Ulmanis’s attitude towards the Jews, and the 
deterioration of Latvian-Jewish relations were also examined by Stranga (1997), while his 
relations with the Baltic Germans were appraised by R. Cer&zis (2004). The Latvian 
historians '. (ilde, E. Andersons, and U. )%rmanis have also critically evaluated the 
causes and consequences of the authoritarian coup of 1934. 
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Despite the largely critical treatment that the authoritarian regime has received at 
the hands of historians, the public perception of K. Ulmanis and his dictatorial rule remains 
highly ambiguous in present-day Latvia. A bronze monument was erected in the centre of 
Riga in July 2003; the inscription, describing Ulmanis as the first prime minister of Latvia, 
and president of Latvia (1936-1940), says: ‘Freedom, nation, country – ahead of me’. A 
memorial museum in Ulmanis’s birthplace Pik!as, Dobele region, hosts a number of 
exhibitions, lectures and events throughout the year; its internet homepage puts a special 
emphasis on educating schoolchildren. In 2009, the musical Vadonis (The Leader) was 
staged at the National Theatre in Riga. It portrayed Ulmanis as a national hero, a saviour, 
and a martyr who was often tragically misunderstood, and the Latvian interwar parliament 
as either an absurd circus overtaken by ethnic minorities, or a gathering of corrupt 
politicians who were indifferent to the fates of ordinary people. The programme booklet of 
the show, apart from the cast, the synopsis, and the usual acknowledgements, contained 
some excerpts from Ulmanis’s diaries, as well as several blurbs contributed by its creators. 
For example, the author of the lyrics, the Latvian singer and poet K. Dimiters, compares 
Latvian ‘national consciousness’ under the Ulmanis regime with the situation at the 
moment, to the detriment of the latter: 
 
The ideal of the first independent Latvian state is remembered not because of the parties’ 
skirmishes in the Saeima, but because of its early budding on 18th November 1918, and because of 
its coming into bloom during the Ulmanis times. It was Ulmanis who raised Latvians’ 
consciousness of their own independence to the highest level, and who liberated it from the slavery 
complex acquired over centuries. He was an ingenious master [saimnieks], as well as an idealist, 
who was able to transform his dream into our state’s reality. But here we are again, servants to yet 
another big power, or the Euroempire – humiliated, feeble, and dependent. With the idea of The 
Leader, which I nursed for seven years, I wanted to remind people that Latvians could also be 
masters in their own land - it was not secured, it was short-lived, but it was beautiful. 
 
The director of the National Theatre, O. Rubenis, also draws a parallel between the 
past and the present, comparing Ulmanis to the Latvian state leaders of today: 
 
K"rlis Ulmanis had, on many occasions, to make decisions that determined the fate of 
Latvia and its people. Rightly or wrongly, fairly or not, but he had enough strength to make a 
decision and to take responsibility for it, in contrast to our state leaders today. If only because of 
this, we must always treat K"rlis Ulmanis and his achievements with deep respect. 
 
                                                                                                                                                Chapter 6: The Latvian Latvia, 1934-1940 
 310 
Ironically, the show, which was sold out every night and often ended with standing 
ovations from the public, took place on the very same stage where the Latvian democratic 
republic was proclaimed on 18th November 1918.  
 
This, outside academic circles, largely ‘unanalysed nostalgia’ (to use the term 
coined by Liven (1993: 55)) for the person who almost single-handedly ended the brief 
period of Latvian parliamentary democracy, imprisoned Social Democrats, banned 
political parties, took away freedom of gatherings and association, censored mass media 
and all printed matter, replaced the free market with a planned economy and an overall 
nationalisation of industry and finance, cancelled the cultural autonomy of ethnic 
minorities, stifled any opposition or dissent, and smothered the country in a syrupy 
parochial nationalist rhetoric, seemingly defies logic. But under a more detailed 
examination, reasons for Ulmanis’s perennial popularity among many Latvians abound.  
 
The first and foremost factor is the tragic chain of events that followed Ulmanis’s 
demise – the Soviet occupation of 1940, the Nazi occupation of 1941-1945, and the long 
forty-six years of Soviet rule. By contrast with the horrors of war, deportations and a new 
wave of Russification, the Ulmanis regime certainly looked mild and benign. The influx of 
Soviet-era immigrants, the supremacy of the Russian language and the Communist 
ideology, and rapidly falling living standards infused Ulmanis’s slogans of a ‘Latvian 
Latvia’, ‘national justice’, and ‘national fairness’ with a new meaning. The tragic death of 
Ulmanis himself at the hands of the NKVD made him into a hero and martyr; the 
subsequent consistently negative interpretation of the Ulmanis regime’s ideology by 
official Soviet historiography only added to this image, turning him into a legend. 
Anybody who grew up in Soviet Latvia, even if completely ignorant of its interwar history, 
was aware that the expression ‘the Ulmanis times’ [ulma!laiki], usually said wistfully (and 
quietly), stood for order, prosperity, and common sense – in short, for something 
completely different from the current reality.  
 
Another factor contributing to Ulmanis’s popularity is the persistent belief that it 
was President Ulmanis who led the country out of the depths of the Great depression back 
to economic prosperity, despite the available evidence that the first signs of recovery had 
manifested themselves already in 1933 (see, for example, Aizsilnieks 1968: 582). 
 
The fact that Ulmanis’s dictatorial rule was so short is yet another important factor 
contributing to this lack of critical evaluation in Latvia. Under Ulmanis, censorship was 
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rigid, and conformism and compliance were cultivated. Had Latvia not been absorbed 
immediately afterwards by two totalitarian states in succession, remaining part of the 
Soviet Union until 1991, but instead re-gained independence after World War Two, there 
can be no doubt that the regime, its ideology, its causes and its consequences would have 
been examined in the greatest detail by historians, economists, sociologists, psychologists 
and other specialists. As it happened, before 1991 all the existing critical accounts of the 
regime were published abroad by Latvian émigrés, being unavailable to Latvians at home. 
And although all these works have become available since, and new critical historical 
accounts have been published in Latvia, they have to compete with word-of-mouth 
legendary accounts which had been circulated and reproduced among the people for over 
fifty years – a competition where dry historical accounts often lose.  
 
Fourthly, the prominent role that Ulmanis had played in Latvian politics prior to the 
coup (he was prime minister seven times), in securing Latvia’s independence in 1918, at 
the National Council and at the Constitutional Assembly, and during the implementation of 
the Agrarian Reform, cannot be so easily separated, at least in the public perception, from 
his later incarnation as a dictator and destroyer of Latvian democracy. The fact that not a 
single drop of blood was shed during the coup that met no resistance lends the whole 
takeover an air of if not legitimacy, than at least a certain benignancy – Ulmanis is often 
portrayed not so much as a conspirator but as a strict-but-fair father figure who had to step 
in and admonish his misbehaving children before they could harm themselves.  
 
Fifthly, in the hierarchy of values associated with the First Republic in collective 
memory, parliamentary democracy ranks curiously low. While ‘independence’, 
‘sovereignty’, and ‘self-respect’ are treated as absolute and indivisible values, 
‘democracy’, often used with the qualifiers like ‘excessive’, ‘exaggerated’ and 
‘misunderstood’, is interpreted as optional, even potentially dangerous, and certainly as 
not-good-for-all.  
 
Finally, while the Ulmanis regime’s real and imaginary achievements in the fields 
of economy, state administration, foreign policy, culture and education may remain under 
scrutiny, many commentators contend that his main driving force was his selfless love for 
his country and his nation, and his ultimate goal – the unity of the nation. For example, 
Dunsdorfs (1978: 345) writes that  ‘…there can be no doubt that by instigating the coup, 
Ulmanis wanted the best for Latvia – his love for Latvia cannot be doubted’. Leji!" (1971: 
151) also mentions Ulmanis’s ‘deep patriotism’. Of more recent examples, the homepage 
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of the President of the State of Latvia, which provides brief biographies of all former 
Latvian presidents, says about Ulmanis: ‘His ideal was a Latvian Latvia, agrarian in its 
essence, independent, economically secure, and neutral. Ulmanis was an ardent patriot who 
wanted to transform Latvia, where one quarter of all residents were non-Latvians, into a 
distinctively Latvian land’. 1  
 
There is no agreement among Latvian historians on what precisely Ulmanis’s idea 
of a united nation was; however, it is generally acknowledged that he did not succeed in 
uniting his people. For example, Dunsdorfs (1978: 344) posits that Ulmanis was greatly 
mistaken in thinking ‘that the Saeima was the cause of national disunity, when in fact the 
opposite was the case: the Saeima was just a reflection of the existing cleavages in the 
society’. Dunsdorfs (1978: 345) observes that ‘the fact that Latvia was a multinational state 
had caused certain political and economic difficulties since the country gained 
independence’, and claims that the Latvian minorities, who comprised a quarter of the total 
population, were not as loyal towards the Latvian state as minorities in other multinational 
republic, like, for example, Switzerland. Therefore, describing Ulmanis’s policies towards 
ethnic minorities, he contends that ‘also in this sense Ulmanis wanted to achieve a ‘united 
nation’, but the means he had chosen were very similar to those he himself, according to 
his biographers, had sullenly suffered from, during his youth under the hardships of 
Russification’. Dunsdorfs  (1978: 345) defines Ulmanis’s beliefs as ‘national positivism’, 
which he attributes to the influence of O. S. Marden, one of the founders of the New 
Thought movement, an indefatigable promoter of strong will and positive thinking, and a 
pioneer author of self-help books.2 Dunsdorfs’s conclusion, however, is unequivocal: ‘The 
ideal of a united nation remained unattained – the 15th of May divided the nation more than 
any other event in its short independent history’. (Dunsdorfs 1978: 346) 
 
Ronis (1994), referring to the diaries Ulmanis wrote in his Soviet prison, claims 
that Ulmanis categorically rejected the chauvinistic slogan ‘Latvia for Latvians’, and, 
rather implausibly, that he recognised the equal rights of ethnic minorities. According to 
Ronis (1994: 84), all Ulmanis asked from minorities in return was loyalty towards the 
Latvian state, ‘that they put Latvia’s interests in the first place, and not the interests of their 
ethnic homeland, as had often happened in practice.’ Ronis posits that the fact that 
                                                
1 http://www.president.lv/pk/content/?cat_id=910&lng=lv ; last time accessed 29.08.2012. 
2 If Ulmanis was indeed under the influence of Marden, then the titles of the latter’s books make for  
poignant reading: Pushing to the Front or, Success under Difficulties (1984), Architects of Fate, or Steps to 
Success and Power (1897), An Iron Will (1901), The Hour of Opportunity (1900), How to get What You 
Want (1917), and Ambition (1919). 
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Ulmanis asked all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic belonging, above all to respect the 
Latvian state was not liked either by the Nazi sympathisers among the Baltic Germans, or 
by the ‘empire’s supporters’ among the Russian minority, and that for the sake of the 
efficiency of their propaganda, they often accused Ulmanis of Perkonkrusts-style ethnic 
intolerance (Ronis 1994: 84). Overall, Ronis is convinced that ‘as many accusations can be 
made against K. Ulmanis himself and the authoritarian Latvia of 15th May, it must be 
recognised that the government of the 15th May Republic was definitely against 
chauvinism, in particular against anti-Semitism’. (Ronis 1994: 84) 
 
The question of whether Ulmanis was an anti-Semite is yet another contentious 
issue. Ezergailis (1999: 87) observes that ‘it is easier to make an accusation than to prove 
it’. However, he contends that there were certain ambiguities during Ulmanis’s reign of 
power. ‘K. Ulmanis is uniquely different from all other European fascist leaders as anti-
Semitic publications were banned under his rule’, writes Ezergailis, adding that ‘the 
Latvian anti-Semites actually called Ulmanis ‘a Jewish agent’. On the nationalisation of 
industry and trade, Ezergailis notes: ‘This policy is sometimes interpreted as anti-Semitic 
but in reality it was anti-capitalistic’, and Latvian and German entrepreneurs suffered from 
it as well’. However, Ezergailis (1999: 87) observes that although there was no open anti-
Semitism during the Ulmanis times, ‘it nevertheless does not mean that K. Ulmanis did not 
create a situation which greatly upset and angered some Jews, and made them worry about 
their future’. But nonetheless, Ezergailis (1999: 90) is convinced that ‘if there was any 
open hatred towards a minority under the Ulmanis regime, it was hatred against Germans’.  
 
An interesting take on this double-faceted process of nationalisation-Latvianisation 
is provided by Aizsilnieks (1968). He quotes one of Ulmanis’s speeches, where The 
Leader, after announcing the creation of two new state joint-stock companies, declared:  
‘This opens the way to the industrial and production sectors for those groups of the 
population who prior to these measures remained the most alienated, namely, Latvian 
ploughmen and their sons and brothers in the cities.’3 Aizsilnieks claims that although state 
propaganda created an impression that the goal of the government’s economic policies was 
to help the biggest possible number of Latvian agricultural workers to become industrial 
entrepreneurs, in reality, though, the process of squeezing non-Latvians out of 
manufacturing, trade and other industries in order to create vacancies for Latvians was 
used by the regime to conceal, from the wider masses, the fact that the number of state 
                                                
3 LKK Darb!bas p"rskats par 1936/37. g., pp. 29-30 quoted in Aizsilnieks (1968: 609). 
 
                                                                                                                                                Chapter 6: The Latvian Latvia, 1934-1940 
 314 
enterprises was constantly increasing (Aizsilnieks 1968: 609-610). In other words, the 
rhetoric of expropriating the minorities in favour of ethnic Latvians was consciously used 
by the regime as a distraction from its real goal of statism. 
 
Stranga (1997: 63) also contends that the policy of Latvianisation was in fact a 
transfer of private property (any private property, not just under ethnic minorities’ 
ownership) into state ownership, under the administration of ethnically Latvian 
bureaucrats. Stranga, describing how the Jews were gradually squeezed out of finance, 
industry and trade, how their rights to buy real estate were limited, and how higher tax 
rates were applied to Jewish-owned enterprises, observes that all these measures were 
taken without any official declarations, or without adopting any anti-Jewish legislation. 
However, he stresses, this does not change its discriminatory nature (Stranga 1997: 70). 
Overall, Stranga believes that Ulmanis’s regime was not specifically anti-Semitic, 
although, as an authoritarian regime it was by definition not minority-friendly. Like 
Ezergailis, Stranga also contends that among the ethnic minorities, the main targets of the 
regime were Baltic Germans. 
 
To summarise, there are no, as yet, definitive answers to the following questions: 
what was Ulmanis’s concept of a united nation? What was his position towards ethnic 
minorities? Was Ulmanis an anti-Semite? What was the impact of his policies on nation-
building in Latvia? As rightly observed by Stranga (1997: 80), it is not easy to answer any 
of these questions in the absence of democratic institutions like the parliament, the press, 
or political organisations which would normally reflect both the position of the 
government, and the people’s reaction to its policies. As it is, one is limited to analysing 
trends and making conjectures. In the remaining part of this chapter, I will attempt to 
contribute to the existing knowledge by analysing the scarce information available. 
     
*** 
 
An eerie silence descended upon Latvia in May 1934. There were no voices of 
dissent to be heard, with the Social Democrats being interned in Liepaja camp, the centre 
parties being wary, and the ethnic minorities assuming a ‘wait and see’ position. Of the 
two most vociferous parliamentarians representing ethnic minorities, M. Laserson was held 
in the Liepaja camp along with the Social Democrats, while P. Schiemann (who had also 
left the Saeima by then) was in Vienna. And if there was dissent, there was no public outlet 
for it left – the new government had declared a state of emergency in the country under 
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which public gatherings were prohibited, while Latvian newspapers had an astonishing 
overnight makeover. Whereas up to 16th May 1934 the front pages of newspapers 
displayed the latest local news and lively (at times also vitriolic) political banter, this was 
replaced by repetitive, ad nauseam, attestations of gratitude and support expressed to 
Prime Minister Ulmanis and his government by the Latvian people (individual persons or 
professional organisations, educational institutions, fishermen’s cooperatives, churches, 
musical orchestras and others, but all painstakingly signed). ‘Elated Nation Greets Its 
Liberator’, ‘People’s Congratulations to the Government’, ‘The Whole Country Greets the 
Government’,  ‘Congratulations to Prime Minister Ulmanis’, ‘People’s Best Wishes to the 
Government in Its Work of Organising the State’, etc., etc.  Eventually, these evident 
proofs of the new government’s legitimacy and popularity were replaced by follow-ups on 
government visits around the country, depicting the ‘People’s Leader’ meeting farm 
workers, or greeting boy scouts, or accepting flowers from awed children. 
 
J. K!rkli"#, a veteran journalist at Jaun!k!s Zi"as, recalls ‘the morning after’ the 
coup in his memoir:  
  
When the publishers and senior colleagues had arrived, we started discussing what to do, 
what kind of a stance to adopt toward the destroyers of the Constitution. Everything was still 
unclear. Nobody knew how the new power would develop, and for how long it would survive. 
Akuraters was full of indignation about what had happened, did not spare strong words and 
expressions while talking about the betrayers of democracy. Skalbe looked sad, spoke of our 
‘culture of the herd’ [te#u kult$ra] …A proposal came out to approach Ulmanis with a petition to 
allow Jaun!k!s Zi"as as a ‘sensible, favourably-inclined critical newspaper’, using the argument 
that this would confer a more democratic status on the new regime.4 
       (K!rkli"# 1990: 173) 
 
K!rkli"# (1990:173) recollects that upon receiving the text of Ulmanis’s speech 
‘For My People’, and the accompanying letter, everybody felt uneasy. But ‘the tone of it 
was such that any objections would not be tolerated’, and in fear for the newspaper and for 
their own positions, the editorial team decided to print it on the front page. ‘This step 
defined all that followed’, concludes K!rkli"#.  
 
                                                
4 Nothing evidently came out of the plan to strike a special deal with the government. After the first 
reassuring meeting with leading publishers and journalists that A. B$rzi"# (then – a Deputy Minister of 
Interior, later – a Public Affairs Minister of Ulmanis’s government) held at the Hotel de Rome on 20th May 
1934, the censorship crackdown on the Latvian press which was to follow made many of them feel nostalgic 
even for the Russian Tsarist censors. 
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Eventually, Latvia’s once so lively and diverse press became even bleaker, as the 
voices of all those who did not give the new regime unequivocal support were stifled. Even 
the writings of the most vociferous proponent of ethnic nationalism of the 1920s, E. Blanks 
(who, however, was not an ardent supporter of the dictatorship) disappeared from the daily 
press pages. The article by J. L!gotnis, a Latvian essayist and linguist, better known under 
the archaic version of his name, L!got"u J#kabs, published to mark the two-year 
anniversary of the coup provides an excellent summary of recent changes in the Latvian 
cultural life.  
 
The author asserts that 15th May 1934 was a watershed not only in the country’s 
political life, but also in the spiritual life of the nation. He pays tribute to both the 
Language Law of 1935, which finally assigned an appropriate place to the state language, 
and the Education Law of 1934, which he calls ‘a cornerstone of the national cultural life’. 
Latvian writers, claims L!got"u J#kabs, have finally got rid of their ‘stepchildren’s status’, 
and assumed the place in society they were destined for, thanks to the Law on the Cultural 
Fund (promulgated on 24th July 1934), which diverted the three per cent surcharge on all 
alcohol sales towards cultural needs. L!got"u J#kabs writes warmly about the Friendly 
Appeal campaign initiated by Ulmanis in 1935 – an invitation to the public to donate books 
and works of art to rural schools (a tradition indeed remembered fondly by generations of 
Latvians, which was renewed in 1991). Notably, the author also writes about a new 
direction in national history, headed by Fr. Balodis, A. Tentelis and A. $v%be, which 
reportedly aims to liberate Latvian historiography from German ‘inventions’. At the same 
time, writes L!got"u J#kabs, nationalist ideology has been further developed by Ed. Virza, 
J. Lapi"& and E. Brasti"& (of them more later).5 
 
Dribins (1997: 196) identifies R. B#rzi"&-Valdess (pen name Nordicus) as the most 
prominent media writer on minority issues in authoritarian Latvia. B#rzi"s-Valdess, a 
journalist and an enthusiastic traveller, also happened to be the first Director of the Latvian 
news agency LETA (a position he kept until 1940). 
 
Nordicus’s early writings on minority issues are largely limited to articles on (or 
more precisely, against) Baltic Germans. For example, at the beginning of 1935 he 
published an article ‘Fatherland and Birth Place’, with a subtitle ‘An Open Question to the 
Citizens of German Ethnicity’, in which he questions Baltic Germans’ loyalty to Latvia (in 
                                                
5 Ligot"u, J. ‘Divi gadi latvisk%s kult'ras celtniec!b%’. Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 14.05.1936. 
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the introductory part Nordicus writes about Baltic Germans persistently calling Latvia their 
‘birthplace’ (‘dzimtene’), while referring to Germany as their ‘Fatherland’).6 Another 
article, ‘Our Response to the Germans’, mainly deals with the indignant reaction of the 
German and local Baltic German press to his previous article. ‘Can we possibly fully trust 
those of your brothers in Latvia, whose umbilical cord connecting them with you has not 
been severed?’ – rhetorically exclaims Nordicus.7 Both the aggressive tone of the two 
articles, and the somewhat muddled logic of the author are to some extent explained by J. 
Leji!" (1971:119): ‘A certain Nordicus is writing at Jaun!k!s Zi"as (this is Leta’s 
B#rzi!"), and the series of articles is meant to prepare the mood, as they are planning to 
expropriate both Guilds… the articles are inspired by K.U. [K$rlis Ulmanis].’ 
 
By 1938, however, Nordicus graduates from instigating mistrust toward Baltic 
Germans to more general theorising on minority issues. His article ‘There Are No More 
Minority Problems in Latvia’ is inspired by an interview given by the Romanian King 
Carol II to the Daily Herald reflecting his and the newly elected Romanian government’s 
opinion on minority rights, the rights of Romanian Jews in particular.  Demonstrating his 
own full support for King Carol’s notion that minority rights are an internal affair of the 
state and should not be mixed up with international relations (the king only makes an 
exception for the new territories states have acquired as a result of World War One), 
Nordicus welcomes this new development in the history of minorities’ protection in 
Europe, and eagerly applies it to the Latvian case. He stresses once again that Latvians 
have voluntarily, out of pure goodwill, granted equal rights to ethnic minorities in the past. 
They demonstrated this remarkable generosity, he continues, regardless of the fact that 
‘there is no minorities problem in Latvia in its modern understanding as outlined by King 
Carol’. Those thousands and tens of thousands of people of other ethnicities who are 
scattered across Latvian towns cannot be regarded as ethnic minorities, asserts Nordicus. 
The only exception Nordicus is prepared to make is towards the Russian peasants who live 
compactly in the Latvian countryside – they, according to him, fit the modern concept of 
minority. But then, he shrewdly concludes, their kin state Soviet Russia does not recognise 
the international concept of minority rights. Therefore, he concludes, as a result of the new 
situation in Western Europe combined with the successful solution of minority issues at 
home, the minority problem in Latvia has ceased to exist. 8 
 
                                                
6 Nordicus, ‘Tehwija un dzimtene’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 19.01.1935. 
7 Nordicus, ‘Muhsu atbilde wahceescheem’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 04.02.1935. 
8 Nordicus, ‘Latvij$ vairs nav minorit$tu probl#mas’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 15.01.1938. 
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The informational vacuum resulting from the strict censorship and exaggerated 
propaganda characteristic of any authoritarian or totalitarian regime makes assessment of 
the last period of Latvian interwar state independence extremely difficult, as previously 
observed by many researchers (see, for example, Aizsilnieks 1968: 603; Stranga (1997: 80; 
Cer!zis 2004: 159). It seems at times impossible to separate facts from interpretations, and 
one is forced to rely on a very limited number of sources, as well as trying to ‘read 
between the lines’. For example, Dunsdorfs (1978:371), analysing statistical data, noticed 
that despite the widely advertised Friendly Appeal campaign, the number of books in 
school libraries steadily declined in 1934 and 1935, and from 1935-1938 did not grow 
exactly corresponding to the Friendly Invitation campaign. By comparing various sources, 
he calculated the number of books taken out of use for ideological considerations, i.e. as 
‘unsuitable for the Latvian people’, at 1,270.374 volumes. 
 
M. Skujenieks, a newly appointed deputy prime minister, delivered a speech on 
Latvian Radio to explain the causes of recent ‘changes’ in Latvia’s political life. 
Skujenieks posited that the causes of the political crisis were rooted not just in Latvia’s 
present conditions, but also in the wider situation in the world. He lamented the 
domination of political parties, partisan fights, the impotence of the Saeima – all these 
phenomena put together made the life of the Latvian people impossible, he claimed. The 
most painful issue, according to Skujenieks, was the Saeima’s inability to address ‘our 
Latvian, national matters’. This inability, he continued, was conditioned by the 
composition of the Parliament, where Latvian bourgeois, nationalistically-minded parties 
were in fact in a minority. He then did the maths: 28 seats belonged to the Social 
Democrats and the communists, who for ideological reasons could not and did not want to 
defend Latvian interests, claiming that their goal was to foster cultural development of all 
ethnic groups living in Latvia. But this ‘ostensible fairness’, asserted Skujenieks, had led to 
the other ethnic groups’ supremacy, providing them with unfounded and undeserved 
advantages, and harming Latvian-ness. Another 17 seats in the Saeima belonged to 
minorities, who often sided with the Social Democrats; and due to political considerations, 
Latgalian deputies often voted in favour of the minorities’ ‘exaggerated demands’, said 
Skujenieks.  He claimed that as all the aforementioned groups together had held 58 
mandates, under those circumstances, Latvianness had not stood a chance. ‘I have to say 
that any nation which wants to exist and to strengthen its state, should become, in the 
national sense, as uniform as possible, so that at important historical moments all the 
state’s residents feel that it is their country – a country which they ought to defend.’ But 
the goal was not to oppress other ethnic groups, argued Skujenieks, or to make their life in 
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Latvia impossible. The goal was to strengthen Latvian-ness in the state, which in 
Skujenieks’s interpretation would ensure ‘that at the decisive moment, when our country 
could be endangered, our state’s citizens, their ethnicity and religious creed 
notwithstanding, would present a united front in defending our country.’ (Skujenieks 
seems to struggle in reconciling the two notions here – ‘Latvian-ness’, which he declared 
to be the ultimate goal, and the idea of a ‘uniform nation’. An ardent promoter of 
‘scientific objectivity’ in the past (see Skujenieks 1913), here he engages in a kind of 
verbal acrobatics, as the logical conclusion of what he said would be that the creation of a 
‘uniform’, civic nation in pre-coup Latvia had been hampered purely by other ethnic 
groups’ alleged ‘supremacy’). 
  
The last part of the speech reflected his apparent uneasiness about recent events 
(according to multiple sources, Skujenieks joined the conspirators at the last moment after 
an invitation from General Balodis, and only on condition that he would be the one to 
develop the new Constitution): 
 
Changes have happened. All big changes create difficulties and various unwanted 
phenomena. I am convinced that the government is able to prevent this. Thankfully, up until now 
all changes have happened without a drop of blood being spilled. Peace and order should prevail in 
our country also in the future. I am confident that resistance against the newly established 
conditions would be out of place; it would only lead to unnecessary casualties. It is not possible to 
re-establish the past. It has not happened in other countries, and it will not happen in ours.9 
 
The new regime brought with it a major restructuring in all sectors of state life. The 
economy was increasingly monopolised by the state, and private entrepreneurship 
systematically eradicated (Aizsilnieks 1968; Balabkins and Aizsilnieks 1975). All political 
parties were banned, including the Agrarian Union. The Law on Legislation Order [Likums 
par likumu izsludin!"anas k!rt#bu] of 7th June 1934 empowered the Cabinet of ministers to 
pass, single-handedly, all legislation pertaining to the state, the Cabinet, the courts, the 
state administration system, the civil law, the penal code, procedural law, the state budget, 
state taxes and customs duties, state credits, military service and conscription, and foreign 
policy. The prime minister retained a veto.10 At the municipal level, all key officials were 
appointed by the Minister of the Interior. Non-Latvians were forced out of the state 
administration (not that they were ever present there in significant numbers), and out of 
                                                
9 ‘M. Skujenieka runa par notiku!o p"rgroz#bu c$lo%iem’, Latvijas Kareivis, 24.05.1934. 
10 ‘Likums par likumu izsludin"!anas k"rt#bu’, Vald#bas V$tsnesis, 08.06.1934. 
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closely-related professions, like legal and notary services. As for civic organisations, 
Stranga (1998: 227) writes about the consistent attempt to unify all civic organisations, 
from those representing youth, and women to those representing ethnic minorities, with the 
aim of creating just one, overarching organisation in each sector. But as the ethnic 
minorities’ cultural autonomy in Latvia was guaranteed only by the two education laws of 
1919, the hardest blow was sustained by them – when the government started to introduce 
radical changes in the education sector. 
 
Already during the first meeting of the new government on 17th May 1934, a 
decision was made to re-open the Education Law within the near future with the aim of 
‘significantly restricting the self-administration of minority schools.’11 The new Education 
Minister, Professor Ludvigs Adamovi!s, was well prepared for the task ahead. One of the 
most prominent figures in Latvian interwar pedagogical circles (from 1923 until 1934, he 
served as the head of the Latvian Secondary School Teachers’ Association; for several 
years he had also been head of the Textbook Provision Foundation), Adamovi!s was also a 
well-known opponent of the initial, liberal state educational policy towards ethnic 
minorities. For example, in his review ‘School Matters in Latvia 1919-1927’, Adamovi!s 
sharply criticised the state’s benevolent policy towards minorities’ educational 
autonomy.12 Adamovi!s (1927:17) writes:  ‘The decisive role of ethnic minority 
representatives in the big politics of the Parliament awards those minorities a bigger 
significance than they deserve in proportion to the size of their minority, and than would 
be permissible by the Latvian state, which is a national state of Latvians, who are an ethnic 
majority, without losing self-respect’. The alleged excessive autonomy of the minority 
school departments within the ministry and the disproportionably high budget allocations 
to minority schools, an increase in the overall number of minority schools within the first 
eight years of independence, a higher school attendance rate among minority children as 
compared to ethnic Latvians – all these developments were interpreted by Adamovi!s as 
alarming trends in national education requiring immediate state attention and intervention 
already in 1927. Now his new appointment gave him the power to act upon his beliefs.  
  
Amendments to the Regulations on the Education Ministry’s Structure from 12th 
July 1934, in conjunction with the Law on People’s Education adopted on the same day, 
largely took away ethnic minorities’ rights to cultural autonomy, which had been granted 
                                                
11  ‘Jaun"s waldibas pirm" sehde’, Jaun!k!s Zi"as, 18.05.1934 
12 Adamovi!s, L. Skolu lietas Latvij!. Latvju Kult#ras spiestuve, R$ga, (1927). 
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to them by the education laws of 1919. A. B!rzi"# (1963: 196) makes a candid 
observation: ‘During the time of the Parliament, numerous attempts notwithstanding, we 
did not manage to adopt the important People’s Education Law due to the simple reason 
[sic! i.e., no other considerations] that there was no majority in the Saeima.’ While the 
Amendments effectively dissolved minority school boards, the new Law allowed minority 
children to study only in the schools belonging to their respective ethnic minority. In cases 
where parents belonged to two different ethnic minorities, it was the father who 
determined the ethnicity of the child. Children of mixed marriages where one parent was 
an ethnic Latvian were obliged to attend Latvian schools. Latvian schools were open to all 
children regardless of their ethnic background. In any given region, classes for ethnic 
minorities were to be opened if there were 30 or more children of that respective minority 
living there, and minority schools were to be opened if the number of children was 60 or 
more. 
 
A. B!rzi"# (1963: 196) defends the new law: ‘Latvian nationalism was not trying to 
suffocate ethnic minorities’ cultural nationalism: the state guaranteed each minority child a 
right to compulsory primary education at the expense of the state and the municipalities in 
his father’s tongue. Besides, the state also allocated allowances to minorities’ non-
compulsory secondary schools.’ 
 
It is often argued that the state’s supposedly benevolent attitude towards minorities’ 
cultural needs was exemplified by the granting of the right to study in their ‘father’s’, or 
‘native’, tongue – this claim requires careful examination. The ethnic diversity of the 
Latvian population, in combination with changing foreign rulers and the accompanying 
acculturation campaigns had produced a rather unusual linguistic situation, where ethnic 
and linguistic borders did not always coincide; moreover, there was no linguistic 
homogeneity inside the ethnic groups themselves. This obvious discrepancy between 
ethnic and linguistic criteria, however, was not taken into account, or was perhaps 
overlooked, by the founders of the state when they were drawing up the first education 
laws of the new republic.  The Law on People’s Education Institutions from 08.12.1919 
reads: 
 
Article 39. All compulsory school studies should be conducted in the student’s family 
language. 
                                                                                                                                                Chapter 6: The Latvian Latvia, 1934-1940 
 322 
Article 40. The language that the student’s parents declare when they apply for a place at 
school, and in which they can fluently express their thoughts, is considered to be the Student’s 
‘family language’.13  
 
Practical implementation of these clauses immediately ran into difficulties, which 
kept accumulating over the years. The three biggest Latvian minorities – Russians, 
Germans and Jews – used at least four languages among them. Whereas it is safe to say 
that Russians by and large used the Russian language, and the vast majority of Russian 
children attended Russian-language schools (Apine 2007: 42) mentions that 80 per cent of 
Russian schoolchildren were enrolled in Russian schools in 1930s), some of the Baltic 
Germans, the former local administrators and army officers of the Russian Empire (there 
were a number of mixed marriages as well) had been Russified, and used the Russian 
language as their primary language, or used both Russian and German in their daily life 
and at home. In any case, they were certainly able to ‘fluently express their thoughts’, as 
required by law, in the Russian language, and therefore free to send their children to the 
Russian-language schools. But it all becomes really complicated when we look at the 
Jewish community of Latvia. Whereas Latgalian Jews mainly spoke Yiddish and Russian, 
Jews originating from Kurzeme were fluent in German, and counted it as their mother 
tongue (M. Nuroks, for example, delivered all his speeches to the Saeima in German). On 
top of that, there was increasing competition for Jewish minds between Orthodox Jews and 
Zionists, and therefore a competition between Yiddish and Hebrew to be the language of 
school education at Jewish schools. Z. Michaeli (Michelson) writes on the subject:  
 
The pedagogic principle underlying the Law on Education [the law in question is that of 
1919] was that the language spoken in the family should determine the language of tuition. This 
principle, however, was not congruent with the needs of the Jewish National resistance Movement, 
whose advocates found considerable difficulty at first because the languages of the Jewish masses 
in Latvia were Yiddish, Russian or German to begin with.  
      (Michaeli 1971: 188-189)  
 
Because of the perceived superiority of educational standards at both German and 
Russian schools in comparison with Latvian schools (and objectively, at the beginning of 
independence, those standards were indeed superior as German and Russian schools were 
far better established), and with the (practically non-existent prior to independence) Jewish 
                                                
13 The law does not stipulate that the child should be able to fluently express his thoughts in the ‘family 
language’, only that the parents should be able to do so. 
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schools, Jewish parents often tended to send their offspring to German, or Russian, but 
rarely Latvian, schools. Moreover, some practically-minded Latvian parents also gave 
preference to German or even, occasionally, Russian schools – after all, in full compliance 
with the law, all they needed in order to do that, was to demonstrate fluency in the 
language and claim that it was spoken at home.  
 
This liberal approach towards the language of education as reflected in the Law on 
People’s Educational Institutions caused many practical problems with its implementation 
and led to frequent squabbles between minority school boards over the number of pupils 
under their jurisdiction and the resulting funding, which reflected badly, in the eyes of the 
ethnic majority, on the reputation of minority cultural autonomy institutions.14 Perhaps 
even more importantly, it provided a constant source of dissatisfaction for nationalistically-
minded Latvian politicians and publicists [A. Bergs, E. Blanks, M. Skujenieks, A. !"nin# 
and others quoted elsewhere – e.g. Blank’s famous ‘Jews are in the first place unacceptable 
to us as Russian-speaking Jews’], who perceived those unorthodox language practices as 
evidence of insufficient loyalty on the minorities’ part, and as a sign of association not 
with just another culture but with a different state entity, and as an affront to the Latvian 
culture itself.  
 
Under the Ulmanis regime, minorities’ schools throughout Latvia were closed or 
merged with Latvian schools (Stranga (1998), for example, mentions that the number of 
Russian gymnasiums had decreased from nine to two). In a bizarre turn of events, the 
education reform envisioned by the former Minister A. !"ni$# was now zealously 
implemented, and not a single voice of protest was to be heard. Poignantly, it was 
implemented by the same people who had previously brought about !"ni$#’s demise with 
the help of the ethnic minorities themselves. 
  
The State Language Law of 5th January 1935, largely based upon the Regulation on State 
Language of 18th February 1932, for obvious reasons, dropped those clauses and footnotes 
which referred to language usage in the Saeima and during municipal elections, and thus 
officially excluded the German and Russian languages from the public sphere henceforth.  
  
                                                
14 The Russian and Jewish minority school boards were constantly competing for those schools where the 
language of instruction was Russian, but the majority of pupils were of Jewish ethnicity. In 1925, for 
example, ten schools were transferred from under the jurisdiction of the Russian school board to the Jewish 
one. The main reason behind the change of ‘ownership’ was that out of the total number of 1606 pupils in 
those schools, only 214 were of Russian ethnicity, and the rest were Jewish (‘Evereiskie deti – v evreiskii 
otdel’, Segodnya, 06.08.1925). In this way, the principle of ethnicity prevailed.  
                                                                                                                                                Chapter 6: The Latvian Latvia, 1934-1940 
 324 
Judging by just how promptly the education laws were amended under the new 
regime, and by the amount of speeches addressed to Latvian children and young people, K. 
Ulmanis – understandably - considered national education paramount to his nation-
building programme.   
 
In his numerous addresses to young people, he underlines the need for 
transformation, and the active part every ethnic Latvian should take in order for this to 
happen: 
 
Let’s make Latvia Latvian again, let’s make it a Latvian land, where the Latvian spirit is 
expressed everywhere, and inspires everything, and is noticeable: in everyday life, at school, at 
church, in art, in writing, in politics, and in the economy. Let the Latvian first of all become a real 
Latvian in his soul, in his spirit, his conscience, and his strength – then Latvia will really belong to 
Latvians. But only then.15  
  
In one of the rare instances of his referring to ethnic minorities directly, Ulmanis 
adds: ‘According to this view, others, who have a right to it, can also live in Latvia 
alongside us, but the Latvian will go ahead everywhere, and everywhere everything 
Latvian will shine proudly’.16 
 
Another example of Ulmanis not underestimating the importance of education in 
nation-building is his close attention to the ‘suitability’ of the teaching staff. For example, 
in one of his addresses he describes the spiritual liberation of teachers:  ‘Also 
schoolteachers have become different deep inside, in comparison to earlier. I want to say 
that schoolteachers feel safe, that now they can express whatever is in their hearts, tell it to 
the people, to the fatherland, to their parish, to the children and children’s parents.’17  
  
However, other available documentary sources suggest that while some of the 
Latvian teachers had been ‘liberated’ by the new regime, others experienced a different 
fate. For example, Z. Michaeli (Michelson) (1971:193), who had been the principal of The 
Hebrew Boys’ School since 1923, recalls how he was forced to resign his post in 1934 as 
he was regarded as ‘unfaithful to the spirit of the new regime’. Another document in 
support of both the fact of ‘ideological cleansing’ of schoolteachers’ ranks and the close 
                                                
15 ‘Padaris!m Latviju latvisku’, in: Ulmanis, K. Jaun!tnei: rakstu izlase un izvilkumi. J. Lapi"a sakopojum!. 
R#ga, Zemnieka Domas, (1937), p. 39 
(1937) 
16 Ibid. 
17 ‘Vien#bas aug$i’, ibid., p. 46 
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personal attention K. Ulmanis paid to it, is a letter from the Director of the School 
Department to the State President’s personal adjutant, M. Lukins, dated 3rd October 1939, 
which reads: ‘In accordance with our phone conversation I am proud to send you the 
information about Polish and Russian schools’ principals in the Rezekne region.’ The 
enclosed document contains brief, but rather to the point, characteristics of a number of 
minority school principals provided by a local school inspector: ‘Loyal attitude towards the 
Latvian state, a trustworthy person, fully fluent in the Latvian language’; ‘Loyal, correct. 
Hostile towards the Left. Good command of the Latvian language’; ‘A person absolutely 
loyal to the Latvian state.’18 Although several of the inspected principals did not make the 
final cut, the reasons cited are not lack of loyalty: ‘Loyal but phlegmatic. Should be 
allowed to retire’, or ‘Loyal in her work, but mediocre abilities’. It is probably safe to 
presume that over the five years that had passed since the coup, teachers ideologically 
unsuitable for their task had already been identified and removed from their positions. 
 
As for ethnic minorities in general, K. Ulmanis personally rarely mentioned their 
presence in Latvia at all. Apologists for his regime, and there were many among Latvian 
writers and essayists, however, actively contributed to the ideological foundation of ethnic 
Latvian supremacy, in numerous essays, books and media articles. The fact that their 
works were published under the strict government censorship conditions demonstrates that 
their views were condoned by the regime.  
 
A collection of essays ‘The New Nationalism’, published in 1936, provides a 
valuable insight into the mainstream ideology.19 It was edited by writer, essayist and 
schoolteacher J. Lapi!". In his earlier days, Lapi!" was one of the founders of the National 
Democratic Party, and a member of the Latvian Provisional Council in 1917. Later he 
became known as an early supporter and an ardent follower of K. Ulmanis. As early as in 
February 1934, speaking at the Teachers’ Congress, he openly expressed dissatisfaction 
with the state of Latvian nation under the democratic regime: ‘A fish rots from its head, 
and the nation rots from its intelligentsia.’20 
 The collection is a manifestation of a racist nationalist ideology which was 
widespread in Europe in the 1930s, being upheld by far-right parties, and underpinning 
many authoritarian regimes. It had been undoubtedly present in Latvia long before 1934, 
but in democratic Latvia it was confined to far-right circles and their publications. Now it 
                                                
18 LVVA, 5969. f. 1. apr., 439. l., 8. lapa 
19 Jaunais n#cionalisms. Rakstu kr#jums J. Lapi!a redakcij#. Valters un Rapa, R$ga, (1936) 
20 Lapi!", J. Atdzim!ana. R$ga, (1935) 
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found itself an official outlet. In the introduction to ‘The New Nationalism’, Lapi!" 
exhibits his primordialist views on nationhood, and unabashedly juxtaposes ‘nature’ and 
‘humanism’ to the detriment of the latter: 
 
For culturally refined mankind, the new nationalism undoubtedly represents a reaction 
against rational constructions. It is a return to nature. Over the past two hundred years, humanism 
has fanatically believed in man’s omnipotence, his humanity, his spiritual and material 
achievements. Humanism wanted to change man’s nature. But it only succeeded in small measure, 
as nature is conservative, and man’s psyche today is the same as hundreds of years ago. Therefore, 
nationalism theory is looking for origins again and this is why the race question has arisen again 
with the unprecedented force. 
       (Lapi!" 1936: 9)  
 
Lapi!" attempts to ground his racist postulates in reported ‘scientific discoveries’: 
 
 
 Racial science has acknowledged the great inequality among men in terms of talent and 
ability [spraigums]. Racial science…has proved that people are most balanced where the races are 
pure. Admixture of other blood leads to discord in human body and soul. Therefore, every race 
must protect its purity of blood. If in the old times nationalism tried to attract other peoples through 
acculturation, now nationalism aims at natural reproduction among a nation’s members; it tries to 
increase national forces in a natural way. 
(Lapi!" 1936: 9)  
 
 
J. Gr#ns, a famous Latvian writer, editor, schoolteacher and author of textbooks, 
contributed an essay titled ‘On National Eros’ [Par nacion!lo Erotu] to the volume. At the 
beginning of the essay, he defines the relationship between the nation and the individual: 
‘The qualities of each and every Latvian are summed up in the Latvian nation’s qualities. 
And in this case, every Latvian, on the one hand, is a carrier of his own individuality, and 
on the other – a carrier of Latvian national individuality’ (Gr#ns 1934:15). 
 Further on, Gr#ns expresses indignation at the phenomenon of mixed marriages, a 
common denominator of all racist ideologists: 
 
It is hard to imagine a homunculus who does not belong to any nation. However…look 
around you! Children of mixed marriages, even if, in the best case scenario, they finally decide on 
either their father’s or mother’s ethnicity, are in a certain sense moral cripples: either abstinence 
from the above-mentioned spiritual functions or the mixed blood’s insecurity, timidity and inability 
to access national values are dormant in their conscience or subconscious. Geniuses and great 
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talents who are often mentioned as products of mixed blood, are rare exceptions when set alongside 
the thousands and hundreds of thousands of inferior beings.  
(Gr!ns 1934: 16)  
  
He then evaluates the detrimental effects of ‘mixed blood’ among the nation 
members:   
 
By looking at the present post-war world, one can find people whose national individuality 
is more or less damaged. In other respects they may be acceptable members of society, but they 
will never be the carriers of the national spiritual values that form the national essence. Readers 
will know how much blood purity is now being protected in Germany. A half-blood Latvian could 
be a teaching resource at one of the technical faculties of our University, but he could never be a 
national painter or a philologist. 
 
(Gr!ns 1934: 16) 
  
Mentioning partly or fully Germanised Jews who under political pressure from 
Hitler had ‘to return to their own nation’, Gr!ns (1934:17) gleefully observes: ‘There are 
those among them who in their old age are forced to learn how to speak and think in the 
Jewish language.’ 
 
Another contributor to the volume, I. Kochs, writes about ‘Races and Their 
Psyche’, generously quoting H. S. Chamberlain and Count Gobineau. J. L!gotnis and A. 
Kroders pay lip service to Ulmanis for ‘saving the nation and the country from rolling into 
the abyss.’ To summarise the contents of the volume, the essays make it very clear that 
between 1934 and 1936 the ideology supporting the regime slid from the initially declared 
necessity of ‘upholding the Latvian element’ and ‘putting Latvians first’ to ‘organic 
racism’ and the theory of racial inequality so popular at the time among supporters of 
authoritarian regimes around the world. 
 
It is, however, vital to observe that despite condoning the spread of racial theory in 
the public sphere, the Ulmanis regime never acted upon these beliefs. Moreover, along 
with other political organisations, Latvian fascists and their front Perkonkrusts remained 
illegal. It certainly speaks to Ulmanis’s credit that he granted, upon M. Dubins’s insistence, 
refuge in Latvia to hundreds of Jewish refugees from Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia 
and Poland.21 This benevolent attitude of the Latvian authorities ended in October 1938, 
when 77 Jews from Vienna were not allowed to enter Latvia despite all Dubins’s efforts. In 
                                                
21 The precise numbers are not known; Dribins (2004: 52) estimates it at over a thousand. 
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the future, not only were Jewish refugees not allowed into Latvia, but Latvian consulates 
abroad were forbidden to issue them with transit visas.22 (Stranga 1997: 78-79; Dribins 
2002: 74)  
 
According to Stranga (1998: 221, 224), ‘there was not a single minority whose 
relationship with the state’s relationship improved after the coup’. Russians, Germans, 
Jews and Poles all sustained significant blows. Minority schools were either shut down, or 
merged with Latvian schools; school principals and teachers dismissed because of their 
reported ‘insufficient loyalty to the state’; newspapers were closed or heavily censored; 
non-ethnic Latvians were forced out of the state sector and prestigious professions; in 
addition, the nationalisation of industry and commerce forced them out of the private 
sector, too, inevitably contributing to a deterioration in their economic welfare  – these last 
two measures by the government particularly affected Germans and Jews. 23 
 
But although the situation of all ethnic minorities deteriorated after the coup, there 
were still perceptible differences in the ways that the new regime dealt with each one of 
them, conditioned largely by the perceived ‘importance’ of a specific minority in terms of 
the inner life of the Latvian state and, more vitally, by the political situation abroad. 
Stranga (1998: 221) writes that the Russian minority, being politically inactive, provincial 
and marginalised (especially in Latgale), and without any support from abroad, was not 
perceived as an immediate threat to the Latvian state. During the last years of 
independence, the Russian minority started demonstrating increasing support and 
sympathy towards the Soviets, largely thanks to their own deteriorating economic situation 
and the government’s largely unsuccessful ‘border enforcement programme’ (ethnic 
Latvians were brought to settle by the border, while ethnic Russians were forced to move 
further into the interior). The government considered implementing measures for 
reconciliation, but simply ran out of time (see Stranga 1999: 222). 
 
                                                
22 A notable exception was made for a prominent Hasidic Rabbi M. M Schneerson, also known as the 6th 
Lubavitcher Rebbe, in 1939, when the Latvian Embassy in Warsaw helped him to leave the country occupied 
by German troops (Dribins 2002: 74). 
23 The establishment of the four Chambers  (Trade and Industry, Agrarian, Crafts, and Labour; later on – also 
Writers and Artists, and Professions) effectively submitted numerous professional organisations to state 
control – every Chamber reported to a corresponding minister. For Baltic Germans, this also meant the loss 
of the two centuries-old, legendary professional Guilds, whose their functions were taken over by the 
Chambers.  
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Despite the fact that the Baltic Germans were undoubtedly the main target of all 
Ulmanis’s reforms towards the minorities (from the new Education Law to the Law on 
Chambers), the government was forced to exercise a certain caution in dealing with them 
so as not to aggravate already unstable relations with Germany. The Baltic Germans were 
quick to assure the new government of their loyalty - Cer!zis (2004: 158-159) writes that 
immediately after the coup, both Rigaer Tageszeitung and Rigasche Rundschau 
demonstrated ‘full loyalty’ and support for the authoritarian regime, albeit ‘without 
excessive emotions’. In the article ‘The Radical Change’, published on 19th May 1934, 
Rigasche Rundschau claimed that the ‘exaggerated parliamentary democracy’ of the recent 
past was not really suitable for the Baltic German mentality, and asserted that Baltic 
Germans fully understood that the authoritarian state was the only possible way out of 
‘Marxist decay’. ‘We want to serve this country as its real sons, not stepsons, and Germans 
are just as devoted to the task as Latvians are’, reads the concluding paragraph of the 
article. 24 
  
At the same time, the Baltic Germans were the only minority who dared to express 
if not outright criticisms of the new state policies, then at least some dissatisfaction with 
the government’s actions. For example, Rigasche Rundschau allowed itself to cautiously 
express concerns about the fate of school autonomy in Latvia, and reminded the new 
government about the importance of Baltic German support.25  
  
In any case, neither the assurances of their loyalty made by Baltic Germans, nor 
their careful reminders about their own importance seemed to have much effect on the 
continuing deterioration of this never-quite-happy relationship. Those Latvian newspapers 
that avoided closure under the new regime continued their steady anti-German course. 
Cer!zis (2004: 158) observes that ‘although the Baltic Germans’ sympathy towards 
national socialism, and the related decrease in loyalty towards the Latvian state could be 
already observed in 1931, it started to escalate in 1933, and reached its apotheosis during 
the authoritarian period’. Cer!zis asserts that the government’s policies aimed at 
promoting the rights of the core nation further encouraged the local Germans in their 
sympathies towards Germany.  
 
                                                
24 ‘Umbruch’, Rigasche Rundschau, 19.05.1934. 
25 ‘Staat und wir’, Rigasche Rundschau, 18.05.1934. quoted in: Cer!zis, R. 2004. V!cu factors Latvij! (1918-
1939). Politiskie un starpnacion!lie aspekti. R"ga: LVU Akad#miskais apg$ds, p. 160. 
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This stalemate was finally broken in October 1939, when a resettlement agreement 
was signed between the German Ambassador and the Latvian Delegation, foreseeing that 
Baltic Germans would relocate to German territories (read: recently occupied Poland) until 
the end of the year. This agreement was enthusiastically greeted by Latvians. On 31st 
October.1939, Latvijas Kareivis wrote: 
 
The resettlement campaign is a one-time event, during which the German minority will 
forever leave the Latvian land and the Latvian state community. We are living through a big 
historical moment, which should be understood and appreciated properly. If 700 years ago the 
doors opened from our side, now they are opening from the other side. We are parting without hate 
and wish all the best to our former compatriots in their new life and work circumstances.26  
 
 As for the Jewish community, one thing is certain – some parts of it suffered more 
than others. The special relationship that M. Dubins had enjoyed with K. Ulmanis for 
years, both before and after the coup, served as a basis for many interpretations and, 
sometimes, speculations. M. Dubins remains an ambiguous figure in the history of Latvian 
politics, and in the history of the Latvian Jewish community.  
  
As a parliamentarian, M. Dubins, beyond any doubt, provided the best possible 
representation for his electorate, which was largely based in Latgale. He tirelessly 
defended his voters’ interests in all four interwar Saeimas. Moreover, he always went to 
great lengths to assist any Jew who asked him for help. The collection of his personal 
documents at the Latvian Historical Archive contains hundreds of letters, in Yiddish, 
Russian, German and Latvian, from all corners of Latvia, and also from Russia, Germany, 
Yugoslavia and other countries. All the letters are essentially desperate pleas for help – 
correspondents ask Dubins to help with tax relief, reduction of prison terms, a US visa, a 
residence permit in Latvia, or free medical assistance, etc. Remarkably, Dubins not only 
had the time and generosity of heart to attend to all these tasks, but he obviously possessed 
the necessary influence and connections to succeed, as many correspondents write to thank 
him profoundly for a favour already granted. One of the grateful correspondents writes: 
‘All of us Jews consider you to be the only MP who is of use [prinosit pol’zu] to his own 
Latgalian Jews.’27 
  
                                                
26 ‘Parakst!ts l!gums par v"cu taut!bas Latvijas pilso#u p"rvieto$anu uz V"ciju’, Latvijas Kareivis, 
31.10.1939. 
27 LVVA, 5758. f. 1. apr., 2. l., p. 192. 
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Dubins’s insurmountable energy and utter dedication to his people’s needs earned 
him the admiration and respect not just of Jews, but of ethnic Latvian politicians and 
bureaucrats as well. For example, A. B!rzi"# (1963: 128-129) writes that among most 
prominent Latvian parliamentarians,  
 
…It is hard to forget the representative of the Jewish Orthodox Party Agudas Israel, M. 
Dubins. In his time, he was perhaps someone to be insulted and made fun of, but in reality Dubins 
was a person who at least deserved sympathy. He was often seen on the streets of Riga together 
with his party’s other deputy, Vitenbergs, moving in slow, halting steps. Vitenbergs usually stayed 
two steps behind Dubins. This way they travelled from one state institution to another during the 
Saeima period, and also during the national government’s times, to negotiate some kind of help for 
their people. Dubins always had an inexhaustible number of two-Lats silver coins in his pockets. 
These he distributed among petitioners in the corridors of ministries; he also paid stamp duties on 
their behalf. He patiently put up with the bureaucrats’ mockery, never complaining about their 
excesses. Dubins believed that complaints could only lead to bigger problems in the future. 
 
 J. Leji"# (1971: 181) also attests to Dubins’s influence in the government and with 
Ulmanis personally, which he used to save Jews from persecution: 
 
I remember well how Jewish Rabbi Dubins, as a friend of Ulmanis, enjoyed great attention 
in government circles. The Latvian government issued documents for further travel to the USA to 
tens of thousands of Jewish refugees who had arrived in Latvia from Germany or countries 
occupied by the Germans. As anti-Semitism kept growing in other countries, Latvia accepted 
thousands more Jewish refugees. 
 
In his later book, J. Leji"# also writes (1975:8): ‘Dubins was a member of all the 
Saeimas, very popular, among Latvians and Jews alike. He was therefore very successful 
in his work. Even after the changes in 1934 he was influential in government circles and 
Ulmanis considered him to be the leader of the Jewish community.’ 
 
A. Lasmanis (1963) provides yet more evidence about the remarkable influence 
Dubins possessed in governmental circles. In his memoir, he describes his encounters with 
Dubins in 1930s, when Lasmanis himself served the Head of R$ga Military District, 
responsible, among other things, for mobilisation and recruitment: ‘The Saeima deputy 
Dubins was not a bad person. He took good care of his own Jews, assigning them to 
different garrisons, often even specifying to which regiment they were to be sent, before 
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passing the lists to the headquarters.’ (Lasmanis 1963: 121). At the same time, Lasmanis 
was irked by Dubins’s continuous interference: 
 
After I got the lists [of recruits] from the headquarters, Dubin would often come to the 
office to change the assignations. Even on the day when the lists were supposed to be sent off, we 
were forced to make changes, and that caused reluctance on the part of my employees. I asked Mr. 
Dubins to establish a deadline, after which no petitions would be acceptable, but he was way too 
big and proud for that.           
     (Lasmanis 1963: 122) 
 
According to Lasmanis, M. Nuroks ‘also had a list every year, but it was shorter 
and he was very considerate, and did not burden the administration’ (Lasmanis 1963: 122). 
 
Lasmanis also inadvertently provides an insight into just how much influence 
Dubins exercised:  
 
At the end of August 1930, Dubins came to me with the changes in the recruitment list. 
After we dealt with those, he said: ‘The 15th anniversary [of Latvia’s independence] is approaching. 
One or another person will get nothing. For example, that Mednis (the adjutant to the War Minister, 
about whom the newspapers had been writing that he refused to shake hands with Dubins, on the 
grounds that he imposed on the Ministry way too often). But I have already spoken with Ulmanis 
about you. He has no objections, so if you’d like, I will go to General Balodis straight away, and 
the matter will be settled!’ (p. 122).  
      (Lasmanis 1963: 122) 
       
 
According to Lasmanis, he modestly declined the offer. He writes that not 
everybody was happy about Dubins’s extensive contacts: ‘They were saying about Dubins 
in Riga that he had way too much power in Latvia’ (Lasmanis 1963: 122).  
  
Dubins’s close ties with the Agrarian Union, and his personal friendship with 
Ulmanis were also often frowned upon by secular, liberally-inclined Jews during the 
democratic period. After the coup, when Dubins did not just support Ulmanis but also 
unabashedly used his own privileged position to advance the Habad cause in Latvian 
Jewish life at the expense of secular Jews and Zionists, this disapproval turned into 
bitterness. Z. Michaeli (Michelson) recalls:  
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Jewish cultural autonomy came to an end with the coup d’état of Ulmanis in 1934. 
Although the Hebrew schools continued to exist until the advent of the Soviet regime, they were 
void of any Zionist or Jewish National content. Supervision was entrusted to the ‘Agudas Israel’ 
whose representatives, being faithful adherents of the new regime, set out to abolish the secular 
Hebrew schools or to amalgamate them with their own.  
       (Michaeli 1971:216) 
 
A slight hint of disapproval can be also detected in the appraisal of M. Dubins provided by 
M. Bobe, who writes:  
 
Any description of Jewish personalities in Latvia must give an account of them [M. Dubins 
and S. Wittenberg], for they were among the most outstanding figures of the community, and 
defended Latvian Jewry after their fashion. Although certain groups did not accept their political 
approach, this did not correspond to their own point of view, and in their opinion it offered the 
most certain method of helping the largest possible number of Jews. 
      (Bobe 1971: 301) 
 
Bobe, however, is unequivocal in his belief in the purity of Dubin’s intentions and 
in his altruism: 
 
…Whether passport, permit or release from arrest, there was nothing that Dubin could not 
arrange. Such, at least, was the general belief, and as a rule people were right. Everything he did 
was done without considering whether the person asking for help was his supporter or an opponent. 
It was a Jew who was asking for help, and that was what mattered. His popularity among the 
Jewish public was unbounded.’ 
      (Bobe 1971: 301) 
 
Bobe points out that although all Jewish representatives in the Saeima helped and 
interceded on behalf of their voters as much as possible, for Dubins it was ‘his main 
function’. About Dubins’s unwavering support of the Agrarian Union and of the coalitions 
it formed, Bobe writes: 
 
As a matter of principle he supported the Right-wing groups, claiming that the Left-
wingers, the Social Democrats, etc., would support the Jews anyway in accordance with their party 
principles; and since it was often necessary to obtain the help of the Antisemitic groups, they had to 
be supported…True, he did his best to justify his approach. He often said it was impossible to rely 
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on either the Left-wing or the Right-wing, but the latter should be and could be bribed in the Jewish 
interest. 
      (Bobe 1971:301-302)    
 
Bobe’s interpretation of Dubins’s political approach is supported by M. Laserson 
(1971:161), who also writes that Dubins believed that ‘no part of the Latvian people were 
to be trusted; not the right wing, not the centre, and not the Social Democrats.’ 
 
It seems impossible to determine whether it was Dubins’s personal influence and 
inexhaustible energy in pushing his agenda forward, or other considerations and personal 
convictions as well that conditioned Ulmanis’s relatively lenient approach towards the 
Latvian Jews. A transcript of Ulmanis’s conversation with A. B!rgs on 1st August 1934 
(which cannot be considered a fully reliable source as it was transcribed by A. Bergs 
himself; one can be certain, however, that the meeting below did indeed take place, as it is 
mentioned in an entry in Munters’s diary on the same date) perhaps helps to highlight other 
possible considerations that Ulmanis took into account in his approach towards the Latvian 
Jewish community. Ulmanis called for a meeting with B!rgs after his newspaper Latvis 
repeatedly broke the new rules of the game laid out by A. B!rzi"# during his meeting with 
the media the previous week, publishing satirical articles about the new leadership and 
continuing with its customary anti-Semitic propaganda: 
 
U: …There are also 4-5 articles on Jews in every issue. Why are those necessary! You should 
understand, after all, that this could really damage us abroad. Thank God, we have been able to 
hush it up abroad. There is some anti-Semitic paper published by some National Socialist in Erfurt. 
It is sent to everybody, myself included. I read it – the next day it is reprinted in ‘Latvis’! I am 
surprised the Jews were smart enough to hit each other on the head and then to start screaming 
about pogroms! 
 
B: But do ‘Latvis’ articles actually incite this? Anti-Semitism is really big and well grounded 
among our people. It really could come out in pogroms, especially if there is no other outlet for it, 
like, for example, being able to discuss it. 
 
U: But they are fully loyal. Look how they are now using all Latvian geographical names, and how 
they are painting over shop signs, although there is no law to this effect. 
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B: Allow me a small correction. Only little Jews afraid of the police are painting over their shop 
signs on Marijas Street. The big-city Jews have gone to see their lawyers, they do not paint over 
shop signs, but counter the police with questions about the relevant law. 
 
U: Yet we used to do so much for ethnic minorities, and now the situation has completely changed. 
Thank God, we are now independent of them, unlike in other places. But you should understand 
that they could still put pressure on us. 
 
B: Yes, this is exactly what people are talking about. One day I was brought a copy of ‘Br!v" 
Zeme’ with multiple small-format advertisements. Somebody has pencil-marked all Jewish 
advertisements, and you know, it turned out they all were Jewish, with the exception of two or 
three! 
 
U: Well, what is there to do if we have got no Latvian entrepreneurs! 
 
B: At least Jewish advertisements should not be printed in such a blatant way! 
 
U: And why not? Which newspaper, after all, would decline advertisements? Would you refuse to 
print them? 
 
B: We, thank God, are not exposed to such temptations. They do not bring their advertisements to 
us. 
 
U: Well, they bring them to us.28 
 
The extent of the influence exercised by M. Dubins, who after the coup continued 
to enjoy Ulmanis’s favourable attitude and personal friendship, on the government’s 
policies towards Jewish refugees is not fully clear either. As pointed out by Stranga (1997: 
79), the incident in October 1938 proves that this influence was not without its limits.  
  
But regardless of the real considerations – whether economic or diplomatic - 
behind the Ulmanis regime’s attitude towards the Jews, it cannot be disputed that at a time 
when the Jewish population all across Europe was being persecuted and uprooted, Jews in 
authoritarian Latvia, although robbed of their cherished cultural autonomy, had no reason 
to worry about their physical safety. That alone made Latvia, albeit for a short period of 
time, seem like heaven to European Jewish refugees. And for a short period of time the 
Latvian government, unlike the governments of many western European countries, did not 
                                                
28 LVVA, 100. f. 1. apr., 20. l.  
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turn them away. Notably, the government did not try to capitalise on its humanitarian 
efforts, steadily avoiding any publicity. 
  
This very lack of publicity in a state that thrived on propaganda is puzzling, and 
makes one wonder about Ulmanis’s real motives. I tend to agree with Stranga (1997: 53), 
that unlike J. !akste, P. Kalni"# and P. Schiemann, who always acted out of deep personal 
ideological convictions, Ulmanis was guided by ‘external’, pragmatic considerations on 
how particular policies or measures would be perceived at home, or, more importantly 
abroad. Ulmanis always paid special attention to the Jewish question, demanding daily 
world press digests on the matter from his assistants. Was it because of his belief in the 
powers of the Jewish lobby in the US, where he spent his university years, and in 
international politics in general, amplified by the international activities of prominent 
Latvian Jews like M. Laserson, M. Nuroks and M. Dubins? One can only guess.  
 
Overall, under the new order, minorities, with the exception of the Baltic Germans 
who were specifically targeted, were not so much persecuted as firmly removed to the 
margins of state life. They became literally invisible, and their voices were not heard in 
public, apart from occasional congratulatory greetings to the President or the government, 
or public expressions of gratitude for the current state of affairs. However, it would be a 
mistake to classify the regime’s attitude towards minorities either as ‘benign neglect’, as 
such a policy requires the state to be ‘ethnicity-blind’ while ensuring equal rights and 
opportunities for all - or as assimilationist. The absence of specific minority-discriminating 
laws notwithstanding, the state openly declared that its ultimate goal was to ensure the 
prosperity and welfare of ethnic Latvians rather than of all its citizens, thus firmly 
relinquishing any responsibility for the well-being of its minority citizens. At the same 
time, the concept of the united nation itself in reality was neither integrationist nor 
assimilationist towards the minorities – on the contrary, a fixed ethnic and cultural identity 
was pushed upon them. The fact that assimilation was not encouraged under the Ulmanis 
regime is best reflected in the Law on the Change of Surnames from 22nd December 1939. 
Article 2 of the Law simply stated: ‘Citizens of Latvian ethnicity must only choose Latvian 
[latviskus] surnames. Non-Latvians cannot choose Latvian surnames’.29   
 
                                                
29 ‘Likums par uzv$rdu mai"u’, Vald!bas V"stnesis, 22.12.1939. 
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This particular legislative provision drew a clear demarcating line – those who 
were ‘in’, were in, and those who were ‘out’, were supposed to stay there. The nation 
wanted to stay pure.  
  
By the end of the 1930s, the remaining Latvian ethnic minorities, whose economic 
position had been steadily deteriorating, and who had been forced to become ‘second-class 
citizens’ in order to advance the interests of ethnic Latvians, were becoming increasingly 
sympathetic towards the Bolsheviks, falling prey to their propaganda of supposed ‘national 
equality’. Memories of the terror incurred by the population at the hands of Stu!ka’s Soviet 
government in 1919 proved to be extremely short-lived. When Soviet troops entered Latvia 
in June 1940, many members of ethnic minorities, especially among the unpropertied 
classes, unaware of the new horrors ahead, considered it a change for the better – hence the 
notorious flowers presented to the Soviet soldiers. Ezergailis (1999: 88), observing that 
with Stalin’s ascent to power, the popularity of communist ideas among the Latvian 
population started to wane, writes: ‘Nevertheless, K. Ulmanis with his anti-
parliamentarian, anti-Socialist putsch turned out to be the most effective creator of 
Communist supporters in Latvia since the Russificators Pobedonostsev and Plehve. He 
drove all left-leaning Latvians, Jews, and Russians into the Communist embrace’.30 
 
The prominent Latvian historian "dolfs #ilde (1964: 29), analysing the first period 
of Latvian independence, juxtaposed ‘national’ and ‘state’ consciousness, and came to the 
conclusion that both on the part of ethnic Latvians, and on that of the ethnic minorities, an 
exaggerated ‘national’, that is, ethnic, consciousness, overshadowed the ‘state 
consciousness’ necessary for a unified nation. He concluded that this ‘did not strengthen 
our state’. In other words, having reached its lowest point in the creation of a ‘Latvia for 
Latvians’, the brave attempt at nation-building made during the interwar period resulted in 
the ultimate failure: the nation lost its independence. 
                                                
30 K. Pobedonostsev, an advisor to Tsar Alexander III, was famous for his reactionary views and persecution 
of Jews; he was also rumoured to be the mastermind behind the policy of relentless Russification 
implemented by the Tsar. V. Plehve was Minister for the Interior and Chief of Gendarmes in the 
administration of Alexander III, and an ardent oppressor of all revolutionary and liberal groups in the 
Russian Empire, including minority nationalist movements.  
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Chapter Seven. A Nation Once Again 
_________________________________________________________________
        
The Third Latvian National Awakening, better known as the Singing Revolution, 
culminated in Latvia’s regaining independence in 1991. After a half-a-century long slumber, 
the Latvian nation sprang back to life and the Latvian state re-appeared on the map of Europe. 
Among the fifteen states created as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Latvia, Estonia 
and Lithuania take a special place – all three countries had had a history of previous 
independence, and all three claimed to be the legal successors of their respective interwar 
republics.  
 
Much has changed, however, since that first period of independence in the three Baltic 
countries, and Latvia was the one to undergo the most profound demographic changes. After 
five decades of Soviet rule, with its planned economy, ‘ethnic engineering’ and continuous 
Russification, ethnic Latvians had narrowly escaped the fate of becoming a minority in Latvia, 
and Latvian language and culture were perceived to be in danger of extinction. In 1989, 
Latvians constituted just 52 per cent of the entire population, while the number of Russians, in 
comparison with the interwar republic, had tripled, reaching 34 per cent.1 In some cities, like 
Riga, Daugavpils, and Liepaja, ethnic Latvians were in a minority.2  Among other ethnic 
groups accounting for the remaining 14 per cent, Belarussians made up 5 per cent, Ukrainians 
- 4, Poles – 2, and Lithuanians and Jews – 1 per cent each. Many new ethnic groups from other 
Soviet republics had settled in Latvia, contributing to further ethnic fragmentation of the 
population. The majority of the ethnic minority groups living in Latvia were now Russian-
speaking, whereas knowledge of the Latvian language among them was almost non-existent. 
All these factors together contributed to the feeling of the ‘endangered state of Latvianness’ on 
the part of the eponymous population, and would be repeatedly used as a justification of the 
restrictive Citizenship Law of 1994. At the same time, the precarious situation in which ethnic 
Latvians found themselves by the late eighties prompted many to idealise the period of 
                                                
1 In 1935, ethnic Latvians comprised 75.5 % of the whole population, while ethnic Russians – 10.6 % (Source: 
Skujenieks, 1937). In 1989,  ethnic Russians represented 34 % of Latvia’s total population (Source: Migranti 
Latvij! 1944-1989. Dokumenti, 2004). 
2 In 1989, ethnic Latvians comprised 36.5% of the population in Riga, 38.8% of the population in Liepaja, and 
13% of the population in Daugavpils. Source: Migranti Latvij! 1944-1989. Dokumenti, 2004). 
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interwar independence, including the six-years long authoritarian period, when Latvian ethnic 
values reigned supreme, thus lending the option of legal continuity additional attraction.  
 
In Latvia, the principle of legal continuity had not just a huge symbolic meaning, but 
also many legal and practical implications, both domestically and internationally. At home, it 
led to the restoration, with some modernising changes, of the Constitution of 1922 and of the 
Civil Code of 1937, as well as to the de-nationalisation of private property, and restitution of 
the property that used to belong to ethnic and religious communities. On the international 
scene, it enabled Latvia to claim its gold and currency reserves from foreign banks where it 
had been stored since 1940, and to receive back either the property of the Latvian Republic 
diplomatic missions abroad or compensation for such properties where they were no longer 
available.  
 
Memories of the interwar republic were also reflected in many other, more symbolic 
ways. The newly elected parliament was designated as the 5th Saeima, to succeed the 4th 
Saeima, which was dismissed after the authoritarian coup in 1934. Many newly-formed 
political parties claimed descent from pre-war parties, but only the LSDSP (Latvian Social 
Democratic Workers’ Party) and the Agrarian Union used this strategy successfully. Other 
parties used personalities who had the additional appeal of being related to the pre-war 
politicians or had a good standing within the émigré community (as, for example, G. 
Meierovics, a son of the first Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs Z. A. Meierovics, and the 
chairman of the World Federation of Free Latvians, and G. Ulmanis, a grand-nephew of K!rlis 
Ulmanis, the first Prime Minister of Latvia). The Student Corporations were brought back to 
life; the re-established Riga Latvian Society moved back to its historical building reclaimed 
from the Soviet military; the publishing house Valters un Rapa started printing books again; 
everywhere, city streets and squares promptly resumed their old names; hotels and shops that 
existed prior to 1940 quickly put their old signs back, and those who could not claim an 
interwar past invented one. It has been repeatedly observed that the history of prior 
independence both fuelled the popular pro-independence movements in the late 1980s and 
accelerated the Baltic States’ integration into Europe once the state sovereignty was achieved. 
Smith (1996: 132) observed that the fact ‘that the popular fronts so quickly became separatist 
in their aims and in the process were able to convince their peoples so easily of the rightness 
of their cause were in one way or another linked both to the way in which powerful national 
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symbols were drawn upon and equated with a pre-Soviet past and of the material benefits 
which such sovereignty might again provide’. Pabriks and Purs (2002: 86) stressed that ‘the 
memory of independence helped the Baltic peoples maximise their efforts for independence, 
and also helped them organise themselves once independence was achieved.’  
 
But most importantly, this principle of legal continuity became the basis of the 
Citizenship Law of 1994, which granted automatic citizenship only to the citizens of the 
interwar Latvian Republic (17th June 1940 being the cut-off date) and to their direct 
descendants, thus excluding 700,000 Soviet-era settlers who were granted a special legal status 
of ‘non-citizens of Latvia’. As we shall see later, the Citizenship Law would over the years be 
repeatedly identified as the primary source of ethnic tensions in Latvia.   
 
The Law came as an anti-climax after the romantic period of the pro-independence 
movement, which Apine (1992) designated as an ‘ethnic honeymoon’ and a period when two 
parallel processes occurred: a consolidation of ethnic Latvians and a consolidation of all 
democratic forces around ethnic Latvians in the quest for independence. The movement was 
led by two major political forces: the radical Latvian National Independence Movement 
(LNNK in its Latvian abbreviation), founded in June 1988 under the leadership of the former 
‘national communist’ E. Berklavs, and the more moderate Popular Front, created in October of 
the same year, which was chaired by the journalist D. !v"ns. Whereas the LNNK demanded 
Latvia’s independence from the moment of its foundation, the Popular Front initially declared 
political and economical autonomy for Latvia within the Soviet Union as its goal. In 1989, 
however, the Popular Front joined the LNNK in its demand for full independence.  
 
Although the LNNK board’s memorandum, published in July 1988, formally invited 
‘all supporters of the self-determination aspirations of the Latvian [latvie!u] people, regardless 
of their ethnicity, religious or partisan affiliation’ to join the movement with the goal of 
restoring Latvia as a sovereign republic, it also stressed that its goal was to defend the national 
interests of ethnic Latvians. Asserting that the movement was not directed against other ethnic 
groups living in Latvia, and inviting them to cooperate in ‘solving mutual problems’, the 
memorandum listed, among its immediate goals, putting an immediate stop to the influx of 
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migrants into Latvia and fostering the return of some migrants to their own lands.3 This 
unabashedly ‘ethnic’ approach understandably made non-ethnic Latvians wary of the 
organisation. The position taken by the LNNK was reinforced by the Citizens’ Committees, a 
movement started in 1989, which, asserting the legal continuity of the Latvian state and the 
illegal nature of the Soviet annexation, regarded all Soviet-time settlers as illegal immigrants. 
 
The Popular Front, among whose founders were several prominent ethnic minorities’ 
representatives, such as the journalist M. Vulfsons, the writer and journalist V. Dozorcevs, the 
writer M. Kostenecka and the journalist and editor V. Ste!enko, pursued a different strategy of 
appealing to all democratically oriented Latvian residents. The Popular Front put the 
‘overarching human values, pluralism and respect towards all ethnic groups’ as a cornerstone 
of its programme, and stressed that it considered cultural diversity a ‘value of civilisation’, 
promising practical help and support to ethnic minorities to ensure their cultural autonomy, 
access to education in their native language, and ethnic associations. The Popular Front’s 
programme of 1988 envisioned Latvians to be the ‘founding nation’ in the country, and the 
Latvian language the state language, but at the same time Russian was promised a status of the 
language of ‘federative communication’. Like the LNNK, the Popular Front demanded an 
immediate stop to immigration, but unlike the LNNK, it was against the ‘deportation of 
residents of any ethnicity’. The newspaper of the Popular Front, Atmoda, was published both 
in Latvian and in Russian. 
 
Smith (1996: 35) contrasts these two approaches to nation-ness during the Singing 
Revolution as a form of primordialist ethnic nationalism, which, ‘grounded in abstract notions 
of ‘the people’ and in ‘blood notions’ of genealogical descent’, aimed at obtaining, as nearly 
as possible, a ‘coterminous nation-state, and a civic nationalism ‘keeping with a tradition of 
pluralist citizenship and tolerance towards ethnic difference as found in the Baltic States 
during the 1920s’, which placed as much importance on individual rights as on national ones. 
Rozenvalds (2010: 37-38) characterises these two alternative paths as the ‘socially realistic’ 
(the Popular Front) and ‘legalistic’ (the Citizens’ Committees) ways of obtaining 
independence. According to Rozenvalds, the Popular Front’s stance on citizenship issues 
                                                
3 1995 ‘Latvijas Nacion"l"s neatkar#bas kust#bas (LNNK) padomes zi$ojums par organiz"cijas m%r&iem’, in: 
Tauta. Zeme. Valsts. Latvijas Nacion!l!s neatkar"bas kust"ba dokumentos. R#ga: Latvijas Valsts arh#vs, pp. 11-
13.  
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reflected the existing reality, while the other side ‘hoped for the mass emigration of minorities 
that would bring Latvia back to pre-war demographic proportions’. 
 
As a result of its balanced programme and careful approach to the ‘nationalities issue’, 
the Popular Front quickly became a mass movement – within a year, its membership grew to 
over 250,000. It enjoyed significant support of the ethnic minorities, who, inspired by the 
Latvians’ national awakening, started energetically rebuilding their own community life that 
had all but disappeared under the Soviet rule. In 1988, with the support of the Popular Front, 
the Association of the National Cultural Societies of Latvia (the LNKBA in its Latvian 
abbreviation) was established, uniting 18 newly created cultural societies and providing a 
platform for national minorities to discuss issues of cultural autonomy. The Jewish 
community, which was re-established in 1988, at first under the name of the Latvian Society 
for Jewish Culture, was the most proactive, undoubtedly drawing on the vast experience of 
community life organisation during the interwar years. In 1989, the first Jewish school was 
opened, in 1990, the community building in the centre of Riga was returned, and in 1992, by a 
special law of the Parliament, two buildings of the interwar Jewish hospitals were returned to 
the community.  
 
Not all of Latvia’s population were inspired by the idea of an independent Latvia; this 
sizeable opposition, which mainly consisted of representatives of ethnic minorities, was best 
represented by the pro-Soviet International Front of the Working People of Latvian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, or Interfront, led by A. Rubiks, a Latvian communist and a mayor of Riga, 
and A. Aleksejevs. The Interfront was created in 1989 in order to counter the growing 
popularity of the Popular Front; its pro-Kremlin rhetoric and its radical stand against the 
Latvian nation’s right to sovereignty, and against the Latvian language as the state language, 
deepened the already existing rift between the Latvians and the Russian-speakers. According 
to the recollections of R. !ac-Marja"a (2003: 315), a lawyer and a Jewish activist of the late 
eighties who later became an MP in the renewed Saeima, unlike the Jewish, Polish, 
Belarussian and other ethnic minorities, the Russian population did not express much interest 
in the possibilities of cultural autonomy at the time, presumably because it had no reason to 
consider itself an ethnic minority (indeed, within the Soviet system, ethnic Russians were the 
only group to enjoy de facto non-territorial cultural autonomy, as their language and cultural 
rights were guaranteed everywhere in the Union), and no willingness to become such. Besides 
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those ‘reluctant’ in their attitude towards the independence part of the Russian-speaking 
population, there were also ‘old communists’ and apparatchiks (scholars agree that ethnically 
Latvian communists largely sided with the Popular Front, whereas the majority of ethnically 
Russian communists remained loyal towards the Kremlin – see Karklins 1994 and Pabriks and 
Purs 2004), as well as military and ex-military personnel who were openly opposed to 
independence.  
 
The eruption of violence in Riga and Vilnius in January 1991, when the Soviet military 
attempted to take control over the government buildings and the media outlets, in which 
several people were killed, prompted tens of thousands of people to build barricades in the 
streets, especially after an appeal was issued by D. !v"ns, in Latvian and in Russian, to defend 
the government. Pabriks and Purs (2004: 63) note that Russians constituted a sizeable minority 
at the barricades, and that it was a time when many Russians had to make a choice ‘between 
the communist reaction on one side and Latvian nationalism on the other’. As the January 
events aggravated the already strained relations between the republican government and 
Moscow, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR, A. Gorbunovs, aiming to 
resolve the tensions, came up with an initiative of a popular referendum on Latvia’s 
independence. The referendum took place on 3rd March 1991, when voters were asked to 
answer a single question: ‘Are you in favour of a democratic and independent Latvian 
republic?’. 87.6 per cent of all voters took part in the referendum; 73.7 per cent said ‘yes’, 
24.7 per cent said ‘no’ (1.6 per cent of all ballots were recognised as invalid). In the more 
Latvian countryside, 85.9 per cent of the participants supported independence, while in 
multiethnic Riga the number only reached 60.7 per cent. Considering that ethnic Latvians at 
the time constituted only 52 per cent of the whole population, and only 36.5 per cent of the 
population of Riga, these figures indicate that a large part of ethnic minorities supported the 
idea of independence in 1991.4 Indeed, Karklins (1994: 147) interprets the data provided by 
the referendum of 1991 and by various surveys as indicating that ‘the split between loyal and 
unloyal groups among settlers is approximately fifty-fifty’. Rozenvalds (2010: 40) concedes 
that a ‘significant segment of the minority population – at least one fourth – voted for Latvian 
independence’, stressing that in terms of minorities’ support for independence, Latvia ‘outdid’ 
                                                
4 Statistical data as per Taur#ns, J. 2012. ‘1991. gada 3. marta referendums un t" noz$me Latvijas neatkar$bas 
atjauno%an"’, available at 
http://web.cvk.lv/pub/upload_file/Konference_J_Taurens_1991_gada_3_marta_referendums.pdf , accessed 
04.10.2012.; and Migranti Latvij! 1944-1989. Dokumenti. 2004. R$ga: Latvijas Valsts Arh$vs, p. 99. 
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Estonia and Lithuania, where the number of pro-independence ballots only slightly exceeded 
the share of the eponymous population.  
 
However, the analysis of statistical data is a contentious issue – interpretations of the 
results of the 1991 referendum differ widely. Some commentators indeed saw it as an 
indicator of a trend among minorities either to oppose independence or to abstain from 
voting.5 Minorities’ voting in the 1991 referendum on independence received its most negative 
evaluation at the hands of !nore (2010), according to whose calculations, only 19.6 per cent of 
all ‘colonists’ voted in favour of independence. !nore claims that the ‘myth of the USSR 
colonists’ support of independence’ was consciously reproduced by the Popular Front in order 
to lend extra legitimacy to the independence movement – an action, in !nore’s view,  ‘fully 
understandable considering the critical, for the state, situation of 1991’.  
 
The striking differences in interpretation of the 1991 referendum by different 
commentators, and the persistent debates surrounding it twenty years since it took place, 
reveal a certain ‘pain trigger point’, to borrow a medical term, in modern Latvian history, as 
they inevitably lead to the next question – were the Resolution ‘On the Renewal of the Rights 
of the Citizens of the Republic of Latvia’ passed by the Supreme Council on 11th October 
1991, and the subsequent Citizenship Law of 1994, the necessary measures aimed at securing 
Latvian independent statehood, as is claimed by some commentators, or was it a betrayal of 
those parts of the minority population who had initially sided with ethnic Latvians, as is 
claimed by others? At the moment, there is no consensus, but, especially in view of the 
‘different interpretation of history’ being increasingly cited as a major stumbling block on the 
road to social integration, it seems that this particular page of history is still worth revisiting. 
 
This period of overall amicable ethnic relations in Latvia would come to a quick end in 
August 1991, when the Interfront, along with the Communist Party of Latvia, lent its 
unequivocal support to the communist putsch that aimed at restoring the Soviet regime. After 
the putsch was thwarted, both the Communist Party and the Interfront were outlawed in 
Latvia. But the damage had been done – part of the Russian-speaking population openly 
                                                
5 Puri"#, G. and !ulcs, U. 2001. ‘Vai 2001. Gada R$gas Domes v%l%#anu rezult&ti bija p&rsteigums (etniskie 
balsojumi, atskatoties uz 1991. gada 3. Marta aptaujas pieredzi)’ quoted in Rozenvalds (2010). 
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supported an attempt to overturn the existing regime. The other part was found guilty by 
association – for years to come, Russian-speakers would be viewed as a fifth column. 
 
There may be little doubt that the events of August 1991 had a major influence on the 
question of citizenship, which had been actively discussed since 1989, polarising opinions, as 
the demonstrated disloyalty on the part of the Russian-speaking population reinforced the 
position of those who were against the ‘zero option’ of citizenship from the start.   
 
 
7.1. Citizenship 
 
The first legal act pertaining to citizenship was the Resolution ‘On the Renewal of the 
Rights of the Citizens of the Republic of Latvia and the Naturalisation Procedure’ passed by 
the Supreme Council on 11th October 1991, which granted automatic citizenship to the citizens 
of the interwar republic and their direct descendants. Setting the date for the start of the 
naturalisation process as ‘not earlier than on 1st July 1992, the Resolution stipulated 
conversational proficiency in Latvian and a minimum of sixteen years of permanent residence 
as qualifying conditions for naturalisation.6 It was announced that the Law on Citizenship 
would be elaborated by the newly elected parliament. As noted by Barrington (1995), although 
Latvia had no citizenship law, it had a citizenship policy. 
 
Pabriks and Purs (2004: 73) observe that, as a result, the Latvian population was split 
into two groups – citizens, 78 per cent of whom were ethnic Latvians, and non-citizens, 
mainly Russians (60 per cent of all Latvian Russians fell into this category), Ukrainians, and 
Belarussians. These people found themselves in a ‘legal limbo’, which would last for another 
four years, as naturalisation would not start until 1995. They felt betrayed by the Popular Front 
politicians whose early promises included ‘guarantees of full democratic rights to all Latvian 
residents, regardless of their ethnicity, who had tied their fates and their lives with Latvia, are 
loyal towards its laws, and are for independent Latvia’.7 
 
                                                
6 Latvijas Republikas Augst!k!s Padomes L"mums  ‘Par Latvijas Republikas pilso#u ties$bu atjauno%anu un 
naturaliz!cijas pamatnoteikumiem’, available at http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=69914, accessed 05.10.2012. 
7 Godmanis, I. 1989. ‘Par LTF strat"&iju un taktiku’, Atmoda, 10.07. p. 2. 
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The Citizenship Law of 1994 is widely regarded as the primary source of ethnic 
tensions in post-Soviet Latvia (Smith, Aasland and Mole 1996; Lieven 1994; Pabriks and Purs 
2002).  The Law and the status of Latvian non-citizens also remain, to this day, a matter of 
concern for international organisations.8  
 
The citizenship question featured prominently during the parliamentary election 
campaign of 1993, proposals ranging from the zero option to repatriation of all migrants, and 
conservative views on citizenship becoming a mark of ‘true patriotism’ (Kr!ma 2007; Pabriks 
and Purs 2004). The first draft of the law approved by the Saeima foresaw the start of 
naturalisation in 2000, with the regulated annual rate of increase of 0.1 per cent to the total 
number of naturalised persons during the previous year, which, according to Kr!ma (2007), 
would have resulted in approximately a thousand naturalised persons per year. After the draft 
drew numerous criticisms from international organisations, including the Council of Europe, 
which Latvia at the time was aspiring to join, it was returned by the President of Latvia back 
to the Saeima. The Law on Citizenship was finally adopted on 22nd July 1994. Although in this 
final version the minimal qualifying residence period was decreased to five years, Article 14 
of the Law introduced a complicated system of quotas, regulating which age groups and in 
what order could apply for naturalisation. 
 
The quotas, which were finally lifted in 1998, were in the first place introduced in 
order to cope with the expected high numbers of naturalisation applications, but the ensuing 
naturalisation process turned out to be painstakingly slow. Despite the considerable effort on 
the part of the Naturalisation Board, by 1998, the total number of naturalisation applications 
received was just 11,858.  A year after the quotas had been abandoned, further 15,183 
applications had been received.9 The latest data of the Office for Citezenship and Migration 
Affairs shows that, as of 1st July 2012, the number of Latvian non-citizens stood at 304, 806, 
or 13.8 per cent of all residents of the country. Since the beginning of the naturalisation 
                                                
8 In September 2012, the OSCE High Commissioner for Ethnic Minorities Knut Vollebaek sent a letter to the 
Speaker of the Saeima criticising the draft amendment to the Citizenship Law adopted by the parliament in 
August 2012 regarding registration of the children of non-citizens as citizens, in particular the additional 
requirements for parents, such as signing an oath to bring up the child loyal to Latvia, and teaching him the 
Latvian language. 
9 Naturaliz!cijas  P!rvaldes Zi"as. Ikm#ne$a informat%vais izdevums.  2008. gada 15.septembris – 2008. gada 15. 
oktobris.  
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process in 1995, and until the end of 2011, 137,673 people have acquired Latvian citizenship 
through naturalisation – an average of 8,098 per year.10 
 
Non-citizens, nevertheless, are not being granted voting rights in municipal elections, 
despite persistent recommendations to the opposite provided by the OSCE High 
Commissioner for national Minorities K. Vollebaek – in April 2009, Saeima yet again voted 
against the draft law submitted by the opposition party For Human Rights in United Latvia 
(FHRUL). This issue remains highly polarised and divisive. Whereas supporters of non-
citizens’ right to vote see it as a first step in the process of social consolidation, their 
opponents argue that such a measure would further slow down the naturalisation process and 
would devaluate the very concept of Latvian citizenship. At the same time, the 
nationalistically oriented party For Fatherland and Freedom has repeatedly called for 
amendments to the Citizenship Law which would restrict the number of potential 
naturalisation applicants, and for a necessity to slow down the naturalisation process overall. 
 
By now it has been largely recognised that those who were willing to naturalise, have 
already done so, and that naturalisation will not pick up again. But the issue of citizenship, 
which over the past twenty years alienated and marginalised a sizeable part of Latvian 
population, remains caustic. Upon the initiative of the opposition party FHRUL, 12,686 
signatures have been collected in support of the draft amendments to the Citizenship Law to 
award citizenship to all remaining non-citizens of Latvia (only 10,000 signatures are necessary 
to initiate the next, state-funded stage of the collection of signatures, which lasts thirty days 
and must collect the signatures of one-tenth of the electorate in order to initiate a referendum). 
The draft amendments therefore have been submitted to the Central Election Committee and 
are now under the evaluation of its conformity with the Constitution.  
 
 The ruling coalition, which appeared unconcerned about the collection of signatures 
organised by FHRUL until the necessary number enabled them to submit the draft 
amendments to the Central Election Committee, released a number of statements questioning 
the legitimacy of the proposed amendments. The party Unity, part of the governing coalition, 
declared that the proposed amendments threaten the principle of the continuity of the Latvian 
state and are in contradiction with the Satversme. Besides, agued Unity, the amendments 
                                                
10 Available at http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/en/statistics/citizen.html, last time accessed on 16th October 2012. 
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propose to ‘force the Latvian citizenship upon people without their consent’.11 I. Par!dnieks, 
the MP from the National Union, warned that a referendum on citizenship will only cause a 
counterreaction from ethnic Latvians and will not improve relations in the society.12 
  
 The Mayor of Riga N. U"akovs, an ethnic Russian and a member of the opposition 
party The Harmony Centre, who enjoys popularity among ethnic Russians and Latvians alike, 
and whose possible personal support for the initiative was deemed by many as crucial for the 
success of the referendum campaign, has also announced that he would not support the 
referendum as it would intensify ethnic polarisation of the society. At the same time, U"akovs 
stressed that the still large number of Latvian non-citizens remains a problem in urgent need of 
a solution.  
7.2. Cultural Autonomy 
 
The Law ‘On the Unrestricted Development and Right to Cultural Autonomy of 
Latvia’s Nationalities and Ethnic Groups’, adopted on 19th March 1991 by the Supreme 
Council of Latvia, aimed ‘to guarantee to all nationalities and ethnic groups in the Republic of 
Latvia the rights to cultural autonomy and self-administration of their culture’.13 Article 5 
guaranteed all permanent residents of the country ‘the right to establish their own national 
societies, associations, and organisations’. The government undertook the responsibility of 
promoting their activities and of providing material support. Article 10 specified that the 
‘defined sums’ of the government’s budget would be contributed towards ‘the development of 
the education, language, and culture of the nationalities and ethnic groups residing within 
Latvia’s territory’, and stipulated that ‘issues regarding the education of nationalities and 
ethnic groups’ are governed by the Education Law.  
 
Notably, the Latvian Law of 1991 extended the rights to cultural autonomy to all 
permanent residents of the country – in contrast to the Estonian National Minorities’ Cultural 
Autonomy Act adopted in October 1993, which limited rights to cultural autonomy to citizens 
of the republic. But considering that the body of citizens was not legally defined until October 
                                                
11 http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/vienotiba-pilsonibas-pieskirsana-visiem-nepilsoniem-apdraudetu-
latvijas-valsti.d?id=42625142 , last time accessed on 16th October 2012. 
12 http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/paradnieks-bridina-pilsonibas-referendums-latviesos-izraisis-
pretreakciju.d?id=42621122, last time accessed on 16th October 2012. 
13 Here and further on quoted as per the English translation provided by the Latvia Law Institute, available at: 
http://www.humanrights.lv/doc/latlik/ethnic.htm , last time accessed on 11th October 2012. 
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1991, i.e., seven months after the cultural autonomy law, one perhaps should not try to read 
too much into this. On the other hand, the Latvian law on cultural autonomy has never been 
amended in this regard. The corresponding divide between ‘national minorities’ and 
‘migrants’ would be introduced in Latvia later, during the process of the ratification of the 
Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM), which took ten long years after its initial signing in 1995.  
 
The Latvian government put forward two main objections – that the FCNM norms 
were not compatible with the existing state legislation on the Latvian language, and that the 
rights guaranteed by the Convention could not be applied to the Soviet-era settlers; the latter 
objection drew numerous criticisms from international organisations. However, the FNCM 
famously contains no definition of a ‘national minority’ - according to the Explanatory Notes, 
it ‘was decided to adopt a pragmatic approach, based on the recognition that at this stage, it is 
impossible to arrive at a definition capable of mustering general support of all Council of 
Europe member States’.14 After protracted negotiations, a compromise was reached. When 
Latvia finally ratified the Convention on 26th May 2005, it added a reservation that ‘the notion 
"national minorities", which has not been defined in the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, shall, in the meaning of the Framework Convention, apply 
to citizens of Latvia who differ from Latvians in terms of their culture, religion or language, 
who have traditionally lived in Latvia for generations and consider themselves to belong to the 
State and society of Latvia, who wish to preserve and develop their culture, religion, or 
language’. Having this way separated ‘apples from oranges’, Latvia, in a gesture of symbolic 
generosity, extended the same rights to non-citizens: ‘Persons who are not citizens of Latvia or 
another State but who permanently and legally reside in the Republic of Latvia, who do not 
belong to a national minority within the meaning of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities as defined in this declaration, but who identify themselves 
with a national minority that meets the definition contained in this declaration, shall enjoy the 
rights prescribed in the Framework Convention, unless specific exceptions are prescribed by 
law’.15 
 
                                                
14 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/157.htm . 
15http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=157&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG&VL=1 . 
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Smith and Hiden (2012: 111), describing the celebrated revival of cultural autonomy in 
Estonia in 1993, conclude that ‘the reinstatement of the interwar cultural autonomy law was 
primarily a symbolic gesture’, aiming to counter international criticisms of citizenship 
legislation and to enhance Estonia’s reputation in the West. The Latvian law of 1991 granted 
cultural autonomy to Latvian ethnic minorities for the first time, as no legal act to this effect 
had been passed in the interwar republic. The Law, however, defined autonomy only in very 
general terms – the interwar laws on schooling in fact provided minorities with more effective 
means of cultural self-administration. The other significant factor was the newly introduced 
division of non-Latvian ethnic groups into ‘traditional minorities’ and ‘migrants’ – if, until 
then, the main existing cleavage in the Latvian society was the division along ethnic lines, 
now a new cleavage, dividing citizens from non-citizens, had appeared. As we shall see, the 
resulting level of minority cultural activities in post-1991 Latvia bears no comparison with the 
bustling minority cultural life during the interwar period. 
 
It is difficult to evaluate the present state of ethnic minority cultural activities in Latvia 
due to the striking lack of information and statistics on minority NGOs. In those research 
studies that are dedicated to the NGO sector’s development in Latvia, ethnic minority NGOs 
are included in the ‘legislation, interest advocacy, and political sector’; a more detailed 
classification is not available. According to the latest study, out of 13,284 NGOs registered in 
Latvia at the beginning of February 2011, 1,478 NGOs, or 11 per cent of the total number, 
belonged to the aforementioned ‘legislation, interest advocacy, and political sector’ (for 
comparison, 39 per cent of all NGOs belonged to the ‘culture and recreation’ sector, and 21 
per cent – to ‘development and management’). Out of the total of 1478 NGOs in this sector, 
276, or 19 per cent, fell into the category ‘national associations’.16 From this it follows that 
only 2.08 per cent of all NGOs in Latvia were national associations. An earlier study indicates 
that, in 2003, only 0.7 per cent of respondents participated in ethnic minority organisations.17 
 
                                                
16 P!rskats par NVO sektoru Latvij!. P"t#jumu rezult!tu atskaite. 2011. R#ga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences. 
Available at http://lsif.lv/files/pics/Atbalstitie_projekti/EEZ_Norv_fin_instr/BISS-
NVO_sektors_BISS_27_04_final.pdf , last time accessed 13.10.2012.  
17 Pilsonisk!s sabiedr#bas att#st#ba Latvij!: situ!cijas anal#ze. 2004. R#ga: $pa%u izdevumu ministra sabiedr#bas 
integr!cijas liet!s sekretari!ts, p. 15. The same study informs that only 27 per cent of Latvian citizens and 15 per 
cent of Latvian non-citizens participated in the NGO sector (this figures include churches, religious organisations 
and political parties) and refers to the unpublished data of the Philosophy and Sociology Institute of the 
University of Latvia that only six per cent of all population is involved in the NGO sector (this figure does not 
include churches and political parties). 
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In the past, more detailed statistics were available on the website of the Secretariat for 
the Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration (!UMSILS, in its Latvian 
abbreviation), which also hosted an electronic database of minority NGOs. However, since the 
Secretariat was disbanded in January 2009 (its functions were initially reassigned to the 
Family and Children Affairs Ministry, which was just the first among the ‘hosts’ of integration 
matters), this data seem to have disappeared without a trace. It is known that in 2003, a total of 
147 ethnic NGOs were registered with the Secretariat (Racko 2008: 145). According to Racko 
(2008: 139), ‘the highest annual registration of ethnic organisations was in 1993 and 2003’; he 
observes that many of those organisations which were formally registered in 1993 were in 
existence for several years prior, starting from the late 1980s. The second peak of ethnic 
minority NGOs’ registration, in 2003, is most likely related to the creation of the !UMSILS in 
2002. Until then, the aforementioned LNKBA, established in 1988, served as the main 
umbrella organisation for ethnic NGOs. The LNKBA, however, admitted only one NGO as a 
representative of each ethnic minority as a member, and explicitly forbade its members, under 
the threat of expulsion, to undertake any separate applications for financial assistance to 
funding bodies. The emergence of the Secretariat both as an umbrella organisation and as an 
additional source of funding therefore stimulated the creation of new ethnic organisations. It 
appears that, since the Secretariat’s demise, the LNKBA reverted to its role of the main 
umbrella organisation for ethnic minorities. Its website currently lists 23 member 
organisations. 
 
Organisations like the Association for Support of Russian-language Schools in Latvia, 
founded in 1996, and the Headquarters for the Protection of Russian Schools, created in 2003, 
cannot be, strictly speaking, classified as ethnic minority organisations, but rather as interest 
advocacy groups.  
 
The Minorities Advisory Council was created in 1996 under the auspices of the 
President of Latvia, uniting representatives of various minority organisations. After three years 
of work, its activities were suspended when V. Vi"e-Freiberga was elected President of 
Latvia. In August 2011, the current President A. B#rzi$% reinstated the work of the Council. 
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7.3. Language 
 
 The State Language Law was adopted by the Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR in 
1989, and subsequently amended by the Saeima in December 1999. Article 1 of the current 
version describes the goal of the Law as ensuring the following: 
 
1) The preservation, protection and development of the Latvian language; 
2) the preservation of the historical cultural heritage of the Latvian nation; 
3) the right to use the Latvian language in any sphere of life across the territory of Latvia; 
4) the inclusion of ethnic minorities in Latvian society while observing their right to use their 
native tongues or other languages; 
5) the increase of the influence of the Latvian language in Latvia’s cultural space through 
accelerated social integration.18 
 
Article 3 of the Law names the Latvian language as the state language of the Latvian 
Republic, and guarantees the preservation, protection, and development of the Latgalian 
written language as a ‘historical variety of the Latvian language’. Article 4 guarantees the 
preservation, protection and development of the Liv language as an autochthonous language.  
Article 5 defines any language other than Latvian and Liv as a foreign language.   
 
The State Language Centre subordinated to the Ministry of Justice was founded in 
1992 to oversee and safeguard the implementation of the Law.  
 
Despite being legally branded as a foreign language, de facto the Russian language 
remains, along with the Latvian language, one of the dominant markers of ethnic identity in 
Latvia. As observed by Tabuns (2010: 260),  ‘the Latvian and Russian languages are of 
decisive importance in the process of establishing collective identities, as this is the main 
criterion in marking out the boundaries between ethnic and linguistic groups. Competition 
between languages increases the sense of endangerment in the two groups’. The Latvian-
Russian linguistic divide is very pronounced in all spheres of public life, including education 
and media.  
                                                
18 Valsts Valodas Likums. Available at http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=14740, last time accessed on 16th 
October 2012.  
                                                                                                                                                                          Chapter 7: A Nation Once Again 
 353 
 
The position of the Latvian language in the country is considered to be continuously 
strengthened. The Latvian language skills are said to be gradually improving among non-
Latvians.  In 2008, for example, 57 per cent of non-Latvians demonstrated good Latvian 
language skills in comparison to only 47 per cent in 2004.  On the other hand, the Russian 
language proficiency percentage among ethnic Latvians has been in decline: if, in 1993, 84 per 
cent of these claimed good Russian language skills, in 2008, this rate dropped to just 69 per 
cent. The poorest Russian language skills are found among the 15-34 age group: in 2008, 54 
per cent of them knew the language well, 38per cent - poorly, and 8 per cent did not know 
Russian at all. 19 
 
The existing status quo has been recently challenged by both the radical right and the 
radical left flanks of the political spectrum. The nationalist union with the challenging name 
‘All for Latvia – For fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement’ 
(AFL-FFF/LNIM) initiated a collection of signatures with a view of organising a popular 
referendum on the transformation of all state-funded secondary schools to the Latvian 
language of instruction. The nationalists failed to collect the necessary number of signatures to 
initiate a referendum, but the radical left group ‘The Native Tongue’, under the leadership of 
V. Lindermans, responded to the challenge by beginning a collection signatures for the 
referendum on the status of the Russian language as a second state language. The necessary 
signatures were successfully collected, and the national referendum took place on 18th 
February 2012. In response to the question ‘Are you in favour of the draft amendments to the 
Latvian Satversme which foresee granting the Russian language the status of the second state 
language’, out of 71.2 per cent of all voters which took part in the referendum, 24.9 per cent 
said ‘yes’, and 74.8 per cent answered ‘no’. In the capital city of Riga, 36 per cent voted ‘yes’ 
and 64 voted ‘no’. Most strikingly, in Latgale, 66 per cent of all participants voted ‘yes’, and 
44 per cent voted ‘no’. Although the overall reaction to the results of the referendum in the 
Latvian-language media was largely victoriously euphoric, some commentators were more 
cautious in the interpretation of the results. For example, A. Berdnikovs, a researcher with the 
Social and Political Research Institute of the University of Latvia, drew attention to the fact 
that 273,000 people voted for the amendments, and that this number does not include another 
                                                
19 ‘Language. March-April 2008’. A study commissioned by the State Language Centre and conducted by the 
Baltic Institute of Social Sciences. Available at http://www.valoda.lv/downloadDoc_169/mid_543 , last time 
accessed on 16th October 2008. 
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big part of the society, the non-citizens. Berdnikovs also argued against the post-referendum 
political labelling of those who voted for the amendments as marginal - claiming that to 
perceive 40 per cent of the state’s residents as ‘marginal’ is a dangerous practice.20 The 
political scientist I. !jabs, commenting on the results of the referendum, predicted that there 
would be no changes in the political decision-making process and no dialogue between 
Latvian and Russian political parties, as both sides are reluctant to make any concessions. 
!jabs stressed that social integration has no political support, and as a result, the alienated 
Russian community is ready to vote for such extreme measures as two state languages, and 
that collecting 273,000 in support of it is no small feat. ‘The least we can expect now is an 
open discussion about how we came to this, and what we can do to rectify the situation’, 
concluded the political scientist.21 
 
 Paradoxically, neither the outcome of the 2012 language referendum, nor the reported 
overall strengthening of the Latvian language and the observed decline of the Russian-
language proficiency among ethnic Latvians, have decreased the perceived threat to the 
Latvian language or minimised the sense of vulnerability among ethnic Latvians. On the 
contrary, new aspects of this ongoing ‘language competition’ continue to emerge. For 
example, after prolonged debates in the Saeima regarding the alleged discrimination of 
Latvian-speakers (who do not speak Russian) in the labour market, especially the services 
sector, amendments to the Labour Law were passed on 21st June 2012 forbidding employers to 
demand ‘knowledge of a specific foreign language’ [a euphemism for the Russian language] 
from the employees unless it is ‘justifiably necessary in order to perform the employee’s 
duties’. The Head of the State Language Centre A. Kurs"tis believes that the ambiguous term 
‘justifiably’ prevents the amended Law from being effective in protection of the Latvian-
speakers; moreover, in a recent interview he claimed that discrimination on the labour market 
on the ground of not knowing the Russian language is one of the reasons that Latvian-speakers 
emigrate en masse to other countries.22  
 
The language issue remains highly polarised, and the confrontations often border on 
ridiculous – the latest example being the upheaval surrounding the speech given, in the 
                                                
20 http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/viedokli/412108-ja_mazakumtautibas_izies_ielas_var_iestaties_sociala_krize , last 
time accessed on 16th October 2012. 
21 http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/ijabs-pec-referenduma-neredz-pamatu-konstruktivam-izmainam-
politisko-lemumu-pienemsana.d?id=42143298 , last time accessed on 16th October 2012.  
22 ‘Ne govoryashuyu po-russki molodezh’ unizhayut na rabote’, Telegraf, 10.10.2012.  
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Russian language, by the ethnically Russian Mayor of Riga N. U!akovs at a Russian-language 
school in Riga in September 2012. The fact prompted the Head of the parliamentary faction 
Unity O. Pulks to submit a complaint to the State Language Centre claiming that U!akovs 
does not deserve his position of the mayor as he sets a bad example for school children by not 
speaking to them in the State language. 
 
7.4. Education 
 
During the Soviet years, a segregated school system was developed in Latvia, with 
secondary schools divided into three major clusters – those with the Latvian language of 
instruction, those with the Russian language of instruction, and those with both Latvian and 
Russian-language streams. This system still exists in present-day Latvia. The notorious 
Education Reform of 2004, which requested minority secondary schools to use a ratio of 60 
per cent Latvian language and 40 per cent minority language in teaching, and that at the time 
led to an escalation of ethnic tensions23, effectively left the segregated system in place. The 
main goal (or, at least, the most frequently cited reason) of the Education Reform was to 
increase competitiveness of minority students vis-à-vis their ethnic Latvian counterparts in 
higher education and on the labour market. However, as observed by Zepa (2010: 192), 
although ‘a significant amount of research has been conducted in Latvia on the introduction of 
bilingual education.. thus far no research has been done on the impact of bilingual education 
on school results which would permit the evaluation of this policy of attaining the goals set for 
it’.  
 
It was also widely believed among the supporters of the Education Reform that, once 
the initial hurdles were overcome, there would be an overall positive effect on social 
integration. However, the findings of the study ‘Integration of Minority Youth in the Society 
of Latvia in the Context of the Education Reform’ conducted by the Baltic Institute of Social 
Sciences (BISS) in 2004 indicate the opposite. Significantly, the study concentrated on ‘all 
three dimensions of integration’, namely language, education and citizenship, rightly claiming 
                                                
23 A series of mass protests erupted, reaching culmination on the 1st of May, when allegedly over sixty thousand 
people participated in a demonstration against the reform. Reports on the number of participants in the protest 
actions widely differed: the Russian-language newspapers gave an estimate of 60,000 -65,000 (Telegraf, Vesti 
Segodnya), while the official police estimate was 20,000.  
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that ethno-political attitudes towards all three issues are closely linked and affect each other.24 
One of the conclusions of the study was that ‘the education reform process has led to changes 
in the attitudes of non-Latvian young people vis-à-vis all issues that have to do with the 
country’s ethnic policies and integration policies. The views have become more negative’.25 
 
Zepa (2010: 190), stressing that ‘it is well understood that a school system divided 
along linguistic lines promotes the reproduction of sociolinguistic communities …and serves 
to maintain a certain level of tension between these communities’, observes that a bilingual 
education policy which was drafted in the late 1990s as part of the social integration strategy 
‘cannot be found in education policy documents’ any more.  
 
During the 2008/2009 academic year, there were 724 schools with Latvian as the main 
language of instruction; 135 schools with Russian as the main language of instruction, and 81 
schools with the two streams (Latvian and Russian); plus five schools with Polish as the main 
language of instruction, one with Ukrainian, one with Belarusian, and one with English.26 
Respectively, 73.5 per cent of all pupils are enrolled in Latvian-language schools, while 25.8 
per cent attend Russian-language schools, and 0.6 per cent attended schools with other 
languages of instruction.27 In 2010/2011, 73.1 per cent of all pupils were enrolled in Latvian-
language schools, 26.2 per cent – in Russian-language schools, and 0.7 % - in other minority 
schools.28  For comparison, in 1933, there were 1502 Latvian, 236 Russian, 100 Jewish, 88 
German, 35 Polish, 23 Belarussian, 13 Lithuanian, 4 Estonian, and 56 mixed elementary 
schools (Pabriks 2003). 
 
It must be noted that although multicultural standards are incorporated into some 
subjects (like civil education), there are no overall multicultural educational standards in 
                                                
24 ‘Integration of Minority Youth in the Society of Latvia in the Context of the Education Reform’, BISS, 2004. 
Available at http://www.biss.soc.lv/downloads/resources/minoritates/Minority_Engl.pdf , last time accessed on 
16th October 2012. 
25 Ibid., p. 14. 
26 The S. Dubnov Jewish Secondary School in Riga uses the Russian language as the main language of 
instruction; the J. Kupala Belarussian Preparatory School in Riga uses ‘Belarussian, Latvian and Russian’, and 
Riga Ukraininan Secondary School uses ‘Ukrainian, Latvian and Russian’. The I. Kozakevi!a Polish School, the 
Lithuanian Secondary School, and the Estonian Secondary School (all located in Riga) use their respective 
minority language and the Latvian language only. Information available at the website of the Education and 
Sports Department of the Riga City Council, http://dati.e-skola.lv , last time accessed on 16th October 2012.  
27 Data of the Ministry of Education of Latvia. http://izm.izm.gov.lv/registri-statistika/statistika-
vispareja/3334.html . Accessed on 20.03.2009.  
28 Data of the Ministry of Education of Latvia. http://izm.izm.gov.lv/registri-statistika/statistika-
vispareja/6281.html . Accessed on 05.10.2012.  
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Latvia. The available teaching materials do not reflect ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or religious 
diversity of the Latvian population. Effectively, school textbooks create a segregated 
information space for both Latvian and non-Latvian students, not unlike the ones that exist in 
the Latvian media.29 On a positive note, the number of minority students in the Latvian-
language schools is growing, albeit slowly, and in 2009 stood at about 17 per cent.30 
 
The findings of the comparative study ‘Divided Education, Divided Citizens’ (the 
study encompassed eight post-Soviet and post-socialist countries) conducted by the Network 
of Education Policy Centres (NEPC) and led by the Latvian researcher M. Golubeva, 
demonstrated, among other things, that an ethnically divided school system mirrors ethnic 
divisions in the society.31 The representation of minorities in textbooks and in the curricula 
was identified as one of the most divided issues – in Latvia, 59.5 per cent of teachers in 
minority schools (vs. only 16.9 per cent of the teachers in Latvian schools) expressed 
dissatisfaction ‘with the way major ethnic groups are represented in the textbooks and official 
curricula’ and confirmed the presence of stereotypes.32 At the same time, only 4.8 per cent of 
minority teachers (vs. 47 per cent of Latvian teachers) agreed with the statement that the 
representation of minority and majority in history books is balanced and fair.33 
 
The authors of the study have also identified significant support for the segregated 
school system among both Latvian and minority pupils in Latvia: only 42 per cent of Latvian 
students, and 55.9 per cent of their minority counterparts, agreed with the statement ‘I would 
not mind to study in one class with student from other group’.34 
 
                                                
29 ‘Diversity in Latvian Textbooks’, 2004, R!ga: Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies. 
30 Alternative report on the implementation of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities in Latvia, 2008.   
31 ‘Divided Education, Divided Citizens? A comparative study of civic enculturation in separate schools’, NEPC, 
2009. Available at http://www.edupolicy.net/images/pubs/comparative_studies/dedcinternationalreport.pdf , last 
time accessed on 16th October 2012.  
32 Ibid., p. 21. 
33 Ibid., p. 24. 
34 Ibid., p. 23. 
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7.5. Social Integration 
 
What has become known as ‘social integration’ in Latvia is the most comprehensive 
programme yet to combate the existing ethnic polarisation in the country. The concept of 
social integration was born in 1998, when the Latvian government commissioned a group of 
experts to draft a Framework Document for the National Programme of Integration of Society 
in Latvia, as a response to the growing pressure from a newly emerged civil society, 
represented by various NGOs and academic institutions at home, and from international 
organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme and the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe abroad, to deal with the problem of the huge number of 
non-citizens. The Programme of Integration of Society in Latvia attempted not just to link 
together the previously disparate issues of language, education and citizenship, but also to 
promote closer cooperation between the government and the NGO sector.  
 
The drafting of the Social Integration programme caused vivid public interest and was 
regularly reflected in the press. But when the Framework document was submitted to public 
discussion in March 1999, the sheer scope of residents’ involvement in the Draft’s discussions 
exceeded anybody’s expectations and was absolutely unprecedented in Latvia, where civil 
society was at the time still in its emerging stage. According to the data of the Naturalisation 
Board, over 25 thousand people across the country had actively participated in the discussions, 
around 80 events had been organised to facilitate debates, and 306 articles had been published 
in both central and regional newspapers.35 The high level of general public involvement and 
considerable interest from the media indicated that there was a widely perceived need for 
measures against further fragmentation of the society, and that the idea of the Social 
Integration programme had immense popular support. In other words, the beginning seemed 
very promising.  
 
After the National Programme for Social Integration was adopted in 2000, the Justice 
Ministry was made responsible for its implementation. The Programme, which would serve as 
a base for all the subsequent social integration political documents, defined the meaning, goals 
                                                
35 Data of The Naturalisation Board, http://www.np.gov.lv/?id=511 . Last time accessed 17.03.2009. 
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and objectives of social integration. Although it stressed that integration as such must be based 
on ‘a willingness to accept Latvian as the state language’, the main accent was put on 
overarching civic values: 
 
‘The goal of integration is to form a democratic, consolidated civil society, founded on 
shared basic values. An independent and democratic Latvian state is one of these fundamental 
values.’ 
 ‘The task of integration is to facilitate an understanding of the future in all 
dependable and loyal Latvian residents, and simultaneously to promote an understanding 
among all residents that living together in one state is necessary, that only together we can 
improve prosperity and security, and that each person must contribute his/her knowledge, 
initiative, and good intentions to the development of Latvian society.’36 
 
The Programme also recognised, albeit guardedly, that existing interethnic relations 
and residents’ attitude towards the state may be in need of a change: ‘Social integration and 
civic participation are part of the process which will shape the future of Latvia. Changes of 
the attitude in residents toward the state and one another are foreseen in the context of this 
process.’37 It also addressed another sensitive issue, until then largely avoided in public 
discourse, namely that social integration is a two-way process and requires a certain effort on 
the part of the majority population. 
 
Finally, the Programme was the first official document to outline a multicultural 
approach to interethnic relations in the state, introducing a positive concept of linguistic and 
cultural diversity: ‘Integration means broadening opportunities and mutual enrichment. It is 
better to know several languages than to know only one. Experiencing several cultural 
environments offers a better perspective than being confined to only one..’38 
 
During the same year, the Social Integration Fund (SIF) was created, with the mission 
of implementing the Programme through the financial support of various integration projects 
and activities. The Fund is an independent institution reporting directly to the Cabinet of 
Ministers and administers funds from both the state budget and the EU structural funds. 
                                                
36 National Programme ‘The Integration of Society in Latvia’. 2001, 7-8.  
37 Ibid., p. 7. 
38 Ibid., p. 8. 
                                                                                                                                                                          Chapter 7: A Nation Once Again 
 360 
 
The next milestone on the road to social integration was the creation, upon the 
initiative of the First Party that used the ‘social integration’ rhetoric during the 8th Saeima 
election campaign, of the post of a Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration in 
2002. The Minister’s Secretariat was entrusted with developing and implementing state 
policies in the field of social integration, including the fostering of further development of a 
civil society, fighting ethnic and racial discrimination, encouraging tolerance in the society, 
ensuring minority rights, and implementing international regulations binding Latvia, as well as 
the overall coordination of social integration activities and other tasks. 
 
But despite the creation of a governmental body dedicated to social integration, the 
naturalisation rates, being one of the main indicators of integration policies, remained 
painfully low. Membership in the European Union, against all predictions, had a short-lived 
effect on the naturalisation rate – after reaching a peak of 21,297 citizenship applications in 
2004, it began to slow down. The Naturalisation Board received 19,807 applications in 2005; 
10,581 in 2006; 3,308 in 2007, and 2318 applications during the first nine months of 2008. 39 
According to the data of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, on the 1st of July 
2008, the number of non-citizens stood at 365,151 – roughly half of the initial number.  
 
The year 2006 brought a kind of breaking point in the stale public discourse on social 
integration. There were a number of studies published calling the public’s attention to the fact 
that the integration process has indeed come to a halt, if not failed completely; that a big part 
of Latvian residents is alienated from the state, and that a set of new, revised policies is 
necessary in order to address these problems. The study ‘Resistance to social integration: 
causes and ways to overcome it’ identified ‘mistakes and imperfections’ and ‘features of 
ethnic democracy’ in the state ethnopolitics as the principal causes of delayed integration and 
pointed out that ‘two parallel society-uniting factors exist in Latvia – the political and the 
ethnic’. 40  
 
                                                
39 Naturaliz!cijas  P!rvaldes Zi"as. Ikm#ne$a informat%vais izdevums.  2008. gada 15.septembris – 2008. gada 
15. oktobris.  
39 Data of The Naturalisation Board, http://www.np.gov.lv/?id=511 . Accessed 17.03.2009 
40 Apine (ed.), 2006.   
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The authors of the study ‘Integration Practice and Perspectives’ identified the current 
political discourse as one of the hindering factors in the society’s consolidation: ‘…there are 
quite a few politicians in Latvia who pursue a different position – one that could be termed a 
‘nationalist political discourse’. These politicians oppose the official integration discourse of 
Latvia, as well as the position which the EU takes vis-à-vis minority issues.’41 The authors of 
another study, ‘Ethnopolitical tension in Latvia: looking for a conflict solution’, observed that 
‘Political parties continue to engage in political confrontation when it comes to issues of 
ethnic policy, and they hinder public integration instead of promoting it, thus enhancing ethnic 
tensions in society. In Latvia, representatives of the political elite continue to exploit ethnicity 
to mobilise their supporters in elections. Thus they become a chief catalyst in promoting 
ethnic tensions.’42 The study ‘Integration Practice and Perspectives’ also called attention to 
insufficient discussions within the society about the concept of national identity, and observed 
that the ‘debates which began in the early 1990s about the kind of nation that was being 
shaped in Latvia and the kind of the model of nationalism which prevails in the country – an 
ethnic or a civic mode – have diminished’.43 
 
The National Programme of Social Integration was finally recognised to be outdated 
and in need of revision. The task of elaborating new Guidelines for Social Integration 2008-
2018 was, logically, entrusted to the Secretariat of the Special Assignments Minister for Social 
Integration. The first draft, which appeared at the beginning of 2008, was bombarded by 
criticisms on the grounds of being ‘too multicultural’. For example, the State Language 
Commission sent a letter to the Secretariat insisting that integration in Latvia should be based 
on the Latvian language, culture, and history. The Minister of Culture Helena Demakova 
offered similar comments, stating that multiculturalism as a foundation for integration and 
cultural policy cannot be applied in Latvia because the Latvian future depends on common 
ideas such as the Latvian language and Latvian national symbols.44  
 
The Guidelines were revised and submitted to public discussion again, but were 
ultimately abandoned later, not in the least because, in the advent of the economic crisis, by 
the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Secretariat for the Special Assignments Minister 
                                                
41 Zepa (ed.), 2006, p. 4.   
42 Zepa, !upule et al. 2005, p. 13.  
43 Ibid., p. 17. 
44 ‘Demakova par multikultur"lisma #nas pus#m’ , Latvijas Av!ze, 26.02.2008  
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for Social Integration was liquidated as of 1st of January 2009.45 Its functions were assigned to 
the Family and Children Affairs Ministry, which from there on was to be called the Family, 
Children, and Social Integration Ministry, which would be only the first of a string of 
governmental institutions reluctantly ‘hosting’ integration matters. 
 
The new National Identity and Social Integration Programme started being developed 
by the Ministry of Culture, which is, at the time of writing, responsible for integration matters. 
In March 2011, the ministry published a draft preamble to the future Programme, outlining its 
main goals and introducing new definitions – most importantly, the definition of the ‘state 
nation’ (used by the authors to denominate the core ethnie), which, together with ethnic 
minorities, forms the ‘Latvian nation’ on the basis of a common ‘Latvian identity’ (i.e. Latvian 
language, Latvian culture and social memory). The preamble drew numerous criticisms from 
independent experts for being constructed upon outdated theoretical premises, and for placing 
ethno-cultural values above civic ones. After several months of controversy in Latvian printed 
and electronic media46, and consultations with experts and minority representatives, on 20th 
October 2011 the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the final version of the document as the 
Guidelines for National Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy.47 Overall, and 
especially in comparison with the original Social Integration Programme, which posited that 
‘the goal of integration is to form a democratic, consolidated civil society, founded on shared 
basic values’ and named an ‘independent and democratic Latvian state’ as one of these 
fundamental values, the Guidelines may be interpreted as a swing towards ethnoculturalism 
and away from the earlier declared civic principles.48 
 
In general, a staggering lack of political will and determination remains the main 
stumbling block on the path of social integration. In the introduction to the latest study on 
                                                
45 The Secretariat’s demise, it needs to be said, caused mixed reactions among the NGO representatives - while 
some ethnic minority NGOs expressed regret at its disbandment, others, who had been increasingly unhappy and 
critical about the Secretariat’s alleged incompetence in the field, excessive bureaucracy and unclear decision 
making mechanisms, said ‘good riddance’ 9See, for example Ar!ja, D. ‘Kantoris izdz!vo"anai’ and Zankovska-
Odi"a, S. ‘Sp#l#jot integr$cijas te$tri’. Both published by www.politika.lv on 28.10.2008). At the same time, 
many NGOs and academic institutions’ representatives believe that there is a need for a state institution dedicated 
to the problems of social integration, and that this need will only grow in the years to come. 
46 See, for example, #jabs, I. 2011. ‘Neirotisk! integr!cija’ at http://politika.lv/article/neirotiska-integracija , and 
M$rniece, I. 2011. ‘P!r!k daudz latviskuma! Vai b$s pie"emami krieviem?’, Latvijas Av!ze, 13th May.   
47 ‘Nacion!l!s identit!tes, pilsonisk!s sabiedr%bas un integr!cijas politikas pamatnost!dnes (2012– 2018)’, 
http://www.km.gov.lv/lv/nozares_info/integracija.html  (accessed 06.09.2012). 
48 ‘National Programme The Integration of Society in Latvia’, 2001. R%ga: Naturalisation Board of the Republic 
of Latvia, pp. 7-8. 
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social integration, ‘How Integrated is Latvian Society?’ (2010), its editor, N. Mui!nieks, offers 
an explanation of the authors’ reluctance to enter ‘the realm of the prescriptive’ while 
generally letting the analysis speak for itself instead. These considerations cited by Mui!nieks 
are, in fact, an excellent summary of everything that the integration policy in Latvia is short 
of. According to Mui!nieks, to propose any recommendations, ‘one must make a number of 
assumptions: that policy-makers want effective policy, that there is a consensus as to what 
constitutes effective policy, that policy-makers are willing and able to change policy if it is 
found in some ways wanting, and that there are resources available for implementing the 
policy. All of these assumptions are problematic in contemporary Latvia’.49  
 
As long as the policy-makers remain aloof, or, as in the case with the nationalist 
parties, opposed to the idea of an integrated society, social integration will remain the domain 
of well-wishing academics and NGO activists. Without proper political support, it will never 
make the necessary transformation from a theoretical construct into a programme of action.  
 
                                                
49 Mui!nieks, N.  (ed.) 2010. ‘How Integrated is Latvian Society? An Audit of Achievements, Failures and 
Challenges’. Riga: University of Latvia Press, p. 7. 
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Conclusions: A Virtue out of Necessity? 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
After more than twenty years of independence and democracy, Latvian society is still 
polarised over the issues of citizenship, language and education, while common political 
values remain abstract and vague. Uncannily, this sentence can be equally applied to describe 
the late 30s of the past century or the second decade of the present one. This leads us to the 
question of the underlying cause of national disunity – how has it happened that for the second 
time in history, the Latvian civic nation has failed to materialise? 
 
Latvia features prominently in political science articles and textbooks as a case study 
of an ethnically divided society. It has become customary to study this latent ethnic conflict 
through the prism of post-Soviet studies, looking for the causes of societal disaccord in 
Latvia’s recent past as a Soviet Socialist Republic, when numerous traumas were induced on 
the eponymous nation, from the deportations of 1940 which robbed the nation of its 
intelligentsia, to Russification policies that threatened the very existence of the Latvian 
language and culture, and to mass labour immigration that radically changed the country’s 
demography and ethnic composition. All these tragic historical events are viewed if not as a 
justification, than at least as an explanation for restrictive citizenship policies and society’s 
polarisation along ethnic lines. While this approach has its own merits, its weakness, in my 
opinion, lies in the fact that it pays very little attention, if any, to another important factor 
contributing to this society’s fragmentation, namely, to the historical development of the idea 
of the Latvian nation, especially vis-à-vis ethnic minorities, always present in significant 
numbers on Latvian territory through the course of modern history. More often than not, the 
interwar period of Latvian independence and nation-building is discarded by political 
scientists as bearing purely symbolic meaning and having no real impact on the present. I 
argue that, on the contrary, both the genesis of the idea of the Latvian nation and its interwar 
experience of statehood are vital to understanding the present-day dynamics. 
 
There are no available statistics on the ethnic composition of the population of Latvia 
prior to 1897, when the first census encompassing all the Latvian territories within the 
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country’s present borders was conducted. What is clear, however, is that already in the Middle 
Ages, due to the geographical location of the Eastern Baltic littoral, which made it 
strategically attractive for dominant foreign powers and for commercial entrepreneurs alike, it 
was not ethnically homogeneous, and less so in the cities than in the countryside, in many 
parts of which the Latvians remained a majority. In 1897, Latvians comprised 68.3 per cent of 
the population, and in 1920 – 74.9 per cent, the rest being made up of the six largest ethnic 
minorities, i.e., Russians, Germans, Jews, Poles, Lithuanians, and Estonians. In this respect, 
Latvia was not different from the rest of Eastern Europe, which has often been compared to a 
‘patchwork quilt’ of dispersed ethnic groups. In fact, Latvia’s percentage of ethnic minorities 
during the interwar period, far from being exceptional, at 28 per cent stood slightly lower than 
the average percentage of 29.2 for all Eastern European states (Pearson 1983: 148). 
 
Brubaker’s famous definition of nationalising states as ‘states that are conceived by 
their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for particular nations, yet as 
“incomplete” or “unrealised” nation-states, insufficiently “national” in a variety of senses’, 
seems to fit Latvia like a glove; and again, it can be equally applied to the present and to the 
past. But as I have tried to demonstrate in the previous chapters, this nationalising trend aimed 
at maximally benefitting the eponymous ethnic group was not evident in the early conception 
of the Latvian nation dating from the 1850s until the aftermath of the Revolution of 1905, 
when, though it did admittedly become one of the strains of Latvian national thinking, it was 
still far from being a determinant. It was not present in the declarations of the founding fathers 
of the state, and was never voiced from the stage of the National Theatre on 18th November 
1918. At the dawn of Latvia’s first independence, ethnic minorities were promised an equal 
stake in this new – in the words of the first Latvian Prime Minister K. Ulmanis – ‘state of 
democratic fairness’. Latvia’s laws on education, passed in 1919, were the most liberal 
minority-related legislation in Europe of the time, rivalled only by the Estonian Law on 
Cultural Autonomy of 1925. In the course of the 1920s, however, the ‘nationalising’ trend 
continued to gain strength until it came into full bloom under the authoritarian regime.  
 
A number of internal and external factors contributed to the reversal of the initially 
civic-oriented policies, such as: the lack of general political experience among the population, 
particularly in practising representative democracy; the high level of fragmentation of both 
majority and minority political parties, with their often irreconcilable differences that led to 
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political instability; the worldwide economic crisis; and the steadily deteriorating international 
climate. The ‘triadic relational nexus’ between the Latvian state, its minorities and their kin-
states played a significant role – the fact that three of Latvia’s ethnic minorities, i.e., Germans, 
Russians and Poles, had ‘external homelands’ with increasingly expansionist ambitions 
fostered ethnic Latvians’ suspicions and distrust. As for the fourth dimension of the relational 
nexus, international organisations – the League of Nations and the Nationalities Congress – 
their interventions on behalf of ethnic minorities were often perceived as unwelcome meddling 
in Latvia’s internal affairs. 
 
The experience of interwar Latvia, where civic values were ultimately trumped by 
ethnic allegiances, also offers interesting insights into the practice of cultural autonomy in a 
democratic nation-state that is ethnically diverse. As shown in the previous chapters, the 
theory of non-territorial cultural autonomy, developed by the Austrian Marxists K. Renner and 
O. Bauer, inspired Latvian nationalists and Latvian minority thinkers alike, significantly 
contributing to the concept of the Latvian civic nation. The recent revival of interest in the 
NCA model, and its potential application in contemporary multinational and multi-ethnic 
societies, has produced a variety of modern-day critiques of the theory, raising some issues 
that closely resonate with the Latvian interwar experience. Likewise, many of the 
contemporary multicultural debates are surprisingly relevant to the events that took place in 
Latvia ninety years ago (such as, for example, the ‘Sunday peace’ debates in the Riga City 
Council in 1919). 
 
Minority rights are compensatory in nature, being an implicit recognition of the fact 
that the cultural rights of ethnic minorities cannot be fully satisfied by the nation-state, which 
is programmed to favour the dominant culture. By assigning certain group rights to minorities, 
a democratic state affirms its own legitimacy as a true representation of the interests of all of 
its citizens. There is an in-built tension in this relationship, as the rights of the citizens are by 
definition individual rights, whereas minority rights are group rights. This individual vs. group 
dilemma, which can be also expressed as liberal vs. communitarian, or as universalist vs. 
particularist, frequently resurfaces in contemporary debates on both multiculturalism and 
cultural autonomy. For example, one of multiculturalism’s most vociferous critics, Brian 
Barry (2001), juxtaposes justice and equality, arguing that multiculturalism hinders the pursuit 
of ‘broadly based egalitarian policies’ by diverting political effort from universalistic goals in 
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the first place, and by destroying the ‘conditions for putting together a coalition in favour of 
across-the board equalisation of opportunities and resources’. Walter A. Kemp (2005), in his 
critical evaluation of Renner’s theory, observes that national autonomy may foster national 
exclusivity and crystallise ethnic divisions unless a careful balance is sought between the 
national autonomy agenda and the overarching interests of society.  
 
The first sixteen years of Latvia’s interwar independence can serve as an illustration of 
the ongoing tug-of-war between individual and collective values, with both the majority and 
the minorities, albeit for different reasons, increasingly falling back upon the latter.  Whereas 
the Latvian majority increasingly employed the rhetoric of past historical injustices as 
justification for increasingly ‘nationalising’ policies aimed at strengthening the ‘Latvian 
element’, minorities became increasingly alienated from the nation-state, which they felt was 
treating them as ‘stepchildren’, and started to concentrate exclusively on their own ethnic 
agenda. While group allegiances grew stronger, the vital link between individual citizens and 
the state was weakened, eliminating one of the preconditions for the creation of a civic nation, 
and ultimately undermining democracy. 
 
The one notable exception to this tendency was the political campaign mounted by 
ethnic minorities for the amendments to the Citizenship Law of 1919, which aimed at the 
underlying equality principles amongst individuals rather than at auxiliary group rights, and 
which, as I argue in Chapter Four, assumed for Latvian minorities a status of symbolic 
importance. The ethnic minorities justly perceived citizenship as a guarantee of equality and 
justice and as a cornerstone upon which specific minority rights could rest. It is symptomatic 
that in post-1991 Latvia, the citizenship issue has again assumed such crucial importance. I 
believe that the main flaw of all social integration programmes and guidelines introduced so 
far lies in the fact that they have attempted to remedy the symptoms without addressing the 
underlying cause. 
 
The injustices inflicted on ethnic Latvians during the decades of Soviet rule 
exacerbated the nationalising sentiment and created, to use Lieven’s term once again, 
‘unanalysed nostalgia’ for the interwar period. It was this idealised and mythologised vision of 
the First Republic that prompted Latvian politicians ‘to go back to the future’ in an attempt to 
use the pre-Soviet golden age as the basis for polity reconstruction (Smith 1996), to a large 
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extent ignoring present-day realities. The persistent rhetoric of Latvia returning to Europe 
where it rightfully belonged took little account of the fact that the Europe that Latvia was so 
eager to join was very different from the Europe of fifty years ago – the pressures of what has 
become known as ‘European conditionality’, its flaws and limitations notwithstanding, made 
that abundantly clear. 
 
In many ways, the reconstruction of the Latvian state as a perfect nation-state based on 
collectivist ethnic values has been an example of political ‘wishful thinking’ which has 
inevitably come into collision with reality, leading to a situation where a large part of the 
population feels alienated from the state. This undermines the state’s legitimacy and weakens 
its democratic foundations.  For the Latvian state to be strong, it needs the political 
participation and support of all its permanent residents. In order to gain this support, the state 
should make a ‘virtue out of necessity’ and offer more to its ethnic minorities than a chance to 
be supportive of ethnic Latvians’ aspirations, proposing a common platform of clearly 
articulated civic values instead. As Ralph Waldo Emerson famously said, ‘the state must 
follow, and not lead, the character and progress of its citizens’.   
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